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**HISTORICAL RECORD OF
THE 6TH GURKHA RIFLES**



CAPTAIN SIMON FRASER, 1817—1823.

1900-1910

HISTORICAL CITY OF G. A. B. C.





For Private Circulation Only

HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE 6TH GURKHA RIFLES

SINGBHUM 1820
SINGPHOS 1825
SINGPHOS 1843
ABORS 1853
DAPHLAS 1874
NAGAS 1879
CHINS 1888
MANIPUR 1891
EGYPT 1914-15
GALLI POLI 1915
GURKHA BLUFF
MESOPOTAMIA
SALONICA
CAUCASUS



BURMA 1824
SINGPHOS 1834
NAGAS 1849
ABORS 1858
NAGAS 1875
BURMA 1883-87
CHIN-LUSHAI 1889
GREAT WAR 1914-18
N.W. FRONTIER '15
CAPE HELLES
ANZAC
RAMADIE
N.W. PERSIA
WAZIRISTAN

VOLUME I
1817 - 1919

COMPILED BY

1st Batt. Major D.G.J. Ryan *D.S.O.*

2nd Batt. Major G.C. Strahan *O.B.E.*

3rd Batt. Captain J.K. Jones

1925

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FOREWORD

I HAVE been asked to write a short foreword for the Historical Records of the 6th Gurkha Rifles, and gladly do so. I feel that this honour has been accorded to me in continuation of a very great distinction and honour, which was conferred upon me a few months ago, in my appointment as Colonel of the 6th Gurkha Rifles, an honour than which I appreciate none more highly of those which have been conferred upon me by His Majesty the King.

I would commence by congratulating the 6th Gurkhas upon the really excellent work and evidently deep study which has been put in to the compilation of these records, dating, as they do, from the year 1817. I have previously seen many regimental records, but few, I think, can compare with those of the 6th Gurkhas, which will, I trust, last for all times as a reminder of what the Regiment has accomplished in peace and war for over the last 100 years, and as an incentive to those who follow to live up to the great example of those who went before us, and as a reminder to those who are still living and have taken their part in making the 6th Gurkha Rifles what they now are.

The records themselves are so complete that but little reference is required to them in any foreword. Among the interesting points brought to notice, especially in connection with the early history of the Corps, are some of the following.

The uniform of the Regiment from the first was dark green with black facings, and though this was apparently

altered to red coats with green facings in 1835, yet the change was of only very short duration, and we may say that the 6th is probably one of the very few regiments which has retained its old uniform (with only such changes of pattern as must be natural from time to time) since it was raised.

The next point of interest is that the Regiment became "Light Infantry" in the year 1823, an appropriate stepping-stone to the title of "Rifles" in 1891, and as a consequence of which the Regiment ceased to carry colours. Then we find that in 1827 the Regiment first enlisted Gurkhas—the two companies of Gurkhas, who were then added to the Regiment, to develop in 1886 to a complete Gurkha Regiment, such as we now know it, but with the then title of 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry.

As I have said, the fighting records of the Regiment are told in such detail that I can add little regarding them. Having, however, been on various occasions on active service with Gurkha battalions since I first saw active service in 1891, I know from experience what the real value of Gurkha soldiers is when hard fighting, determination and bravery alone can win through. It was, therefore, with something more than satisfaction that I found myself with Gurkhas under my immediate command during the Great War. It so happened that shortly after the commencement of the Great War I found myself in Egypt in command of a Division of Australians and a mixed Division formed of one Brigade of Australian and one of New Zealand troops—a Division, therefore, wanting a third Brigade to complete it. Among the troops on the Canal was the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, under the command of Major-General Cox—a Brigade which included the 6th Gurkhas—and I at once urged the authorities that this Brigade should be transferred to complete my Army Corps. I was given hopes that this would be done before we left Egypt for the Dardanelles.

It has since always been a matter of regret to me that this Brigade was not under my personal command throughout the operations in the Gallipoli peninsula. For tactical reasons it was, however, found necessary to attach it, in the first instance, to the 29th Division at Cape Helles, from which it was transferred to my command at Anzac in August, 1915.

The heavy losses suffered by the 1st Battalion between May and July speak for themselves—479 killed and wounded. Among these was a first cousin of my own, Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, whose name I am glad to be able to continue in the Regiment, for I am aware that he died fighting very gallantly, as so many other of his brother officers did. Having arrived at Anzac the 1/6th Gurkhas were in time to take a leading part in the very heavy fighting which took place in the attempt to cut across the waist of the peninsula, and it was no fault of theirs success was not attained. Of all the troops who took part in that fighting I think I am right in saying that only the 6th Gurkhas, under Major Allanson, reached the summit of Sari Bair, and actually looked down on the Dardanelles, as the regimental history says “the key of the whole peninsula was in the hands of the Battalion.” Never shall I be able to forget my own feelings when I received the report that the 6th Gurkhas were on the summit. It looked as if real success was now in our hands, and that the Gurkhas had opened the road to Constantinople; but we all have to remember the old saying that mortals can only deserve success, and if troops ever deserved it on a day which was momentous for the British Empire then surely the 6th Gurkhas deserved it on that day.

Again, the regimental history gives us all details, and I will only mention the names of two really gallant officers who then fell, Captain le Marchant and Captain Tomes; while I would also refer to the magnificent leading of

Major Allanson and of the example set by Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, I.O.M., who later obtained the M.C., and who, after leaving Gallipoli, had to be invalided out of the service for paralysis, the result of the wound he received there on August 22nd, 1915.

The account of the fighting on the peninsula concludes with the terrible experience which the Regiment went through, when a fearful blizzard swept across the peninsula in November, 1915. Having had personal experience of that, I can fully substantiate all that is said regarding what the troops went through and the magnificent spirit displayed by all ranks. I constantly met brave little Gurkha soldiers either being carried or struggling down the trenches after being fearfully frost-bitten, but never did I hear a complaint, and their whole bearing was an example of what a soldier should be.

That a battalion should be able to suffer casualties amounting to 848 killed and wounded with one man alone missing, and yet be able to maintain the same magnificent spirit throughout, speaks for itself.

I will say no more, for I know well that all my brother officers, and those who may join the 6th Gurkha Rifles in time to come, will read through these records with a feeling of pride and natural elation—shall I say with a determination to “go and do thou likewise”—when next an opportunity may come to live up to the spirit of the 6th Gurkhas.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "W. S. Bidwood". Below the signature is a small, handwritten date "3.17".

Colonel 6th Gurkha Rifles.

SIMLA,
May 8th, 1926.

The lasting gratitude of the Regiment is due to Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., for his unsparing efforts both in the compilation of this history and in the editorial work in connection with the production thereof, which entailed unremitting labour in addition to his official work extending over a long period.

(Sgd.) G. M. GLYNTON,
Lieut.-Colonel,
Commanding 1st Battn. 6th Gurkha Rifles.

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
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EVOLUTION OF THE NAME OF THE REGIMENT



THE 1st BATTALION

HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE 6TH GURKHA RIFLES

CHAPTER I.

DURING the reign of King George III, when all troops in India, British as well as Indian, were still in the service of the East India Company, the Cuttack Legion, now the 6th Gurkha Rifles, came into being.

In 1817 the people of Cuttack (see Map No. 1), driven to desperation by mismanagement, broke out in what was known as the Khurda Rebellion. The Paicks, or landed militia, rose in open revolt against the oppression they suffered at the hands of the underlings to whom was entrusted the collection of the revenue, and against the tyrannies of a venal police.

On May 16th, 1817, consequent on the above trouble, it was announced in General Orders that "The Governor-General is pleased to determine that a Local Corps shall be immediately raised for service in Cuttack, to be denominated the "Cuttack Legion"—the significance of the words "local corps" being that the Corps was to be an irregular one.

Chauliaganj, on the outskirts of the town of Cuttack, was the locality selected, and Captain Simon Fraser was appointed to raise and command the Regiment.

The Corps was organized as follows:—

Two troops of light cavalry.

An artillery detachment.

Three companies of infantry, the first company being rifles.

The sanctioned establishment was :—

	BRITISH.						INDIAN.									
	Captain.	Lieutenant.	Sub-Lieutenant.	Sergeant-Major.	Q.M.-Sergeant.	Asst. Surgeon.	Native Doctor.	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Nalks.	Privates.	Trumpeters.	Buglers.	Farrier.	Roughriders.
C.O.	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Headquarters	†	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Each Troop Cavalry	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Artillery Det.	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Each Coy. Infantry	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Total ...	2	—	5	1	1	1	1	5	10	39	34	560	2	3	1	1

Grand Total—10 British; 656 Indian.
† and-in-Command. * Adjutant. ‡ No details.

The following officers were posted to the Regiment :—

Rank.	Name.	Appointment.
Captain	Fraser, S.	Commanding Officer.
Captain	McLeod, A.	Second-in-Command.
Lieutenant	Wallace, N.	Adjutant.
*Lieutenant	Waddilove, J.	—
*Sub-Lieutenant	Aird, G. D.	—
* " "	Aird, P. A.	*Local rank.
* " "	McGregor, J.	—
* " "	Valle, B.	—

Two 3-pounders M.L. guns (" Gallopers ") were issued to the artillery detachment. It is assumed that the cavalry and infantry were armed with the weapons of the day (*i.e.*, cavalry, the curved sabre and carbine (or pistol); infantry, the long smooth bore musket, having an effective range of about 100 yards).

Two hundred and thirty-two ponies, known as Tangans, were issued for the cavalry, and ten of the same were sanctioned for the two guns.

The uniform was dark green, black velvet facings, and silver lace.

By the end of October, 1817, the country round Cuttack had been subdued. There are no details as to whether the Cuttack Legion was employed in the operations, though it is known that an expedition was despatched against the Paicks from Cuttack itself. The Paicks, armed with bows and arrows and axes, were brave, fought well, and defeated the troops first sent against them.

On August 7th, 1819, an additional company of infantry, similar in strength to those already with the

Regiment, was sanctioned. It was composed of Paicks. The same year the Regiment served against the Rajahs Jagbandhu and Bulbiadur, but no record exists of the operations.

In 1820 the Cuttack Legion took part in the expedition against the Kols in Singbhum. The following extracts have been taken from the Bengal District Gazetteer, and it is more than probable that the Regiment formed part of the force referred to therein.

The Rajah of Porahat, the south-east boundary of whose territory coincided with the north-west boundary of the Kol country, acknowledged himself a feudatory of the British. One of his objects in so doing was to obtain aid to reduce the Kols, whom he claimed as his subjects.

Accordingly, having been acknowledged a feudatory chief, the Rajah pressed the Political Agent, Major Roughsedge, to take steps to force the rebellious Kols to return to their allegiance. The Kols denied that they were subject to Porahat.

Major Roughsedge yielded to the Rajah's representations, and in 1820 entered the Kol country at the head of a battalion of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. Major Roughsedge did his best to conciliate the Kols, and at first thought he would be successful. Indeed, the Kols of the first deputation, thinking the Political Agent's tent a convenient place for a siesta, stretched themselves at full length on the carpets and coolly composed themselves to sleep. Finally, the Kols refused to come to terms; and Roughsedge advanced. The force was allowed to penetrate into the heart of the country unmolested. A position was taken up at Chaibasa. Here some camp followers were attacked in sight of the camp by the Kols. One man was killed and others wounded; and the Kols, after this feat, were seen moving away in the direction of the hills. A troop of cavalry was despatched to cut off their retreat. The troop was assailed with a flight of arrows, but, finding they made no impression with these weapons, "these savages, with a degree of rashness and hardihood scarcely credible, met the charge of the troop half way in an open plain, battle-axe in hand." The result was a terrible slaughter of the Kols, not more than half the party effecting its escape to the hills. The troop then moved towards the village

near which the follower had been killed. Here a party of sixty Kols was encountered. They rushed madly at the troop, and struck furiously with their axes at men and horses. Two sowars and several horses were wounded, whilst the entire party of the enemy was sabred.

The next day Roughsedge moved on the village of Gutialor, where a party of the enemy was attacked. The force was received with repeated discharges of arrows, which caused a considerable number of casualties. To drive the enemy from their enclosed position the village was fired, but still there was an obstinate resistance, and numbers were slaughtered before they could be persuaded to lay down their arms and accept quarter.

The country was traversed and many villages destroyed, until finally the Kols, to avoid further devastation, submitted, and agreed to pay tribute to the Rajah of Porahat.

The peace was not kept for long. Shortly after the British had withdrawn the Kols ravaged the best part of the Porahat Rajah's estate, and once more he called for assistance. The subsequent fighting which took place does not concern this history, the Regiment in the meantime having been transferred from the Cuttack district.

In 1822 one troop and two companies marched from Cuttack to Jamalpur, on the Brahmaputra frontier, and were joined there by the remainder of the Regiment in the beginning of 1823.

In the same year the name of the Regiment was changed to The Rangpur Local Battalion. The origin of this name was probably due to the Battalion being located in the Province of Rangpur, in Bengal. This name had been borne by another battalion, which had been renamed The Dinajpur Local Battalion.

On February 14th, 1823, the following instructions in connection with organization were received:—

“The Rangpur Local Battalion will be composed of 10 companies of Infantry, viz., 8 of light infantry and 2 of riflemen, with two 6-pounder Field Pieces attached.

“The native officers and men to complete the establishment will be supplied under the orders of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief from the two troops of Cavalry now attached to the Corps, discharging such

as are unwilling to remain; by the transfer of two complete companies from the Dinajpur Local Battalion, and the whole of the present Sylhet Corps (4 companies) that may be fit for active service.

"The Corps will be formed on the same establishment and allowances as all other Local Battalions as under."

INFANTRY.

<i>Per Company.</i>	<i>Rate of Pay.</i>	<i>Total Pay.</i>
1 Subadar	At Rs30	Rs30
1 Jemadar	At Rs15	Rs15
5 Havildars	At Rs10	Rs50
5 Naiks	At Rs8	Rs40
2 Buglers	At Rs7	Rs14
80 Sepoys	At Rs5	Rs400

Total, 94 all ranks per company; total pay, Rs549.

"His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is requested to order the necessary measures for completing the Corps with arms and equipment, viz., rifles for two companies and fuzils or muskets for eight of the ordered strength. The exchange of the present 3 Pounder Gallopers for 6 Pounders with two ammunition wagons attached, to be drawn by ponies now with the Corps.

"The European officers and staff will from the 1st April next be placed on the scale of a local battalion, viz., . . ." (included in table below). "The surplus horses with the Cuttack Legion will be delivered over to the Commissary General, who will receive orders from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief as to their disposal."

Establishment of the Rangpur Local Battalion compiled from the foregoing instructions.

	BRITISH.							INDIAN.													
	Captain or Major.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sub-Lieutenants.	Asst. Surgeon.	Sergeant-Major.	Q.M.-Sergeant.	Native Doctors.	Subadar-Major.	Subadar.	Jemadar.	Colour Havildar.	Pay Havildar.	Havildars.	Naiks.	Sepoys.	Bugle-Major.	Buglers.	Tindals.	Lascars.	Sircar.
C.O.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Headquarters	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Artillery	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
10 companies	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
each company	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Total—British Ranks, 6 excluding Sub-Lieutenants; Native Ranks, 993.

† 2nd-in-Command. * Adjutant. ‡ Non-effective.

In accordance with the foregoing instructions, the two troops of cavalry were disbanded.

During 1823 Captain Simon Fraser relinquished command of the Battalion, and was replaced by Captain Alexander McLeod.

Supplementary orders were issued by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on March 15th, 1823. They gave the particulars of the transfers to be received by the Rangpur Local Battalion.

"Captain McLeod will proceed without delay to reorganise the Cuttack Legion, and will further be pleased to indent on emergency on the Berhampur magazine for its proportion of rifles for two Companies and fuzils or muskets for eight Companies."

On March 28th, 1823, on the recommendation of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the Rangpur Local Battalion was formed into a light infantry corps and designated The 8th Rangpur Light Infantry.

It was supplied with a complete set of fuzils and suitable accoutrements, in lieu of the muskets and rifles already ordered.

On April 24th modifications were introduced in the artillery detachments with local corps. The numbers were reduced from two Tindals and twenty-four Lascars to one Tindal and eight Lascars.

The following British officers were posted to the Regiment:—

Captain Fuller.

Lieutenant Kennedy (later appointed Adjutant).

Since 1794 the eastern frontier of the British possessions in Bengal had been again and again disturbed by the incursions of the Burmese. In 1823 they laid claim to the small island of Shahpuri, at the mouth of the Naf river, which was occupied by a detachment of Bengal troops. Two Burmese armies invaded British territory with the object of annexing Chittagong and the adjoining districts; one advanced from Manipur, the other from Assam. In order to oppose the latter army, a force under the command of Major Newton, and comprising the following troops: four companies 8th Rangpur Light Infantry (under Captain Fuller), 1st Battalion 10th

Native Infantry, detachment 2nd Battalion 23rd Native Infantry, and a detachment of guns, was despatched to the Sylhet frontier.

In the meantime the Burmese had advanced into the Province of Cachar, and stockaded themselves at Bikrampur. Major Newton attacked the stockade on January 17th, 1824. The enemy were driven out and routed. The casualties suffered by the British were 6 Indian other ranks killed. The British force was too small to allow of a protracted pursuit; and later Major Newton withdrew his column to Sylhet. After their defeat at Bikrampur the enemy effected a junction with their second army from Manipur. They now advanced along the right bank of the Surma River and began to stockade themselves close to Bhadrapur, where there was a small force, under command of Captain Johnston, composed of detachments from the 8th Rangpur Light Infantry, 1st/10th Native Infantry, and 2nd/23rd Native Infantry.

On February 13th, 1824, Captain Johnston attacked the enemy with great spirit, destroyed the half-finished stockades, and drove the enemy across the frontier. The force lost 1 jemadar and several men wounded in this action.

Captain Johnston's detachment having joined a column under command of Lieut.-Colonel Bowen, which had arrived in the meantime, the pursuit was continued.

The enemy made a stand at the foot of the Bhartika Pass, where they were routed, and subsequently retired into Assam. Having disposed of the Assam army, Lieut.-Colonel Bowen now turned his attention to the Manipur army, which was reported to have entrenched itself at Dudhpatli. The column arrived at Dudhpatli on February 21st, and attacked at once. The Burmese put up a stubborn defence and repulsed the attack. The British lost 21 killed and 135 wounded. Lieut.-Colonel Bowen and Captain Johnston were both wounded. The Regiment lost 1 naik and 3 sepoy killed, and 2 naiks and 4 sepoy wounded in this action.

The attack, though repulsed, had been sufficiently vigorous to cause the enemy to evacuate the position, and the British force, having left a detachment of the

Rangpur Light Infantry to hold Cachar, withdrew to Sylhet.

During the above operations a force (Commander: Colonel Macmorine; troops: detachment Irregular Horse, six 6-pounder guns, six companies Rangpur Light Infantry, seven companies 2nd/23rd Native Infantry, the Dinajpur Local Infantry, Wing Champaran Light Infantry) was assembled at Goalpara with the object of expelling the Burmese from Assam. Gunboats on the Brahmaputra River accompanied the force.

The column left Goalpara on March 13th, 1824. Thick jungle, heavy sand, and swamps delayed the march considerably. Gauhati was occupied without opposition on March 28th. Here the column was delayed. Towards the end of April a detachment which included a portion of the Regiment was pushed forward under command of Colonel Richards. The enemy was encountered at Kaliabar and driven from their stockade, and defeated at Hautbar. Colonel Macmorine died of cholera, and Colonel A. Richards succeeded to the command of the column. Lack of supplies and the commencement of the rains compelled the commander to retire to Gauhati, and to defer further operations for a time.

In the meantime a force had been despatched to Rangoon by sea, its object being to work up the Irrawaddy River to Ava, the capital of Burma. The force arrived at Rangoon on May 11th, 1824. The town was found deserted, and, still worse, all boats had been removed. It had been hoped that sufficient river craft to transport the expedition up stream would have been forthcoming. The Burmese made several attacks, which were repulsed, but owing to the lack of transport the British force was unable to advance. Towards the end of 1824 the prospect of success of the British force at Rangoon was in grave doubt, and a further plan was evolved.

Two new forces were concentrated, one at Sylhet with the object of invading Burma through Manipur, the other in Chittagong, to march on Ava through Arakan.

It is now necessary to return to the Gauhati column.

The weather had become suitable for renewing operations in Assam, and Colonel A. Richards, with a column

composed of river gunboats, detachment Irregular Horse, detachment artillery, Rangpur Light Infantry, Champaran Light Infantry, Dinajpur Local Battalion, 46th and 47th Native Infantry, marched from Gauhati and arrived at Kaliabar on December 27th, 1824.

The Burmans had looked upon the withdrawal of Colonel Richards' force from this area earlier in the year as a sign of weakness, and consequently considerable enemy resistance was encountered during the march. Towards the end of January, 1825, when the column was a few marches west of Rangpur (not to be confused with Rangpur in Bengal), the opposition of the enemy stiffened. On January 27th the 8th Rangpur Light Infantry, under Captain A. McLeod, were holding the crossing over the Ramdong Nalla. Here the Burmans made an attack on the Regiment. The thick jungle in which the Burmans concealed themselves rendered offensive measures against the enemy difficult. The force feigned a retreat. This move encouraged the enemy, who, debouching from the jungle, came on to attack in numbers. Suddenly the British, facing about, delivered a charge, and having suffered severe casualties the Burmese broke and fled. Lieutenant Kennedy, Adjutant of the Regiment, and one sepoy were wounded.

"The conduct of the Rangpur Light Infantry," wrote Colonel Richards, "and of the Volunteer Cavalry, which belong to the same Corps,* merit my warmest approbation. To Captain McLeod, Commanding The Rangpur Light Infantry, and Lieutenant Brooke, who commanded the Volunteer Cavalry, and whose conduct is reported by Captain McLeod to have been most conspicuous, my best thanks are especially due."

On January 29th the town of Rangpur was attacked.

* An order dated April 27th, 1824, directed the formation of a squadron of Horse, each troop being 80 strong, mounted on stout undersized horses, not under 13½ hands, for service with the Corps. The equipment was to be of good light Hindustani pattern, and the weapons a pistol and a lance. Five months later, however, the order was cancelled, and the men enlisted in the squadron were directed to be assimilated with the infantry; but it appears that a squadron of Local Horse must have, at the same time, been obtained to fill its place, both from the words of Colonel Richards' despatch, quoted above, and from G.G.O. No. 122 of 1826, which directed that the squadron of Local Horse with the Rangpur Light Infantry be reduced.

Although strongly fortified and defended by the enemy in force, the outskirts leading to the town were carried after some hard fighting. Finally, on condition that their lives should be spared, the Burmese surrendered the town. Captain A. McLeod (Officer Commanding Rangpur Light Infantry) was again thanked in the despatch of Colonel Richards.

Colonel Richards and Lieutenant Brooke were wounded in this action, whilst the Regiment lost 2 men killed.

From Rangpur the force proceeded to Dibrugarh, Sadiya, and Bisa (see Map No. 1). At the commencement of the rains (about June) the force withdrew to Sadiya, whence small columns were constantly despatched to deal with marauding parties of Singphos and Kamptis, savage tribes, armed with spears, bows and arrows, and occupying the country south-east of Sadiya.

After the surrender of Rangpur the Burmese ceased to be active in Assam.

In the meantime the Sylhet force had advanced. No enemy opposition was encountered, but the difficulties of the route and the incessant rains eventually brought the march to an end. In February, 1825, it became evident that to reach Burma through such a country was an impossibility, and the force retraced its footsteps.

In March, 1825, the Chittagong force had arrived before the town of Arakan. On April 1st the British, having lost 30 killed and 213 wounded, captured the town. It was now found to be too late in the season to make further progress; and the force, having suffered severely in health at Arakan during the monsoon, was withdrawn to Bengal at the end of the year.

As both these columns had failed to gain their objectives, the one remaining chance of bringing the war to a successful, though tardy ending, lay with the Rangoon force.

After remaining nine months at Rangoon, Sir Archibald Campbell commenced his march towards Ava on February 13th, 1825, but it was not until exactly a year later that he succeeded in getting within striking distance of the Burmese capital.

On February 24th, 1826, the enemy sued for peace and

a treaty was signed; and thus the first Burmese War came to an end.

Permission was given for the words "Ava," "Arracan," and "Assam" to be borne on the Colours of the corps engaged. It would appear that the Regiment was entitled to the word "Assam," but why it has been excluded from bearing this honour is not clear. A medal was granted for the campaign.

In 1825 the strength of each company was increased by ten privates, thus increasing the strength of the Regiment from 993 native ranks to 1,093. (G.G.O. No. 28 of 1825.)

CHAPTER II.

On conclusion of the first Burma War the Regiment was localized in Assam, which was now for the first time permanently occupied by troops.

During the first thirty-four years of the Regiment's stay there (1826-1860) there was a great deal of fighting. A glance at Map No. 1 will show how Upper Assam is bounded by tribal territory. Commencing with the Nagas on the East, there are, in addition, the Kamptis, Singphos, Mishmis, Abors, Daphlas, Akas, and Khasias, all very turbulent people, whom the Regiment assisted to put down.

In 1827 the designation of the Regiment was changed from the 8th Rangpur Light Infantry to the Assam Light Infantry.

The garrisoning of Assam necessitated a number of detachments, more than the Regiment was able to furnish, and in 1828 two companies were transferred from the Sylhet Battalion to assist. The same year, under the provision of G.G.O. No. 104 of 1828, the establishment of the Regiment was again changed. The strength was increased from ten to twelve companies, each company being composed of:—

Subadar	1
Jemadar	1
Havildars	5
Naiks	5
Privates	80
Bugler	1
Total						93

The chief point of interest about this change was that the personnel of the two new companies was composed of Gurkhas, who now for the first time were enlisted in the Regiment.

Captain J. B. Neufville assumed command of the Regiment on the departure of Captain A. McLeod in March, 1828.

In 1829 the Regiment marched to Jorhat, whence four



CAPTAIN J. B. NEUFVILLE, 1828-1830.

companies were detached for service against the Rajah of Biba. The Rajah was captured and brought to Dibrugarh, where he died.

The same year was marked by a tragic occurrence in the Khasiah Hills. Lieutenants Bedingfield and Burlton had proceeded to Nanklao for the benefit of their health, with a small escort from the Regiment. The place was suddenly attacked on April 4th, 1829, by some 500 Khasiahs.

Bedingfield, who on the outbreak of the disturbance had gone outside his bungalow to ascertain the cause of it, was immediately killed. Burlton got the escort together, but the next day, whilst attempting to retreat, he was killed, with nearly all his men. Punitive operations were undertaken against the Khasiahs and Garos by the Sylhet Light Infantry. The Khasiahs were defeated at Mamlu on April 14th, Nanklao was retaken, and the strong position of Mogandi was stormed on May 21st. A desultory conflict was maintained for two years, in difficult jungles. In 1832 two companies of the Regiment reinforced the Sylhet Light Infantry, and the Rajah Tirat Singh, who had been the instigator of the attack on Lieutenant Bedingfield's party, was captured at Muklapara and brought to justice.

In February, 1829, a force of 2,000 Singphos made an inroad to British Assam. They were attacked at Latu by the Political Agent with a party of 54 men of the Regiment; defeated several times, they were finally driven over the frontier.

In October, 1830, Captain J. B. Neufville relinquished command. Lieutenant A. Charlton assumed temporary command until August, 1831, when Captain A. White was appointed to the command of the Regiment.

In 1834-35 the Singphos again became truculent, and a detachment of the Regiment, under Captain Charlton, was sent against them. An action was fought at Kuju, in which the Regiment lost 7 men killed, and 1 British officer (Captain Charlton) and 40 men wounded. The detachment having been reinforced by Major White, the enemy's stronghold at Mania Purhat was invested, and after a siege of fifteen days was stormed and taken. The losses sustained by the Singphos were heavy, but they succeeded in inflicting severe casualties amongst the

ranks of the Regiment. Several men were killed, whilst all the British officers present and a number of the men were wounded.

On February 3rd, 1835, a post at Balipara, held by one havildar and seven men of the Regiment, was attacked by a force under the Aka chiefs. The guard, with the exception of two sepoy, was massacred.

In 1835 two companies of the Regiment were transferred to the Assam Sebundy Corps (now the 8th Gurkha Rifles) which was raised in this year. Thus the organization of the Assam Light Infantry reverted once more from twelve to ten companies.

A circular letter, dated Adjutant-General's office, April 22nd, 1835, changed the uniform of the Assam Light Infantry from green to red coats with green facings. In 1836 this order was cancelled, and the Regiment reverted to the green uniform with black facings.

By G.O.C.C. dated February 13th, 1836, the artillery detail attached to the Regiment was reorganized. A subaltern of artillery was attached to instruct the men in special artillery duties, whilst the strength of the gun detachment was fixed as follows:—

Subaltern	1
Gun Sergeant	1
Gun Corporal	1
Jemadar	1
Havildars	2
Naiks	2
Sepoys	26
Tindal	1
Gun Lascars	8
6-pounders M.L. Guns	2

In April, 1838, the year of the first Afghan War, a small detachment under Lieutenant Millar, accompanied by a party of local levies, attacked an Assam chief named Peshi Geroum, who, with a considerable following, had invaded British territory. In the action which ensued the levies proved unreliable; they deserted, and Lieutenant Millar with difficulty withdrew his detachment safely. Having stockaded himself, he awaited the arrival of reinforcements from the Regiment. These were promptly despatched by Major White, and, on arrival, Lieutenant Millar attacked and drove the enemy across the frontier.

In 1839 the Assam Light Infantry moved from Jorhat to Sadiya, where it remained for five years, during which period the Regiment was constantly fighting marauding parties from the surrounding tribes.

Major White was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel. It will have been noted that until now the Regiment had not been commanded by an officer above the rank of Major.

Shortly after arriving at Sadiya the Commanding Officer and several of the men lost their lives in a surprise attack made by two frontier tribes. Just before daylight on January 28th, 1839, the cantonment was suddenly attacked on three sides by a large force of Kamptis and Singphos. Every person, irrespective of age or sex, whom the savages fell in with, was massacred; the magazine stockade was seized; Colonel White was cut to pieces on his way to the lines; the Subadar-Major was killed, after a gallant resistance in which he accounted for seven of the enemy. A great number of men, women and children were slain and wounded. At length, the enemy having been driven out, the stockade was reoccupied by the Regiment. Immediately it became light, detachments under Lieutenant Marshall and Captain Hannay counter-attacked the enemy, and having inflicted heavy casualties compelled them to seek cover in the jungle. A company was despatched in pursuit. Taking advantage of the cover afforded by the jungle, the company overtook and surprised the enemy on the banks of the river Brahmaputra. The entire enemy party was either killed or captured. The Regiment sustained the following casualties:—Killed, 1 British officer (Colonel White) and 12 men; wounded, 29 men. Twenty-four enemy dead were picked up in and around the cantonments.

Colonel White is said to have been warned by the Subadar-Major of the impending attack, but he refused to believe the rumour, especially since he had interested himself in the Kampti tribe, with which he had taken pains to ingratiate himself. Later the Kampti tribe was completely broken up by deporting large numbers of prisoners to distant parts of India; a policy which prevented them from ever recovering the position they formerly held as one of the principal tribes on the North East Frontier.

On the death of Colonel White, Captain J. F. Hannay succeeded to the command of the Assam Light Infantry, an appointment which he held for twenty-two years.

G.G.O. No. 41 of 1839 directed the increase of the Assam Light Infantry by 100 sepoys, or ten per company. In 1840 the artillery detachment, which until now had formed part of the Regiment, was transferred to the newly-raised Assam Local Artillery.

In 1840 the Mishmi tribe gave trouble. A party raided into Assam and carried off 300 of the local inhabitants. A detachment of the Regiment, under Subadar Byjenauth Singh, pursued the enemy and rescued the captives. A sword of honour was presented to the Subadar for his conduct on this occasion.

Whilst at Sadiya one of the duties of the Regiment was to furnish outpost detachments. Two such posts were garrisoned by the Regiment at Ningru and Bisa, forty miles south of Sadiya. In 1843 these posts were attacked simultaneously by the Singphos. At Ningru the advance of the enemy was discovered by a sentry, who immediately warned the garrison by discharging his musket. A party of from 300 to 400 tribesmen attacked. They were met by a gallant resistance, and, after three unsuccessful attempts to carry the post by assault, they were finally driven off, leaving 10 dead behind. A pursuit was organized, but the enemy made good their escape.

At Bisa the stockade was besieged for a week, and, ammunition and food having been exhausted, the garrison, consisting of 1 Subadar, 1 native doctor, and 21 non-commissioned officers and men, on a promise of a safe conduct by the Singphos, opened their gates and surrendered. The entire detachment was barbarously murdered by the enemy. In the meantime reinforcements under Lieutenant Lockett had been despatched from Sadiya, but they arrived a few hours too late.

The Singphos attacked Lieutenant Lockett's detachment, and he was compelled to fall back on Kuju, where he occupied the existing stockade. Six years previously a detachment of the Regiment had fought an action with the Singphos at Kuju, in which 7 men were killed and Captain Charlton and 40 men were wounded. Here Lockett was closely besieged for several days. To escape from the fire of the enemy, who were sniping into the

MAP No. 1
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stockade from the trees, the garrison had to entrench itself. At length a company arrived from Ningru, drove off the Singphos and relieved the garrison, which had sustained a loss of 2 men killed and several wounded. A week later Lieutenant Lockett succumbed to an attack of fever.

As a result of these two attacks, punitive operations were undertaken on a large scale by the Regiment. The operations continued until the end of May, 1843, during which period villages and crops were burnt, several of the leading men of the tribe were either killed or captured, and eventually the power of the Singphos was completely broken.

Having dealt with the Kamptis and Singphos round Sadiya, the Regiment was moved in 1844 to Jaipur, where it was constantly employed checking the incursions of the Nagas.

The same year, by G.G.O. No. 234, the designation of the Regiment was changed from the Assam Light Infantry to the 1st Assam Light Infantry, whilst the Assam Sebundy Corps became the 2nd Assam Light Infantry (now 8th Gurkha Rifles). From this it will be seen that a relationship exists between the 6th and 8th Gurkha Rifles.

Three years later, November, 1847, the Regiment, less three companies detailed for duty at Jaipur and Ningru outpost, moved from Jaipur to Dibrugarh.

In 1849 the Nagas raided Dimapur, fifty-five miles south of Golaghat. The post at that place was garrisoned by the 2nd Assam Light Infantry, and the detachment suffered considerable loss at the hands of the enemy. A small force, composed of one section Assam Local Artillery and two companies 1st Assam Light Infantry, the whole under the command of Captain David Reid, R.A., marched from Dibrugarh to Gauhati and Dimapur. The Nagas, under their Rajah, Lilu Pilu, were found stockaded. Captain Reid ordered an attack on the stronghold. The attacking party was met by a volley from the enemy, which killed and wounded nearly all the men of the leading sections. Before the Nagas had time to reload their muskets the troops charged, forced an entrance into the stockade, and slew a number of the defenders. Sepoy Humail Khan, later promoted Subadar,

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distinguished himself in this attack; he was the first to enter the stockade, a second sepoy who accompanied him being shot down at his side. He was given the Order of the British India on January 1st, 1877. The casualties suffered by the detachment were 4 sepoys killed and 15 wounded. On the conclusion of this affair the detachment returned to Dibrugarh.

In March, 1850, the Augami Nagas gave trouble, and an expedition was despatched against them. A small detachment of the Regiment was engaged in these operations. This detachment greatly distinguished itself and was present at the recapture of Mozema and the destruction of Khonema.

From 1850 to 1853, which period includes the second Burmese War, the Regiment had a spell of quiet at Dibrugarh, but during the latter year, the Abors having become more truculent than usual, the 1st Assam Light Infantry carried out punitive operations against them.

In 1854 the Mishmis, a tribe which inhabits the hills on the north-east border of Assam, committed an outrage in British territory in murdering some French missionaries. With the object of capturing the Mishmi chief—Kaisa Gohani—who had prompted the outrage, one company of the Regiment, under command of Lieutenant Eden, was despatched to the Mishmi Hills from Dibrugarh. He left Dibrugarh with his company in January, 1855, and proceeded to Dura Mukh. Here he left the company, less a picked detachment of 20 men. With this party he carried out a forced march of four days into the Mishmi Hills. He reached Kaisa Gohani's village at night, and unobserved. The following morning, having surrounded this chief's house, he entered it at daybreak and captured him in bed. Realizing that the Mishmis, as soon as they heard what had happened, would endeavour to intercept his withdrawal, Lieutenant Eden wasted no time in returning to Dura Mukh, which he reached safely with his captive. Later the Mishmi chief was tried, found guilty, and hanged. Two sepoys who accompanied Lieutenant Eden were awarded the Order of Merit, 3rd Class, and promotion for distinguished conduct during this operation. The coolness and gallantry with which this brilliant exploit was carried out reflect the utmost credit on Lieutenant Eden, who, ignorant of the roads,

and without adequate provisions, penetrated such a distance into a hostile and difficult country.

During the great Indian Mutiny of 1857-58 the Regiment was at Dibrugarh, and throughout these trying two years no suspicion of disaffection ever fell on the 1st Assam Light Infantry. The name of the Regiment appears in the list of corps which remained loyal and retained their arms, published by the Governor-General in 1859 (G.G.O. page 515). By G.G.O. No. 299 of 1858 five jemadars and three sepoy received a step of promotion, and seven subadars, two jemadars, one havildar, and one bugler were awarded the Order of Merit, for conspicuous loyalty, the whole to date from October 2nd, 1857, on which day Kandorparas Singh, the Surang Rajah of Assam, was arrested for endeavouring to tamper with the allegiance of certain native officers of the Regiment.

In 1858, a point of historic interest to the Army in India, all troops in India were transferred from the service of the East India Company to the service of the Crown. In that year Queen Victoria assumed the direct government of India, and the Honourable East India Company practically ceased to exist.

In 1858 and 1859 the Regiment took part in two expeditions against the Meyong Abors, who had perpetrated a murderous attack on a village near Dibrugarh. The Abors were armed with bows and arrows, in the use of which they were most efficient. The arrows were poisoned with a species of aconite. The first expedition was commanded by Captain Lowther, Second-in-Command of the Regiment. The force consisted of 15 gunners, No. 4 Naval Brigade, Indian Navy; 15 gunners, Assam Local Artillery, with two 12-pounder howitzers; 3 non-commissioned officers and 101 men, 1st Assam Light Infantry.

The troops were conveyed up the river Dihang as far as possible in boats, when the howitzers were transported to Pashi on elephants, beyond which place it was impossible to take them. From Pashi the only means of transport were coolies.

The country was of an intricate and mountainous nature, and up to the date of this expedition had not been explored. To make matters still more difficult,

there was friction between the Military Commander and the Civil Officer (Captain Bivar) who accompanied the force. From the outset they disagreed so much about the route to be followed, and on other matters, that there was little, if any, hope of achieving successful results.

The line of the river Dihang was followed to within striking distance of the village of Kebong, the objective of the force. Without having attempted to attack the village the retreat was sounded, and the force commenced to withdraw.

Mistrusting his guides, Captain Lowther selected a route of his own, and suddenly came up against an outlying party of the enemy on a tributary of the Dihang. Captain Lowther, in a subsequent report, stated that had he not left trustworthy officers with the guns and rations in his rear, the entire party must have been destroyed, as the whole Abor country had taken up arms. The casualties on our side were: Killed, 1 European and 3 men; slightly wounded, "several" men; whilst a number of camp followers, boatmen, and coolies were cut up by the enemy. Captain Lowther blamed the Civil Officer for the failure of the expedition, and pointed out that the villages which had received presents and promised to remain friendly were the worst. The Civil Officer, on the other hand, blamed the Military Commander, and attributed the failure to the selection of the commander, insufficient force, insufficient ammunition, to the desertion of coolies carrying supplies, and also to the fact that the men carried nothing in the shape of an emergency ration to guard against mischance. The Civil Officer also asserted that the order to retire was given when success was within grasp of the force; but the Civil Officer was neither present at the time, nor had he seen the village of Kebong.

By order of the Commanding Officer (Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Hannay) a Court of Enquiry was assembled to investigate the circumstances leading up to the failure of the expedition. The opinion recorded by the Court was that the conduct of the detachment was creditable in every way; and that there was little doubt but that the Civil Officer was completely duped by his guides, and by the tribes in which he had placed every confidence.

Captain Lowther's expedition having ended so unsatisfactorily, a second expedition (detachment No. 4 Naval Brigade, Indian Navy—3 B.Os., 60 men; detachment Assam Local Artillery—1 B.O., 35 men, two 12-pounder howitzers, two mortars; 1st Assam Light Infantry—2 B.Os., 160 rank and file; Auxiliaries—150 Kamptis, Singphos and Duranis) was organized under the personal command of Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Hannay, 1st Assam Light Infantry. Lieut.-Colonel Hannay marched from Dibrugarh in February, 1859. Pashi Ghat was reached on February 26th. On February 27th Pashi and Rong-Kong, the principal villages of the Meyong Abors, strongly situated and defended by many stockades, were attacked. The enemy put up a stubborn resistance, and it was not until the force had suffered 45 casualties that they were defeated and the villages captured. On completion of the operations the force returned to Dibrugarh.

Two years later, on January 25th, 1861, Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Hannay died at Dibrugarh. He had commanded the Regiment for twenty-two years. His remains are interred in the Dibrugarh Cemetery.

On April 25th, 1861, Major H. M. Garstin was appointed Commandant, *vice* Lieut.-Colonel J. F. Hannay.

In 1860 khaki uniform was introduced.

CHAPTER III.

IN 1861 orders were published reorganizing the confused crowd of regiments, old and new, regular and irregular, which the storm of the Mutiny had left to represent the Army of Bengal.

By G.G.O. No. 400 of May 3rd, 1861, the 1st Assam Light Infantry ceased to be an irregular corps, and was brought on to the strength of the line and numbered the 46th Bengal Native Infantry.

Six months later, however, all the Gurkha corps were withdrawn from the line, and numbered separately from the 1st to the 4th, the Hazara Gurkha Battalion being numbered the 5th.

Consequent on the above changes, the line regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry were renumbered. By G.G.O. No. 990, dated October 29th, 1861, the Regiment's number was changed from the 46th to the 42nd Regiment of Native Infantry (Light Infantry). The old title of "Assam," though granted officially, was not used in the Army List until 1865. The full and correct title of the Regiment, therefore, was The 42nd Assam Regiment of Native Infantry (Light Infantry). The organization of the Regiment was changed from ten companies to eight companies, the total strength being as follows:—

Subadar-Major	1
Subadars	7
Jemadars	8
Drill Havildars	1
Pay Havildars	8
Colour Havildars	8
Havildars	23
Drill Naiks	1
Naiks	39
Bugle-Major	1
Buglers	15
Privates	600
Total	712

The British officers named below formed the staff at the time of this reorganization:—

Commandant, Major H. M. Garstin; Second-in-Command, Captain A. G. Forsyth; Adjutant, Lieutenant D. Ross; Paid Doing Duty Officers, Lieutenants J. Johnstone and G. D. Crawford; in Medical Charge, Asst.-Surgeon J. B. White.

In 1864 the names of the following British officers appeared on the Books of the Regiment:—

Second-in-Command and Wing Officer, Captain F. V. R. Jervis; Wing Officer, Captain J. M. Nuttall; Adjutant, Lieutenant H. W. Williams; Quartermaster, Lieutenant H. Woodhouse; Doing Duty Officer, Lieutenant R. Vivian.

On April 3rd, 1865, Major H. M. Garstin having proceeded to Europe on medical certificate, Major Thomas Rattray was appointed officiating Commandant of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry. Major Garstin did not return to India, and later Major Rattray was confirmed in the appointment of Commandant.

The same year, on the earnest recommendation of Major Rattray, the organization of the Regiment into class companies, as under, was sanctioned by A.G.'s letter No. 273/C, dated December 9th, 1865.

Two Sikh companies; four Gurkha companies, each company composed of twenty-five per cent. Jarwahs; two Hindustani companies, one Mussulman and one Hindu.

In April, 1866, the strength of the Regiment was increased from 600 to 800 privates; and during the same year the ordinary rates of pension as admissible to other regiments of the line were sanctioned.

Lieutenant J. H. Alexander was despatched to the Punjab to recruit Sikhs for the Sikh companies.

In 1867 the long smooth-bore musket was replaced by the short smooth-bore musket (authority, General Letter No. 299 of 1867).

It is interesting to note that in 1870 the weekly holiday on Thursday was introduced (authority, G.O. No. 191 of 1870). No field days or parades, except musketry, were allowed to take place; and no courts-martial of any description were permitted to sit unless the exigencies of the public service absolutely required it.

During the next three years nothing of importance

occurred. The Regiment remained at Dibrugarh, where it was inspected by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Napier of Magdala, on February 7th, 8th and 9th, 1871. On conclusion of the inspection, the Commander-in-Chief commented favourably on the work of the Regiment, but said that a separate communication would be made regarding the bad feeling existing between certain officers of the Corps.


On September 9th, 1871, the short smooth-bore musket was replaced by the long Enfield rifle, the introduction of which had been made the pretext for the Indian Mutiny in 1857. The year 1871, therefore, is notable as far as the Regiment is concerned for the abolition of the musket in favour of the rifle.

Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriiff joined the Regiment on October 21st, 1871.

Although there are no records to authenticate the statement, Colours were presented to the 42nd Assam Light Infantry about the period 1870-80. On examination of the old King's Colour a Royal Crown will be found, and not the Lion and Crown which used to be the device prior to 1867 (G.O. 515 of 1867). The Royal Crown surmounts the figures XLII on the King's Colour, whilst the Regimental Colour bears the inscription XLII Assam Light Infantry, a title assumed by the Regiment in October, 1861. In March, 1891, the Regiment became a rifle regiment, and, in accordance with the custom, the Colours ceased to be brought on ceremonial parades. All recruits, however, continue to be attested on the King's Colour, for which purpose the Colours are brought on parade. They are treated with great reverence by all ranks, and on the occasion of the Dussera they are allowed to be carried uncased by two Gurkha officers, escorted by the usual Colour escort, the whole party being in uniform. When not in use they are kept in the Officers' Mess.

For a period of more than ten years (January, 1861—October, 1871) the Regiment had remained at Dibrugarh under peace conditions. Indications of trouble, however, were becoming apparent in the Lushai Hills (see Map No. 1).

For many years the Lushai clans had been guilty of predatory inroads into British territory, where they had



COLOURS OF 42nd ASSAM L.I., NOW 6th GURKHA RIFLES.

committed numerous outrages on the inhabitants; latterly these had been increasing in frequency, until finally, in the autumn of 1871, affairs had reached such a stage that punitive operations were ordered.

Two columns, one under the command of Brigadier-General G. Bouchier, C.B., and the other under the command of Brigadier-General H. Brownlow, C.B., were assembled at Cachar and Chittagong respectively. Detail of troops as under:—

Cachar Column.

Half Peshawar Mountain Bty.
One Coy. Sappers and Miners
500 22nd Bengal Native Infantry
500 42nd Assam Light Infantry
500 44th Bengal Native Infantry

Chittagong Column.

Half Peshawar Mountain Bty.
One Coy. Sappers and Miners.
27th Native Infantry
2nd Goorkha Regiment
4th Gurkha Regiment

On October 29th, 1871, Headquarters and 500 men of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry, under command of Colonel Rattray, C.S.I., embarked at Dibrugarh on the river steamer *Koladyne* and proceeded to Kalarooka, where they disembarked. Thence the Regiment proceeded via Sylhet, which was reached on November 15th, to Cachar, where it arrived on November 21st, 1871.

The following British officers accompanied the Regiment:—

Commanding Officer, Colonel Thos. Rattray, C.S.I.; Second-in-Command, Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff; Adjutant, Lieutenant A. K. Abbott; Quartermaster, Lieutenant W. Brydon; Captain H. S. Moules; Medical Officer, Surgeon J. B. White.

Captain R. D. Beeston remained at Dibrugarh in command of the Depot.

Shortly after arrival at Cachar, cholera broke out amongst the Gurkha coolies in Captain Hadaiyat Ali's Gurkha coolie detachment. Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff, Surgeon J. B. White, 2 non-commissioned officers and 10 men were detailed for special duty in connection with this outbreak. General Bouchier's column left Cachar on November 21st and advanced without meeting any opposition, or being hindered in any way except by the difficulties of the country, as far as Tipai Mukh, sixty miles from Cachar. The column concentrated at Tipai Mukh. Several villages were destroyed in the neighbourhood. On December 29th, 200 of the Regiment, under

Colonel Rattray, accompanied by the Brigadier, attacked the village of Kolel. The Lushais kept up a continuous but ineffective fire, and subsequently asked for terms. With a loss of 1 sepoy wounded, the detachment, having achieved its object, retreated to Tipai Mukh. On January 9th, 1872, an advance was made on Kungnung, twenty-five miles south-east of Tipai Mukh. Kungnung was attacked and taken with a loss of 4 men killed and 11 wounded, Brigadier-General Bouchier being amongst the latter. On February 1st the column advanced thirty miles south of Kungnung to Champhai, the principal village of the Lushai Chief Lalburah. Throughout the advance but very slight resistance was encountered, and the people generally seemed disinclined for hostilities.

In the meantime the Chittagong column had advanced via Kassalong Demagiri to Savunga, twenty-five miles south-west of Champhai, where it arrived at the beginning of January. Punitive operations were carried out in the neighbourhood until early February, when, as a proof of their readiness to treat for terms, the Lushais gave up the child of an English planter who had been carried off in the preceding year. Peace was concluded, and in March, 1872, the columns arrived back at Cachar and Chittagong.

The Indian Medal, with a special clasp, was granted to the Lushai Expeditionary Force by G.G.O. No. 1,295 of 1872.

The Regiment reached Cachar on March 6th, whence it marched via Shillong, where it arrived on March 29th, to Dibrugarh, which was reached on April 17th, 1872. On arrival the Regiment was received by the detachment of the 43rd stationed there, and by all the British inhabitants with gratifying expressions of welcome.

The following extracts are taken from the order published by Brigadier-General G. Bouchier, C.B., on the breaking up of the Field Force:—

“From the beginning of November, when the troops were first put in motion, to the present time every man has been employed on hard work, cheerfully performed, often under most trying circumstances of heat and frost, always bivouacking on the mountain side in rude huts of grass and leaves, officers and men sharing the same accommodation, marching day by day over precipitous

mountains, rising at one time to 6,600 feet, having made a road fit for elephants from Lakipur to Chipvou (No. 10), a distance of 103 miles, the spirits of the troops never flagged, and when they met the enemy they drove them from their stockades and strongholds until finally they were glad to sue for peace."

"The history of the Expedition has been sheer hard work."

"On the advanced wing. . . . of the 42nd Assam Light Infantry, under Colonel Rattray, C.S.I. . . . the hardest work has fallen; each has shared in the actual fighting."

Colonel Thos. Rattray, C.S.I., was awarded the C.B. for services rendered in connection with the Lushai Expedition (G.G.O., No. 1093, of 1872), and Subadar-Major Runbahadur was promoted to the Second Class of the Order of the British India (G.G.O., No. 155, of 1872).

The excellent services rendered by Lieut.-Colonel Sherriff and Surgeon J. B. White in connection with the outbreak of cholera at Cachar were noticed by the Government of Bengal in the following communication to the Government of India, dated Fort William, December 20th, 1871:—

"Dr. White's conduct is equally admirable; every possible precaution appears to have been taken by him for stamping out the disease and preventing its spread. . . . Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff, the senior officer present, appears to have done all that could be desired. It seems due to his indefatigable exertions and his admirable tact and temper that various barracks and hospital sheds were erected with promptitude."

On March 29th, 1872, batta, at the rate of Rs2·8 per month, was sanctioned for all troops permanently stationed in Assam.

On November 10th, 1872, short steel mounted Enfield rifles were received and issued.

By A.G.'s letter, No. 1282, of June 20th, 1871, the Hindustani element was ordered to be removed from the Regiment. This order was subsequently modified, and permission was given for the enlistment of relations of sepoy, whether Hindustani or Sikhs.

At this time there was an acute controversy in the

Regiment. With the exception of Colonel Ratray and Lieut.-Colonel Sherriff, all Commanding Officers wanted to eliminate Sikhs from the Regiment. Colonel Sherriff wanted to eliminate Gurkhas and replace them by Sikhs. Captain Brydon and Lieutenant Abbott, both of whom appear to have been able to exert their influence, saved the Regiment from this fate.

On April 29th, 1873, Captain R. D. Beeston was tried by General Court-Martial. He was sentenced to be cashiered, and was struck off the strength of the Regiment on July 16th, 1873 (G.O.C.C., dated July 1st, 1873).

On May 16th, 1873, Colonel T. Ratray, C.B., C.S.I., gave up command of the Regiment, having held the appointment for just over eight years. Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff succeeded him. He officiated from May 16th, 1873, to July 21st, 1874, when Colonel G. E. Holmes was appointed to the command. Holmes, however, never joined, and on December 13th, 1874, Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff's appointment as Commanding Officer was made substantive. He commanded for eleven years.

In April, 1874, the 42nd Assam Light Infantry moved in relief from Dibrugarh to Gauhati.

At the end of the same year an expedition was organized and despatched under Brigadier-General Stafford, C.B., against the Daphlas, a savage tribe inhabiting the hills north of the River Brahmaputra, who had been guilty of plundering in British Territory. Troops employed were as follows:—Half Hazara Mountain Battery, detachment 16th Native Infantry, detachment 42nd Assam Light Infantry, detachment 43rd Native Infantry, and detachment 44th Native Infantry.

The detachment furnished by the Regiment was composed of Headquarters and 250 all ranks, under command of Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff. Lieutenant A. K. Abbott also accompanied the detachment. Leaving Gauhati on November 23rd, 1874, Harmatti, the base of operations, was reached on December 18th. From Harmatti the force advanced into the Daphla country, but met with no opposition. On February 17th, 1875, the force returned to Narainpur. During the advance a flying bridge was thrown across the Dikrang River by a party of the Regiment under Lieutenant A. K. Abbott's



LIEUT.-GENERAL J. P. SHERRIFF, C.B.,
COMMANDED 1873—1884 ;
COLONEL OF REGIMENT 1904—1911.

supervision. A model of this bridge was subsequently sent to the Commander-in-Chief, who was much impressed with Lieutenant Abbott's ingenuity, and ordered the model to be presented to the United Service Institution, India. Sir Frederick Haines' approval of the work in throwing the real bridge across the Dikrang was conveyed to Lieutenant A. K. Abbott and to the Indian officers and other ranks of the bridging party.

Shortly after arrival at Narainpur, in consequence of a treacherous attack by the Nagas on, and the massacre of, a survey party under Lieutenant Holcombe at Ninu, Lieut.-Colonel Sherrieff's detachment was ordered to proceed to Dibrugarh to join a punitive column of troops as follows, under command of Colonel J. M. Nuttall, 44th Native Infantry:—Detachment 42nd Assam Light Infantry and detachment 44th Native Infantry.

The force marched from Dibrugarh on February 27th, crossed the Disang River, and, passing through a thickly populated country, arrived before the village of Ninu. After a smart skirmish on March 19th the village was captured. A week was spent scouring the country. Ninu and several other villages were destroyed. On March 26th the column was reunited at Ninu, when the persons most directly implicated in the massacre having been captured or given up the troops returned to Dibrugarh, arriving there on April 11th. Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherrieff's and Lieutenant A. K. Abbott's names were brought to notice for good work in connection with the operations.

During the cold weather of 1875-76 two escorts were furnished by the Regiment: one, commanded by Lieutenant F. C. U. Goldney, accompanied the Deputy Commissioner when laying out the boundary of the Aka Hill tribes, the other, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Tulloch, escorted a survey party and the Political Agent, Captain J. Butler, into the Naga Hills. This party penetrated as far as the village of Pangti. On December 25th the Nagas attacked the village, and Captain Butler was mortally wounded. The village was promptly burnt, as well as several others, also a quantity of grain. The party then pushed on to Ninu, and, as some of Lieutenant Holcombe's murderers had not yet been surrendered, and more villages were destroyed. The detachment then

returned to British territory, reaching Dibrugarh on April 23rd, 1876. From Dibrugarh the detachment rejoined Headquarters at Gauhati.

About this period Snider rifles were issued to the Regiment, to replace the Enfield.

On November 1st, 1877, the Regiment marched in relief from Gauhati to Shillong.

Towards the end of 1877 the Naga tribes again became aggressive, and, several outrages having been committed in British territory, it became necessary to adopt punitive measures against the raiders. On November 15th a detachment of 205 men, under Captain W. Brydon, marched via Samaguting against the important village of Mozima, which was captured and burnt on December 8th. Further than this Captain Brydon was unable to move, owing to the weakness of his detachment; indeed, his position at Mozima was somewhat precarious until the arrival of 100 men of the 43rd Native Infantry on January 9th, 1878, when the Nagas sued for peace, and tranquility was temporarily restored.

Captain Brydon's name was brought to notice for the satisfactory manner in which he commanded his small force, and for the excellent results achieved.

The following extract is taken from letter No. 169, dated September 3rd, 1878, from the Secretary to the Government, Military Department, to the Q.M.G. :—

"I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter . . . and with reference thereto to state for the information of the Commander-in-Chief that the Government of India concur in the opinion expressed by His Excellency regarding the good conduct of the troops employed, and the generally satisfactory results of the expedition. The manner in which Captain Brydon, 42nd Assam Light Infantry, conducted the expedition placed under his command is viewed with much satisfaction by the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General in Council, and I am to request that an expression of the approval of the Government of India may be conveyed to this officer."

In the musketry season 1877-78, the Magdala Medal and reward of Rs100 for the first infantry prize, was won by Havildar Gangadur Rai.

We have now reached the period in history marked by the second Afghan War (1878-1881). Although the

Regiment took no part in this war, it is interesting to note the events taking place across the North-West Frontier, concurrently with the happenings on the North-East Frontier of India.

On November 1st, 1878, Subadar-Major Runbahadur (Bahadar), after forty-five years' distinguished and loyal service in the Regiment, retired.

In the autumn of 1879, an attack on Mr. Damant, the Political Agent, in which that gentleman, Jamadar Preamsingh, and ten sepoy of the 43rd Native Infantry were killed, and five sepoy wounded, compelled the Government once more to despatch an expedition against the Nagas.

The force detailed for service was composed as follows:—Commander: Brig.-General Nation. Troops: 2 Mountain Guns, 44th Native Infantry, detachment 34th Native Infantry, and detachment 43rd Native Infantry. On November 15th, 1879, Sephima having been attacked and taken with a loss of 2 men killed, 1 British officer and 2 men wounded, the column was ordered to concentrate at Pephima on November 21st. On November 22nd the Naga stronghold at Khonema was attacked. After a whole day's battle the Nagas evacuated their position during the night of November 22nd-23rd, having inflicted the following casualties: 1 Indian officer and 17 men killed, 4 British officers, 2 Indian officers and 27 men wounded. Leaving a detachment at Khonema, Brig.-General Nation retired, and on November 27th destroyed the village of Jotsoma. Inaction prevailed until the end of December whilst awaiting the arrival of reinforcements and supplies. In the meantime a detachment of the Regiment (334 all ranks), under Captain Abbott and Lieutenant Melvin, marched from Shillong to join General Nation's column. It entered the Naga Hills on December 15th, and having left small detachments at several posts along the lines of communication, reached Pephima on the 19th. On arrival Captain Abbott was ordered to drive the enemy out of Sephima, a village to the north-west, which the enemy had reoccupied. The enemy were driven out of Sephima without much difficulty, and, having hunted the Nagas through the jungle and destroyed quantities of grain, Captain Abbott returned to Pephima without having suffered a single casualty. At the end of

December the column again advanced, the village of Cheswejuma was destroyed, whilst Poplongmai was surprised and taken with a loss of 1 killed and 4 wounded. On January 10th, 1880, Captain Abbott's detachment was directed to Kohima, where Headquarters of the Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel Sherriff, arrived on the 27th.

On February 7th Captain Abbott was ordered to visit the territory of the Cachar Nagas. Accordingly, with a composite detachment consisting of 150 rifles of the 42nd and 43rd, a few frontier police and a contingent of 50 Kohima Nagas, he marched for Poplongmai, where he arrived on March 9th. Making this village his headquarters, he visited and destroyed many villages in the neighbourhood, amongst them Dipuma, Ridima, and Nakama. On March 28th, 1880, the enemy sued for peace. Captain Abbott remained at Poplongmai until April 14th, moving thence to Khonema, to which place Regimental Headquarters had already moved on March 14th. On April 22nd the field force dispersed. Meanwhile the detachments of the Regiment employed in garrisoning posts on the lines of communication had been having very hard and harassing work, and suffered greatly from malarial fever. They were constantly employed on convoy escort duty. The most serious attempt made by the Nagas against the lines of communication was a determined attack against the Nichuguard stockade on the Golaghat road. The enemy were repulsed on four successive nights at a cost of 2 men killed and 4 wounded to the defenders. The conduct of all ranks throughout the operations was warmly commended by Brig.-General Nation in his final despatch published in G.G.O. No. 165 of December 23rd, 1880.

Havildar Madansing Bandari was awarded the Indian Order of Merit, Third Class, for conspicuous gallantry during the operations (G.G.O. 151/1880).

The Indian Medal, with a special clasp, was granted for the Naga Hills Expedition by G.G.O. No. 334 of 1881.

On the conclusion of operations the Regiment returned to Shillong.

On November 28th, 1880, the Regiment moved in relief from Shillong to Kohima.

On December 1st, 1882, the 42nd Assam Light Infantry

marched in relief from Kohima to Dibrugarh, and whilst at the latter place furnished detachments at Sadiya and Poba.

On April 1st, 1884, Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Butter succeeded Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Sherriff as Commanding Officer of the Regiment. The following additions and changes took place the same year: In October two steel seven-pounder mountain guns (carried by porters) were received. Later, when these weapons became obsolete, two facsimiles were presented to the Regiment by the Government, and are to be seen to-day (1925) in front of the Officers' Mess at Abbottabad. They are supposed to have been known by the names of Bubble and Squeak. In November brown accoutrements were taken into wear. A year later Kilmarnock caps were sanctioned.

In January, 1885, the designation of the Regiment was changed to the 42nd Bengal Infantry.

By A.G.'s letter No. 1,973/1 of April 29th, 1885, the Sikh and Hindustani personnel in the Regiment were allowed to volunteer for service with other corps, one whole company of Sikhs being transferred to the 45th Sikhs.

The Regiment was now composed wholly of Gurkhas, and in June, 1886, its name was changed to the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, and on the formation of a scheme of Reserves (the same year) the Regiment was linked with the 43rd and 44th Gurkha Light Infantry, the present 2/8th and 1/8th Gurkha Rifles.

On February 21st, 1885, the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry moved in relief from Dibrugarh to Shillong, and furnished detachments at Tezpore, Gauhati, and Jowai.

CHAPTER IV.

ON October 30th, 1885, war was declared against Burma, and the third Burmese War commenced. On November 28th of the same year Mandalay was reached. Upper Burma was annexed by the British, and King Thebaw deported.

On conclusion of the war hundreds of Burmese soldiers had been allowed to disperse, armed, over the country. Dacoities and outrages were frequent, pretenders to the throne and local leaders arose, until finally it became necessary to send considerable reinforcements into the country to deal with the aftermath of the war.

In May, 1886, trouble arose in the Kubo Valley (see Map No. 1). On May 21st, 1886, a small force, commanded by Major Hailes, 4th Bengal Infantry, composed of detachments from the 4th Bengal Infantry, 42nd and 44th Gurkha Light Infantry, marched on Tammu via Imphal. Captain Stevens and Captain Briscoe, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry accompanied the column. On arrival at Imphal the Maharajah of Manipur detailed one gun and a small detachment of Manipuris to accompany the force. Tammu was occupied after some fighting.

Operations were next undertaken against the stockaded village of Chaung-Nai-Naung. On June 19th, 1886, the village was attacked. The attack was unsuccessful, and the force withdrew to Tammu. Major Hailes having been wounded, command devolved on Captain Stevens, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry.

The rains set in, and the force remained at Tammu, where it suffered severely from cholera, dysentery, and fever. In the autumn, two guns and two companies 44th Gurkha Light Infantry arrived, and Captain Stevens again advanced on Chaung-Nai-Naung. The village was attacked and taken on October 10th, 1886. Several other stockaded villages were visited and occupied, but with the exception of Auktang, where the enemy attacked the camp, but little resistance was encountered. On March 26th, 1887, Captain Stevens' detachment arrived at



LIEUT.-COLONEL A. D. BUTTER, 1884-1886.



LIEUT.-COLONEL A. T. DAVIS, 1886-1888.

Kohima, to which place the Regiment had in the meantime moved.

For his political as well as military services in these operations, Captain Stevens received the thanks of His Excellency the Viceroy. The following men were awarded the Order of Merit, Third Class, for conspicuous gallantry in charging up to the stockade at Chaung-Nai-Naung and endeavouring to cut an opening under heavy enemy fire:—

Naik Judhbir Gurung (was appointed Subadar-Major of the Regiment later—1/5/1904).

Sepoy Budhsing Thapa.

Sepoy Ramsing Khawas.

Sepoy Sidhbir Thapa.

On October 25th, 1886, Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Davis succeeded Lieut.-Colonel A. D. Butter in command of the Regiment.

At the end of 1887 the Regiment received orders to proceed to Burma by route march. The Headquarters and Left Wing left Kohima on December 7th and arrived at Maymyo on January 31st, 1888. The Right Wing marched from Kohima on December 27th and reached Bernardmyo, in the Ruby Mines district, on February 29th, 1888.

On February 10th, 1888, Lieut.-Colonel C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., was appointed Commanding Officer, *vice* Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Davis.

The wild tribes (notably the Chins) on the Burmese frontiers had commenced to raid into Burma, and this necessitated a recourse to hostilities.

In October, 1888, the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry was warned to form part of a column to operate against the Chins. The force concentrated at Kambale, in the Kale Valley, during December.

One hundred rifles, under Captain Westmorland, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, occupied Sihaung, where they were attacked by the enemy on December 10th. The enemy, having suffered many casualties, were driven off.

Later, Kongyi was occupied and held by Captain Butcher and a detachment from the Regiment.

For some weeks the Regiment was employed on road construction to facilitate subsequent operations. On

December 25th, 1888, Captain Butcher's detachment was attacked by a strong party of Chins. The enemy were driven off, after a fight which lasted for one and a half hours. Our casualties were 1 sepoy missing and 6 mules killed.

Various stockades on the lines of communication having been completed, the final advance against Tokhlaing, now known as Fort White, was ordered to commence on February 3rd, 1889. The force consisted of:—Commander: Brig.-General Faunce. Troops: One section No. 1 Mountain Battery, detachment Q.O. Madras S. and M., one company Norfolk Regiment, two companies 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry. After a good deal of desultory skirmishing Tokhlaing was attacked, and taken on February 5th. The Regiment lost 3 men wounded. After the fall of Tokhlaing small columns were employed in the vicinity on punitive missions.

A column under the personal command of Brig.-General Faunce, composed of 2 mountain guns, 75 men from the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry and 100 from the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry, left Fort White on March 8th for operations against the Kanhow Chins. There was a great deal of skirmishing, and nearly all the villages having been destroyed the column returned to Fort White on March 20th. Casualties suffered by the Regiment were 4 sepoys wounded.

On April 6th a water piquet on the lines of communication was attacked, and 2 men were killed. The naik in command of the piquet—No. 2533 Lance-Naik Bhimsing Thapa—pursued the enemy, and for gallant behaviour on this occasion was awarded the Order of Merit, Third Class (G.G.O. 655/1889).

On May 4th a column (Commander, Captain Otway Mayne, Norfolk Regiment; troops, 65 rifles Norfolk Regiment, 60 rifles 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, Captain Westmorland) was ordered to move against Tartan. On approaching the village, the column was heavily fired on from two small stockades and from a covered way connecting them.

The loopholes in the latter were flush with the ground and difficult to see. The Norfolk and 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry detachments charged the covered way, pulled off the roof and bayoneted 30 of the enemy. One British

officer, 2 British other ranks (Norfolks) were killed, 2 British officers (Norfolks, including Captain Mayne) and 10 men 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry were wounded. The enemy were driven out of one stockade, but they kept up a hot fire from the other. Captain Westmorland assumed command on Captain Mayne being wounded. Considering his force too weak to attempt it he decided not to attack the second stockade, and having collected the killed and wounded he retired a short distance, where he remained in observation, and later fell back to Fort White, arriving there at 8 p.m.

Captain Westmorland was later awarded a brevet majority in connection with these operations, whilst the following men of the Regiment were awarded the Order of Merit, Third Class, for gallantry in the attack on Tartan (G.G.O. No. 796/1889):—

No. 2333 Naik Amarsing Rana.

No. 2754 Lance-Naik Singeah Lama (promoted later to Second Class for further gallantry).

No. 2540 Sepoy Parbir Thapa.

No. 2879 Sepoy Sahabir Thapa.

No. 2461 Sepoy Matbar Chattri.

No. 2781 Sepoy Maninarayan Nagerkoti.

No. 2872 Sepoy Chandrabir Gharti.

The Regiment remained throughout the hot weather in the Chin Hills, where men and officers suffered severely from fever, from which Major Stevens, acting C.O. of the Regiment, died. At times as many as sixty per cent. of the garrison of Fort White were on the sick list at the same time.

By G.G.O. No. 31 of 1890 the grant of the Indian Medal, with a clasp for Burma, originally limited to operations up to April 30th, 1887, was extended to all who had served in the country up to March 31st, 1889, and an additional clasp was granted to those who were already in possession of the previous one.

Before handing over command of the Chin Field Force, Brig.-General Faunce issued the following complimentary order (Order No. 458):—

“Before leaving these hills, I desire to thank you officers and men of the force for the cheerful, soldier-like spirit in which the constant exposure, the long-continued

and exceptionally hard work of the last five months, have been undergone by one and all.

“ So long ago as the 8th February, 1889, you were told by the very distinguished and experienced soldier after whom this post (Fort White) is named, that the necessity of the operations even up to then had subjected the force taking part in them to more than the ordinary difficulties of field service in our Eastern Empire. Since then the work has been harder, and the enemy has stood more pluckily, and the country you have worked over has been more difficult. You have had to climb up the sides of almost precipitous hills, and it looked as if you would barely reach the top to lie down there; but if on getting to the top, the smallest chance of closing with or of overtaking the enemy presented itself, each officer and man dashed forward as if he had not seen a hill for a week.

“ On one occasion, when we bivouacked at 9,000 feet, just below the crest of the hill, where no water was available, and you had only the little you could carry, I was specially struck by the bright cheery spirit in which, after a hard day's work, the discomforts of the night, added to the biting cold wind, were borne by all.

“ You will admit that, having been the nucleus of the force, that very gallant Regiment, the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, which, I am sorry to say, has had 7 men killed and 18 wounded, has had the largest share of the work, while I feel that you will join me in saying that they and the 44th Gurkha Light Infantry have specially distinguished themselves by their admirable flanking over very difficult, indeed at times almost impassable, country, while in keenness, in dash, in forwardness, you Norfolks and Gurkhas have vied with each other. Your fire discipline in action has been remarkably good, and the behaviour of all has been exemplary. . . .

“ I have been intimately associated with the men and officers for the last five months, and leave the command, which you have made so pleasant and easy to me, with many regrets. I shall often look back, as I hope some of you may do, with kindly recollection to the days we have spent together in the Chin Hills. The only satisfaction I have in bidding you good-bye is that I leave the command in the very able hands of my old friend General

Symons, whose sympathy with the soldier, British and native, I know so well, and he, amongst the many who have made names for themselves, is second to none."

In April, 1889, a force was despatched from Bhamo, under command of Brig.-General Wolseley, C.B., A.D.C., to punish the Paukan Kachins in the Bhamo district. At the time of these operations a party of 100 recruits, under Jemadar Dhanbir Karki was on its way from Kohima to join Regimental Headquarters at Fort White. The party was suddenly ordered to join General Wolseley. The recruits took part in the Kachin operations, losing 1 man killed and 2 wounded.

The following is an extract from a letter written by Brig.-General Wolseley to Colonel Skene:—

"I cannot allow the post to leave without writing to tell you how greatly pleased I am with the ever ready and willing service afforded me by Jemadar Dhanbir Karki and the rank and file of your Regiment which accompanied my expedition against the Paukan Kachins. No troops could have behaved better under fire, and few could have competed with them in their eagerness to get at the enemy. The jemadar is a brave man and an able officer, and I sincerely trust you will be able to give him some proof of your appreciation of the good service he rendered whilst with me.* In fact, one and all whilst in fight and camp behaved splendidly, and you may well be proud of the recruits now on their way to join you."

This detachment reached the Regiment on June 4th, 1889.

Notwithstanding the expedition against the Chins, during the cold weather, 1888-89, their depredations by no means ceased. This fact, coupled with the desirability of opening out the narrow strip of country which now alone divided British Burma from India, led in the cold weather of 1889-90 to the Chin-Lushai Expedition.

Three columns were organized. Two operated from Burma, the third from Chittagong.

The Burma Columns, under command of Brig.-General W. P. Symons, were divided as follows:—

(a) Northern Column, under command of Colonel C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, to operate from Fort White. Troops: No. 5 Q.O., S.

* Jemadar Dhanbir Karki became Subadar-Major in 1903.

and M., 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, 10th Bengal Infantry, 38th Bengal Infantry.

(b) Southern Column, under the personal command of Brig.-General W. P. Symons, to operate from Kan. Troops: No. 6 Q.O., S. and M., Burma Company Q.O., S. and M., No. 1 Bengal Mountain Battery, 1st Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd/4th Gurkha Regiment, 2nd Madras Infantry.

Troops not employed in the above columns garrisoned the western frontier of Burma and held posts on the lines of communication.

The Northern Column advanced in November, 1889, and by the end of the year had succeeded in establishing several posts for the protection of the Burma frontier from Chin raids. The Kanhau and Siyin Chins offered considerable opposition. The losses sustained by the Regiment were only 2 men killed and 1 wounded.

The Southern Column, experiencing extraordinary difficulties owing to the nature of the country, took sixty instead of thirty days to march from Kan to Haka. Enemy resistance was slight.

In March, 1890, a simultaneous advance was made from Fort White and Haka, on Falam. Elaborate preparations had been made by the tribes (Tason Chins) to oppose the advance. The columns reached the valley of the Tashon Ywama, where they established British influence without any actual fighting.

Further operations were carried out by the Northern Column against the Siyins. By the end of April, 1890, the operations were concluded.

The following extracts are taken from the *Gazette of India*, No. 677, dated July 25th, 1890:—

“(i) Col. C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., Commanding 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, the Chin Hills, and the Northern Column, has well sustained a reputation previously gained for command.”

“(ii) Lieut. E. J. Lugard, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, served with distinction in the Chin Expedition of 1888-89, and has displayed conspicuous gallantry and intelligence in leading his men on several occasions during the operations of this season.

In recognition of services rendered in connection with

operations against the Chins, Lieut.-Colonel Skene, D.S.O., was awarded a brevet Colonelcy, and Lieutenant E. J. Lugard and Surgeon Rogers were awarded D.S.Os.

The Chittagong Column opened up the Lushai country by constructing roads, one of which was made from Fort Tregear to Fort Haka.

The Indian Medal, with a clasp inscribed "Chin-Lushai, 1889-90," was, by G.G.O. No. 275 of 1891, granted to all troops in these operations between November 15th, 1889, and April 30th, 1890.

In April, 1890, the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, less a detachment of 100 rifles under Lieutenant Colomb, left the Chin Hills for Assam via Rangoon and Calcutta, and arrived at Dibrugarh on May 11th, 1890.

Lieutenant Colomb's detachment proceeded as escort to the Shan Boundary Commission, and rejoined the Regiment at Dibrugarh on May 16th, 1890.

Before leaving Burma the following complimentary orders were published:—

Extract from Chin Field Force Order No. 2, dated Myingyan, April 4th, 1890, by Brig.-General W. P. Symons:

"The 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry being about to leave the Myingyan district, in Burma, and return to Assam, the Brigadier-General desires to place on record his appreciation of the services of the Regiment whilst it has been under his command. Under very trying circumstances of sickness and exposure, the Regiment has distinguished itself greatly on active service and in endurance in the Chin Hills during the past year. The conduct of the men in quarters has been admirable, and has been equalled by their gallantry on all occasions in face of the enemy. By the departure of the Regiment, General Symons feels that he is losing, in the officers and men, friends and comrades whom it will be difficult to replace, and whom he will not forget. The Brigadier will be pleased if it will be notified to Subadar-Major Bhola Bhaju and other native officers how highly he thinks of them and the excellent work they have done. General Symons and all his Staff officers wish the Regiment a hearty farewell and a pleasant journey to more comfortable quarters."

Extract from Burma District Orders by Lieut.-General

B. L. Gordon, C.B., commanding; dated Rangoon, April 28th, 1890:

“On the departure of the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry for India, after a service of two and a half years in Burma, the Lieutenant-General Commanding desires to place on record his sense of the good services rendered by the Regiment. For over eighteen months it has been uninterruptedly employed on the Chin Frontier and engaged, with but slight cessation, during the whole of that period in either offensive or defensive operations against a determined and enterprising enemy. The gallant conduct of the Regiment on all occasions when it has met with the enemy has been conspicuous, and has elicited the warm approval of both Major-General Sir G. White, V.C., K.C.B., A.D.C., and Brigadier-General Faunce, but beyond this the steadfast endurance of the men in a prolonged and arduous undertaking of the kind described merits recognition, and the Lieutenant-General records with the greatest pleasure his sense of the excellent spirit and discipline displayed by the Regiment, and conveys his thanks most specially to Colonel Skene, D.S.O., commanding, and to the other British officers who have been associated with him in the operations, and begs he will convey to the native ranks the expression of his entire satisfaction with and approval of their conduct.”

In September, 1890, a revolution took place in the little State of Manipur. Tekandrajit Bir Singh, then Senapati (Commander-in-Chief), ousted his brother, the Maharajah, and installed another brother, then Jubraj (Heir-Apparent), as Maharajah, while he himself assumed the position of Jubraj and became the virtual ruler of the State. The Government of India refused to recognize this *coup d'état*, and decided that the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Mr. J. W. Quinton, C.S.I., should proceed to Manipur, there hold a public Durbar, and arrest and deport Tekandrajit, the self-appointed Jubraj.

In accordance with this decision, which was kept a profound secret, Mr. Quinton proceeded to Manipur, via Kohima, in March, 1891, with an escort of 400 men of the 42nd and 44th Gurkha Rifles, under the command of Colonel C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., Commandant 42nd Gurkha Rifles. The officers accompanying the detach-

ment of the 42nd Gurkha Rifles were Captain G. H. Butcher, Lieutenant J. B. Chatterton (Adjutant), Lieutenant E. J. Lugard, D.S.O., and Surgeon J. T. Calvert. The officers with the 44th Gurkha Rifles were Captain T. S. Boileau and Lieutenant L. W. Brackenbury.

About 10 a.m. on March 22nd, 1891, the Chief Commissioner arrived at Manipur. For the last mile or more the road was lined by Manipuri troops, and the Maharajah's band played the column in. The Jubraj met the Chief Commissioner four miles from Manipur, while the Maharajah or Regent (as designated by the Government) received him at the main gate of the city. The troops were cordially welcomed and provided with grass huts on the polo ground, alongside the north wall of the Residency Compound. The force then consisted of 200 rifles 42nd Gurkha Rifles, 200 rifles 44th Gurkha Rifles, less 20 men left at Sengmai (ten miles from Manipur) as a baggage guard, and the Residency guard of 100 rifles 43rd Gurkha Rifles, under Lieutenant W. H. Simpson. Of this guard, however, 33 rifles were on detachment at Langthobal, four miles from Manipur, and 11 rifles were on escort duty to Cachar; this escort returned to the Residency on the afternoon of the 24th. There were, therefore, some 440 rifles available on arrival. The 42nd and 44th were armed with Snider rifles, the 43rd with Martini rifles.

Orders were given for a Durbar to be held at noon that day. The men of the escort were ordered to remain more or less under arms, and guards were posted for the Durbar, including one of 70 rifles concealed in rear of the Residency. At noon the Regent arrived in great state, but was kept waiting a considerable time owing to delay in translating the orders of Government. When he was admitted it was seen that the Jubraj had not come, excusing himself on the grounds of illness. The Chief Commissioner declined to see the Regent without the Jubraj. The Jubraj was sent for, but persisted in his excuses, and the Regent eventually returned to his palace, being informed that a Durbar would be held the next morning at eight o'clock. The next morning, 23rd, the Regent did not come, and the Durbar was again postponed till one o'clock, with the

same result, as the Jubraj continued to plead illness and refused to see any officer. The Regent was pressed to surrender the Jubraj, but refused. After dinner that night Colonel Skene summoned all the military officers and told them, what had hitherto been kept absolutely secret, that the Chief Commissioner's object was to arrest and deport the Jubraj, and he gave orders for the next morning for carrying this into effect. His orders were :

1. Lieutenant Brackenbury, with 30 rifles, to proceed to the north entrance to the city, to cut off the escape of the Jubraj, either through this entrance or into the palace itself.

2. Captain Butcher, with 70 rifles, to proceed to the Jubraj's house—outside, and to the north of, the inner wall—and arrest him.

3. Lieutenant Lugard, with 40 rifles, to support Captain Butcher's party.

4. One hundred rifles to remain in reserve, under Colonel Skene.

5. Remainder of force available to remain as guards to the camp and the Residency, under Captain Boileau.


Our men were not to open fire unless first fired on by the Manipuris.

The city was a square of rather over three-quarters of a mile, surrounded by an outer wall, with a ditch in front. This outer wall was mostly in ruins and the ditch was mostly dry, except the portion facing the Residency Compound. There was an inner enclosure, nearly half a mile square, surrounded by an inner wall in good repair, with bastions and wet ditch. Within this again was the Citadel, a formidable work, about 160 yards square. The Political Agent estimated the enemy within the city at 6,000 armed men, with four 7-pounder guns (presented by the British Government), besides some guns of older date, with plenty of ammunition.

At 4.45 a.m. on the 24th Lieutenant Brackenbury moved off. Having reached the neighbourhood of the Jubraj's house, he was fired on at close quarters. His party fell back under cover of a bank, but was attacked in rear and in flank. Lieutenant Brackenbury and Subadar Hima Chund, 1 colour havildar and 2 sepoys were severely wounded, and two or three others slightly wounded. Great difficulty was experienced in tracing

RECONNAISSANCE SKETCH OF MANIPUR FORT.

Grade 1 Book = 640 Feet



their whereabouts, although separate efforts were made by Lieutenants Simpson and Lugard and Surgeon Calvert. Ultimately, they were very gallantly brought in by Havildar Dhup Chand and Lance-Naik Naiwal Singh Rana, of the 44th, and Naik Singeah Lama and Sepoy Jaimani Thapa, of the 42nd.

Captain Butcher's party, guided by Lieutenant Simpson, moved off about 5 a.m. As it entered the outer enclosure the Manipuris at once opened fire. Leaving 20 rifles at the outer wall to keep down the fire from the inner wall, Captain Butcher pushed on, under heavy fire, to the Jubraj's enclosure, and eventually seized the Temple in the centre of that enclosure at about 7 a.m., having previously been joined by the support, under Lieutenant Lugard. The enemy's guns now opened fire from the Citadel. Seven men were wounded in reaching this objective. Captain Butcher here awaited further orders. Colonel Skene, on hearing the position, at once started with his reserve to join Captain Butcher. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Chatterton, with 30 rifles, had very gallantly rushed and occupied the Main Gate on the west. Colonel Skene at first intended to attempt the assault of the inner enclosure, and escalading ladders, prepared overnight, were brought up for the purpose. Fifty rifles, under Lieutenant Simpson, were detached to cover the assault. Later, however, Colonel Skene decided that ammunition was too low to warrant him in assaulting, and he returned to the Residency to consult the Chief Commissioner.

The Residency Compound was a rectangle, about 530 by 350 yards, surrounded by a mud wall and a ditch; the wall was about three feet high, except on the east side, where it was six feet high, too high to fire over. It was bullet-proof, but not loopholed. Men were placed all round the Compound walls. The Compound was completely commanded on the east by the city wall, and on the south and west was hemmed in by villages. At 11 a.m. the telegraph lines were cut, and about noon fire was opened on the Residency from a large village on the west. All attacking parties were now recalled for the defence of the Residency, which was being heavily attacked from several points. About 5 p.m. the guard holding the Main City Gate was driven

out, and this enabled the enemy to man the outer wall facing the Residency Compound and only 100 yards from it.

Heavy shell and musketry fire now swept the Compound, while the guns were accurately laid on the Residency; fire was also opened from the villages to the south and west. The hospital became untenable, being riddled with bullets, and Surgeon Calvert and Lieutenant Lugard managed to get the wounded out, placing them under cover of the masonry plinth, in which task Lieutenant Lugard was wounded.

About 8 p.m. the "Cease Fire" was sounded and a truce obtained. Negotiations were opened with the Regent, and eventually Mr. Quinton went out, accompanied by Mr. Grimwood (Political Agent), Mr. Cossins (Secretary to the Chief Commissioner), Colonel Skene and Lieutenant Simpson, to meet the Jubraj. After a long consultation outside the city gate, they all went inside and were seen no more. During the truce the wounded were taken over to the cellar of the Residency, where Lieutenant Brackenbury and Subadar Hima Chund died of their wounds. Mrs. Grimwood rendered help here. About midnight a terrific fire was reopened on the Residency. It was obvious that the Chief Commissioner and the officers with him had been treacherously taken prisoners and (as was learnt long afterwards) foully murdered. The position in the Compound became quite untenable, ammunition was very short, and the men were exhausted from want of food and sleep. It was, therefore, decided to retreat by the Cachar road, as a detachment of 200 men of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles, under Captain Cowley, was expected next day by that route. The necessity for abandoning the untenable Residency Compound and taking up a position in the open, where the guns might be rushed if brought against us, had been realized by Colonel Skene earlier in the day. The retreat began about 2 a.m. on the 25th. After great privations, the retreating force met Captain Cowley's column on the Cachar road early on the 26th. It was decided, on account of the shortage of ammunition and lack of food, to continue the retreat to Silchar.

The detachment of 33 rifles of the 43rd Gurkha Rifles at Langthobal found it impossible to comply with the

orders sent them on the 24th to come into Manipur, and, after being attacked on the 25th, successfully retreated to Tammu, where they met Captain Grant and joined him in his gallant defence of Thobal, for which he was awarded the V.C.

The 42nd Gurkha Rifles suffered the following casualties: Killed, Colonel C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., and 3 sepoy; wounded, Lieutenant E. J. Lugard, D.S.O., and 15 sepoy; missing, 11 sepoy; total, 31.

The Court of Inquiry, which assembled at Manipur in May, commended the conduct of the following as "conspicuously creditable":—

42nd Gurkha Rifles.—Surgeon J. T. Calvert, Lieutenant E. J. Lugard, D.S.O., Naik Singeah Lama, and Sepoy Jaimani Thapa.

43rd Gurkha Rifles.—Jemadar Birbul Nagarkoti.

44th Gurkha Rifles.—Havildar Dhup Chand, Lance-Naik Nawal Singh Rana, Sepoy Dalsingh Thapa, Mansingh Thapa, and Goreah Thapa.

Naik Singeah Lama was promoted to 2nd Class, Order of Merit, and Sepoy Jaimani Thapa was awarded 3rd Class (corresponding to 1st and 2nd Class, respectively, of to-day).

On receipt of the news of the disaster, the Government of India gave orders for three columns to be assembled immediately, as follows:—

Kohima Column, under Brig.-General H. Collett, C.B.—Three guns No. 8 M.B.; 100 rifles 13th B.I.; 200 rifles 42nd Gurkha Rifles; 400 rifles 43rd Gurkha Rifles; 300 rifles 44th Gurkha Rifles; 200 Assam Military Police.

Cachar Column, under Lieut.-Colonel R. H. F. Rennick.—Two guns No. 8 M.B.; 370 rifles 18th B.I.; 100 rifles 42nd Gurkha Rifles; 280 rifles 43rd Gurkha Rifles; 100 rifles 44th Gurkha Rifles; 1st Bn. 2nd Gurkha Regiment; 50 Pioneer Company, Calcutta Volunteer Rifles; 200 Surma Valley Military Police.

Tammu Column, under Brig.-General T. Graham, C.B.—Four guns No. 2 M.B.; 1 Wing, 4th Bn. 60th King's Royal Rifle Corps; 2nd Bn. 4th Gurkha Regiment; 12th Madras Infantry.

Total Force.—Nine guns, 4,800 rifles (approx.).

These Columns reached Manipur simultaneously on April 27th, and became the Manipur Field Force, under

Major-General H. Collett, C.B. The Tammu Column was opposed at Palel, but no serious resistance was offered to the other Columns. No attempt was made at Manipur to resist such an overwhelming force. The Regent, the Jubraj, and others prominent in the outbreak, fled before the arrival of the troops. They were, however, captured and brought to trial. The Jubraj and Tongal General were condemned to death and hung; the Regent and others were transported for life.

The India Medal with clasp "N.E. Frontier 1891" was granted to the troops of the Field Force.



LIEUT. COLONEL C. McD. SKENE, D.S.O.,
1888—1891.



CAPT. & BREVET COLONEL A. G. B. TERNAN, D.S.O.,
1891—1893.

CHAPTER V.

ON the death of Colonel C. McD. Skene, D.S.O., in March, Lieut.-Colonel Elliston officiated in command of the Regiment until the arrival of Captain and Bt. Colonel A. G. B. Ternan, D.S.O., on September 10th, 1891.

The Regiment remained at Imphal until May 16th, 1891, and then marched to Kohima, where it was ordered to remain.

Detachments were furnished at Khonema, Kuzama, Kairong, and Maityphum.

In March, 1891, the designation of the Regiment was changed from the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry to the 42nd Gurkha Rifle Regiment of Bengal Infantry (G.G.O. 175/1891), and, according to Rifle custom, black accoutrements were issued.

By G.G.O. 64/1891 sanction was accorded to the Regiment to bear on its appointments the battle honour "Burma, 1885-87."

In November of the same year Martini-Henry rifles Mk. II were issued to replace the Snider.

During the same month Captain G. H. Butcher was removed from the service.

By G.G.O. 208/1891 the three Presidency armies were amalgamated under the general designation of "Indian Staff Corps." Recruiting centres were introduced in 1892 as a step towards removing the difficulty of attracting recruits of the right stamp. Gorakhpur was selected as the centre for Gurkhas. In December, 1892, the Head-quarter Wing marched from Kohima to Imphal to take part in a camp of exercise, on conclusion of which it was inspected by Brig.-General G. N. Channer, V.C., C.B., and reported on very favourably.

On December 11th, 1893, Captain and Bt. Colonel A. G. B. Ternan, D.S.O., died as a result of the effects of active service, and was replaced in command by Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O.

The system of enlisting recruit boys (half chokras) was introduced in the Regiment in 1894 (Commander-in-Chief's letter No. 1,620/A, dated June 8th, 1894).

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In December of the same year the Regiment marched, via Golaghat, from Kohima and Manipur to Shillong. General Sir George White, V.C., K.C.B., inspected it at Shillong on March 7th, 1895, and in October it marched from Shillong to Gauhati, from where it was conveyed by river steamer to Tezporé to take part in a camp of exercise. Having been inspected at Tezporé by Lieut.-General Sir William Elles, K.C.B., the Regiment returned to Shillong in February, 1896.

The Presidency Army system was abolished in 1896, and in its stead the Army in India was organized in four commands : —

Punjab.

Bengal.

Madras (including Burma).

Bombay (including Sind, Quetta, Aden).

A Lieutenant-General was appointed to each command.

G.O. 59/1896 abolished the fatigue cap. It was replaced by the Austrian pattern field cap. A badge was directed to be worn on the left side, and the one chosen and sanctioned was two silver Kukris, $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches long, crossed edge downwards, the figures 42 under the angle, and the words Gurkha Rifles on a silver scroll below. With the exception of the substitution of the figure 6 for the figures 42, the design remains the same to-day (1925).

Lieut.-General Sir Baker Russell, K.C.B., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bengal Command, inspected the Regiment at Shillong in January, 1897. The same year Lieut.-Colonel Macgregor, D.S.O., was selected to command brigades in the Mohmand and Tirah Expeditions respectively. He was mentioned in despatches and awarded the C.B. After the expeditions he went home on furlough, and rejoined the Regiment in December, 1898. During his two years' absence Captain and Temporary-Major H. W. Priestly commanded.

A disastrous earthquake occurred at Shillong during the afternoon of June 12th, 1897. Every building in the place was destroyed. Two men were killed in the hospital, and two women in the married lines died of injuries received.

Nearly all the mess plate, which happened to be on the dining-room table, was ruined by the fall of the mess. Recovered later, the bent and battered silver was sent

home, where it was melted down and made into the present centre-piece, the silver figure of a rifleman of the 42nd Gurkha Rifles.

Nearly all the rifles in the Bells of Arms were so damaged as to be rendered unserviceable, and in August the Regiment was rearmed with Martini-Henry Mk. IV rifles.

The Assam Government Secretariat printing press collapsed, entombing between 30 and 40 workers. Two companies of the Regiment, under Captain Chatterton, proceeded immediately to the spot and worked with reliefs for thirty-six hours. They succeeded in rescuing some of the men who had been buried in the ruins.

For three months after the earthquake the Regiment was continually assisting the residents of Shillong, both civil and military, in building temporary houses, pitching tents, clearing debris, and working on the Shillong-Gauhati road, where many bridges and culverts had been damaged and destroyed.

The following is an extract from a letter, No. 1,736, dated July 29th, from the Deputy Commissioner to the secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam:—

“ . . . At the Press I found the Gurkhas, who had been working all night under Captain Chatterton, recovering the killed and wounded at the risk of their lives amid successive shocks, the worst of which occurred shortly after 1 a.m. The men were quite exhausted. It was now about 3 a.m. While on the subject, I may say all praise is due to the Regiment and the officers in command, who worked night and day to rescue the entombed in the ruins of the Press as long as there was any hope of anyone being left alive. . . . ”

Further complimentary tributes were paid to the rescue work of the Regiment by the Chief Commissioner of Assam and by the Assam District Commander.

The following letter was published in the *Assam Gazette* dated August 21st, 1897:—

“ The Chief Commissioner desires to acknowledge the invaluable services which were rendered by the military authorities to the Administration. Fatigue parties of sepoys, under the command of Captain Chatterton, were employed day and night immediately after the earthquake in rescuing those who were entombed in the fall of the

Secretariat Press. They also assisted in building huts for the civil population, and temporary sheds for the Secretariat records, and were detailed in bridge and road repairing under Captain East. Mr. Cotton heartily thanks the officers and men of the 42nd G.R. for their willing and active co-operation."

Brig.-General Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., commanding the Assam District, published the following order, dated July 5th, 1897:—

104.—"The General Officer Commanding wishes to put on record his appreciation of the good work done by Captain Chatterton and the officers and men of the 42nd Gurkha Rifles during the time succeeding the very severe earthquake of the 12th June, 1897, in which all the buildings in Shillong, public and private, were destroyed, both in rescue work and afterwards in erecting shelters, which latter work is still being carried on by Major H. W. Priestly, now rejoined from leave.

"The General Officer Commanding thanks them heartily for himself and for all whom they have helped, for the willing, cheery way in which they have done all that was asked of them."

An outbreak of cholera followed the earthquake at Shillong, but, due to timely precautions, no cases occurred in the Regiment.

Lieutenant F. C. Macnaghten died of dysentery on August 3rd. On August 5th Subadar-Major Mahes Thapa was accidentally shot on fatigue parade. He had served for thirty years, and was appointed Subadar-Major on January 1st, 1892.

The green cloth patrol jacket was abolished in 1897 and a green serge patrol jacket introduced.

From November, 1897, until July, 1898, the Regiment was employed in building new barracks at Shillong. The Government sanctioned the expenditure of Rs8,000 for this purpose. The barracks were constructed of stone and roofed with corrugated iron.

In December, 1898, Colonel Macgregor, C.B., D.S.O., rejoined and assumed command. In January, 1899, he proceeded to Tezpur on special duty, and on February 22nd assumed temporary command of the Assam District until March 1st. Major Priestly officiated in command during his absence. Finally, on April 6th, 1899, Colonel



LIEUT.-COLONEL C. R. MACGREGOR, D.S.O.,
1893—1899.



LIEUT.-COLONEL H. O'DONNELL, D.S.O.,
1899—1907. COLONEL OF REGIMENT 1911.

Macgregor was appointed Colonel-on-the-Staff, and handed over command of the Regiment to Major Priestly, pending the arrival of a permanent Commanding Officer.

Captain F. C. Colomb graduated at the Staff College, Camberley, in 1899. He was the first officer in the Regiment to go to the Staff College.

Major Priestly died at Shillong, after a short illness, on May 5th, 1899; and the following appeared in Regimental Orders (R.O. No. 201, dated May 5th, 1899):—

“It is with the deepest regret, which he knows is shared by all ranks, that the Commanding Officer has to announce the death this morning of Major H. W. Priestly. Major Priestly joined the Regiment on 6th December, 1892, as Wing Commander, and was appointed 2nd-in-Command on 31st May, 1896, since which date he has for some time officiated as Commandant.

“To his zeal and intimate knowledge of every detail of military duty the Regiment owes a debt which it can never repay. His whole energies were devoted to his corps, and he invariably displayed the keenest interest in it as a whole, and in every member of it individually. Of his professional attainments the present Commanding Officer feels some diffidence in speaking, but they are so well known that any mention of them appears unnecessary.

“He excelled in every branch of sport, and everything that he did he did well. In taking leave of him on behalf of the Regiment the Commanding Officer bids farewell to a fine soldier, good sportsman and true comrade, whose place it will be hard to fill in the corps he served so well.”

(Major Priestly joined the 42nd Gurkha Rifles in 1892 from the 44th Gurkha Rifles.)

Major H. O'Donnell, D.S.O., 44th Gurkha Rifles, was appointed Commandant *vice* Colonel C. R. MacGregor, C.B., D.S.O., on May 31st, 1899.

In 1899 the Regiment was transferred to the Punjab Command. All men were offered the alternative of taking their discharge or of accepting a bonus of Rs50 (to forego Assam Batta) to proceed with the Regiment to the Punjab on the condition that they completed three years' service there. About 50 men took their discharge.

After a tour of duty of seventy-seven years in Assam the Regiment left Shillong for Gauhati by route march en route to Abbottabad on September 16th, 1899. On arrival at Gauhati the Regiment embarked on September 24th on the river steamer *Vulture*. From Gauhati the s.s. *Vulture* proceeded down the River Brahmaputra as far as the junction of that river with the Ganges at Goalundo, thence up the Ganges to Rajmahal. Two days after leaving Gauhati (September 26th) cholera broke out on board. Owing to the severe rains and floods the scenes on board were very distressing. On October 1st the Regiment arrived at Rajmahal and disembarked. The disease raged until October 5th. By constantly moving camp the epidemic was stamped out. The following were seizures and deaths :—

<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Admissions.</i>	<i>Deaths.</i>	<i>Recoveries.</i>
Gurkha Officers	0	0	0
Non-commissioned Officers	3	3	0
Riflemen	46	24	22
Followers	7	4	3
Women	31	19	12
Children	18	8	10
Total	105	58	47

The Regiment was kept at Rajmahal, Maharajpur and Jhajha till December 3rd, 1899, when it was finally pronounced clear, and permitted to be railed to Benares, where it remained until March, 1900.

A detachment of the Regiment, under command of Lieutenant H. S. Shaw, composed of 4 Gurkha officers, 20 non-commissioned officers, 4 buglers, and 196 riflemen, was left at Shillong on the departure of the Regiment to take part in operations against the Mishmis. In December the detachment proceeded to Dibrugarh and joined the column commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Molesworth, 44th Gurkha Rifles. Lieutenant B. A. Rice joined this detachment later from Jhajha. The operations lasted from December to January. The detachment saw no fighting, but had a good deal of hard work and marching at high altitudes, and rejoined Headquarters at Benares on February 23rd, 1900.

Lieut.-General Sir George Luck, K.C.B., G.O.C.-in-C. Bengal Command, inspected the Regiment at Benares, and on March 4th, 1900, it was railed to Hasan Abdal,

railhead at that time for Abbottabad. On March 25th the 42nd Gurkha Rifles arrived at Abbottabad. (See Map No. 2.)

Army Circular, India, 66/1900, abolished the system of wings in native infantry battalions and introduced the double company system. The Regiment was reorganized as follows:—

<i>Old Companies.</i>	<i>Double Companies.</i>	<i>Commander.</i>
"A" and "B" Coys.	No. 1 Double Coy.	Major F. C. Colomb.
"E" and "F" Coys.	No. 2 Double Coy.	Capt. J. B. Chatterton.
"C" and "D" Coys.	No. 3 Double Coy.	Capt. E. J. Lugard, D.S.O.
"G" and "H" Coys.	No. 4 Double Coy.	Capt. M. G. James.

On September 21st, 1900, the Regiment left Abbottabad en route for Chitral, and arrived at Kila Drosh on October 17th, where it relieved the 32nd Punjab Infantry, the latter returning to India on October 24th. One double company, under Lieutenant S. F. B. Dalrymple-Hay was detached to garrison the fort at Chitral. During the absence of the Regiment in Chitral the depot remained at Abbottabad, and was commanded successively by the following officers of the 5th Gurkha Rifles F.F.:—Major F. G. Lucas, D.S.O., Lieutenants Bridges, Govan and Battye.

As a result of the discharges on the transfer of the Regiment from Assam to the Punjab, and the cholera outbreak, 150 recruits were required to bring the Regiment up to strength. By March, 1900, a recruiting party, under Subadar Judhbir Gurung, had obtained the required numbers.

The Regiment remained at Kila Drosh and Chitral until October, 1901, and on the 14th of that month commenced its return march to India and arrived at Abbottabad on November 9th.

The same year the name of the Regiment was changed from 42nd Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment of Bengal Infantry to 42nd Gurkha Rifles.

In January, 1902, the 42nd Gurkha Rifles took part in the Yusufzai camp of exercise, as part of the 2nd Indian Infantry Brigade under command of Colonel Young, Royal Sussex Regiment.

Double furlough was given to all ranks to make up for the furlough missed when the Regiment was in Chitral.

In March, '303 Lee-Enfield Mk. IV rifles were issued, and replaced the Martini-Henry pattern.

One Gurkha officer and 25 rank and file were trained in mounted infantry duties at Ambala during the year, a form of soldiering extraordinarily unsuited to Gurkhas.

Lord Kitchener had taken over the duties of Commander-in-Chief in India in 1902, and many reforms were introduced in 1903.

The first was the abolition of the designation "Indian Staff Corps," the name "Indian Army" being substituted.

In April of the same year the Regiment furnished the Simla guard detachments for their Excellencies the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief. Captain A. J. Strange commanded the detachment, which was composed of 4 Gurkha officers and 184 rank and file. It marched from Abbottabad on March 21st and returned on November 30th, 1903.

Indian Army Order No. 181, dated October 2nd, 1903, published new names and numbers for all units of the Indian Army. Gurkha regiments were numbered separately, and under this scheme the name of the Regiment was changed to the 6th Gurkha Rifles. Had the renumbering been based on the dates on which the regiments were raised, the order of regiments would have been 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 9th, 8th, 4th, 5th, 10th, and 7th Gurkha Rifles.

In November the Army in India was grouped into three army corps. Under the four-command system the Army was distributed in geographical divisions, and not in accordance with war requirements. In the army corps scheme all trace of the names of the Presidency armies was obliterated.


In December the 6th Gurkha Rifles formed part of the 1st Indian Infantry Brigade, and took part in manœuvres at Rawal Pindi.

Two machine guns were issued to the Regiment during the year 1903, also sixteen pairs of binoculars and three mekometers, two men rangefinders, disrespectfully known as "the string and guessing box."

On the conclusion of the Rawal Pindi manœuvres the Regiment returned to Abbottabad, where it remained throughout 1904.

**SKETCH
ILLUSTRATING
GEOGRAPHICAL HISTORY
FROM 1900 TO 1914.**

MAP No. 2.



2 Miles to 1 Inch.

50

100 miles

D.G.J.R.

Bandolier equipment was introduced. The Wolseley pattern helmet replaced the old pattern, and the staff cap with peak was substituted for the Austrian pattern field cap.

On May 13th, 1904, Lieut.-General J. P. Sherriff, who had commanded the Regiment from 1873-1884, was appointed Colonel of the 6th Gurkha Rifles.

In November, 1904, orders were received to form a second Battalion. A copy of the Army Order is published below (I.A.O. No. 790, dated November 5th, 1904):—

“With the approval of the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to sanction the formation of a Battalion to be designated the 2nd Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles, to be composed of Gurkhas of the same class as those recruited for the 1st Battalion of that Regiment.

“2. The Battalion will be raised at Abbottabad.

“3. The uniform of the Battalion will be that prescribed in the Army Regulations for the 6th Gurkha Rifles.

“4. The strength and organization of the Battalion, including its establishment of followers, will, for all ranks British and Native, be that authorized for Gurkha Battalions of the Northern Command.

“5. The 6th Gurkha Rifles will be divided into two wings. Four of its companies will be retained to form the 1st Battalion, the other four being transferred to form the 2nd Battalion. Both Battalions will then complete their strength by enlisting recruits up to the number authorized.

“6. Recruiting for both Battalions will be carried out under the orders of the R.S.O. for Gurkhas. Two Regimental Officers from each Battalion, including a Medical Officer, may be detailed at a time to act as his assistants. These officers will be allowed to travel at the public expense by rail and dak, and they will be entitled to the special allowance authorized for Assistant Recruiting Officers, viz., Rs5 per diem, whilst absent from Battalion Headquarters.

“7. The Native ranks of the Battalion will be provided with transport at the public expense. They will not be entitled to draw marching batta.

" 8. Consequent on the conversion of the 65th Carnatic Light Infantry into a Gurkha Battalion, to be designated the 2nd Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles, the latter will take over the Regimental Funds, and Mess and Band Funds of the 65th Carnatic Light Infantry as ordered in para. 10, I.A.O. 765 of 1904, and the subsidiary instructions published with reference thereto in Madras Command Orders.

" 9. An advance of Rs10,000, to be repaid within three years, is sanctioned by Government to assist the Battalion in the organization of its funds.

" 10. The Lieutenant-General Commanding Northern Command will issue any further orders that may be necessary."

The division of the 6th Gurkha Rifles into two battalions took place at Abbottabad on November 5th, 1904, as follows:—

The Left Wing of the Regiment was transferred to form the 2nd Battalion, the Right Wing became the 1st Battalion.

The British officers were divided as follows:—

1st Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel H. O'Donnell, D.S.O., Commanding Officer; Major C. M. Crawford, Major J. B. Chatterton, Major E. J. Lugard, D.S.O., Captain M. G. James, Captain H. S. Shaw, Captain F. H. Norie, Lieutenant G. W. S. Sherlock, Lieutenant C. J. L. Allanson (Adjutant), Lieutenant A. H. Seagrim, and Lieutenant C. W. B. Birdwood.

2nd Battalion: Major F. C. Colomb, Commanding Officer; Captain A. J. Strange, Captain A. E. C. Perkins (Adjutant), Captain S. F. B. Dalrymple-Hay, Lieutenant B. A. McH. Rice, Lieutenant R. C. Blair (Quartermaster), and Lieutenant B. C. Sparrow.

From the date of the formation of the 2nd Battalion this history deals only with the 1st Battalion. History of the 2nd Battalion will be found on page 199 *et seq.*

Reorganization in the 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles commenced immediately.

Old " A " Coy.	became " A " and " B " Coys.	or	No. 1	Double Coy.
Old " B " "	" " " C " and " D " "	"	No. 2	" "
Old " C " "	" " " E " and " F " "	"	No. 3	" "
Old " D " "	" " " G " and " H " "	"	No. 4	" "



LIEUT. COLONEL C. M. CRAWFORD,
COMMANDED 1st BN. 1907-1908; 2nd BN. 1908-1912.



LIEUT. COLONEL J. B. CHATTERTON
1908-1914.

By March, 1905, 485 recruits, to bring the Battalion up to strength, had been enlisted. The Adjutant and drill staff were assisted by additional British and Gurkha officers and instructors. It was indeed a strenuous time for the training staff, but of the 485 recruits 380 were allowed to join the ranks temporarily to take part in the Prince of Wales's manœuvres and review near Rawal Pindi in December, 1905.

On December 8th the Battalion was inspected in its camp near Rawal Pindi by H.R.H. Prince of Wales, now H.M. King George V, who was accompanied by Lord Kitchener.

On December 13th the Battalion returned to Abbottabad.

For financial reasons the scheme outlined by Lord Kitchener in November, 1903, for the reorganization of the Army in India was not completely adopted. By the beginning of 1905 a new organization was introduced. The troops were grouped by formations into three commands (Northern, Western, and Eastern) and two independent divisions (9th Secunderabad and Burma).

Short Lee-Enfield rifles were issued in 1905 to replace the long Lee-Enfield. It is interesting to note in respect to the short Lee-Enfield rifle of 1905, that the long Enfield rifle issued to the Regiment in 1871 was replaced by a short pattern Enfield rifle in 1872.

In February, 1906, the Battalion took part in the Hasan Abdal manœuvres.

During the same year khaki drill shorts were adopted as uniform, instead of khaki drill knickerbockers.

Summer camps were introduced and became an annual institution. The sites selected were at Jaba and Miranjani, averaging between 7,000 and 8,000 feet above sea level, and at Sabul not quite so high. The recruits spent just over two months in camp, whilst each company did one month. On account of the monsoon it was usually necessary to leave summer camps by the first week in July. Much praise is due to Captain G. W. S. Sherlock for the introduction of the camps.

A khaki felt hat for use in field service order was introduced in 1907.

Colonel H. O'Donnell, D.S.O., relinquished command of the Battalion on January 31st, 1907, and was succeeded by Major C. M. Crawford.

In January of the same year the Battalion took part in brigade manœuvres at Chamhad.

In 1907 the three-command organization of the Army in India was replaced by the introduction of an Army organization—Northern and Southern. The Northern Army comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th and 8th Divisions, and the Kohat, Bannu, and Derajat Brigades; the Southern Army was composed of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th Divisions, the Burma Division, and the Aden Brigade.

Lieut.-General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Northern Army, inspected the Battalion at Abbottabad in October, 1907.

In 1908 an expedition was carried out against the Zakha Khels. The Battalion mobilized, and on February 8th marched from Abbottabad for Hasan Abdal, where it entrained and was railed to Nowshera. On arrival it was detailed to the 3rd (Reserve) Brigade. This Brigade was not employed, and on conclusion of the expedition the Battalion returned to Abbottabad.

In April, 1908, an expedition was sent against the Mohmands. Again the Battalion mobilized, and on May 5th marched for the Margalla Pass. Thence it was railed to Nowshera, where it formed part of the Malakand Movable Column. It remained in camp at Nowshera Tahsil during May. The Malakand Movable Column took no part in the operations, and on conclusion of the expedition the Battalion returned to Abbottabad. On June 2nd, whilst en route from Hasan Abdal to Abbottabad, a case of cholera occurred. It was followed by others, and the disease was not finally stamped out until September, 1908. Twenty-three cases occurred, with seventeen deaths.

Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Crawford was transferred from the command of the 1st to that of the 2nd Battalion on September 1st, 1908. He was replaced by Major J. B. Chatterton.

In 1908 a recruit, Tulbir Gurung by name, joined the Battalion. Shortly after joining he showed a special aptitude for Khud running. Captain Sherlock, who was Adjutant at the time, trained him with the other Khud runners, and in 1909 Tulbir won the Gurkha Brigade Khud Race for the first time. He won again in 1910,



KHUD RUNNERS, 1st & 2nd BNS. GURKHA RIFLES, 1914
(Tulbir Gurung standing in front row.)



BRIG.-GENERAL H. V. COX, C.S.I., C.I.E.

1911, 1912, and 1913, which up to the present (1925) is a record of successive wins. In 1914 he was beaten by Rfmn. Manniraj Gurung, of the 2nd Battalion, a man who had previously won the race in 1907. In 1915 Tulbir was wounded in the leg in Gallipoli, and his running career ended.

On January 1st, 1909, the pay of British and Indian officers and Indian other ranks was increased.

In March, 1909, rucksacks were introduced. Bronze buttons replaced the composition pattern. The Sirhind entrenching tool was issued in the proportion of seventy-five per cent. of the field service strength of the Battalion.

During the winter of 1909 the Battalion took part in the Rawal Pindi divisional manœuvres, which were preceded by brigade and inter-brigade training.

On conclusion of manœuvres the Battalion marched into Rawal Pindi and camped on the glaxis of the Arsenal. It remained at Rawal Pindi until February 10th, 1910, and then marched back to Abbottabad via the Shalditta Pass, Khanpur and Haripur.

The guard detachment at Simla was furnished by the Battalion during 1910; Major J. H. Lloyd, and later Lieutenant A. W. D. Cornish, commanded it. It was composed of 3 Gurkha officers and 192 rank and file. This detachment was previously furnished by the Regiment in 1903.

Lieut.-General J. P. Sherriff, Colonel of the Regiment, died in England in 1911; and Major-General H. O'Donnell, C.B., D.S.O., who had commanded the Regiment from 1899 to 1907, replaced him.

During the year helmet lines with full dress were sanctioned and introduced.

Subadar Gambirsing Pun and Rfmn. Dallu Ale proceeded to London to attend the Coronation of His Majesty King George V.

The Gazette of India, dated January 12th, 1912, announced that all ranks of the Indian Army were eligible to win the Victoria Cross.

White helmets for full dress were introduced for British officers instead of the black helmet (I.A.O. 173/1913).

On March 16th, 1914, Colonel J. B. Chatterton died in the Military Station Hospital at Rawal Pindi, whither he


had been removed from Abbottabad to undergo an operation. His death was a severe blow to all ranks of the Regiment, with whom he was universally popular. All British officers of the Regiment, Gurkha officers and buglers of the 1st Battalion, and all British officers of the garrison attended the funeral at Rawal Pindi. The escort was furnished by the 2nd Battalion The Rifle Brigade.

The following Battalion Order was published :—

“ It is with the greatest regret and sorrow that the Commanding Officer has to announce to the Battalion the death of Colonel J. B. Chatterton, which occurred at Rawal Pindi on the morning of March 16th. Colonel Chatterton had a long and honourable career, and his whole life's work centred in the 6th Gurkha Rifles. No regiment could have had a better friend, or one more devoted to its interests. His untimely death has cut short a career which was already assured. Both as a soldier and as a personal friend his loss is very great to all ranks. The Officer Commanding is sure that his sorrow will be shared by all who had the honour to serve under him.”

Colonel J. B. Chatterton was succeeded in command by Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O., who had been transferred as Second-in-Command to the 1st Battalion from the 5th Gurkha Rifles F.F. in May, 1913.

In May, 1914, double companies and recruits proceeded to summer camps at Jaba and Miranjani, as usual. Little was it thought at that time that in a few months the great European Powers were to be plunged into a war destined to last for many years and to strain the military resources of the British Empire to the utmost.



RECRUITS BEING SWORN IN ON THE KING'S COLOUR. ABBOTTABAD, 1914

CHAPTER VI.

On August 4th, 1914, war was declared against Germany. The first thought which crossed the minds of most officers in the Indian Army was: "Will the Indian Army take part?" Hopes that it would were raised when a telegram was received from Army Headquarters ordering reservists to be called up and all men on furlough to be recalled. Despite the difficulty of travelling through Nepal at this season of the year, owing to the swollen rivers, both furlough men and reservists soon commenced to arrive at Abbottabad.

By the middle of August units of the Poona and Meerut Divisions had been ordered to mobilize; and although these orders did not include either battalion of the Regiment, they did at least explode the idea about not using the Indian Army.

On September 21st the first convoy of Indian troops sailed for France. Orders to mobilize were expected daily, and in anticipation of such orders much was done to expedite mobilization as soon as they should be received.

At 9 p.m. on October 15th, 1914, orders for both battalions to mobilize were received. There was little left to be done to complete mobilization. Field service clothing had to be drawn at Rawal Pindi; whilst the Battalion was inspected medically at Abbottabad. The peace establishment of the Battalion, including reservists, was 1,026 all ranks. The war establishment, including a first reinforcement calculated at ten per cent. of all ranks, was laid down at 826, excluding British officers. The fighting battalion was soon selected, but not without much heartburning on the part of those who were rejected by the Medical Officer, and more especially by the very young recruits, who with streaming eyes implored to be allowed to accompany the Battalion. They were consoled by being told that they would come later, which they did, but at the time neither they themselves nor the person who told them believed it. The popular idea was that the war would be a short one!

On October 18th the Battalion completed mobilization,

and on the 26th orders to proceed to Karachi were received.

At 7 a.m. on October 28th the battalion marched for Havelian, where it entrained, and arrived at Karachi, without incident, at 9.45 a.m. on the 31st. Strength:—12 British officers, 18 Gurkha officers, 1 Sub-Assistant Surgeon, 82 non-commissioned officers, 685 riflemen, 24 signallers, 16 buglers—total, 826; 45 followers, 12 mules, and 12 ponies.

British officers who accompanied Battalion:—

Commanding Officer: Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.

Adjutant: Captain D. G. J. Ryan.

Quartermaster: Lieutenant J. M. Whittall.

Signals: Lieutenant L. E. Poynder.

Medical Officer: Captain E. S. Phipson, I.M.S.

I.D.C.: Captain D. R. H. Jackson.

II D.C.: Captain H. R. A. Whytehead and Captain F. B. Abbott (Machine Gun Officer).

III D.C.: Captain A. N. Bredin and Captain C. W. B. Birdwood (Scout Officer).

IV D.C.: Major W. Campbell Little (Second-in-Command) and Captain J. S. Dallas.

Having been informed that Major G. W. Sherlock would join at the base, the Battalion left Abbottabad one officer short.

The undermentioned British officers were detailed to remain at the depot:—Captain F. M. Ransford, Captain A. W. D. Cornish, Lieutenant E. C. Brown, and Lieutenant H. N. King Salter.

Gurkha officers who accompanied the Battalion:—

Subadar-Major Jamansing Gurung, "D" Company.

Jemadar-Adjutant Satsaling Thapa, "D" Company.

Subadar Gambirsing Pun, "A" Company.

Jemadar Nandalal Gurung, "A" Company.

Subadar Santabir Ale, "B" Company.

Jemadar Balsing Thapa, "B" Company.

Subadar Kulia Thapa, "C" Company.


Jemadar Kulbahadur Thapa, "C" Company.

Jemadar Mandersing Thapa, "D" Company.

Subadar Dhanbir Thapa, "E" Company.

Jemadar Dhanraj Pun, "E" Company.

Subadar Dalbir Rana, "F" Company.



**RECRUITS HAVING TAKEN THE OATH, ABOUT TO PASS UNDER THE CROSSED COLOURS
TO JOIN THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPANIES.**

Jemadar Runbahadur Gurung, " F " Company.

Subadar Sahabir Thapa, " G " Company.

Jemadar Dalbahadur Thapa, " G " Company.

Subadar Deodat Thapa, " H " Company.

Jemadar Indrajit Thapa, " H " Company.

Jemadar Kharkbahadur Rana, Reinforcement.

Subadar Lilaram Gurung, Depot.

Jemadar Mehrman Thapa, Depot.

Jemadar Munbahadur Gurung, Depot.

On arrival at the rest camp siding at Karachi the Battalion detrained and marched to camp. Orders were received for the Battalion to join the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General H. V. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., and composed of the following units:—14th K.G.O. Sikhs, 69th Punjabis, 89th Punjabis, and 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

The same afternoon orders were received to hold the Battalion in readiness lest it should be required to quell disturbances in Karachi. War had been declared against Turkey, and there was a possibility of local trouble. However, nothing happened.

The entry of Turkey into the war, as will be seen later, had a far-reaching effect on the destiny of the Battalion.

On November 1st the Battalion, having entrained at the rest camp, was railed down to the Kiamari Docks, where it embarked on the s.s. *Teesta*, a ship belonging to the British India Company. The next morning the *Teesta* moved out of Karachi Harbour and lay off Fort Manora, awaiting the arrival of the other ships of the convoy, which in all numbered ten. At 6 a.m. on November 3rd, escorted by H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh*, the convoy, in two lines ahead, sailed for Suez. The voyage was not without incident. The weather was calm, and the men had every opportunity of settling down to the novel experience of life on board ship. Parades were held daily, physical training, handling of arms, and rapid loading and firing with dummy cartridges.

The fact that a ship can carry only a limited supply of drinking water could not be understood by the men. They argued any amount of water all round, so why should there be any shortage of water on the ship? Subadar Gambirsing Pun, who had attended King

F

George's Coronation, soon enlightened these philosophers. Selecting a dozen men, he seated them in a row on the deck. He then lowered a bucket into the sea, and administered a pint of salt water all round. There was no further waste of fresh water.

The third day at sea a convoy of transports from Bombay, escorted by H.M.S. *Swiftsure* and the R.I.M. *Dufferin*, was sighted. Our convoy slowed down to allow it to come up, eventually proceeding with it in eight lines ahead, in all forty-three ships, a truly wonderful sight.

On arrival at Aden on November 9th, the convoy, less H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh* and three transports, anchored outside the harbour until 3 p.m. the following afternoon, when the voyage was resumed. Shortly after passing Perim a message was taken in from H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, which explains the special mission of H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh* and three transports referred to in the preceding sentence.

"Fort at Sheik Saad has been occupied AAA Casualties 2nd Lieut. Campbell wounded 4 I.O.Rs. killed 10 wounded AAA Enemy's casualties as known 6 killed 2 wounded AAA About half garrison of 400 escaped remainder and his field guns captured AAA Troops re-embarking AAA Pass down line."

The troops which took part in the above action were the 14th Sikhs, 23rd Pioneers, 69th and 89th Punjabis.


Up to this period, although it was hoped that the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was on the way to Marseilles, no information regarding its destination had been received. This belief was strengthened by the receipt of a message from H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh*, asking how much coal the *Teesta* required to take her to that place.

When nine hours from Suez a signal was made to all ships of the convoy to proceed immediately to Suez.

The *Teesta* increased speed and narrowly missed a collision. As she was passing H.M.S. *Duke of Edinburgh* her steering gear jammed. The *Duke of Edinburgh* altered her course and avoided the *Teesta*, which shot past under a volley of abuse, to which the skipper, who was a seafaring Scot, merely replied "Them's all savages."

At 9.30 a.m. on November 16th the *Teesta* dropped anchor off Suez.

Map No.3



CHAPTER VII.

THE Battalion remained on board the *Teesta* at Suez for six days. This delay was unavoidable, due to limited accommodation for ships in the Suez docks. On November 16th (the day of arrival at Suez) orders were received for the Battalion to proceed to Port Said as soon as disembarked.

Turkey having entered the war, the protection of the Suez Canal was of vital importance strategically. Its defence was organized in four sections, under the command of Major-General Wilson, C.B. No. 4 Section, which extended from Ras-el-Esh to Port Said, both places inclusive, was allotted to the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. (See Map No. 7.)

The Battalion disembarked at Suez on November 22nd, and arrived at Port Said the same evening in two separate trains. Darkness having set in before detraining had been completed, the Battalion bivouacked for the night, and the next morning pitched a perimeter camp on the site allotted, which was situated half a mile south of the town.

The first month of the Battalion's stay at Port Said was devoted to the construction of the defences of No. 4 Section. The two chief features of the defence were a redoubt and an inundation. The former, when completed, would block effectively the only direct route from Qatia to Port Said, whilst the latter would render any attempt on the part of the enemy to approach the Canal from the east most difficult. The first attempt to build the redoubt was frustrated by a storm, which completely obliterated four days' hard work. A second attempt, however, proved successful. The inundation, on the other hand, from the defence point of view was an immediate success, but a source of anxiety to the Canal engineers. To inundate the selected area a breach was made in the south bank of the Salt Works Canal. The rush of water through the breach was so strong that the cut began to widen at an alarming pace. The Canal

engineers, apprehensive lest the east bank of the Suez Canal should be damaged, requested that the breach should be reduced. "A" Company was ordered out at five minutes' notice and worked in reliefs throughout the night, but it was not until two days later that the damage was repaired effectively.


On December 13th the Battalion relieved the 89th Punjabis on outpost duty. The dispositions of the Battalion are shown on Map 3. Early in December rumours of a Turkish attack on the Canal were prevalent. Several reconnaissances to the east had been carried out by the Battalion scouts, under Captain Birdwood, but no enemy were encountered.

On December 14th the scouts of the 69th Punjabis and 1/6th Gurkhas, under the command of Captain Birdwood and supported by a detachment of the Battalion under Captain Dallas, reconnoitred towards Qatia and returned to Port Said on the 16th. During the reconnaissance one man, who escaped, was seen; his camel was captured, and on the camel two greatcoats, belonging to Turkish soldiers, were found.


The New Year (1915) which was to prove most eventful in the career of the 1st Battalion, found it manning the defences at Port Said, but on January 10th, having been relieved by the 3rd Brahmins, the Battalion proceeded to El-Kantara.

This move was due to a readjustment of the scheme of defence of the Canal. Whereas originally there were four sections of defence, there were now to be three. No 3 Section absorbed No. 4 and extended from Ballah to Port Said, both places inclusive, a distance of about thirty-seven miles. In addition to the 29th Indian Infantry, with headquarters at El-Kantara, the following troops were allotted to No. 3 Section:—Two squadrons Imperial Service Cavalry, detachment Bikanir Camel Corps, 26th Mountain Battery, half field company R.E., 27th Punjabis, 93rd Burma Infantry, 108th Indian Field Ambulance, and 121st Indian Field Ambulance.

The Egyptian State Railway, linking up Kantara and Port Said, runs along the west bank of the Canal. The defence post was situated on the east bank. It was necessary, therefore, to ferry the Battalion and all the baggage across. Two lighters, two steam tugs, and a



DEFENCES AT KANTARA, 1915.
EMBARKING ON s.s. "DUNLUCE CASTLE,"
PORT SAID, 1915.



DEFENCES AT KANTARA, 1915.
1/6th GURKHA RIFLES BIVOUAC, VICINITY
CAPE HELLES LIGHTHOUSE, 1915.

chain ferry were available for this purpose, and six hours after arrival at Kantara the Battalion and all baggage had been transferred from the west to the east bank.

Except at Port Said and Kantara, the main line of resistance for the defence of the Canal was prepared on the west bank. This procedure, contrary to the principle that "the defensive battle should be fought in advance of localities, the retention of which is vital to the defender," gave rise to Lord Kitchener's biting comment: "Are the troops defending the Canal, or is the Canal defending them"?

The defences at Kantara consisted of an entrenched camp covered by an outpost position. By day the outpost troops (two double companies) occupied a line situated about four miles north-east of the post in the vicinity of Hill 40, and at night were withdrawn to a line Tel-el-Ahmar, an ancient ruin about one and a half miles east of Kantara, to a point on the canal one mile north of Kantara. Later it was decided to give up Tel-el-Ahmar, and the two piquets immediately west of that place in favour of the semi-circular position shown on Map No. 5.

The Cavalry and Camel Corps carried out reconnaissances daily in the direction of Qatia and east of Kantara.

When not employed on outpost duty all companies were occupied constructing defences, not only in Kantara itself but also at Ballah and the Bridgehead Camp. (See Map No. 6.)

At about this time the four company organization was brought into force in the Battalion instead of the double company system.*

Lieutenant L. E. Poynder was appointed Brigade Signalling Officer.

Subadar-Major Jamansing Gurung was invalided, and on arrival in India was transferred to the pension establishment.

On January 13th three officers from the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps joined the Battalion:—Lieutenant H. C. Toller, 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill, and 2/Lieutenant R. M. Bear.

* All references to companies from now on in this history refer to the four company organization—i.e., "A" Company means No. 1 Double Company, etc.

On the whole life at Kantara was peaceful, almost to a degree of disappointment. The men were under canvas most nights of the week. A house known as "The Shop" was turned into an officers' mess, and provided a limited number of quarters. Several games of football were played against teams from H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, whilst three days' leave to Port Said or Cairo was not an unfrequent pleasure for officers.

On January 20th, however, the cavalry located 100 Turks fifteen miles north-east of Kantara. The next two days were blank, and on the 24th shots were exchanged between the cavalry and the enemy, who were still in the same locality where they had been seen on the 20th.

The General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, evidently satisfied with regard to the intentions of the enemy, proceeded at 7 a.m. the next day to carry out a tactical exercise with all troops less those furnishing the outposts. The force marched towards Ballah: that is away from the direction in which the enemy had been located. At 9 a.m. a sowar arrived at Kantara with a message from the outpost commander to say that an enemy force estimated at 300 cavalry and 400 to 600 infantry was advancing on Kantara. By this time the 29th Brigade was between Kantara and Ballah. No special arrangements had been made to establish communication between it and Kantara; the only course to be taken, therefore, was to send on the message by mounted orderly.

At 11 a.m., by which time the 29th Brigade was at Ballah, seven miles from Kantara, and the enemy were approaching Hill 70, six miles from Kantara, the message reached the General Officer Commanding Brigade. Orders were speedily issued to the cavalry and Camel Corps to turn back, and to do what they could, in conjunction with the outpost troops, to delay the advance of the enemy pending the arrival of the Brigade.

The Cavalry and Camel Corps started at 12 noon, and were followed at once by the remainder of the force.

By 3.30 p.m. the outpost troops had been reinforced at Hill 40 by one company 14th Sikhs and one section 26th Mountain Battery. The Cavalry and Camel Corps in the meantime, having passed through the outpost position, were in touch with the enemy, who were establishing



COLONEL THE HON. C. G. BRUCE, C.B., M.V.O.,

1914—1918.

themselves on Hill 70, where they appeared content to remain, at any rate for the present.

At dusk, the night outpost position having been occupied by "C" Company and two platoons "A" Company, the forward troops were withdrawn to Kantara.

The cavalry had one man wounded. The section of the Mountain Battery fired a few shells, to which no reply was made by the enemy, who either had not got their artillery up, or did not wish to disclose the fact that they had guns with them.

At 7.30 p.m. operation orders for January 26th were received.

A force (detachment Patiala Lancers, detachment Bikanir Camel Corps, 26th Mountain Battery [less one section], two companies 14th Sikhs, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles [less two companies] and detachment 108th Field Ambulance), under the command of Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O., 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, was to reconnoitre the enemy's position and to attack and turn the enemy out of it unless very strongly held. (See Map No. 5.)

At 7 a.m. on January 26th the force left Kantara. The detachments of cavalry and Camel Corps, supported by one section 26th Mountain Battery, "B" Company (Captain H. R. A. Whytehead and 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill), the Machine Gun Section (Captain F. B. Abbott), 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, formed the advanced guard.

At 8.15 a.m., as the main body approached Hill 40, the enemy were observed to be busy digging on Hill 70.

"B" Company, protected on each flank by cavalry and Camel Corps, had passed Hill 40 and was approaching a slight rise some 2,000 yards from the enemy's position when the Turkish artillery opened on them with shrapnel. The country between Hills 70 and 40 is flat, sandy, and devoid of cover.

The section of 26th Mountain Battery with the advanced guard, which was joined shortly afterwards by the section from the main body, came into action on the forward slope of Hill 40 and replied to the enemy's fire.

"D" Company (Major W. Campbell Little and Captain J. S. Dallas) occupied temporarily trenches

which had been dug previously on the forward slope of Hill 40, and were subjected to an ineffective shelling.

Thus did the Battalion receive its baptism of fire in the Great War. Prior to this the Regiment, and then as the 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, had not heard a shot fired on active service since 1891 (twenty-four years), when it was employed on operations in Manipur.

It was now decided to pin the enemy to his position with "B" and "D" Companies, and to attack the south flank with the two companies of the 14th Sikhs.

At 9.5 a.m., however, a message was received from Brigade Headquarters ordering the Commanding Officer to limit the operation to observation only. Up to this time, in spite of the exposed position in which "B" Company and the Machine Gun Section were, there had been no casualties.

On receipt of this order the first thing to do was to get "B" Company and the Machine Gun Section back to Hill 40. The 26th Mountain Battery was ordered to be ready to cover the withdrawal, and by 10 a.m. "B" Company and the Machine Gun Section having sustained five casualties, Captain F. B. Abbott and 4 Gurkha other ranks wounded, arrived under cover of Hill 40.

For the remainder of the day there was intermittent shelling on both sides, but there were no further casualties.

At 1.15 p.m. the force commenced a retirement on Kantara. The Turks made no attempt to follow up; this was probably due to the fact that H.M.S. *Swiftsure* had been seen approaching Kantara from Port Said at 1 p.m. By 5 p.m. the troops were back in camp.

The next day a force, similar in composition to that which went out on the 26th, proceeded in the direction of Hill 40, where it remained in observation of the enemy, who were still holding Hill 70. The Battalion did not form part of this force.


Even in the light of after events it is difficult to conceive the reason which led to the issue of the order by Canal Defence Headquarters forbidding offensive action against the Turks on January 26th and 27th.

At 3.45 a.m. on January 28th the troops were aroused by the sound of rapid firing from the outposts, and several "overs" commenced to fall into the camp, one

GH SKETCH OF YTHARA POST

MAP 4

Scale 8.8 inches = 1 Mile.



of which severely wounded a rifleman. The attack was directed against No. 5 Piquet, and was successfully repelled by the 14th Sikhs, who lost one jemadar and 1 sepoy killed. One Turkish officer and 2 men killed and 1 man wounded were found in front of the outpost line. At 4.30 a.m. the Turks retired, harassed by fire from H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, which kept a searchlight beam on them. At 5.30 a.m. a force of which "A" and "C" Companies (Captain Jackson and Captain Bredin) formed part, was ordered to pursue the enemy, but was not allowed to go beyond Hill 40, where it remained until dusk in observation. The Turks shelled this force ineffectively as it withdrew.

The next day was quiet, and on January 30th it was found that the Turks, having left 200 Bedouins to cover them, had withdrawn from Hill 70.

The five days' operations which have just been described were carried out by a Turkish force of all arms estimated 800 strong, with two field guns and four mountain guns; the field guns were fitted with special broad-tyred wheels, and the mountain guns were transported on camels.

There was but little doubt that the operation was intended as a reconnaissance and a feint to draw troops away from localities which the enemy had selected as objectives for the main attack on the Canal.

Aeroplane reports indicated that a large enemy force was moving in the direction of Ismailia on February 1st.

On February 2nd "A" and "B" Companies (Captain Jackson and Captain Whytehead), which formed the infantry portion of the outpost troops for the day, reported that the enemy had reoccupied Hill 70.

At 1 p.m. a high wind got up, and there was a violent sand storm, which lasted until after dark. Observation from the air was rendered impossible. It was under cover of this sand storm that the Turks were able to approach within easy distance of the Canal opposite Toussoum and Serapeum preparatory to their attempt to bridge the Canal at the former place early the following morning.

On February 3rd Kantara, Toussoum and Serapeum (see Map No. 7) were attacked simultaneously between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. The 89th Punjabis, who were on

outpost at Kantara, had no difficulty in holding up the Turks in front of the outpost position. When dawn broke the Turks, having failed to penetrate the outposts at any point, were compelled to retire under a gruelling enfilade fire, brought to bear on them by H.M.S. *Swiftsure*, which had taken up station one mile north of Kantara.

At 9.30 a.m. a fresh Turkish attack developed against Kantara from a point about one mile south of Tel-el-Ahmar, but was brought to a standstill by a company of the 89th Punjabis.

Firing continued all day, and at dusk the enemy withdrew.

The British casualties at Kantara amounted to 5 Indian other ranks killed and 17 wounded. The Turks left 21 killed, 25 wounded and 36 unwounded prisoners. Their total casualties at Kantara were estimated at 300.

The Battalion, which was held in readiness in reserve, took no part in the day's fighting.


In anticipation of a further attack by the enemy night outposts were increased to three companies, and were furnished by "B," "C" and "D" Companies. The Turks, however, did not resume the attack.

It has been remarked on a preceding page that the piquet at Tel-el-Ahmar and the two piquets immediately west of that place were thrown back towards Kantara. This decision was brought about by the enemy's attempt to attack Kantara from the direction of Tel-el-Ahmar, as already described. It is more than probable that during the reconnaissance of January 28th the Turks located correctly the position of the right of the Kantara night outpost line, and had their two attacks been properly synchronized on February 3rd the task of repelling them would not have been as easy as it turned out.

February 4th and 5th passed quietly. On the 6th cavalry patrols were fired on by parties of Bedouins between Hill 70 and Bir-el-Duiedar. The enemy had withdrawn, and, worst of all, they had been allowed to withdraw at their leisure.



From February 4th to the 15th the Battalion, when not furnishing outposts, was employed on the improvement of defences.

MAP N° 5



Scrub

HAS BEEN COMPILED
 ES DRAWN IN 1915
 OOD AND RYAN
 RATES
 HE FIGHTING AT
 ARA
 2nd 3rd FEB. 1915



D.G.J.R.

Parties of sightseers from Cairo visited Kantara, whilst parties of officers from Kantara were granted short leave to Cairo, so, on the whole, the nature of the war, as far as the Canal was concerned, could not exactly be described as desperate.

On February 14th information was received that the Turks were in the vicinity of Qatia, and, hoping that they might be enticed to fight, a column was ordered to proceed to Qatia to regain touch with them.

On February 15th a column (Commander Brig.-General H. V. Cox, C.S.I., C.I.E., detachment Westminster Dragoons, detachment Patiala Lancers, detachment Bikanir Camel Corps, 26th Mountain Battery, 14th Sikhs, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, and detachment 108th Field Ambulance) marched from Kantara at 7.30 a.m. en route to Bir-el-Duiedar, a distance of twelve miles. (See Map No. 6.)

At Hill 70 a dump of forty-five Turkish field gun shells was found covered over with scrub. Two of these shells are now in the Regimental Mess at Abbottabad. The march, although not a long one, was tedious, due to heavy going on account of the sand. The column arrived at Bir-el-Duiedar at 12.15 p.m., and the cavalry having pushed on as far as Bir-el-Nus returned to Bir-el-Duiedar at 4.30 p.m. without having encountered the enemy.

On the 16th the column, less "D" Company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, which was ordered to remain at Bir-el-Duiedar, resumed its march at 7.30 a.m. The route traversed a series of sand hills, which rendered the march even more fatiguing than that of the previous day. At 11.30 a.m. the main body reached a point just short of Bir-el-Dhakka, where it halted on the fringe of sand hills overlooking the Qatia Plain. The cavalry and Camel Corps pushed on beyond Qatia, but only to find that the enemy had withdrawn still further east. At 1.30 p.m. the column, leaving Bir-el-Dhakka, retraced its steps to Bir-el-Duiedar, where it arrived at 5.30 p.m., having covered a distance of about twenty miles. "D" Company (Major W. Campbell Little) furnished the outpost troops for the night.

The next morning the column marched from Bir-el-Duiedar at 8.15 a.m. and reached Kantara at 12.15 p.m.

A draft of 1 Gurkha officer (Subadar Lilaram) and 49

Gurkha other ranks, under Captain A. W. D. Cornish, arrived at Kantara on February 17th from Abbottabad.

From March 1st to 22nd the Battalion was split up into six detachments to furnish garrisons for various Canal posts and an armoured train. The dispositions of the Battalion during this period will be found on Map No. 6.

On April 3rd General Sir Ian Hamilton visited Kantara. One company from each Battalion of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade ("B" Company, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, Captain H. R. A. Whytehead) was paraded for his inspection. Had the contents of a letter from General Sir Ian Hamilton to Lord Kitchener, an extract from which is now published, been known, the significance of this inspection would have been realized.


"25th March, 1915.

. . . "I am very anxious, if possible, to get a Brigade of Gurkhas, so as to complete the New Zealand Divisional organization with a type of man who will, I am certain, be most valuable on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The scrubby hillsides on the south-west face of the plateau are just the sort of terrain where these little fellows are at their brilliant best. There is already a small Indian commissariat attached to the Mountain Batteries, so there would be no trouble on the score of supply.

"As you may imagine, I have no wish to ask for anything the giving of which would seriously weaken our hold on Egypt, but you will remember that four Mounted Brigades belonging to Birdwood's force are being left behind to look after the land of the Pharaohs, and a Mounted Brigade for a Battalion seems a fair exchange. Egypt, in fact, so far as I can make out, seems stiff with troops, and each little 'Gurkh' might be worth his full weight in gold at Gallipoli." . . .

The intention to land an expeditionary force on the Gallipoli Peninsula was no longer a secret. On April 1st two battalions of the Royal Naval Division had arrived at Kantara and occupied the Bridgehead Camp. From them it was learned that they had been to Mudros, and that the force was now in Egypt. It may perhaps be difficult to understand why a force destined for Gallipoli should proceed to Mudros and then disembark in Egypt. Formations had been embarked on the transports in

Map No. 6.



England without sufficient regard to the task which they were about to be called upon to perform. In spite of the delay which it would entail, General Sir Ian Hamilton decided that it was imperative to organize and to re-embark properly the force before undertaking landing operations, and it was for these reasons that the force was disembarked in Egypt.

(See Naval and Military Despatches, Part II, November, 1914, to June, 1915. Despatch dated May 20th, 1915, page 267.)

Hopes ran high that the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, or, possibly, the Battalion, might be ordered to join the Dardanelles Expeditionary Force.

On April 5th there was a violent sand-storm. "B" Company, under Captain H. R. A. Whytehead, and two platoons of "C" Company were out in the direction of Hill 40 on outpost duty. By midday the storm had become so intense that it was considered advisable to withdraw the outpost troops to the night outpost position. This was effected, but only with great difficulty; it was not easy to walk against the wind, whilst the sand made it impossible to see more than twenty yards. So strong was the wind that it was necessary to stop all traffic through the Canal. The look-out post on the roof of "The Shop" was blown down with a crash. On arrival in camp three riflemen belonging to the outpost platoons of "C" Company were missing. These three men arrived later, but in the meantime three more men from a search party which had gone out under Subadar Dalbir Rana got lost. Having spent the night in the desert they found their way back to Kantara early next morning.

The reader will remember that the Turks availed themselves of an opportunity afforded by a sand-storm to approach the Canal on February 2nd, the day before their attack.

The following episode which took place under similar weather conditions inclines one to the theory that the Turk took into account the possibility of a sand-storm in connection with a particular operation as a means of surprise.

On March 15th a patrol, which had been sent out from Km. 39.6 by Subadar Lilaram Gurung, reported that they had fired at a man in the Sweet Water Canal. (See Map

No. 6.) On April 6th, the day after the sand-storm, a patrol of the 14th Sikhs from Km. 39·6 killed one of the enemy on the west bank of the Canal at about midnight. On April 7th cavalry patrols were fired on by the enemy at Hill 70. Two days later a patrol from Km. 39·6 noticing tracks leading eastwards along the spit between the inundations followed them up, and found a large packing case and two stout poles, evidently used for carrying the case. From the marking on the inside of the packing case a mine was suspected as having been its contents. The Royal Navy were requested to drag the Canal in the vicinity of Km. 39·6. This was done, and on April 11th an anchored mine was found a few yards outside the buoyed channel just above the post at Km. 39·6. Shortly before the mine was discovered H.M.S. *Bacchante* passed it en route to Port Said, and, judging from the explosion when the mine was blown up that afternoon, there is no doubt that had she struck it she would have been sunk.

It is probable that this mine was brought within easy reach of the Canal on the night of April 5th; was placed in position on the 6th, when the 14th Sikhs shot one of the enemy whilst the Turks who fired on the cavalry patrols on the 7th were covering the enterprise.

On April 10th a warning order was received that the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was to embark at Port Said, and although no mention of its destination was made the Dardanelles were understood.


The Brigade, less the 69th Punjabis, which Regiment had left Kantara on the 6th, commenced to move to Port Said on April 18th. Territorial battalions garrisoned the post on the departure of the 29th Brigade.

At 4.30 p.m. on April 20th the Battalion, less "A" Company (Captain Jackson), marched out of Kantara headed by the band of the 9th (T.) Battalion The Manchester Regiment, and crossed to the west bank of the Canal, where it bivouacked for the night. The following morning, "A" Company having rejoined, the Battalion left Kantara at 8.30 a.m. and detrained at Port Said at 9.45 a.m.

The Brigade was paraded at Port Said for inspection by Major-General A. Wilson, C.B., General Officer Commanding Canal Defences, during the afternoon of

anean Sea

MAP No. 7.....



*GENERAL MAP
TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS
ON THE SUEZ CANAL DURING 1914-15*

° Bir-el-Hassana

*References
Lines of Turkish attacks —→*

1 inch = 10 miles
20 30 40 50 miles

D.G.J.R.

April 22nd. After the inspection he thanked all ranks for their services in Egypt, and wished them good luck in the theatre of operations for which they were destined.

This brings to a conclusion the account of the Battalion's stay in Egypt.

The total casualties in the 1st Battalion in Egypt were: Killed in action or died from wounds, 1 other rank; wounded, 1 British officer and 5 other ranks; total, 7. Rifleman Angad Rana was accidentally wounded.

The names of the following officers were brought to notice for conspicuously good work in Egypt:—Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O., Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, and Lieutenant L. E. Poynder.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON April 24th, 1915, orders were received for the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles (less transport mules and chargers) to embark at Port Said on the s.s. *Dunluce Castle*; transport animals and officers' chargers on the s.s. *Japanese Prince*.

The Battalion having been ordered to proceed at a strength of 13 British officers, including the Medical Officer, and 753 Gurkha officers and Gurkha other ranks, it was necessary to leave at Port Said 3 British officers, 1 Gurkha officer and 117 Gurkha other ranks.

The undermentioned British officers and Gurkha officer remained in Egypt:—Captain A. W. D. Cornish, Lieutenant H. C. Toller, 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill, and Jemadar Indrajit Thapa.

Commencing at 10 p.m., "C," "B" and "D" Companies worked in two-hour shifts until 4 a.m. the following morning loading stores on the transports. Loading operations continued throughout the 25th, all companies working in two-hour reliefs from 4 p.m. until twelve midnight.

On April 26th, headed by the band of the 4th (T.) Battalion The East Lancashire Regiment, the Battalion marched at 11 a.m. to the quays and embarked on the Union Castle liner s.s. *Dunluce Castle*. The transport animals in charge of Captain J. S. Dallas embarked on the s.s. *Japanese Prince*. In addition to the Battalion the following units embarked on the s.s. *Dunluce Castle*; Headquarters, 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 14th K.G.O. Sikhs, and 108th Indian Field Ambulance.


At noon on April 27th the *Dunluce Castle* sailed from Port Said for the Dardanelles, though at the time no mention of the destination of the Battalion had been made.

As a precautionary measure against enemy submarines a piquet of 2 non-commissioned officers and 15 riflemen was furnished by the Battalion during the voyage.


On the afternoon of April 29th the *Dunluce Castle* arrived off Cape Pappas, where, according to orders, she

SKETCH
OF
OPERATIONS CAPE HELLES 1915.

Scale of Miles



Approximate contours at 100 feet V.I.



ed-el-Bahr

a r d a n e l l e s

ale

Erenkeui Bay



D.G.J.R.

was to await the arrival of an escort and the remainder of the ships of the convoy. By 3.30 p.m. three out of the four ships had arrived, but, due to the presence of enemy submarines, it was decided not to await the arrival of the missing ship, and orders were issued for the convoy to proceed to Lemnos. At 1.30 a.m. the following morning orders were received by wireless to push on to Cape Helles, where troops were to be ready to disembark at 1 p.m. At 12.30 p.m., on April 30th, the *Dunluce Castle* anchored off Sedd-el-Bahr. (See Map No. 15.)

Before continuing the narrative of the part played by the Battalion, it is now necessary to state the object of the Dardanelles expedition and the result of operations up to this period.

The reasons for the expedition were briefly as follows :

Russia was short of munitions, and was pressed by the enemy. The deadlock in France limited the scope of operations on the western front, except at a prohibitive cost in casualties.

There were two possible ways of relieving the Russian situation, via the Baltic or via the Dardanelles. The latter course was chosen, some of the principal reasons being :—

- (i) To divert a large part of the Turkish Army from operations against the Russians in the Caucasus and elsewhere.
- (ii) To pass into Russia at a time when her northern ports were closed by ice the necessary munitions of war.
- (iii) To bring out of Russia large stores of wheat lying in her southern ports awaiting shipment.
- (iv) To prevent, by successful operations in the near East, any new alliance amongst the Balkan States detrimental to the cause of the Allies.

At dawn on April 25th the covering force of the 29th Division, supported by the fire of His Majesty's ships, commenced to land on five beaches, S, V, W, X and Y. (See Map No. 8.) V, W and X constituted the main landings, whilst S and Y were mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements.

Simultaneously with the landing at Cape Helles the

G

covering force of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (A.N.Z.A.C.) landed in the vicinity of Gaba Tebe.

Concurrently with the above landings one regiment of the French Corps was disembarked at Kum Kale under the guns of the French Fleet. This operation, which was a feint, drew the fire of the Asiatic guns from Morto Bay and V beach, and contributed largely to the success of the British landings at Cape Helles.

By the evening of the 27th the Allied Forces had established themselves on a line three miles long, which stretched from Eski Hissarlik Point to the mouth of the nullah, 3,200 yards north-east of Tekke Burnu.

On April 28th the line had reached from a point on the coast three miles north-east of Tekke Burnu to a point one mile north of Eski Hissarlik, whence it was continued by the French south-east to the coast.

The troops, after the previous four days' strenuous fighting, were exhausted, units mixed up, and before any further advance could be attempted it was necessary to reorganize and strengthen the positions gained. At this juncture the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles arrived (12.30 p.m., April 30th).

Although orders had been received to be ready to disembark at 1 p.m. on the 30th the Battalion remained on board for the whole of that day. Everybody was occupied trying to take in the new surroundings. The troops ashore were busily engaged landing stores at the different beaches; small craft were plying between the transports and the land. The roadstead off the south-west coast of the Peninsula was crowded with shipping, warships and transports, and packed so thickly that it was difficult to understand how they remained there immune from the fire of the enemy.

At 9.30 a.m. on May 1st Battalion Headquarters, "B" and "C" Companies were landed at V beach, and were followed at noon by "A" and "D" Companies. All beaches at the best of times were unhealthy places, and though the Battalion suffered no casualties the companies came in for a mild shelling. Companies, as soon as they were landed, marched independently to the vicinity of the Cape Helles Lighthouse. The bivouac, which was visible to the enemy on the Asiatic side of the Straits, was shelled ineffectively, but several high explosive shells

landed unpleasantly close. Two companies were employed during the afternoon building a pier on W beach, whilst the remainder of the Battalion was fully occupied landing and bringing up Battalion stores from V beach to the bivouac, a task which was not completed until well after nightfall.

An episode which reflects credit on the smartness of the Battalion may suitably be recorded here.

"B" Company (Captain H. R. A. Whytehead) were working on the construction of the pier at W beach. Whilst at work the C.R.E. of the 29th Division remarked to Captain Whytehead that it was not the job of a C.R.E. to supervise such work. Captain Whytehead, thinking that the work of his company was being adversely criticized, asked the C.R.E. if there was anything amiss. "Far from it," replied the C.R.E. "The extraordinary energy and keenness with which your men work keeps me here watching them when I might be elsewhere."

At 10 p.m. the enemy commenced a violent bombardment. Our artillery and ships replied; the ground literally shook; whilst the noise to those who had not experienced an intense bombardment was indeed a revelation. Half-an-hour later, just before the rise of the moon, the Turks delivered a series of desperate attacks, which succeeded in penetrating the line in two places, but the enemy were counter-attacked and driven back. At about this time the Battalion was ordered to stand to arms, but an hour later was dismissed, having suffered its first casualty on the Peninsula, Subadar Kulia Thapa, wounded. The attack continued throughout the night, and at 5 a.m. the following morning a counter-offensive was ordered, and all ground lost was recovered. The Battalion, leaving its bivouac at 6 a.m., marched to a point half a mile south-west of Zimmerman's Farm, where it remained until 5 p.m. in reserve with the remainder of the 29th Indian Brigade, ready to support the French if required to do so. Although not actively employed, the Battalion sustained 15 casualties from shell fire, Captain A. N. Bredin wounded, 1 Gurkha other rank killed, and 13 wounded. The Battalion was now ordered to bivouac for the night of May 2nd/3rd one mile in rear of the position occupied during the day. Shortly after 9 p.m. the Turks made another attack against the whole of the

Allied line, but were repulsed. At 2 p.m. on the 3rd the Battalion was ordered back to its bivouac of May 1st, and again that night the Turks attacked the right of the Allied line, and again were repulsed.

Captain J. S. Dallas and the transport animals were landed during the night, and rejoined the Battalion early on the morning of the 4th.

During May 4th and 5th the Battalion was busily engaged marching and counter-marching to and from threatened portions of the line where it was thought assistance might be wanted. On the night of the 4th, whilst moving forward to support the 87th Brigade, an unfortunate incident occurred. The Battalion was passing in front of an 18-pounder battery; the battery was called upon to support the firing line; a shell burst prematurely and wounded four riflemen in "A" Company.

At this time the 29th Indian Brigade, which formed an extra brigade to the much depleted 29th Division, was the only reserve on the Peninsula.

As already related, the Turks made a series of counter-attacks against the Allies on May 1st, 2nd and 3rd.

On May 6th the Allies resumed the offensive, and the three days' Battle of Krithia commenced. The net result of the battle was an average gain of 500 yards all along the front.

The 29th Brigade was held in reserve during the battle in rear of the left centre of the Allies' line; the Battalion, therefore, did not take an active part in the fighting. The Scouts, under Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, during this period carried out three reconnaissances after dark in front of the left of the Allies' line, an area in which a stubborn resistance was put up by the Turks.

The Battalion had been on the Peninsula for nine days without an opportunity of firing a single round; whilst it had sustained up to this time 1 Gurkha other rank killed, 1 British officer and 20 Gurkha other ranks wounded. Practically all the above casualties were from shell fire.

On conclusion of the three days' battle, it may be said that trench warfare set in on the Peninsula.

At 6.45 p.m., on May 9th, the Battalion took over the firing line trenches from the 1st Battalion The King's

Own Scottish Borderers located in the Point "P" area. (See Maps 8 and 9.)

The Turkish right flank rested upon a bluff about 300 feet high and 500 yards north-east of the trenches held by the Battalion (Gurkha Bluff, see Map No. 9). "Since the landing the enemy had converted the Bluff into a powerful bastion, from which the fire of machine guns had held up the left of the Allies' attacks. Two gallant attempts by the Royal Munster Fusiliers and Royal Dublin Fusiliers to establish a footing on this cliff on May 8th and 9th had both failed." (General Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, dated August 26th, 1915.)

The day after taking over the firing line two reconnaissances, with a view to securing the Bluff, were carried out.

Captain C. W. B. Birdwood went on board H.M.S. *Sapphire* and examined the Bluff and its surroundings from the sea; whilst under cover of darkness Jemadar Nandalal Gurung ("A" Company), with a party of selected men, went forward to the Bluff, and having been fired on before they got half-way up they returned to the trenches.

On May 11th the Commanding Officer, Adjutant, Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, and Jemadar Kharkabhadur Rana reconnoitred the coast from H.M.S. *Kennet* (T.B.D.). On conclusion of this reconnaissance a plan for an attack on the Bluff on May 12th was discussed with, and approved by, the General Officer Commanding 29th Division (Major-General Hunter-Weston).

CHAPTER IX.

BRIEFLY, the plan of attack was as follows:—Captain C. W. B. Birdwood was detailed to go on board H.M.S. *Talbot* to act as liaison officer, and to indicate targets, that ship and H.M.S. *Dublin* having been detailed to co-operate with the Battalion in the operation.

Two batteries R.F.A. were put at the disposal of the Officer Commanding 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.


At dusk the 89th Punjabis, who were occupying the firing line on the right of the Battalion, were to demonstrate with fire on the enemy trenches in front of them.

One company 1/6th Gurkha Rifles was to assemble on the beach below Point "P," and, under cover of darkness, seize and establish themselves on the Bluff. As soon as the Bluff had been secured, the Machine Gun Section was to move forward, whilst a second company was to move up and prolong the line held by the first company to the south-east, the intervening ground between the right of the second company and the left of the 89th Punjabis to be sapped across.

The morning of May 12th broke wet, but it stopped raining at about 10 a.m. Subadar Gambirsing Pun, and Havildar Santabir Gurung ("A" Company) had succeeded early that morning in crawling well forward, and examined closely the ground over which "A" Company was to move in the evening.

At 3.30 p.m. the two batteries registered their targets. Just before dusk "A" Company (Captain D. R. H. Jackson) commenced to trickle down to the beach immediately below Point "P." By a stroke of ill-fortune the enemy selected this moment to shell violently our trenches, but in spite of the shelling "A" Company assembled on the beach unperceived, with only one casualty (1 Gurkha other rank killed).

The 89th Punjabis and the artillery now opened fire on the Turkish trenches east of Gully Ravine, with the object of diverting the enemy's attention from the Bluff.



A HEIGHT ON THE COAST OFFICIALLY RENAMED, TO COMMEMORATE INDIAN HEROISM : "GURKHA BLUFF."

As soon as the bombardment had started "A" Company moved forward towards its objective. To reach the foot of the spur up which the company intended to climb, it was necessary to cross the mouth of a ravine (Gurkha Ravine), at the head of which the enemy were suspected to have machine guns. Just before the company reached the mouth of the ravine H.M.S. *Talbot* and H.M.S. *Dublin* raked the upper portion of the nullah with fire, and, under cover of the bombardment, "A" Company crossed the ravine and commenced the ascent of the Bluff. At 8 p.m. the top was reached. Much to everybody's astonishment there was no opposition. Captain Jackson at once threw out a covering party, and under cover of the noise of artillery and machine-gun fire commenced to entrench. Communication by telephone was established between Captain Jackson and Battalion Headquarters, and as soon as a report had been received to the effect that the objective had been captured, the Machine Gun Section, under Captain F. B. Abbott, was sent forward to reinforce "A" Company.

At 4 a.m. on the 13th Captain J. S. Dallas led "C" Company forward, via the beach, to prolong "A" Company's front to the south-east. As "C" Company was approaching the northern lip of Gurkha Ravine, the enemy were observed from Battalion Headquarters (Point "P") to be advancing against the Bluff across the open ground, from a point 700 yards east. The two batteries, which were in communication with Battalion Headquarters by telephone, lost no time in opening on this target, and the enemy's advance, subjected to the fire of the artillery and also to that of "A" and "C" Companies and the machine guns, was brought to a standstill.

At 6 a.m. on the 13th the line A B (see Map No. 9) was held by "A" and "C" Companies and the Machine Gun Section. It will be seen, therefore, that a gap of about 300 yards, B X, existed between the right of "C" Company and Gully Ravine.

The General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, who had come up to the old firing line, C D, shortly after 6 a.m., ordered this gap to be filled at once.

"D" Company (Major W. Campbell Little) were holding the line C D, and orders were sent to him to


advance at 6.30 a.m., to get into touch with the right of "C" Company and prolong the line south-east to Gully Ravine. Accordingly, at 6.30 a.m. "D" Company went "over the top." As the company left the old firing line it came under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and was unable to get to the line B X, and failed to establish touch with the right of "C" Company. Beyond the fact that "D" Company was somewhere between "C" Company and Gully Ravine and ahead of the trench C D, further information could not be obtained. "B" Company (Captain H. R. A. Whytehead) moved to X and commenced sapping in a northerly direction to link up with the right of "D" Company.

By 9 a.m. the whole Battalion had been deployed on the line X B A. The line was exceedingly bent, but, owing to the exposed position of "D" Company and the heavy fire of the enemy, no further progress could be made in daylight. The length of this line was approximately 700 yards, which, in view of the probability of a counter-attack, caused uneasiness. At 11 a.m. two companies of the 14th Sikhs arrived at the head of Gurkha Ravine in support of the centre of the firing line, and at the same time Battalion Headquarters (1/6th Gurkha Rifles) arrived and took up its position at the head of and just below the northern lip of the same ravine.

Throughout the day the enemy kept up a desultory fire.

In the afternoon orders were received to organize the position into two sections. Officer commanding, Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O., 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. Right section, from Gully Ravine to the right of "C" Company, to be taken over by the 14th Sikhs. Left section, the line held by "C" and "A" Companies, to be retained by the Battalion. The Inniskilling Fusiliers (less two companies) to move to Gurkha Ravine as a local reserve. The half battalion of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, due to the exposed nature of the approaches from its bivouac to Gurkha Ravine, was unable to start until dusk, and arrived at 8.30 p.m.

At 6 p.m. reorganizing commenced. "B" Company was brought into close support in rear of "C" Company. "D" Company did not complete handing over to the 14th Sikhs until nearly 10 p.m., and by 10.30 p.m. was in position to support "A" Company.



**CUTTER AND PINNACE FROM H.M.S. "TALBOT" TAKING
OFF 16th CASUALTIES AFTER THE ACTION OF
GURKHA BLUFF.**

**GURKHA BEACH AFTER THE CAPTURE OF GURKHA
BLUFF.**

RESERVE POSITION, GURKHA BEACH (Battalion Cooks at work).

At 6.30 p.m. the enemy opened a very heavy fire all along the new line, and, although a counter-attack was expected, the firing died down without anything happening.

After the arrival of the Inniskilling Fusiliers and "D" Company, the position was well established. There was heavy firing throughout the night, but the enemy made no attempt to counter-attack.

The net result of the day was an advance of 500 yards on the left and about 150 yards on the right of the firing line held by the Battalion on May 12th.

Casualties: Killed, 18 Gurkha other ranks; wounded, 3 British officers, 39 Gurkha other ranks.

The British officers wounded were Major W. Campbell Little (severely wounded), Captain F. B. Abbott (slightly wounded), and Captain J. S. Dallas (severely wounded).

Jemadar Kharkabahadur Rana was severely wounded on the night of May 11th/12th whilst out in charge of a small party which was attempting to scupper enemy snipers.

Subadar Gambirsing Pun and No. 4813 Havildar Santabir Gurung received congratulatory cards from the General Officer Commanding 29th Division in recognition of their reconnaissance carried out on the morning of May 12th.

The following General Routine Order (No. 160) was published on May 17th, 1915:—

"In order to mark the good work done by the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles in capturing the Bluff on the coast west of Krithia, the General Officer Commanding has ordered that this Bluff will in future be known as 'Gurkha Bluff.' This name will be added to those mentioned in General Routine Order No. 101, dated May 2nd, 1915."

Referring to this episode in his despatch dated August 26th, 1915, General Sir Ian Hamilton writes as follows:—

"Our left flank, which had been firmly held up against all attempts on the 6th to 8th (May) was now, by strategem, advanced nearly 500 yards. Purchased as it was with comparatively slight losses (21 killed, 92 wounded), this success was due to careful preparation and organization by Major-General H. V. Cox, commanding 29th Indian Infantry Brigade; Lieut.-Colonel the

Hon. C. G. Bruce, commanding 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, and Major F. A. Wynter, R.G.A., commanding the Artillery Group, supporting the attack.

“The co-operation of the two cruisers was excellent, and affords another instance of the admirable support by the Navy to our troops.”

In view of the fact that the enemy had, during the Three Days' Battle, succeeded in holding up the advance of the left of the Allies from Gurkha Bluff and its immediate vicinity, it is difficult to understand why so important a position was allowed to pass into the hands of the Battalion with practically no resistance. An explanation would appear to be, that the Bluff being a prominent feature, the Turks were chary about occupying permanently such a well-defined position on account of the Navy, and therefore only occupied positions on the Bluff temporarily when they considered results would justify their so doing. This explanation is supported by the fact that there were but few enemy trenches on the Bluff itself, or, indeed, in its immediate vicinity to the north-east when “A” Company occupied it. Whether the above explanation is right or wrong, or that the Battalion succeeded where others had failed may have been due in no small measure to the fortune of war, is immaterial; the fact remains that the Bluff was ordered to be taken and it was taken.

The dispositions of the opposing forces in the neighbourhood of Gurkha Bluff on May 13th are shown on Map No. 9.


From this date until June 4th, 1915, no definitely planned operation took place. In the meantime much was done to improve the position by pushing forward the line, which eventually rested from 80 to 100 yards from the enemy. (See Map No. 9.)

On May 14th the 1st Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers moved up to Gurkha Ravine, and the following day the 69th and 89th Punjabis, having been withdrawn from the line, were ordered to be prepared to embark and return to Egypt. The reason for withdrawing these two battalions from the Peninsula was that it was not considered desirable to employ Mohammedan troops against the Turks. The 1/5th and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles replaced these two units, but not until June 2nd; in the

Sketch
illustrating
Action of Gurkha Bluff
12th & 13th May 1915

References

British dispositions
Turkish "



D.G.J.R.

meantime the 29th Indian Brigade was made up to strength by the addition of the 1st Battalion The Inniskilling Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers.

On the evening of May 15th the Inniskilling Fusiliers took over the section of the firing line held by the Battalion, which, less two companies detailed to support the 14th Sikhs, moved into reserve in Gurkha Ravine.

The next day, in accordance with orders from the 29th Division, possibilities of a further advance were considered. Captain C. W. B. Birdwood and Captain D. G. J. Ryan accompanied a party which carried out a reconnaissance of the coast north-east of Gurkha Bluff, on board H.M.S. *Grasshopper* (T.B.D.). Under cover of darkness Captain C. W. B. Birdwood and a party of scouts reconnoitred the beach towards Fusilier Bluff, and located certain enemy piquets commanding the beach.

On the 17th the Battalion less "B" Company (Captain Whytehead) and the Machine Gun Section (Captain F. B. Abbott) moved back to a reserve position in the broken ground immediately south-west of the mouth of Gurkha Ravine. Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, who still commanded the section, and Captain Ryan, who was acting as Staff Officer to the Officer Commanding Section, in addition to his duties of Adjutant, remained at the old headquarters of the Battalion in Gurkha Ravine. "B" Company remained in local reserve in Gurkha Ravine: the Machine Gun Section was required in the firing line.

By keeping close in to the beach it was possible for the men to bathe under cover of Gurkha Bluff. True, bathers were occasionally ineffectively shrapnelled, but this did not deter them. The reserve position was not immune from enemy shell fire—no part of the Peninsula was—but the short period in reserve was very much appreciated.

By May 20th the Inniskilling Fusiliers had advanced the firing line considerably. One hundred yards ahead of the left flank there was situated on the cliff a trench, which had been dug by the King's Own Scottish Borderers on April 25th. It now lay in No Man's Land. The General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Brigade ordered the Battalion to seize and occupy it. Accordingly, at 9 p.m. Captain H. R. A. Whytehead and a party from

"B" Company rushed and occupied the trench, which hereafter will be alluded to as the K.O.S.B. Trench.

Shortly after the trench had been occupied, one machine gun was sent forward to reinforce the garrison.

At 9 a.m. the next morning Captain Whytehead and the garrison (less one machine gun sub-section) were relieved by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, and returned to their former position in Gurkha Ravine.

At 2 p.m. on May 22nd there was a submarine scare. H.M.S. *Talbot*, one of the ships which used to take up station from which to cover the left flank, was signalled away. Taking advantage of the absence of the ship, the enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of the Gurkha Bluff area. At this time the Inniskilling Fusiliers were working on a T-shaped sap, which had been dug in front of the centre of the left section. (See Map No. 10.)

The enemy attacked the sap at 2.30 p.m., and the working party of the Inniskilling Fusiliers was eventually driven back to the firing line.

Before the situation had been realized the K.O.S.B. Trench was rushed by the enemy and the garrison was forced back to the old firing line. Sad to relate, the machine gun belonging to the Battalion (though subsequently recaptured) was abandoned.

A battle was now in progress between the T Sap and the K.O.S.B. Trench.

Captain D. G. J. Ryan, in his capacity of Staff Officer to the section, had on the outbreak of the firing proceeded to the battalion headquarters of the Inniskilling Fusiliers to find out the situation. Immediately it became known that the T Sap and K.O.S.B. Trench had been captured by the enemy, "B" Company (Captain H. R. A. Whytehead) was ordered to move from Gurkha Ravine to counter-attack the enemy in the K.O.S.B. Trench.

"C" Company (Captain Birdwood) which was in reserve with the remainder of the Battalion on the beach, was ordered to reinforce the Inniskilling Fusiliers to the right of the T Sap area, whilst "A" and "D" Companies were ordered to move towards the head of Gurkha Ravine and await orders.

"B" Company arrived on the scene to find that the enemy had secured a footing in the old firing line south-

west of the K.O.S.B. Trench. Captain Whytehead led a counter-attack, drove out the enemy, and was killed immediately afterwards. In the course of the fighting which ensued, Subadar Dhanbir Thapa ("B" Company) was also killed.

"A" Company (Captain Jackson) and "D" Company were ordered to reinforce "B" Company. Stubborn fighting continued, in which Captain Jackson was wounded. There were now three companies closely engaged with the enemy, with only one British officer (Captain F. B. Abbott) to direct operations. Captain Abbott and Jemadar Balsing were hotly engaged with the enemy, who were endeavouring to envelop the left by way of the cliff, but their efforts were frustrated.

2/Lieutenant Sutton, R.E., who fortunately happened to be on the spot, organized and gallantly led a counter-attack against the K.O.S.B. Trench and effected a footing. The enemy raised a white flag. No attention was paid to this. All the enemy in the trench were killed, and the machine gun which had been lost early in the afternoon was recovered. 2/Lieutenant Sutton, due to a bomb exploding prematurely, lost his right hand during this fighting. Subsequently he was awarded the Military Cross for his initiative and gallant conduct.

The K.O.S.B. Trench was a mass of dead, British and Turks; the parapet, partly due to the efforts of the enemy to convert the trench to their own use, and partly on account of the scuffle in the trench, practically ceased to exist. It was therefore filled in, and the occupants withdrew to the old firing line 100 yards in rear.

In the meantime a party of the enemy, about thirty in number, which had been driven back in the counter-attack, had taken refuge in the ravine between the K.O.S.B. Trench and Mushroom Redoubt. Protected as it was by fire from the garrison of trench J.10 and Mushroom Redoubt, it was not feasible to deal with this party by a frontal attack. Jemadar Balsing Thapa volunteered to endeavour to get in rear of it, via the beach. He accordingly led his platoon along the beach, and, climbing up the spur, reached a point within 40 ft. of Mushroom Redoubt. Here he found himself to be in dead ground and 100 yards in rear of the enemy who were watching "A" Company on the spur below the K.O.S.B. Trench. As soon as he

had assembled his platoon he opened a rapid fire and killed the entire party. He then withdrew his platoon by the same route as it had advanced, and rejoined "A" Company.

In the T Sap area there had also been severe fighting. When "B" Company arrived the Inniskillings were hard pressed, and were already falling back to the firing line. Shortly afterwards the enemy broke off the attack in this area and withdrew.

By 5 p.m., with the exception of the K.O.S.B. Trench, all lost ground had been recovered.

The Battalion lost: Killed—1 British officer, 1 Gurkha officer and 6 Gurkha other ranks; wounded—1 British officer and 24 Gurkha other ranks.

The enemy suffered severely in killed and wounded, whilst the Battalion captured 16 unwounded prisoners.

The Battalion, since its arrival on the Peninsula, had now lost all its permanent company commanders.

No. 1088 Rifleman Harka Gurung and No. 343 Naik Hembahadur Rana, "B" Company, were awarded the Indian Order of Merit, Second Class, for conspicuous gallantry during this action. The names of the following British and Gurkha officers and other ranks were brought to notice for conspicuous good work: Captain F. B. Abbott; Subadar Gambirsing Pun, "A" Company; Subadar Sahabir Thapa, "D" Company; Jemadar Balsing Thapa, "A" Company; No. 266 Naik Budhiram Gharti, "A" Company; No. 514 Rifleman Gajmal Gurung, "B" Company.

By the death of Captain H. R. A. Whytehead the Battalion sustained a severe loss. From the day he joined his time was devoted to the interests of the Regiment. As Quartermaster, and later as Adjutant, he was untiring in his efforts to promote efficiency, whilst a more conscientious worker would be difficult to find. He was buried next day immediately above Y Beach on the south-west side of Gurkha Ravine.

Heavy firing continued throughout the night, during which companies remained in their battle positions.

The 88th Brigade, which was holding the line on the right of the 29th Indian Brigade, was heavily attacked during the night.

When dawn broke on the 23rd the enemy were seen

to be occupying the K.O.S.B. Trench. They were at once counter-attacked and driven out by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, who reoccupied the trench. A party from "D" Company was sent forward to assist in re-digging the trench and to construct a sap, linking up the right of it with the old firing line. The remainder of the Battalion returned to the reserve position near Gurkha Beach. Shortly after arrival orders were received to relieve the Inniskilling Fusiliers in the firing line. The relief was carried out at dusk. Jemadar Runbahadur Gurung, "C" Company, was wounded during the night.

The next day the Royal Munster Fusiliers were ordered to relieve the Battalion at 7.30 the same evening. The relief was completed at 1 a.m. on May 25th, and the Battalion once again returned to Gurkha Beach.

H.M.S. *Triumph* and H.M.S. *Majestic* were sunk by enemy submarines on May 25th and 27th respectively, and as a result of these losses it was decided to withdraw the Allied Fleet to Imbros and Mudros Harbours, where anti-submarine defences had been prepared. The morning of May 27th was a memorable one. On looking out to sea from the reserve position, instead of seeing the host of ships as usual there remained only two torpedo boat destroyers. The moral support of the presence of the Navy had instilled into the troops a certain sense of security, and now that the ships had gone there was a general feeling of loneliness.

At 5.30 p.m. on May 27th the Battalion and the Inniskilling Fusiliers relieved the Royal Munster Fusiliers, the Inniskillings taking over the right and the Battalion the left of the line. Battalion Headquarters were located in Bruce's Ravine.

The next day there was a conference at the Headquarters of the Inniskilling Fusiliers, at which the General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Brigade discussed plans for an offensive in the near future.

Subadar Gambirsing Pun was appointed Subadar-Major *vice* Subadar-Major Jamansing Gurung, transferred to the pension establishment.

On June 1st Captain A. W. D. Cornish, Lieutenant H. C. Toller, and a draft of 105 Gurkha other ranks joined the Battalion from Egypt.

On June 2nd the 1/5th and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles landed on the Peninsula.

At 5 p.m. on June 3rd the Battalion was warned to be ready to carry out an attack the next day, in accordance with orders which had been issued on June 2nd.

Early on the morning of June 4th a draft of 76 Gurkha other ranks, under 2/Lieutenant H. V. Collingridge, joined the Battalion.

CHAPTER X.

THE object of the attack about to be carried out was to advance the whole of the Allied line 1,000 yards.

The 29th Indian Brigade occupied the firing line from a point 100 yards east of Gully Ravine to the sea. (See Map No. 10.)

From right to left the troops holding the line were the 14th Sikhs, 1st Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, with the 1st Battalion The Inniskilling Fusiliers in close reserve.

The conduct of the attack of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was to be as follows.

There were to be two distinct phases, preceded by an artillery bombardment of one hour's duration.

First Phase.—Troops: 14th Sikhs, Lancashire Fusiliers and half battalion 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. Objectives: Enemy trench J.11.

Second Phase.—Troops: Inniskilling Fusiliers, half battalion 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. Objectives: Enemy trench J.13.

At 5 a.m. companies assembled in their jumping-off positions. (See Appendix No. II.)

"D" Company, under Lieutenant L. E. Poynder, in the firing line trench from the T-shaped Sap to and including the K.O.S.B. Trench.

"C" Company, under Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, in rear of the K.O.S.B. Trench.

"B" Company, under Captain A. W. D. Cornish, in the trenches in rear of the right of "D" Company.

"A" Company, under Captain F. B. Abbott, in Bruce's Ravine.

Battalion Headquarters, Sea View.

At 8 a.m. the heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued until 10.30 a.m.

At 11 a.m. the artillery bombardment reopened and continued for twenty minutes. During this period 5 Gurkha other ranks were wounded in the K.O.S.B. Trench from a premature burst.

At 11.20 the bombardment ceased, bayonets were fixed, men cheered, and immediately afterwards opened a steady fire on the enemy trenches. The idea of this ruse was to induce the enemy to man their trenches, which it was thought might be cleared during the bombardment. This, however, was not the case, and the Turks returned our fire in a most hearty manner.

It was hoped that the bombardment would have destroyed the wire entanglement in front of J.9, but during the lull in the bombardment it was seen that the greater portion of the wire was intact.

At 11.30 the artillery continued the bombardment with greater intensity, and Captain C. W. B. Birdwood led "C" Company down the cliff below the K.O.S.B. Trench with the object of getting into position under the Mushroom Redoubt preparatory to rushing it and J.11.

At twelve noon the bombardment lifted, and the first wave went over the top. The enemy greeted the advance with rapid fire. The 14th Sikhs were brought to a dead stop at the enemy's wire. The Lancashire Fusiliers suffered severe casualties before they reached the enemy wire, and their advance was checked, whilst Nos. 13 and 14 Platoons, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, which were the first to go over the parapet, met a similar fate.

"C" Company in the meantime had arrived on the spur immediately below the Mushroom Redoubt before the Turks realized their danger. It was too late, and under a shower of bombs "C" Company stormed and captured the redoubt, and drove the enemy out of the north-west end of J.11.

Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, unfortunately, was mortally wounded, and Subadar Lilaram Gurung took over command of the Company.

With the exception of the advance made by "C" Company the attack had failed in front of J.9 all along the front of the 29th Indian Brigade due to the uncut entanglement.

At 1 p.m. "C" Company was still in J.11 and holding its own, but was hemmed in on three sides by the enemy.

The Commanding Officer was now faced with a problem which required a rapid solution. The Turks were bringing up reinforcements against "C" Company. There was no prospect of making any headway against

J.9, and unless "C" Company received assistance it could not maintain itself long in its isolated position. The Commanding Officer, therefore, ordered it to withdraw.

A message was sent to H.M.S. *Wolverine* (T.B.D.) to cover the retirement, and shortly after 1 p.m. the Company was skilfully withdrawn, but not before Subadar Lilaram Gurung had been killed.

The right and centre of the Allied line had gained ground. The news of the failure on the left, therefore, was a disappointment at Corps Headquarters. The General Officer Commanding 29th Brigade was ordered to make a second attempt to capture J.11.

Accordingly the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles were ordered to assault the Mushroom Redoubt and the north-west end of J.11, via the route taken by "C" Company, whilst the Royal Dublin Fusiliers were to advance via Gully Ravine and drive the enemy out of the south-east end of J.11.

The advance of the Dublin Fusiliers was brought to a standstill in Gully Ravine by machine gun and rifle fire, and having suffered severe casualties the Battalion had to withdraw.

The 1/5th Gurkha Rifles advanced along the beach from Gurkha Ravine, and in spite of a heavy artillery and rifle fire gallantly gained the dead ground below the Mushroom Redoubt, where they were defiladed from the enemy's shrapnel, but suffered heavy casualties from hand grenades which were showered down on them from the Redoubt. Having lost 3 British officers killed and 4 wounded, in addition to other casualties, the Battalion refused to give ground, until finally at dusk it was ordered to withdraw.

The whole essence of the success earlier in the day achieved by "C" Company lay in surprise. When the 1/5th attacked the enemy were prepared.

By the time the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles had effected their withdrawal darkness had fallen, and preparations were made to repel a counter-attack which it was anticipated the enemy would make. "B" and "D" Companies, occupied the firing line, supported by "A" and "C" Companies, whilst the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles formed a local reserve in Bruce's Ravine.

There was heavy firing throughout the night, but the enemy did not attempt to counter-attack.

The Battalion sustained the following casualties in this action: Killed—Subadar Lilaram Gurung, "C" Company, and 13 Gurkha other ranks; wounded—Captain C. W. B. Birdwood, Jemadar Dhanraj Pun, "C" Company, and 79 Gurkha other ranks.

The following names were brought to notice for gallant conduct and conspicuous good work: Captain C. W. B. Birdwood (mentioned in despatches); Jemadar Nemansing Thapa, "D" Company; No. 4668 Havildar Sherbahadur Thapa, "C" Company; No. 4140 Signaller Naik Kharru Thapa, "C" Company; No. 327 Signaller Darbasing Thapa, "C" Company; No. 972 Signaller Shamsher Gharti, "C" Company; No. 1108 Rifleman Dhanbir Thapa, "D" Company (awarded the I.D.S.M.).

During the next few days the enemy devoted their attention to the centre of the Allied line, and by a series of counter-attacks succeeded in regaining a portion of the lost ground.

On June 6th the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles arrived, and the 29th Indian Brigade was once more composed of Indian units.

The same evening Captain C. W. B. Birdwood succumbed to his wound, and was buried at Gully Beach. He was a most gallant officer, and by his death a severe loss to the Battalion. The General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Brigade, in a letter to the Commanding Officer deploring his loss, wrote ". . . not only is he a loss to the Brigade, but to the whole Army. His daring as a scout, and his spirit of offensive, were the success of the advance on the left."

Captain Birdwood was recommended for the award of the D.S.O., and had he lived there is no doubt but that he would have received this decoration, which he well deserved.

On June 8th the Battalion was relieved by the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles and moved into reserve on Gurkha Beach, where it remained until June 13th.

Owing to the heavy casualties amongst the British officers of the 1/5th Gurkhas, it was necessary during periods in reserve to detail officers to assist them, so that

there was little rest for Captains Cornish and Abbott, and Lieutenants Poynder, Toller, Bear, and Collingridge.

Captain Abbott, in addition to his other duties, was Brigade Machine Gun Officer.

The health of the Battalion had been excellent, but at this period dysentery made its appearance. The conditions prevailing on the Peninsula favoured this disease. The army was in a cramped area, whilst, owing to the proximity of the enemy trenches, it was not possible to bury the numerous corpses which lay between the lines. The weather had got hot, and there was a plague of flies. In many parts of the trenches occupied by the Battalion corpses were buried in or just outside the parapets, making it most unpleasant for the occupants, who, in an endeavour to improve conditions, were wont to stuff their nostrils with pull-through flannelette. The first case of dysentery appeared in the Battalion on June 14th.

Although the Turks did not use gas, respirators were issued to all ranks on June 13th as a precautionary measure.

At 3.30 p.m. on the 14th the Battalion relieved the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, and occupied once more the trenches on the extreme left of the line, where it remained until June 23rd, when it was again relieved by the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

During this period the enemy howitzers paid the trenches more attention than before, but the Battalion only suffered ten casualties—1 Gurkha other rank killed and 9 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

Two maxims (converted '450) were issued, which increased the fire power of the Battalion.

Three reconnaissances were carried out by the scouts, under Jemadar Barsing Thapa and No. 266 Naik Budhiram Gharti, "A" Company. The object of these reconnaissances was to find out the enemy dispositions in the vicinity of the beach north-east of the firing line.

The following complimentary message was sent to the Battalion by General Sir Ian Hamilton: "The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean Expeditionary Force is pleased to inform all ranks of the Battalion that he has reported in very favourable terms to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India on the conduct of the

Battalion since its arrival on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and that he has made a personal request to the Commander-in-Chief in India asking him to acquaint His Excellency the Maharajah of Nepal of the terms of his report."

On June 23rd the first indications of a fresh push were noticed.

Major-General de Lisle had taken over command of the 29th Division, to which the 29th Indian Brigade continued to form an extra brigade.

Reconnaissances of the coast from the sea were precursors of attacks, and the reconnaissance from the *Wolverine* (T.B.D.) on the 23rd was no exception to this rule. The Divisional Commander, Brigade Commander 29th Indian Brigade, Captain D. G. J. Ryan, Adjutant 1/6th and Lieutenant K. Erskine, Adjutant 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, took part in the reconnaissance, a clear indication that the 29th Indian Brigade was about to be called upon to negotiate the cliffs in a forthcoming attack.

Further indications of the impending attack were to be found in an order to the effect that nightly reconnaissances of the beach were to be made. Much information with regard to the dispositions of the enemy in the vicinity of the beach was obtained through these reconnaissances. It was ascertained that Turkish observation posts were established on the cliffs nightly after dark and withdrawn before daylight, and the location of more than one of these posts was marked down.

On June 26th an attempt to ambush the Turks in one of their posts was made. At 8.30 p.m. a party of scouts slipped out and forestalled the enemy by occupying one of the Turkish posts. There the party lay in waiting. After half an hour's staring into the darkness the forms of nine men approaching the posts could be distinguished. The success of the ambush seemed to be assured, but an unfortunate incident robbed the scouts of victory. The silence of the night was broken by one of the scouts falling through a bush, and seeing that the "gaff was blown" the non-commissioned officer in charge (No. 266 Naik Budhiram Gharti, "A" Company) ordered rapid fire, but the enemy had started to make off before fire could be opened, and the result of the shooting was never known. The scouts got back just before the moon rose. When the General Officer Commanding 29th Division

heard about this episode, he issued an order to the General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Brigade that this post was to be scuppered the next night.

Much time during this period in reserve was spent in bombing instruction. The type of bomb used on the Peninsula was the "jam pot" variety. The supply was strictly limited, and to a certain extent depended upon the amount of jam consumed by the troops, and the manufacturing capacity of the Royal Engineers; the smart-looking article produced by the munition department at home was only occasionally seen.

On June 26th 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill, who it will be remembered was ordered to remain at Port Said when the Battalion left Egypt, joined.

In spite of having lost 2 British officers killed and 4 wounded, the situation with regard to British officers was still fairly satisfactory in the Battalion, a statement which ceased to hold good immediately after the operations between June 28th and July 5th.

The British officers present with the Battalion on June 27th were:—

<i>Appointments.</i>	<i>Rank and Name</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
C.O. ...	Lt.-Col. The Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.	Wounded, 1/7/15
Adjutant ...	Capt. D. G. J. Ryan ...	—
Qr.Mr. ...	Lieut. J. M. Whittall ...	Invalided, 28/6/15
Medical ...	Capt. E. S. Phipson, I.M.S. ...	—
"A" Coy. ...	Capt. F. B. Abbott ...	Wounded, 29/6/15
	Lieut. H. C. Toller, I.A.R.O. ...	Wounded, 2/7/15
"B" Coy. ...	Capt. A. W. D. Cornish ...	—
	*2/Lieut. H. C. Underhill, I.A.R.O.	—
"C" Coy. ...	Lieut. H. V. Collingridge ...	Wounded, 5/7/15
	2/Lieut. R. M. Bear, I.A.R.O....	—
"D" Coy. ...	Lieut. L. E. Poynder. ...	Wounded, 30/6/15

* Replaced Lieut. J. M. Whittall, invalided on 28/6/15.

On the evening of June 27th a composite party of scouts, drawn from the 1/6th and 2/10th Gurkhas, ran into a stronger party of the enemy than usual whilst carrying out the enterprise along the beach in accordance with the wishes of the General Officer Commanding 29th Division. The *Wolverine* (T.B.D.) was signalled to go to their assistance, and at the same time a party from "D" Company, under Lieutenant Poynder, was despatched to support them. The scouts, having lost 3 men wounded, effected their withdrawal shortly after midnight.

CHAPTER XI.

(See Maps Nos. 10 and 8 and Appendix No. III.)

On the evening of June 26th orders for the attack on the 28th were received.

The scheme of attack differed from June 4th plan, in that, whereas on June 4th a "general" advance was attempted, on the 28th the advance was limited to the left of the Allied position.

The left, pivoting upon a point in our line about one mile from the sea, south-east of Gurkha Bluff, was to push forward until its outer flank advanced about 1,000 yards. If the operation was successful, then, at its close, we should have driven the enemy back for 1,000 yards along the coast, and the trenches of this left section of the line would be facing east instead of, as previously, north-east. Obviously the ground to be gained lessened as our line drew back from the sea towards its fixed or pivotal right. Five Turkish trenches—J.9, 10, 11, 12, 13—must be carried in the section nearest the sea; only two Turkish trenches in the section farthest from the sea.

The troops allotted to the attack were the 86th and 87th Brigades and 29th Indian Brigade, whilst the greater portion of the artillery on the Peninsula, as well as the guns of certain ships, were detailed to co-operate.


The prospect of success was distinctly more hopeful than on June 4th.

The attack was divided into two phases:—

(i) The capture of trenches J.9, 10, 11 by the 87th Brigade; the 2/10th Gurkhas, of the 29th Indian Brigade, to work up J.11A on the left of this attack.

(ii) The capture of trenches J.12, 13 by the 86th Brigade, the 1/6th Gurkhas to advance on the left of this attack, secure such portion of J.11A as the 2/10th Gurkhas might be unable to secure, and eventually to establish themselves on the spur running north-west from the left of trench J.13.

This necessitated the Battalion advancing by way of the cliffs and beach, a route affording a limited frontage.



Fusilier Bluff
J.13

J.12

J.11

J.10

J.9

K.O.S.B. Trench

Gurkha Bluff



**AEROPLANE PHOTOGRAPH OF BRITISH AND TURKISH TRENCHES
BETWEEN GURKHA BLUFF AND FUSILIER BLUFF.**

"A" and "B" Companies were detailed as firing line, whilst the remainder of the Battalion was to follow in support.

H.M.S. *Talbot*, and the T.B.Ds. *Wolverine* and *Scorpion*, were detailed to support the attack along the cliffs.

At 4.30 a.m. the enemy commenced to bombard our positions, which made us wonder if the Turks had planned an attack for the same day.

The 28th dawned a perfect summer day, though later the heat was rather too great to be comfortable for the operation in hand, and resulted in the men arriving at the final objective with empty water-bottles.

At 8 a.m. the fleet made its appearance. It could be seen in the distance hugging the shore of Imbros, and then, suddenly altering course, the ships steamed towards the Peninsula and took up their respective stations for the battle.

At the same hour the Battalion moved to its position of assembly in Gurkha Ravine.

At 10.20 a.m. our bombardment opened, the Turks replied, and the noise, intensified by the echoes in Gurkha Ravine, is difficult to describe.

At 11 a.m. the guns lengthened their ranges, and the 87th Brigade assaulted and captured J.9, 10, 11, the 2/10th Gurkhas, working their way along the cliffs and J.11A, joined hands with the left of the 87th Brigade.

The 1/6th Gurkhas moved from Gurkha Ravine to Bruce's Ravine, preparatory to the second phase.

Bruce's Ravine was packed with troops moving forward.

The 86th Brigade was assembled in our old trenches ready to assault J.12, 13, which were being pounded by our guns.

At 11.30 a.m. the 86th Brigade, passing over J.9, 10, 11, already secured by the 87th Brigade, assaulted J.12, 13, whilst the Battalion, working its way via the cliffs and beach, joined hands with the Royal Fusiliers at Fusilier Bluff and secured the spur running north-west to the sea from that feature.

"A" Company, under Captain Abbott, was digging in on the cliff between J.13 and a point immediately east of Battalion Headquarters.

"B" Company, under Captain Cornish, prolonged the line held by "A" Company to the left and down the spur to which reference has already been made.

"C" Company, under Lieutenant Collingridge, was ordered to take over from the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, who were too extended, as much of J.11A. as they could between J.12 and J.13.

"D" Company, which had been temporarily depleted by furnishing carrying parties, remained in support.

Battalion Headquarters were located immediately below the point of the spur about forty yards north of the north-west end of J.13.

The portion of J.11A taken over by "C" Company was sited below the crest of a rise, and it was necessary for the company to dig a new line, in advance of it, and whilst so doing they suffered severely from shell fire, to which they were unavoidably exposed.

The situation at 4.30 p.m. was somewhat obscure. Fighting was in progress in J.13, a portion of which still remained in the hands of the Turks. The Munster Fusiliers were assembled in J.12 and charged J.13 across the open, whilst the 1/5th Gurkhas co-operated with them by working their way down J.13 from the north-west end. The Turks were driven out, and for the moment the trench passed into our hands. Half an hour later the Turks counter-attacked and regained the disputed half of J.13. Captain D. M. Govan, of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, was killed.

The 86th Brigade was withdrawn from the Fusilier Bluff area at dusk, and at 7 p.m. "A" Company (Captain Abbott) took over the British portion of J.13 from the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, and commenced to build a barricade about 100 yards from the north-west end of the trench. The idea now was to link up J.13 and J.12 with a sap, thus facing the firing line east in accordance with the scheme. Captain Abbott despatched Lieutenant Toller to J.12 to warn the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles that he intended to commence digging towards them. Lieutenant Toller arrived in J.12 just as the Turks launched a counter-attack against that trench. The counter-attack was repulsed. Lieutenant Toller was wounded in the ear, but not before he had accounted for six Turks with his revolver.

Up to this period of the day's fighting the Battalion had sustained the following casualties: Killed—15 Gurkha other ranks; wounded—1 British officer, 1 Gurkha officer, 59 Gurkha other ranks. In addition to the above casualties, Lieutenant J. M. Whittall was invalided, suffering from enteric.

At dusk food and water were sent up from Gurkha Beach. As already stated, the heat during the day was considerable, and the men were badly in need of water.

The day had been successful, the left of the line had been advanced 1,000 yards, and except on the right, near the pivotal point, all objectives had been carried. The total British casualties amounted to 1,750.

After the counter-attack on J.12 had been repulsed the situation eased, and work on the consolidation of our position progressed.

At 12 midnight the Turks launched a counter-attack against "A" Company in J.13. Running short of bombs, the company was forced back slowly. Fifty bombs per company was all that could be spared for issue on June 28th. It was necessary, therefore, to collect bombs from the other companies to replenish "A" Company. In the darkness this took time, but as soon as a supply had been collected Captain Abbott led an attack against the enemy, and when he had almost recovered all the lost ground he fell, severely wounded in the head. Of the two men who accompanied Captain Abbott, No. 927 Rifleman Bindoj Gurung was killed, and No. 1060 Bugler Dimansing was wounded. Five riflemen took on the bombing, and the barricade was regained. Later the Turks again returned to the attack, and once more "A" Company were forced to give ground, but, regaining the upper hand, the enemy were driven back, and the trench as far as the barricade was retained for the remainder of the night.

Dawn was welcomed on the 29th, even though it was the signal for the Turks to open a heavy bombardment with high explosive on our position.

Shelled at frequent intervals throughout the day, work on strengthening the position progressed satisfactorily. When darkness set in activity was resumed in J.13, but we were able to maintain our position.

Casualties for June 29th were: Killed—2 Gurkha other

ranks; wounded—1 British officer (Captain F. B. Abbott) and 1 Gurkha other rank.

The Turks commenced the day on the 30th by renewing the bombardment of our position.

"D" Company took over the line held by "A" Company, which remained in close support of the former; whilst "C" Company, having been relieved by a company of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, moved to a position in rear of and in support of "B" Company.

At about 10 p.m. bombing operations reopened in J.13 with renewed vigour; our supply of bombs exhausted, a machine gun was mounted on the top of a traverse and a continuous fire poured down the trench, until finally a bullet put the gun out of action. Things now became critical, and an urgent message was sent to Brigade Headquarters to send up more bombs. Lieutenant Poynder was wounded, and the garrison of J.13 was being driven back. Early in the morning on July 1st the situation in J.13 was desperate; we had been driven back to within two traverses of J.11A (that is, from the north-west end of J.13) and unless bombs were forthcoming, the Turks, who had an ample supply of percussion grenades, looked like getting us right out of the trench. The behaviour of Subadar Sahabir Thapa and the men of "D" Company was magnificent. Man after man was shot down defending these last two traverses, and no sooner had one man been killed than another took his place, and in this way was the small remaining portion of J.13 held until a fresh supply of bombs arrived. Pending the arrival of the bombs, a bombing party, composed of men from the 1/6th and 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, was organized by Captain Ryan and Lieutenant Erskine (1/5th).

In addition to the bombing party, a working party was also collected. Forty bombs were all that could be raised, and with these, Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun well to the fore, an onslaught was made on the Turks, and they were driven down the whole length of J.13. With an uncertain supply of bombs, it was decided that the most effective way of maintaining our position in the Fusilier Bluff area was to surrender, but at the same time deny the fifty yards of J.13 nearest to J.11A to the Turks. Accordingly the working party cut away the

traverses in that part of the trench and wired some fifteen to twenty yards of it, incidentally denying it as a means of withdrawal to the bombing party. Just as the work was nearing completion the forty bombs were exhausted. However, it was possible to complete the work before it was necessary to withdraw. The whole operation took twenty minutes, and in spite of a severe shrapnelling there was not a single casualty in the bombing or working party. A loopholed barricade was erected at the mouth of J.13, and a machine gun was mounted behind it enfilading the cleared portion of the trench. By these means we were enabled to keep the Turks out of bombing distance, and the trouble in the vicinity of J.13 ceased for the time being.

Casualties on June 30th sustained by the Battalion were: Killed, 16 Gurkha other ranks; wounded, 1 British officer (Lieutenant L. E. Poynder), 61 Gurkha other ranks.

The remarkable feature of the operations in progress was that although the enemy position was assaulted and captured on June 28th, it was now July 1st and no attempt at a serious counter-attack had been made by the enemy. We expected one, and we were prepared for it.

On the afternoon of July 1st the enemy shelled our position very heavily, and though we thought it might be, it was not a prelude to a counter-attack.

Towards evening it started to rain, a dismal proceeding in trench warfare; but a still more dismal occurrence took place shortly afterwards, and that was, the Commanding Officer was severely wounded through both legs.

Casualties on July 1st were: Wounded, 1 British officer (Lieut.-Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.) and 3 Gurkha other ranks.

On the morning of July 2nd the trenches were again subjected to a heavy bombardment, at the conclusion of which there was comparative quiet.

In the course of the morning the 14th Sikhs arrived and took over that part of the firing line on either side of the barricade at the mouth of J.13. Work continued on the sap linking up the centre of J.12 and a point some twenty yards south-west of the mouth of J.13.

At 4 p.m. the enemy opened an intense bombardment on our position. It lasted until 4.30 p.m., when at last the long-expected counter-attack was delivered by the enemy. Our artillery had registered the ground in anticipation of this attack. The attack came from the east and was directed against the portion of our line between J.13 and Fusilier Bluff, manned by "B" Company. In less than fifteen minutes the attack was shattered, and those of the attackers who survived sought shelter in the dead ground afforded by Gully Ravine, whilst some attempted to get into J.13. Seeing that the attempt had failed, the enemy rebombarded our position and then returned to the attack, but their hearts were not in it this time, and leaving 800 corpses in front of us they broke and made for what cover they could find.

The Battalion sustained 23 casualties—5 Gurkha other ranks killed, and 1 British officer (Lieutenant H. C. Toller severely wounded) and 17 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

The night passed quietly, but the next morning (July 3rd) the trenches were again subjected to a heavy bombardment, resulting in 4 casualties (4 Gurkha other ranks wounded).

During the afternoon the 14th Sikhs made an attempt to retake J.13. They succeeded in bombing the Turk out of his first barricade, only to find he had erected a second one which commanded the first, and after a heavy bomb fight they were compelled to give up the contest.

A detachment of the Border Regiment took over 100 yards of the firing line from us, enabling us to send the remnants of two companies into local reserve in the nullah immediately below the firing line.

Except for a shelling in the afternoon on July 4th the day passed quietly.

At 2.50 a.m. on July 5th one of the sentries in that part of the line held by "B" Company reported that the enemy were massing in front of the trench. It was an extremely dark night, and although several officers peered into the darkness they could discern nothing. To be on the safe side the firing line was ordered to stand to arms. A Verrey light was fired; the sentry was right; the enemy were preparing to attack. The artillery forward observation officers lost no time, and two field artillery

Map N° 11

References
Direction of Turkish Counter
Attacks 2nd & 5th July 1915. →



batteries were soon busily engaged shelling a dense formation of the enemy assembled 200 yards east of the trenches occupied by "B" Company.

As luck would have it, H.M.S. *Wolverine* was away from her usual night station opposite our left flank, but a lamp signal called her back in time. Switching on her search light, further enemy parties were seen advancing along the cliffs, and the *Wolverine*, like the artillery, soon became busily engaged.

Shortly after 3 a.m. the Turks advanced, and were greeted by a crash of rapid machine-gun and rifle fire. By 4 a.m. the firing had died down, but just before 5 a.m. in the dim dawn further lines of Turks were to be seen advancing. The Turkish attack on the 2nd could not be compared to this one. On came the Turks, line after line, but not a single man reached the parapet of our front-line trench. They were literally mown to pieces, and the dead were heaped one on top of the other. The rifles of the men in the firing line became so hot that it was necessary to pass up rifles from the supports; whilst the men in support kept the firing-line rifles while they cooled and recharged the magazines. (A fortnight later when the rifles were stripped at Imbros the fore ends and hand guards were found to be badly charred.) Once it became light the attack faded away, whilst heaped in front of our trenches lay the dead. It was estimated that there were 2,000 corpses in front of our line alone. When all seemed over there came a burst of artillery fire, and looking back from our position a line of bursting enemy shell was seen to extend across the Peninsula south-east from Gully Beach. Presumably a barrage to catch the "Infidels" flying from the "Champions of Islam"! But the "Champions of Islam" had failed once more to drive us into the sea.

The Battalion lost 2 Gurkha other ranks killed, 1 British officer (Lieutenant H. V. Collingridge) and 14 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

At 12 noon the Inniskilling Fusiliers relieved the Battalion in the firing line, which, after eight days' and nights' strenuous fighting, went into reserve in the nullah immediately below the firing line.

During the eight days, from June 28th to July 5th, the Battalion lost in killed and wounded 205 all ranks.

			<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>
British Officers	—	5
Gurkha Officers	—	2
Gurkha Other Ranks	40	158
Total	40	165

The following congratulatory message was received from the General Officer Commanding VIII Army Corps :

“ The Lieutenant-General Commanding the VIII Army Corps congratulates the 5th and 6th Gurkhas on their gallant and successful action in repelling the strong Turkish attacks on July 2nd and 5th, 1915, and on having inflicted such heavy casualties on the enemy.”

In connection with this fighting the names of the following British and Gurkha officers and Gurkha other ranks were brought to notice for gallantry and conspicuous good work :—

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Company.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
—	Capt. F. B. Abbott ...	“ A ”	Awarded D.S.O.
—	Capt. D. G. J. Ryan ...	Adj.	Awarded D.S.O.
—	Lieut. L. E. Poynder ...	“ D ”	Awarded M.C.
—	Lieut. H. C. Toller ...	“ A ”	Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Sub-Major Gambirsing Pun ...	“ A ”	Awarded I.O.M.
—	Sub. Sahabir Thapa ...	“ D ”	Awarded I.O.M.
—	Jem. Dalbahadur Thapa ...	“ D ”	Awarded I.O.M.
—	Jem. Kulbahadur Thapa ...	“ B ”	Awarded I.D.S.M.
4802	Naik Yapai Gurung ...	“ A ”	Died of wounds.
927	Rfmn. Bindoj Gurung ...	“ A ”	Killed in action.
1060	Bugler Dimansing Thapa ...	“ A ”	Wounded.
473	Rfmn. Bhowansing Rana... ..	“ A ”	Killed in action.
528	Rfmn. Ganjasing Gurung... ..	“ A ”	—
515	Rfmn. Mane Gurung ...	“ A ”	—
4889	Rfmn. Narsing Gharti ...	“ A ”	—
225	Rfmn. Panchabir Gurung ...	“ A ”	—
775	Naik Kharkasing Rana ...	“ A ”	—
3979	Hav. Puransing Gurung ...	“ A ”	Killed in action.
4953	Hav. Indrasing Gurung ...	“ A ”	Killed in action.
4937	L./Naik Jitbahadur Thapa ...	“ A ”	Wounded.
4832	Hav. Lalbir Thapa ...	“ A ”	—
514	Rfmn. Bahadur Gurung ...	“ A ”	Wounded.
98	L./Naik Mandoj Gurung ...	“ C ”	—
591	Rfmn. Adalsur Pun ...	“ B ”	Wounded three times ; died of wounds.
957	Rfmn. Nimbahadur Thapa ...	“ B ”	—
925	Rfmn. Yaru Gurung ...	“ A ”	—
839	Rfmn. Rampatti Gurung ...	“ B ”	—
202	Rfmn. Rattansing Thapa... ..	“ D ”	—
4596	Hav. Narbir Thapa ...	“ B ”	Killed in action.
4049	Naik Rannu Thapa ...	“ B ”	Wounded.
757	Naik Mandrabahadur Gurung ...	“ B ”	—
486	Naik Sete Thapa ...	“ D ”	—
896	Rfmn. Amarsing Rana ...	“ C ”	—

42	Hav. Balbir Rana	...	" D "	Awarded I.O.M.
285	Hav. Narbahadur Gurung	...	" D "	Awarded I.O.M.
561	Rfmn. Lalsing Thapa	...	" D "	Awarded I.O.M.
4659	Rfmn. Karnasing Thapa	...	" D "	—
639	Hav. Lalsing Thapa	...	" D "	—
4869	Rfmn. Junia Bura...	...	" D "	—
385	Rfmn. Lalu Pun	...	" D "	—
4831	Hav. Chandrasing Gurung	...	" B "	—
4991	Rfmn. Harkabahadur]			
	Gurung	...	" C "	—
4732	L./Naik Thaksing Gharti	...	" C "	—

On July 6th the Battalion relieved the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles and took over that part of the firing line between Fusilier Bluff and the sea. Later the same day orders were received that the Battalion would be relieved at 7 p.m. by a Territorial Battalion of the Royal Scots belonging to the 52nd Lowland Division. This relief, however, was not completed until 2.30 a.m. on the 7th, when the Battalion moved to its old reserve position at Gurkha Beach, arriving there at 3 a.m. Officers and men were exhausted, and the joy of that rest, unless experienced, is difficult to describe. Most people slept well on into the day, and had it not been for a whisper of rum it is doubtful whether anybody would have had the energy to leave his blankets.

On July 9th Captain J. S. Dallas, who had been wounded in the action of Gurkha Bluff, rejoined. The same afternoon the Battalion received orders to be ready to march to V Beach, where it was to embark for the Island of Imbros.

At 9.15 p.m. the Battalion marched from Gurkha Beach, and arrived at V Beach at 11.45 p.m. There, having embarked on three trawlers, and packed like sardines, the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles bade farewell to the Cape Helles theatre of operations.

The total battle casualties sustained by the Battalion in the Cape Helles area were 96 killed and 383 wounded. Detail as follows:—

		<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Killed and Wounded.</i>
British Officers	...	2	9	11
Gurkha Officers	...	3	5	8
Gurkha Other Ranks	...	91	369	460
		<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	...	96	383	479

CHAPTER XII.

AFTER a smooth passage the trawlers arrived off Imbros before dawn on July 10th, but owing to the boom being closed were not able to enter the harbour until daylight.

The Battalion disembarked at 6.30 a.m., and marched one mile inland to the site allotted for a bivouac.

Imbros is a small island situated twelve miles west of the Gallipoli Peninsula. (See Map No. 15.)

In addition to General Headquarters being located at Imbros, the island was used by the Royal Air Force as a base from which to co-operate with the troops on the Peninsula. The 11th Division concentrated there prior to landing at Suvla Bay.

At midday on the 10th the General Officer Commanding VIII Army Corps (Lieut.-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston) paid an impromptu visit to the camp. The reason of his visit is best described by quoting verbatim the very complimentary message which he asked the Commanding Officer (Captain A. W. D. Cornish) to convey to all ranks of the Battalion: "I want you to tell your men that the first thing I did on landing at Imbros to-day was to come and see you. Your Battalion has done wonderful work—magnificent work, and work which will go to make the name of the Gurkha greater than it already is, if such a thing is possible."

The Battalion remained at Imbros from July 10th to August 4th, a period which afforded ample time in which to rest and reorganize.

The following British and Gurkha officers joined the Battalion on the Island: Lieutenant J. W. J. Le Marchant, 56th Rifles, July 12th; Major C. J. L. Allanson, who took over command from Captain A. W. D. Cornish, July 24th; 2/Lieutenant N. H. Hearsey, I.A.R.O., July 24th; Jemadar Bhadrabir Thapa, 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, July 11th; Subadar Parbir Thapa, 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, July 30th.

In addition to the above officers, two drafts from the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, totalling 116 other ranks, joined.

As already related, dysentery had made its appearance in the Battalion whilst at Helles. The day after arrival at Imbros 36 Gurkha other ranks went down with this complaint; five days later the number had increased to 54.

Amongst the amusements at Imbros were sea bathing, football, and walks. The bathing is second to none—wonderfully clear water, a shingly beach which slopes sharply, resulting in the bather being out of his depth ten yards from the shore. Football, usually beginning with inter-company games, generally finished up 1/6th Gurkhas *versus* one of the New Army battalions of the 11th Division. Panaghea, the capital of the island, where a European meal could be procured, at a price, was the objective of most walks. Frequent visits were also paid by the men and officers to H.M.S. *Talbot*, which happened to be at anchor in Kephalos harbour during the Battalion's stay at Imbros.

On July 18th these peaceful surroundings were momentarily disturbed by the visit of a Hun aeroplane, which, having ineffectively deposited its cargo of bombs, departed whence it came.

Captain D. G. J. Ryan was transferred to the General Hospital at Alexandria on August 4th, suffering from dysentery.

Late in July there were persistent rumours of a fresh offensive; a map of Asia Minor had been issued, and there was much conjecture as to where the push was to be made. Secrecy on this point was so well maintained that even when the Battalion left Imbros it did not know its intended destination.

The following British officers were available to move with the Battalion on receipt of orders:—Major C. J. L. Allanson, Captain A. W. D. Cornish, Captain J. S. Dallas, Lieutenant J. W. J. Le Marchant, 2/Lieutenant R. M. Bear, 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill (Quartermaster), Captain E. S. Phipson, I.M.S. (Medical Officer). 2/Lieutenant N. H. Hearsey was appointed Brigade Transport Officer.

On August 2nd the General Officer Commanding 29th Indian Brigade and all battalion commanders left Imbros, and the following day administrative instructions for a move were received, but neither date nor place were indicated.

On August 5th the Battalion embarked after dark and sailed for an unknown destination. After an exceedingly rough crossing the 1/6th Gurkhas landed at Anzac early on the morning of the 6th, and proceeded at once to a concealed position in Reserve Gully. (See Map No. 12.)

Before continuing further it is necessary to explain the general idea of the operations in which the Battalion was about to take part.

Three fresh divisions (10th and 11th, forming the IX Corps) and the 13th were sent to Gallipoli to take part in the August offensive, the strategical conception of which was:—(See Map No. 15.)

(1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from land communication with Constantinople.

(2) To gain such a command for the artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish Army from sea traffic, whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

(3) To secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all troops operating in the northern theatre.

The plan was as follows:—

(a) Offensive action in the Cape Helles area to pin the enemy to their ground and to distract the enemy's attention and reinforcements from the Anzac zone.

(b) A vigorous offensive from Anzac (to be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 13th Division and 29th Indian Brigade), combined with a surprise landing at Suvla Bay (to be effected by the IX Corps).

The general dispositions at Anzac at this time are shown on Map No. 12.

"Z" day for the break-out from Anzac was fixed as the night of August 6th/7th.

The first step to be taken was a night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair Ridge (see Map No. 12), and with this object in view the Anzac forces were organized into two covering and two assaulting columns.

(i) Right covering column, one brigade plus two regiments, to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines.

(ii) Left covering column, one brigade plus two regiments, to move northwards along the beach, seize

Damajelik Bair, and protect the left flank of the left assaulting column.

(iii) Right assaulting column, one brigade and one pack battery, to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to storm Chunak Bair Ridge.

(iv) Left assaulting column (which included 1/6th Gurkhas), General Officer Commanding, Major-General H. V. Cox; troops, 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, one pack battery, one company New Zealand Engineers, to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Koja Chemen Tepe.

The night of August 6th/7th was also fixed for the landing of the IX Corps at Suvla Bay.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE Battalion left Reserve Gully at 10 p.m. on the night of August 6th/7th, its objective being the capture of the Chunak Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe Ridges at dawn on August 7th, in conjunction with the other troops of the left assaulting column.

The left assaulting column order of march was as follows: 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Column Headquarters, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, one company New Zealand Engineers, 21st Pack Battery, Royal Artillery, and 14th K.G.O. Sikhs. It followed closely on the heels of the left covering column; entered the Aghyl Dere at 1 a.m. on the 7th.

The left covering column took the enemy by surprise near the Damajelik Bair, where the Battalion added 10 prisoners to the number already captured by the covering column. By 1.30 a.m. the Turks had been driven from the Damajelik Bair, whilst the two assaulting columns faced east and moved to the attack of the Sari Bair Ridge.

The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade was directed to move on Koja Chemen Tepe via the Chumchik Punar Spur, whilst the 29th Indian Brigade moved on Hill Q via the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere. The advance was stubbornly opposed by the enemy.

When dawn broke on the 7th the crest of Sari Bair Ridge had not been reached.

The left assaulting column was on a line roughly from the Farm to a point just south of the e in Azmac Dere.

At 6.30 a.m. orders were received by the Commanding Officer to reinforce the 4th Australian Brigade. Attempts to reach them were frustrated by the enemy, and the Battalion, swinging to its right, pressed on up the spurs north and south of the nullah south of the north fork of the Aghyl Dere, and eventually reached a point about 500 yards below the crest of Hill Q, with the 1/5th Gurkhas some distance to the right in the neigh-

bourhood of the Farm. The 14th Sikhs were on the left of the Battalion.

The enemy's resistance grew stronger, and no further advance was made.

The Battalion suffered the following casualties: Killed and missing, 11 Gurkhas other ranks; wounded, 1 Gurkha officer (Jemadar Santabir Gurung) and 64 Gurkha other ranks.

The right assaulting column reached and entrenched a position at the top of Rhododendron Spur.

The IX Corps had effected a surprise landing at Suvla Bay, where but slight opposition had been encountered.

Throughout the night of August 7th/8th the assaulting columns clung to the ground so gallantly gained on the western slopes of Sari Bair.

At 1.30 a.m. on August 8th orders were received for a further attack to be delivered at dawn, the general idea of which was:—

The right assaulting column to attack the Chunak Bair Ridge.

The left assaulting column, reinforced by the 39th Infantry Brigade, to attack the prolongation of the Chunak Bair Ridge north-east to Kojia Chemen Tepe.

Captain J. S. Dallas had, during the afternoon and evening of August 7th, carried out a reconnaissance of an approach towards Hill Q.

When orders for the attack were received three companies were holding the front line, whilst the fourth was in reserve at Battalion Headquarters, which were located at a point on the spur between the north and south forks of the Aghyl Dere and about 500 yards east of the junction of the forks.

Attack orders were telephoned to the companies, but due to darkness and the scrub-covered hillsides, which hindered rapid movement, a considerable space of time elapsed before companies reached their assembly points for the attack.

At 4.15 a.m., the hour appointed for the attack, the 1/6th Gurkhas, two companies leading and two companies in support, moved forward on Hill Q.

At 9.30 a.m. a point 200 yards below the crest of the ridge was reached, where the attack was brought to a standstill by the enemy. Fighting continued all day, and

by nightfall the Battalion, assisted by one company of the North Staffordshire Regiment, had succeeded in advancing another fifty yards. Beyond this point it was impracticable to advance. The ground gained was consolidated and held during the night of August 8th/9th. Two companies of the 6th Battalion The South Lancashire Regiment and one company of the Warwickshire Regiment, at the request of the Commanding Officer, were moved up in support of the Battalion.

During the day's fighting Captain J. S. Dallas was dangerously wounded, while 2/Lieutenant H. C. Underhill was reported missing. 2/Lieutenant Underhill was seen several times during the day most gallantly leading his men. There is no doubt now but that he was killed. During his only too brief military career he did splendid work for the Battalion.

In the day's fighting the Battalion sustained 39 casualties: 12 Gurkha other ranks killed, and 2 British officers, 2 Gurkha officers (Subadar Sahabir Thapa and Jemadar Dalbahadur Thapa) and 23 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

The right assaulting column had established a footing on the south-west end of Chunak Bair, and, in spite of desperate fighting, maintained its position.

On the left the 4th Australian Brigade advanced from the Azmac Dere against the lower slopes of the Abd-el-Rahman Bair, but were driven back to their original position, where they withstood the repeated attacks of the Turks.

The expected support from Suvla hung fire, and thus closed the second day of the struggle for the Sari Bair Ridge.

It was now decided to renew the attack at dawn on the 9th. Taking advantage of the footing gained on Chunak Bair by the right assaulting column, five battalions drawn from the 38th and 29th Infantry Brigades (New Army), under the command of Brig.-General Baldwin, were detailed for the main attack.

The right assaulting column was to hold its ground, the left assaulting column to attack Hill Q, whilst Baldwin's battalions were to pass through the right assaulting column and attack north-east along the Sari Bair Ridge.

During the night of August 8th/9th orders for attack at dawn on the 9th reached Battalion Headquarters. The attack was to be preceded by half-an-hour's naval bombardment from 4.45 a.m. to 5.15 a.m. Punctually at 4.45 the bombardment opened. The naval work was splendid. Shells of all descriptions were absolutely hurled on the Turkish position, which was a mass of smoke, dust, and flying clods of earth. 5.15 arrived, but the bombardment continued; 5.18, 5.20, and then it ceased. Despite the risk, the Commanding Officer waited until 5.23 a.m., and then, together with the two companies of the 6th Battalion The South Lancashire Regiment, the Battalion (less the machine guns and forty men under Captain A. W. D. Cornish left in the position) advanced.

The following extract from General Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch, dated December 11th, 1915, continues the narrative:—

“And now, under that fine leader Major C. J. L. Allanson, the 6th Gurkhas, of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunak Bair and Hill Q. Not only did this Battalion, as well as some of the 6th South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast retreating enemy.”

It was not known at the time that the General Officer Commanding Division, General Godley, was on a torpedo boat destroyer, and that every telescope was focussed on this attack.

At the top of the ridge the Turks were met. Le Marchant fell, a bayonet through his heart. Major Allanson was also wounded by a bayonet thrust in the thigh. For ten minutes hand-to-hand fighting of the most bitter character ensued, bayonets, rifles and pistols, used as clubs, and fists. Then the Turks turned and fled. The key of the whole Peninsula was in the hands of the Battalion. Below could be seen the Straits, motors and wheeled transport on the roads leading to Achi Baba. Looking round, the Commanding Officer saw that the Battalion was not being supported. He therefore ordered the Battalion to pursue the retreating Turks down the eastern slopes of Sari Bair.

The psychological moment had arrived. Much depended on what happened within the next few minutes. The road had been opened for Baldwin's battalions, battalions which might have turned the scale in our favour in Gallipoli. Unfortunately, they had lost the way in the darkness, and there was yet no sign of them.

For fifteen minutes the Battalion had been in occupation of the crest and beyond, when suddenly the Navy rebombarded the crest line. There was a panic. The Turks saw it and rallied, and soon the position so splendidly won after three nights and two days' fighting passed out of the hands of the Battalion.

By 9 a.m. the Battalion was once again holding the position from which it had advanced earlier in the morning. On arrival Captain A. W. D. Cornish was found to have been severely wounded in the chest. With the exception of Captain E. S. Phipson, the Medical Officer, every British officer had been either killed or wounded. Major Allanson, though wounded, remained at his post until the afternoon, when Captain G. Tomes, 53rd Sikhs, attached to the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, arrived and assumed command. Major Allanson was then helped down to Brigade Headquarters, where he made a full report of the situation before being taken to the field ambulance.

During this period Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, I.O.M., was conspicuous for his magnificent behaviour and splendid example.

Throughout the remainder of the 9th and night of August 9th/10th the Battalion fought and clung to its precarious position. At 1 a.m. on August 10th the Battalion was reinforced by forty men from the Warwickshire Regiment. At daybreak the same day Captain G. Tomes, whilst endeavouring to improve the general dispositions, was killed. With the exception of Captain E. S. Phipson, I.M.S., there were now no British officers with the Battalion, and command devolved on Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, I.O.M. A little later the enemy developed a counter-attack against the position from Chunak Bair to Hill Q. Every available rifle in the Battalion was in the firing line. The position held by the Battalion was a little forward of those held by the troops on either flank, and from here an oblique machine-gun

and rifle fire was brought to bear on the advancing Turks, and the attack was repulsed. This, however, was only a prelude to a series of counter-attacks. The position on Chunak Bair, held by the right assaulting column, was overwhelmed by the enemy, and the defenders driven back down the western slopes.

All along the line fierce fighting ensued, in which the Turks, exposed as they were on the western slopes of Sari Bair to the fire from the Navy and artillery, suffered heavy casualties.

By 10 a.m. the enemy was in occupation of the entire crest of the Sari Bair, and thus ended the fierce struggle, lasting three nights and two and a half days, for the possession of the Sari Bair Ridge.

The Anzac troops had suffered 12,000 casualties, but the "grand coup" had not come off.

Being unable to speak, read or write English, the Subadar-Major found it difficult to maintain touch with the rapid change in events; and had it not been for Captain E. S. Phipson, I.M.S., who came to his assistance, his already difficult position would have been rendered doubly difficult.

In the course of the morning of August 10th information reached Battalion Headquarters from the British regiments on either flank that, in accordance with orders received, they had commenced to retire. No such orders had reached the 1/6th Gurkhas. Brigade Headquarters were referred to, and after a delay, due to the telephone cables being cut, orders were received to withdraw to the vicinity of the Damajelik Bair.

Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun organized the retirement. Before a man moved, all material such as ammunition, rifles and equipment, which could not be taken back with the survivors of the three days' fighting, was rendered useless. Bolts were removed from these rifles, the ammunition was scattered amongst the scrub, whilst the equipment was cut up. The Battalion then retired in good order, and reported for orders at Brigade Headquarters, which were located at Damajelik Bair.

It was now 4 p.m. The men were dog tired, and until 6 p.m. the Battalion remained under cover in a small nullah on the south slope of the Damajelik Bair. The Damajelik Bair was held by the left of the 4th Australian

Brigade, and the South Wales Borderers, belonging to the 11th Division; it constituted the left of the flank of the Anzac position.

At dusk the Battalion was ordered to take up an outpost position facing north-east between the left flank as described above and the sea. Two companies furnished the outpost troops; the remainder of the Battalion was held in reserve.

During the fighting of August 9th and 10th the Battalion sustained in casualties: Killed, 2 British officers (Captain G. Tomes and Lieutenant J. W. J. Le Marchant) and 19 Gurkha other ranks; wounded, 2 British officers (Major C. J. L. Allanson and Captain A. W. D. Cornish) and 66 Gurkha other ranks.

The total casualties for the three days' fighting amounted to 204 all ranks. Detail as follows:—

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
British Officers ...	3	3	6
Gurkha Officers ...	—	3	3
Gurkha Other Ranks	42	153	195
<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total ...	45	159	204

Lieutenant Le Marchant was a severe loss to the Regiment. His conduct during August 7th, 8th and 9th had been gallant and magnificent. The Regiment owes him a heavy debt of gratitude. He worked so gallantly and fearlessly that, despite only having been twenty days with the Battalion, the Regiment followed him gladly and helped to add to the credit of this day's work.

The names of the following British and Gurkha officers and Gurkha other ranks were brought to notice for gallantry and conspicuous good work:—

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Company.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
—	Major C. J. L. Allanson ...	C.O.	Awarded D.S.O.
—	Capt. A. W. D. Cornish ...	—	Awarded M.C.
—	Capt. J. S. Dallas ...	—	Died of wounds. Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Lieut. J. W. J. Le Marchant	—	Killed. Mentioned in Despatches.
—	2/Lieut. H. C. Underhill ...	—	Killed. Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Capt. E. S. Phipson ...	I.M.S.	Awarded D.S.O.
—	Sub.-Maj. Gambirsing Pun, I.O.M.	"A"	Awarded M.C.
—	Sub. Satsalsing Thapa ...	J.A.	Awarded I.O.M.
—	Jem. Balsing Thapa ...	"A"	Awarded I.O.M.
—	Jem. Dhanraj Thapa ...	"B"	Awarded I.D.S.M.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Company.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
4804	Rfmn. Dhanbir Thapa ...	" A "	Mentioned in Despatches.
3314	Rfmn. Lalbir Thapa ...	" A "	Mentioned in Despatches.
607	L./Naik Kesaram Gurung	" A "	Died of wounds.
4587	L./Naik Kishenbahadur Thapa	" A "	—
284	Rfmn. Dalbir Thapa ...	" A "	—
678	Rfmn. Nalbahadur Gurung	" A "	—

On August 11th Lieutenant D. I. B. Lloyd, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, took over command of the Battalion, and the same afternoon the following officers joined:— Captain J. O. Airy, I.A.R.O.; Lieutenant K. L. Fasken, 95th Infantry; Lieutenant R. L. Leman, 30th Punjabis.

In the evening the outpost zone was advanced.

Lieutenant D. I. B. Lloyd was killed by a sniper on August 14th. The same evening Major Allanson rejoined from the field ambulance and assumed command, but on the 17th his wound compelled him to return to hospital, and command devolved on Captain J. O. Airy.

Lieutenant Greene, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, and 2/Lieutenant Roberts, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles, joined the same evening.

On the 19th Major Allanson returned and resumed command.

Except for a thin line of outposts, communication between the left of the Anzac force and the right of the IX Corps in the Suvla area had not yet been established.

Hill 60 (see Map No. 13) commanded the outpost zone, and incidentally the communications between Anzac and Suvla. There were also several wells, notably those at Kubak Kuyu and Susak Kuyu, the possession of which were most desirable. It was decided, therefore, to carry out an attack, in conjunction with the IX Corps, against Hill 60 and Ismail Oglu Tepe.

The troops and objectives allotted to the Anzac force were as follows:—

Commander: Major-General H. V. Cox. Troops: Right Section—Two battalions New Zealand Mounted Rifles, objective Hill 60. Centre Section—5th Connaught Rangers (10th Division), 4th South Wales Borderers, objective Kubak Kuyu well. Left Section—29th Indian Infantry Brigade (less 14th Sikhs), objectives prolong line to Susak Kuyu and the capture of the well at that place.

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was disposed as under:—

1/5th Gurkhas (right) and 2/10th Gurkhas (left) of the firing line. 1/6th Gurkhas in support.

The attack, preceded by a bombardment, was launched at 3.40 p.m. on August 21st.

The Connaught Rangers carried the trenches covering the Kubak Kuyu wells, and, seeing the New Zealanders' advance against the eastern slopes of Hill 60 to be heavily opposed, detached a company to attack up the western slope. The company of the Connaughts made a gallant advance and was annihilated, but the New Zealanders succeeded in effecting a lodgment on the south-eastern slopes of Hill 60.

The advance of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was heavily opposed. "A" and "C" Companies were sent forward to reinforce the 2/10th, and "B" Company the 1/5th Gurkhas, "D" Company remained in reserve. Lieutenant Greene, who was in command of "C" Company, was wounded, and before he could be got away was hit a second time and killed. Naik Dalsing, whilst attempting to get Lieutenant Greene under cover when he was first hit, was wounded. Lieutenant Leman was also wounded. By nightfall the left section had not reached the objective. At 8 a.m. on the 22nd "D" Company moved forward to reinforce further the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. As this company was forming up they were shelled by the enemy, and Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun was severely wounded in the head, a sore loss to the Battalion. (Three and a half years later, as a result of this wound, he became paralysed and had to be invalided out of the service.) Due to the exposed nature of the country little progress could be made, but during the night of August 22nd/23rd the left section captured Susak Kuyu (where hands were joined with the right of the IX Corps) and entrenched the line Farm—point on the sunken road 150 yards south-west Susak Kuyu—Susak Kuyu. (See Map No. 14.)

Battalion Headquarters moved up to the point on the sunken road described above.

From August 11th to 22nd the Battalion lost 2 British officers and 14 Gurkha other ranks killed, and 1 British officer, Gurkha officer and 65 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., rejoined on August 23rd and resumed the duties of Adjutant.

It will be seen from Map No. 13 that a gap existed between the left of the 1/5th and the right of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. At 8.30 p.m. orders were received to push up into line with the 1/5th Gurkhas. The ground was reconnoitred at once, and, the selected line having been marked out, work commenced at 11.30 p.m. By dawn on the 24th the new line had been sufficiently prepared to permit of it being lightly held; it was completed during the night of the 24th/25th.

On August 27th attention was directed once more to Hill 60. This hill overlooked the Anafarta Valley, and it was therefore tactically an important feature. An attack, preceded by an intense bombardment by naval guns and artillery, was launched at 5 p.m. from the south-east and south. The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles were detailed to co-operate with fire from the trenches, but not to advance. The right of the attack was conducted by detachments from the 4th and 5th Australian Brigades, the centre and left by a New Zealand battalion and the 5th Connaught Rangers respectively. By nightfall the hill had been captured, but a counter-attack delivered later forced the attackers back to a line just below the crest on the south side of the hill, a position which was maintained and beyond which no advance was made to the end of the campaign.

From this date forward trench warfare set in. For three weeks there had been incessant fighting. The Battalion had, however, no reason to complain of the lack of official recognition. In addition to the eloquent tributes to the work of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles paid by Sir Ian Hamilton in his official despatches, the following letter was received by the General Officer Commanding 20th Indian Infantry Brigade from Major-General Sir A. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand Division:—

“I must write to tell you how very much I appreciate all the work and gallant fighting that has been done by your Brigade during the time it has been attached to my Division.

“The attack by the 1/6th Gurkhas on the morning of the 9th August, and the work done by the whole Brigade

on the outpost line during the latter part of the operations bear eloquent testimony to the value of the Brigade, and I shall be glad if you will convey to all officers, non-commissioned officers and men my appreciation of all they have done for us, and my great regret that our close association has ended."

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade from now on formed an extra brigade to the 54th (T.) Division.

From August 28th to September 10th nothing of interest occurred, the Battalion being engaged in the usual routine of trench warfare, the conditions of which were improved by a noticeable Turkish shortage of high explosive shell.

Map N° 12

Biyuk Anafarta

Kurija Dere

one Pin

Pine Ridge

5 1000

2000

3000 Yards

D.G.J.R.

CHAPTER XIV.

On September 10th, after a spell of thirty-four days' fighting, the 1/6th Gurkhas were relieved by the 19th Australian Infantry Battalion, and sent into reserve in 19th Avenue (see Map No. 14). The same evening Captain P. J. Gout joined, and took over command of "D" Company.

On September 14th Subadar Harku Thapa, Jemadar Suraj Pun and 105 Gurkha other ranks, 2/6th Gurkhas, were transferred to the Battalion from the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles, which had landed at Anzac two days previously.

On the 15th the Battalion was reinforced by a further draft, composed of Captain I. W. Bagot Harte, 2/6th, 2/Lieutenant N. B. Hart, I.A.R.O., Jemadar Amarbahadur Gurung, 2/6th, and 134 Gurkha other ranks.

Major-General Cox, Commanding the Indian Brigade, was invalided on the 18th. Replying to a letter written later congratulating him on his promotion to Lieutenant-General, General Cox wrote:—

"Very many thanks for your letter and kind congratulations. It was you brave lads of the 6th and 5th Gurkhas and the 14th Sikhs who won me any credit I got."

On the 19th Lieutenant Fasken was invalided.

Since the Army on the Peninsula had now gone to ground, and as there was no prospect of resuming the offensive in the near future, it was decided to sap as close up to the enemy trenches as possible with a view to harassing them by raids and bombing.

The first step in this direction was taken on the night of September 28th/29th when the line Farm—Susak Kuyu was straightened out. The Battalion moved up from reserve and worked from 10 p.m. to 1 a.m., and again the following day from 12.30 p.m. to 3.30 p.m.

News that Captain J. S. Dallas had succumbed to his

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wound was received, and the following appeared in Battalion Orders:—

“It is with extreme regret that the Officer Commanding has heard of the death in Egypt from his wound of Captain J. S. Dallas. There are many who will remember his brave leading on August 7th and 8th. By his death the Regiment has lost a very gallant officer and a true friend. The Commanding Officer is conveying to his nearest relatives the sympathy of the entire Regiment in its great loss.”

Subadar Harku Thapa was appointed officiating Subadar-Major *vice* Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, M.C., I.O.M., wounded.

Having spent three weeks in reserve, the Battalion relieved the 1/5th Gurkhas in the firing line on October 4th, and took over the trenches from Hill 60 to a point just east of the Farm (Gurkha Street and Piccadilly, see Map No. 14). At nightfall communication trenches (Bagot and Grafton Street and Tillard Sap) were dug forward from the firing line with a view to “T”-ing their heads, thus forming a new firing line on an average of 100 yards ahead of the existing line, and reducing the distance between the Turks and ourselves to about eighty yards. By the night of the 7th, except on the extreme right, the new line was completed. The portion of the right was too close to the enemy to dig in the open; it had to be sapped (Harte Sap).

On October 8th (?) a message from the Secretary of State for War was circularized to all units. It ran:—“Bulgaria has entered the war against us. My advice to you is dig.” Had Lord Kitchener been given an opportunity of seeing the Battalion during the hours of darkness he might perhaps have omitted the last portion of the message!

On the 10th the Turks exploded two mines in front of our trenches on Hill 60.

With the entry of Bulgaria into the war the Turkish supply of high explosive shells improved, and on the morning of October 12th the trenches were subjected to a violent bombardment.

The weather commenced to get very much colder, with occasional showers of rain. The men were clothed in khaki drill, and the number of sick started to increase.

The 1/4th Gurkhas having relieved the Battalion at 4.30 a.m. on October 19th it returned to the reserve position at Damarjelic Bair, and shortly afterwards "A" Company was detached to Anzac to work on the construction of a tram line.

Captain E. Watson Smyth, 1st Brahmins, Lieutenant N. H. King Salter, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 2/Lieutenant J. Snodgrass, I.A.R.O., and 28 Gurkha other ranks joined.

The situation in the Battalion with regard to British officers was now satisfactory. The detail is as follows:—Lieut.-Colonel C. J. Allanson, Commanding Officer; Captain D. J. G. Ryan, D.S.O., Adjutant; 2/Lieutenant N. B. Hart, Quartermaster; Captain E. S. Phipson, I.M.S., Medical Officer; Captain J. O. Airy, Officer Commanding "A" Company; Captain C. Watson Smyth, Officer Commanding "B" Company; Captain I. W. Bagot Harte, Officer Commanding "C" Company; Lieutenant N. H. King Salter, "C" Company; Captain P. J. Gout, Officer Commanding "D" Company; 2/Lieutenant J. Snodgrass, "D" Company.

During the period August 23rd—October 31st there were 43 casualties: 13 Gurkha other ranks killed and 30 Gurkha other ranks wounded.

On October 29th a British mine was exploded on Hill 60, but no attempt was made to occupy the crater.

The Battalion having spent a fortnight in reserve, relieved the 1/4th Gurkhas in the firing line on November 3rd. (See Appendix No. V.)

"D," "A" and "C" Companies, in the order named, took over the line from Ivy Lane to Leeson Street (see Map No. 14), with "B" Company in support in Piccadilly.

On November 6th the Turks blew up a mine on Hill 60 to the right of the trenches held by the Battalion. The same day a British aeroplane was shot down whilst flying over our trenches.

During this tour of duty in the firing line a catapult bomb thrower was issued. It was installed behind the firing line between Bagot Street and Grafton Street, and the Turkish trenches some eighty yards in front of the catapult's emplacement were subjected to a fairly accurate bombardment. On the night of November 10th a bomb from the catapult fell short, pitched into the firing line,

and had it not been for the greatest coolness displayed by No. 560 Lance-Naik Kaharsing Gurung, of "B" Company, four men who were asleep in the bay into which the bomb dropped would very likely have been either killed or wounded. Kaharsing, who realized the danger, picked up the bomb, and had barely succeeded in throwing it behind the parapets before it exploded. This non-commissioned officer was subsequently awarded the I.O.M. for his gallant behaviour.

Captain E. S. Phipson, who was suffering from dysentery, was invalided on November 9th. He was replaced by Captain P. M. Rennie, I.M.S.

On November 11th the 2/10th Gurkhas relieved the Battalion, which returned to the reserve position at Damarjelic Bair.

The next day Captain D. G. J. Ryan was invalided and left the Peninsula.

Captain N. H. King Salter took over the duties of Adjutant.

An event, the significance of which was not generally realized, took place on November 14th. The Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, visited Anzac. His visit, though short, satisfied his mind on the point which he came to decide—the evacuation of the Peninsula.

The weather continued to grow colder and wetter, and on the 11th Colonel Allanson, realizing the necessity of proper warm clothing for the men, went to Anzac to try to hasten its issue. In this he succeeded, but, most unfortunately, whilst on his way back was wounded in the hand by a shrapnel bullet. He was taken to a field ambulance, whence he refused to be evacuated further, and fifteen days later was back with the Battalion, in spite of the fact that his wound had not healed. Captain P. J. Gout commanded during his absence.

The Battalion returned to the firing line on November 26th. The area allotted was larger than usual, and one company from the 2/10th Gurkhas was put under the orders of the Officer Commanding 1/6th Gurkhas. The dispositions were (see Map No. 14):—"C" Company from Ivy Lane to Bagot Street; "D" Company, Bagot Street to Tillard Sap; "B" Company from Tillard Sap to a point east of Leeson Street; whilst "A" Company prolonged the line to Sackville Street.

The company 2/10th Gurkha Rifles was placed in support in Piccadilly.

At four o'clock the same afternoon orders were received to relieve the Northamptonshire Regiment, which was holding the line from Oak Lane to Ivy Lane. "A" and "B" Companies were detailed for this duty, their part of the line from Tillard Sap to Sackville Street being taken over by the 2/10th Gurkhas.

At 4.15 p.m. it commenced to rain. Later this rain became a downpour, and soon the trenches were knee deep in mud and water. This was the beginning of a storm and blizzard said to be nearly unprecedented in violence for the time of year. It lasted for three and a half days, during which period there were 200 deaths from exposure, whilst no fewer than 10,000 sick were evacuated. "A" and "B" Companies, by reason of having to carry out a relief during the storm, fared worse than the rest of the Battalion. The difficult conditions under which the relief was performed, and the hardships which the Battalion suffered, will be best appreciated from the following narrative taken from an account written by Captain C. Watson Smyth, who was at the time in command of "B" Company. (See Map. No. 14.)

"About 4 p.m. on November 26th I was ordered to take over from the Northamptonshire Regiment the right sector of Hill 60. The relief was to be carried out the same evening. I at once went up to Hill 60 and examined the line I was to hold. When trying to describe the position words fail me. The maze at Hampton Court is child's play compared with the tangle of trenches and tunnels which is called the right sector of Hill 60. To make confusion doubly confounded, the Turks had blown in certain portions of the line, so that just when you thought you had unravelled the labyrinth you were brought up standing by a blank wall of mud, and it was necessary to make a circuit of about fifty yards actually to travel five yards straight. I will not harp on this, but it is necessary that a faint idea of what the position was like should be obtained before it will be possible to understand how 'B' Company suffered, and also to realize how by that suffering every man proved himself a real hero.

"The examination of the sector showed me that to

relieve the British infantry in the dark, to put my men in trenches into which entrance was difficult, exit more difficult, and with a parapet over which they could not fire, was asking too much. The matter was referred to the Brigade Commander, who agreed that the relief should be postponed until dawn the next morning. The 2/10th had already been warned to take over my line to the north-west of Hill 60, and, therefore, I had to vacate my trenches.

"The Brigade Commander personally showed me where the company was to spend the night, a ridge known as Connaught Ridge, to the south-east of Hill 60 and some 600 yards behind it.

"I had never been there before, and in the fading daylight my inspection was somewhat cursory. By the time it was completed it was dark, and I had to reconnoitre the road back to my company as best I could.

"I had hardly reached my line and given the order to pack kits when the rain, which had been threatening all day, come down in earnest—a real tropical downpour. Within the hour the trenches were rivers, with water from twelve to thirty-six inches deep. The 2/10th Gurkhas, who took three hours to travel 1,000 yards, relieved me at about 10 p.m., and, therefore, for close on three and a half hours my men had been sitting in the rain with only their waterproof capes for shelter. By good luck I managed to find the road back to Connaught Ridge, and owing to the splendid work of Subadar Kulbahadur Thapa and all the non-commissioned officers of the company I arrived on the ridge without losing a man on the way.

"We found the trenches on the ridge full to the brim with water; there must have been over seven feet of water in them. Naturally, it was impossible to occupy them, therefore the company was ordered into the open. Here, in spite of the constant 'zut' of the overs, the men passed the night walking up and down to try to keep their blood circulating. No man was allowed to lie down lest he should sleep that sleep from which there is no awakening.

"At 5 a.m. on November 27th the company was on the march again, moving up to Hill 60, through mud and water over their knees. On arrival at the rendezvous it

was found that the Northamptonshire Regiment had decided to vacate their trenches after, and not before, 'stand to arms,' as had been originally arranged. In consequence, my company had to stand for one and a half hours in a trench not more than three feet wide with mud and water up to their knees. Each man was carrying his rifle, 200 rounds of ammunition, and 20lbs. of kit, in addition to his rucksack.

"By 8 a.m. the Northamptoners had disappeared, and my company found itself in occupation of a line which nowhere was less than eighteen inches deep in mud, and in some places as much as three feet. Oak Lane was impassable the whole time I was in these trenches. The parapets had been built for the British Tommy, and, therefore, the small Gurkha could not fire over them. The first work was to raise the firing step.

"The men not actually in the firing line were supposed to be accommodated in what were known as 'rest pits.' These were merely oblong chambers cut back from the communication trench; they had no roofs. The rain had turned them into quagmires, in which it was impossible to sit, stand, or lie. However, the Gurkha set to with his usual cheerfulness, and soon made these pits fairly habitable, but as it was raining all the time the best they could do was but a degree removed from the worst. For instance, after lying down for a short time, the men found that the mud oozed over the edges of their blankets, and they had literally to take up their beds and walk.

"On the night of the 27th/28th it snowed, and by dawn the whole country was white, three inches having fallen. During the 28th it snowed all day, turning, towards dark, into a blizzard with a hurricane of wind from the north. The sentries suffered severely that night, men dropping where they stood. I ordered every man to 'double mark-time' for a quarter of an hour in each hour throughout the night and discouraged them sleeping, as I feared lest once asleep they would never waken again.

"At dawn on the 29th the hurricane abated, and the temperature started to drop. In a few hours what had been feet of mud and slush was frozen sufficiently hard to walk over. Coats and blankets left out in the trenches were just like boards; impossible to do anything with.

The few men who were wearing felt hats found them frozen to their heads, and so stiff that when the brim was bent it simply fell away from the crown.

"The 29th was the first time since the 26th evening that I was able to get off the men's boots, and the state of their feet appalled me. In nearly every case they had lumps of ice between their toes; their feet were white as far as the ankle and insensible to touch. Hard rubbing with snow was tried, but the men were too cold and too tired to be capable of much effort in this line. A few men whose feet were rubbed by troopers in the Welch Horse recovered, but the proportion was small.

"From now on the men commenced to fall out, but I should like to say most emphatically that nearly all the men had to be forced to go sick, incapable as they were of any movement beyond a crawl. Nevertheless, they were ready and willing to continue.

"By the morning of the 30th 'B' Company was reduced to an effective strength of about eighty rifles, and eighty per cent. of these had feet more or less frost bitten. Throughout all this time I never heard a single complaint; the men were cheerful and ready to laugh at a joke. No praise could be too high for them.


"To give one instance. My field orderly, Hastabir Pun, had accompanied me everywhere during the three days; always he was at my heels, and never had been anything but cheerful and keen. Yet on the 30th, when I made him show me his feet, to my horror I found them black with gangrene from neglected frost bite. He had never said a word to me, and never would have. His case is not an exceptional one, but merely a typical example of the courage these Gurkhas displayed.

"If any conglomeration of conditions could equal what 'B' Company went through I should like to hear of them.

"Finally, I should like to say that the British officers owed their lives to the untiring fidelity of their orderlies, who at least twice a day, through a sea of mud, brought them warm food. They arrived in the firing line soaked to the waist, waited patiently till their sahibs had eaten, and then set off again on their perilous journey back to headquarters. No thought of self entered their minds; all they were concerned with was the comfort of their sahib."

**SKETCH
ILLUSTRATING
COUNTRY BRIGADE TRENCHES
HILL 60 AREA
DEC. 20 1915**

Map No. 14



Scale.
300 600 900 Yards
at 10 Metres YL.

DGJH

The foregoing account gives a graphic description of the discomfort which "B" Company had to put up with during the blizzard. The remainder of the Battalion had their share of hardship too, and faced it in the same fine spirit as "B" Company did.

During the break in the weather on the 30th, Company Commanders inspected their men's feet. Many had been so severely frost bitten that once they had taken their boots off they were unable to put them on again; 103 all ranks had to be sent to the field ambulance.

Colonel Allanson was wounded for the third time on December 2nd, and had to be evacuated from the Peninsula. He was standing at the entrance of the headquarter dug-out when an eight-inch shell struck and demolished it. The blast of the shell blinded him, and it was not until two months later that he recovered his sight.

The command of the Battalion devolved on Captain P. J. Gout. The same afternoon Jemadar Runbahadur Gurung, "D" Company, was wounded.

The 1/4th Gurkhas relieved the Battalion on December 3rd, which again returned to the reserve position at Damarjelic Bair. (See Map No. 14.)

The eight days in the firing line had cost the Battalion in killed, wounded and sick 1 British officer, 2 Gurkha officers, and 125 Gurkha other ranks.

2/Lieutenant Harrop and 2/Lieutenant G. H. Ogilvie joined on December 7th, and the next day Lieutenants K. L. Fasken and H. C. Toller rejoined. The former had been invalided, whilst the latter, it will be remembered, was wounded on July 2nd at Fusilier Bluff.

The strength of the 1/6th Gurkhas was now 11 British officers and 365 Gurkha officers and Gurkha other ranks.

2/Lieutenants Harrop and Ogilvie were transferred to the 2/10th Gurkhas on December 8th.

On the 11th the Battalion returned to the firing line and took over the trenches from Ivy Lane to Sackville Street. (See Map No. 14.)

That evening there were rumours to the effect that it was intended to evacuate the Peninsula.

The positions occupied by the troops on the Peninsula presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coast line had been secured. The

beaches and piers upon which the army depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. The entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather.

CHAPTER XV.

ON December 12th Battalion Commanders were summoned to Brigade Headquarters. They were informed in secrecy that it was intended to evacuate the Anzac and Suvla areas of the Peninsula.

On the 14th the first step within the 29th Indian Brigade towards the evacuation was taken. All non-combatants (mess servants, public followers, etc.) were ordered to proceed to Anzac. 2/Lieutenant Hart marched the party there. It was embarked on K lighters, and later transferred to a small transport, which conveyed them to Mudros. Munshi Mir Ahmed, whilst embarking, was wounded in the shoulder. He had been with the Battalion throughout the Gallipoli period, and it was unfortunate that he should have been wounded at this juncture. His work during the campaign is deserving of special mention. His duties were multifarious. Although a clerk, there were times when, due to the heavy casualties amongst British officers, he was called upon to carry out the duties of Quartermaster, and most efficiently did he perform this work.

On return to the trenches from Anzac 2/Lieutenant Hart reported that immense quantities of stores were being shipped, and that the Brigade Supply and Transport Officer had already left, as had also the 14th K.G.O. Sikhs and the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles. This news confirmed the rumour of December 11th with regard to the intended evacuation.

The Battalion cooks having left, cooking pots were moved up from the dump to a point in rear of the trenches. Riflemen were told off to do the cooking, whilst 2/Lieutenant Hart undertook the duty of *chef* in the Officers' Mess, and proved himself most skilful.

The dispositions of the three remaining Battalions of the 29th Indian Brigade were (see Map No. 14):—

1/6th Gurkhas from Ivy Lane to Leeson Street.

The 1/5th Gurkhas held the Hill 60 sector on the right of the Battalion. The 1/4th Gurkhas the Susak Kuyu sector on the left.

At 10.30 p.m. on December 16th instructions regarding the general conduct of the withdrawal were received.

The Secretary of State for War issued orders on December 8th for the evacuation, but in anticipation of such orders General Headquarters had already started work on the plan.

The problem with which the Staff were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

The blizzard in November had demonstrated how entirely the army was at the mercy of the elements. In view of the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Aegean rapidity of action was a paramount factor.

It was decided to carry out the evacuation in three stages.

(1) All troops, animals and supplies not required for a long campaign.

(2) All men, guns, animals and stores not required for defence during a period when the weather conditions might retard the evacuation or seriously alter the programme contemplated.

(3) Final stage, in which all troops on shore should be embarked with all possible speed, leaving behind such guns, animals and stores needed for military reasons at this period.

It was imperative that the front-line trenches should be held, however lightly, until the last moment, and that the withdrawal from these trenches should be simultaneous throughout the line.

For purposes of withdrawal the right of the 1/4th Gurkhas determined the right of the IX Corps, which was to embark from the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay; the left of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles formed the left of the A.N.Z.A. Corps, which, with the exception of a rear party, furnished by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, was to embark from Anzac.

The night of December 19th/20th was fixed as the date of the final withdrawal, provided that the weather proved favourable.

A reference to the diagram facing page 142 and Map No. 14 will show the dispositions of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade at this time.

The 1/4th Gurkhas being under the orders of the IX Corps are not included in the further narrative of events.

The 1/5th and 1/6th Gurkhas, for purposes of withdrawal, were considered as one unit. There was to be no reduction in the length of the front held by these two units, though before the final withdrawal there was to be a considerable thinning of the line.

Each Battalion was divided into four parties, composed of men from both units, but commanded by a Commander common to both units. The detail of the parties and their Commanders is tabulated on the diagram.

The first party was to leave on the evening of the 18th, and was composed of all weakly men.

The remaining three parties, "A," "B" and "C," were to leave on the night of the 19th/20th at the hours shown on the diagram.

The operation orders for the withdrawal of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles and for "C" party will be found in Appendices No. VI and VII.

The strength of the Battalion was 10 British officers, including the Medical Officer, 10 Gurkha officers, and 290 Gurkha other ranks.

On December 16th Captain I. W. Bagot Harte and 2/Lieutenant J. Snodgrass were shown the place near the mouth of the Azmac Dere where "C" party was to embark on the final night.

The 17th broke wet and cold, and there was a certain amount of apprehension lest there should be a recurrence of bad weather. There had been a high wind blowing from the south, and the conditions were exactly the same as they had been before the blizzard on November 27th.

December 18th was unusually quiet.

At 7 p.m. Captain J. O. Airy collected his party on the left of the support line held by the Battalion near Sackville Street. At 7.30 p.m. the men carrying their kit moved very silently out of the trenches and, passing down Sikh Walk, marched via Brigade Headquarters to Anzac, where they embarked on K lighters. From the K lighters they were transferred to a small transport which

conveyed them to Mudros. The night passed quietly. It was apparent that the Turks had not the slightest conception of what was happening.

The 19th was heralded by the explosion of a mine, which blew up a portion of the line held by the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles and wounded 13 Gurkha other ranks. A sharp bombardment followed, but much to everybody's relief no attack was made. At 11 a.m. there was further activity on the part of the Turks, this time in the shape of a heavy bombardment of the trenches with 8.2-inch howitzers. There were practically no British guns left in the Anzac or Suvla areas, but those that there were replied hard to deceive the Turks as to our intentions. There was great aerial activity in order to prevent the enemy's machines from obtaining any information as to what was happening.

In spite of the alarms of the morning, the situation was more reassuring in the afternoon, which was spent in destroying all material to be abandoned.

At 5 p.m. "A" party 1/6th Gurkhas left the trenches very quietly (boots were muffled by wearing socks over them), and followed the same route as taken by Airy's party to Brigade Headquarters. The place appointed for embarkation was reached without incident, where they embarked on K lighters, which transferred them to a Clyde River steamer, and on this the voyage to Mudros continued.

All had gone uncommonly well so far. The fates seemed to be on our side. The night was perfectly calm, and a slight haze obscured the moon; an extraordinary piece of good luck, as there was a full moon that night.

With the departure of "A" party, the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles relieved the Battalion from Ivy Lane to Tillard Sap. At 7.30 p.m. "B" party, with which Brigade Headquarters and Battalion Headquarters were to go, began to get ready to move, and at 8.30 p.m., leaving the trenches via Sackville Street and Sikh Walk, made their way to Brigade Headquarters. "B" party 1/5th Gurkhas having joined up, the whole moved to Anzac, and were taken by K lighters to a mine layer, on which the voyage to Mudros was completed.

On the departure of Brigade Headquarters, Captain Watson Smyth, Officer Commanding "C" party, took

up his headquarters at Damajelik Bair, from where he was in direct telephonic communication with Captain I. W. Bagot Harte in Tillard Sap and with Brigade Headquarters, which had opened up at Anzac.

The tension experienced by "C" party was severe. Forty-eight rifles were holding a line which a month earlier had been considered too much for a whole battalion. Situated as they were, less than 100 yards from the Turks, another five hours must pass before their turn came to move. In case of attack their orders were to hold on to the last round and to the last man. Would that attack come? The few men remaining in the trenches did all they could to assimilate normal conditions, firing went on just as usual, and the Turk still failed to detect anything unusual. About five minutes before "C" party was due to move telephone communication between Captains Bagot Harte and Watson Smyth broke down, but by dint of much coaxing the one word—"Move"—was heard exactly at 1.30 a.m.

"C" party, led by Captain Bagot Harte, left the trenches noiselessly. The rear was brought up by 2/Lieutenant Snodgrass, who pulled out a coil of French wire down Leeson Street. Thence the party moved by Sikh Walk to Damajelik Bair, where they met Captain Watson Smyth and "C" party, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. Then, picking up their rucksacks, which had been sent down during the afternoon, they moved to the mouth of the Azmac Dere, where ships' boats were waiting to take them off. The 1/5th Gurkha Rifles furnished a covering party in the sandhills about 100 yards inland from the beach. The boats conveyed the party to a mine sweeper, in which they were conveyed to Mudros.

Before leaving, the Australians exploded a large mine under some Turkish trenches near Anzac. The explosion, which took place at about 4.30 a.m., aroused the Turks to activity, and they opened a heavy fusillade. The British trenches, however, were empty, and by 5.30 a.m. the last man had left.

The evacuation of Anzac and Suvla had been completed.

The Battalion suffered only two casualties, Munshi Mir Ahmed wounded and No. 180 Naik Kulbahadur Gurung missing. Kulbahadur left the trenches with "B" party, got separated from the rest of the party on the way to

Anzac, and was eventually captured by the Turks and sent to Constantinople.

On the morning of the 20th the Turks shelled the evacuated positions at Anzac heavily. They then massed to attack on the slopes of Chunak Bair. The Navy opened fire and drove them back. At noon the Turks again bombarded, massed to attack, and were again driven back by the Navy.

By noon on the 20th the various detachments of the Battalion had been transferred from the small craft to a cattle ship, s.s. *Knight Templar*. The 1/5th Gurkhas were embarked on the same ship. At 4 p.m. on the 21st the *Knight Templar* left Mudros, and arrived at Alexandria on Christmas Eve at 4 p.m.

This brings to a close the account of the Battalion's experiences on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

On January 9th, 1916, the evacuation of the Helles area was successfully completed.

The casualties sustained by the Battalion from November 1st to December 20th, 1915, were: Killed, 9 Gurkha other ranks; wounded, 1 British officer, 2 Gurkha officers, and 26 Gurkha other ranks; missing, 1 Gurkha other rank.

The percentage of loss in Gallipoli in battle casualties in relation to the field service strength of the Battalion was: For British officers, 161 per cent.; for Gurkha officers, 77 per cent.; for Gurkha other ranks, 110 per cent.

The details of casualties are given below:—

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>	<i>Missing.</i>	<i>Total.</i>
British Officers ...	7	14	—	21
Gurkha Officers ...	3	11	—	14
Gurkha Other Ranks	169	643	1	813
Total ...	179	668	1	848


The following extract from a letter dated January 19th, 1918, written by General Sir Ian Hamilton's Secretary, acknowledging a Christmas card from the Regiment, forms a fitting conclusion to the narrative of the Dardanelles:—

"It is Sir Ian Hamilton's most cherished conviction that if he had been given more Gurkhas at the Dardanelles he would never have been held up by the Turks."

26°30'

(SAROS)

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CHAPTER XVI.

THE Battalion disembarked at Alexandria on Christmas morning, and left by train at 11 a.m. the same day for Suez. On arrival at Suez it marched to camp one mile distant from the railway station, where the 2/10th Gurkhas assisted to provide food for the men and officers. Lieutenant J. M. Whittall, who had arrived some days previous to the Battalion, rejoined, and the following day Captain D. R. H. Jackson, who took over command from Captain P. J. Gout.

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade was now concentrated at Suez, and until January 22nd remained there.

After Gallipoli the Battalion was badly in need of a refit, and it was only with difficulty that indispensable deficiencies were made good.

The strength of the Battalion was increased by drafts, and soon the numbers exceeded war establishment.

The following British officers, Gurkha officers, and Gurkha other ranks joined on the dates shown:—

<i>Date.</i>	<i>British Officers.</i>	<i>Gurkha Officers.</i>	<i>Gurkha Other Ranks.</i>
25/12/15	Lieut. J. M. Whittall ...	Sub. Jitman Gurung...	207
26/12/15	Capt. D. R. H. Jackson	—	—
31/12/15	2/Lieut. J. W. Merk ...	*Sub. Hilarup Sahi ...	66*
31/12/15	†2/Lieut. W. H. Marley, I.A.R.O.	†Jem. Harising Gurung	48†
2/1/16	†2/Lieut. R. M. S. Barton, I.A.R.O.	†Sub. Matbarsing Gurung	146†
		†Jem. Bishanbir Thapa	—
2/1/16	Maj. A. N. Bredin ...	—	—
3/1/16	2/Lieut. Hearsey, I.A.R.O.		
6/1/16	2/Lieut. G. T. Gill, I.A.R.O.		

Total—British Officers, 8 ; Gurkha Officers, 5 ; Gurkha
Other Ranks, 467.

* From Assam Military Police.

† From 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.

In addition to the above, a proportion of sick and wounded men rejoined.

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The men of the new drafts were composed chiefly of recruits. Generally their physique and age were below pre-war standard, but in view of the drain on the recruiting areas caused by the wastage and requirements of the war, this falling off was not to be wondered at. Normally, the requirements to keep the Gurkha Brigade up to strength are 1,650 recruits per annum approximately. During the first twelve months of the war the number of men recruited from Nepal was 12,312.

Captain A. N. Bredin rejoined on January 2nd, and took over command of the Battalion from Captain D. R. H. Jackson.

At 7.45 a.m. on January 22nd the Battalion left Suez by route march for El Kubri. (See Map No. 7.) Orders had been received that the Canal was to be crossed by a pontoon bridge. On arrival at a point opposite the El Kubri post it was found that the bridge was not in position, and there was no ferry or other means of crossing. Presumably a Staff officer had blundered. Having spent the night in bivouac on the west bank the Battalion crossed to the east bank at 8 a.m. on the 23rd, the bridge having been placed in position in the meantime.

The post at El Kubri was situated 200 yards east of the Canal, whilst about one and a half miles further inland was the first line of defence. Unlike the early days of 1915, the defences throughout the whole length of the Canal were now located to the east.

The 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General P. C. Palin, was composed of: 57th Rifles, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

2/Lieutenant N. B. Hart was appointed orderly officer to the Brigade Commander.

A memorial service was held on February 3rd in commemoration of the British officers of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade killed in Gallipoli.

A fortnight after arriving at El Kubri news that the Battalion was expected to return to India was received from General Birdwood, who wrote:—

“I hear the 6th is under orders to return to India, and as I was not able to see you all just before we left Anzac I feel I must write you a line to tell you how much I

appreciated having the 6th serving with me all the time you did at Anzac.

"I much hoped that you would have continued to be with me here, and it is only now that I hear this is not to be the case.

"I shall be very grateful if you will very kindly let the whole Regiment know how much I appreciated their good services, and how sincerely I trust it may be my good fortune to be serving alongside of you all again some day.

"The best of all good wishes to all ranks."

On February 9th Captain P. J. Gout, having been selected for intelligence work in Salonika, left the Battalion.

The same day orders were received directing that the Battalion was to be ready to embark at short notice, but that the draft composed of personnel of the Assam Military Police, and 150 of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles would not accompany the Battalion. Captain I. W. Bagot Harte was detailed to command the draft of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles. 2/Lieutenants Marley and Barton were also to accompany him. On February 11th they marched to Suez, pending embarkation for Basra, whither it was stated the 2/6th were shortly to go.

The next day the Battalion, having crossed to the west bank of the canal, bivouacked there during the night February 12th/13th, and leaving early on the morning of the 13th marched to Suez Docks.

The orders were 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, less one company, to embark on the s.s. *Arankola*.

Accordingly, at 11 a.m., the Battalion, less "A" Company (Captain Jackson), commenced embarkation, and by 8.30 p.m. the ship was ready to put to sea. The next morning, however, it was considered that the *Arankola* was overcrowded, and consequently "B" Company (Captain Watson Smyth) was ordered to disembark. At noon on the 14th the *Arankola* sailed for Karachi.

"B" Company was ordered to embark on the s.s. *Ekma*, and narrowly missed a similar fate to that experienced on the *Arankola*.

The two ships arrived at Karachi on February 23rd and 24th respectively, whence the Battalion, less "A" Company, proceeded by troop train to Peshawar. When

the train arrived at Campbellpore it was found that the Depot had been transferred there from Abbottabad.

Peshawar was reached at 7.15 p.m. on February 28th. All the officers of the 2/6th were at the railway station to welcome the sister battalion. Owing to the late hour of arrival the men spent the night in the train, and the next morning marched to a camp situated on the northern outskirts of Peshawar. Sad to relate, no arrangements were made by the local staff to welcome the Battalion, not even down to the time-honoured custom of sending a band to play in a new coming regiment.

On March 3rd the 2nd Battalion left Peshawar for Karachi *en route* to Mesopotamia. The 1st Battalion marched to the railway station to give them a send-off. The same afternoon the Depot, under command of Captain F. M. Ransford, arrived from Campbellpore, and with him Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, M.C., I.O.M., who appeared to have completely recovered from his wound.

On March 7th and 8th "A" Company, which followed the Battalion from Suez on board the s.s. *Baroda*, arrived in two parties, the first under Lieutenant H. C. Toller, and the second under Captain D. R. H. Jackson.

Captain J. O. Airy having been transferred to a British Regiment remained in Egypt.

This concludes the account of the first period of active service of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles in the Great War.

So far, the experiences of the Battalion only have been described; nothing has been written about the Depot.

When the Battalion mobilized in 1914 the strength of the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles was 932, excluding British officers. The reserve was called up, which added an additional 100 riflemen, making a grand total of 1,032.

The Battalion, including a first reinforcement of ten per cent. all ranks, marched from Abbottabad at a strength of 826, leaving a nucleus of 206, of which 23 were recruits, to form the Depot. By the end of February, 1916, the strength of the Depot, exclusive of drafts totalling 5 British officers, 2 Gurkha officers, and 332 Gurkha other ranks despatched to the Battalion, was 3 British officers, 2 Gurkha officers, 672 Gurkha other ranks, including 492 recruits.

It is laid down in Field Service Regulations: "If the infantry reinforcements required for one year are 100 per cent., exclusive of first reinforcements, the percentage for other arms will be as follows. . . ." This affords a guide on which to base calculations. The casualties suffered by the Battalion during the six months in Gallipoli were 827, or 110 per cent. of its war establishment, in battle alone, *i.e.*, excluding sick. Based on the principle laid down in Field Service Regulations, the Depot could not possibly make good the wastage, and assistance was rendered by the 2nd Battalion, which furnished drafts amounting to 6 British officers, 8 Gurkha officers, and 549 Gurkha other ranks. In addition to those furnished by the 2nd Battalion, British officers were detailed from units which could spare them, and from the Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

This undesirable state of affairs soon became apparent at Army Headquarters, and an order was issued to recruit sufficient numbers to bring depots up to strength, whilst a bonus of Rs100 to stimulate recruiting was paid to each recruit on enrolment. Recruits began to flow in, but as the number increased two new difficulties arose.

(a) There was an insufficient Depot Staff to deal with the increasing numbers.

(b) The type of recruit was poor.

The first difficulty was countered by the Adjutant-General's order (A.Os. 110 and 192 of 1915) sanctioning the promotion of Gurkha officers and non-commissioned officers *pro rata* on the strength of the Depot.

The second difficulty was due to force of circumstances, and the best had to be made of the material available. Recruits were under size, and in many cases under age.

The custom of the Regiment to enlist only Magars and Gurungs had to be dropped for the time being. By the end of the first year there was almost every class of Gurkha to be found in the ranks of the Regiment—Khas, Chettri, Limbu, Rai, Sunwar, Lohar, Magar, and Gurung.

There were several disabilities in connection with the training at the Depot. Captain F. M. Ransford was left in command, and to assist him he had three British officers, Captain A. W. D. Cornish, Lieutenant E. C. Brown, and Lieutenant N. H. King Salter, but before

the war had been in progress long these three officers, who were experienced and knew the language, were required elsewhere, and the Depot Commander found himself confronted with the problem of training recruits with untrained officers to assist him. In normal circumstances it might have been expected that wounded and sick officers would have been available sooner or later for the Depot. This was not the case. The British officers were needed elsewhere, and so we find potential Depot officers employed training Nepalese troops, emergency battalions, and filling Staff appointments.

Fifty per cent. of the non-commissioned officer instructors, too, had not the necessary experience of recruits to instruct efficiently, added to which recruits were required to be turned into trained soldiers in a shorter period than in pre-war days.

The administration of the Depot was another important matter which took up much of the Depot Commander's time, and, therefore, militated against concentration on training. In peace time, with a full complement of officers, a great deal of time has to be devoted to this matter; it will be quite readily understood, therefore, what a tax it must have been on the Depot Commander, provided as he was with an inadequate and inexperienced staff, and responsible for the pay, clothing, ammunition, treasure chest, regimental account books, etc., etc., and last, but not least, the disbursal of family remittances to the wives of men at the front.

To add to the difficulties already enumerated, the Depot was constantly being inspected—District and brigade commanders, inspector of Infantry, medical officers, inspectors of musketry, physical and bayonet training. No departure from normal training was to be made on their account—they would see the men at their ordinary work; but such an order requires no comment. Gurkha recruits have not been accustomed to seeing these important people, and their visits have a disturbing influence on training immediately before and after the inspection. There can be no doubt but that the too frequent inspections at this time defeated their object to a great extent.

The human factor has also got to be considered. The uppermost thought in the Depot Commander's mind, as well as in the mind of each individual at the Depot, was

“When will my turn come to go to the war?” Drafts went, officers went, but the Depot Commander stayed and toiled in the interests of the Empire and his Regiment. Such was the case until the Battalion returned to India in 1916. The greatest praise is due to all Depot Commanders and their training staffs, and particularly to Captain F. M. Ransford, who was not afforded an opportunity of joining the Battalion which his work at the Depot helped to keep in the field.

On March 10th Captain F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., and Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., rejoined.

Captain Ryan resumed the duties of Adjutant.

Shortly afterwards Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Lloyd joined and assumed command of the Battalion.

Reorganization was taken in hand at once. As many men as possible who had been on service were granted furlough.

Accounts on the normal cost system had been introduced early in 1914, and when it came to settling up the furlough men it was found that the F.C.M.A. at Poona was not in possession of the individual accounts of the men. A cheque for over Rs1 lakh on account of pay due to the men was received, but without the individual rolls it was not possible to disburse the money. Advances were granted pending a final settlement of accounts. The individual rolls were received in April, but no entries had been made since July, 1915, despite the fact that a clerk had been specially ordered to proceed to the A.G.'s office at the base (Alexandria) to keep the accounts. This was in no way the clerk's fault, as on arrival he was detailed for other work. Receiving the individual rolls in this state was a serious matter. Some men had been killed, others promoted to Gurkha officer and non-commissioned officer; no record of dates had been kept by the Military Accounts Department. A clerk was despatched to Poona, and it was not until November, 1916, that he returned with the accounts properly made up. The result of this spelt hardship in the case of many men. For instance, take the case of a man who had been severely wounded, and who had lost a leg. He returned to Peshawar from the base hospital, and was invalided out of the service with a wound pension. He was anxious to get home, and naturally expected a final settlement of

accounts before he left. He could not afford to wait, and, once home, to be carried from his home to the Treasury at Gorakhpur later to receive his dues meant expense and discomfort. The only way out of the difficulty was to make up his accounts roughly, pay him in advance, and inform him that if anything further was due to him it would be sent.

On May 22nd, 1916, the Battalion left Peshawar by train and arrived at Sultanpur, twelve miles from Abbottabad, the next day. There it remained in camp for a fortnight, when the Battalion, less recruits, marched to Abbottabad. Three days later the recruits followed, and arrived at Abbottabad on June 9th. The following day the Battalion (less one company) and recruits marched to Dehri, where they remained until September. The company went into camp at Dobhattar.

There were at this time no less than 600 recruits, and Dehri afforded excellent facilities for training.


On July 7th Colonel the Hon. C. G. Bruce, C.B., M.V.O., rejoined and assumed command, but on August 26th, having been appointed Brigadier-General, he left to take command of the Bannu Brigade. Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Lloyd resumed command.

Whilst at Dehri news was received that Captain L. E. Poynder, M.C., who was with the 2nd Battalion in Mesopotamia, had been accidentally killed at bombing practice. The following appeared in Battalion Orders:—

“It is with the deepest regret that the Commanding Officer has to announce to the Battalion the death of Captain L. E. Poynder, accidentally killed in Mesopotamia on the 26th June, 1916. The loss sustained by the Regiment in the death of Captain Poynder is very great, both professionally and socially. Captain Poynder displayed his ability as an officer in the Dardanelles, where he was mentioned in despatches and awarded the Military Cross for conspicuous service rendered up to the time he was wounded.

“The Regiment has lost a very fine officer and true friend, and the Commanding Officer is sure that all ranks will sympathize with Captain Poynder's relations, to whom he has written in the name of the Regiment.”

Captain D. R. H. Jackson, 3 Gurkha officers and 228 Gurkha other ranks were despatched to the Malakand on



1st BATTALION RECRUITS' CAMP, DEHRI, 1916.

September 25th. It had been decided to form a new Gurkha battalion, termed the 1st Reserve Battalion Gurkha Rifles; the name was subsequently changed to 4/3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles. Similar drafts were drawn from three other battalions to complete its strength.

Early in September trouble was anticipated in Waziristan, and on the 30th orders were received to mobilize. On October 9th the 1/6th Gurkhas sailed to Rawal Pindi, and on arrival went into camp at West Ridge. Forming a unit of the 4th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General Watson, they remained at Rawal Pindi until December 1st, when the Battalion accompanied the Brigade on manœuvres in the vicinity of Jhang. Training concluded in the Hasan Abdal—Kot Najibullah area with a three days' divisional exercise.

Leaving Hasan Abdal on December 19th, the Battalion marched back to Abbottabad and arrived there on December 22nd, where it remained until February 23rd, 1917.

Major W. C. Little and Captain A. W. D. Cornish, M.C., on return to India, were posted as supervising officers to the Nepalese contingent at Kakul.

Captain F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., was appointed A.D.C. to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Northern Army.

On January 16th, 1917, Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., left to take over the appointment of Staff Officer to the Inspector of Infantry in India.

Captain N. H. King Salter was appointed Adjutant.

A list of British officers on the books of the 1st Battalion at this period is given below.

<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Lt.-Col. J. H. Lloyd	Commandant.
Major W. C. Little	With Nepalese Contingent.
Major G. W. S. Sherlock	With Punjabi Bn.
Major C. J. L. Allanson, C.I.E., D.S.O.	G.S., York.
Major F. M. Ransford	2nd-in-Command, " B " Coy.
Major A. N. Bredin	O.C. " C " Coy.
Capt. D. R. H. Jackson	1st Reserve Bn. Gurkhas (4/3rd Q.A.O. Gurkha Rifles).
Capt. A. W. D. Cornish, M.C.	With Nepalese Contingent.
Capt. F. B. Abbott, D.S.O.	A.D.C. to G.O.C.in-C., Northern Army.
Capt. D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O.	S.O. to I. of Inf. (Northern).
Capt. E. C. Brown	Div. Staff, Euphrates Front.

<i>Name and Rank.</i>		<i>Remarks.</i>
Capt. N. H. King Salter	...	Adjutant.
Capt. J. M. Whittall	O.C. " A " Coy.
Lieut. J. L. Miller Hallet	...	Depot.
2/Lieut. H. V. Collingridge	...	Quartermaster.
2/Lieut. E. Castells	—
2/Lieut. J. W. A. Merk	...	Signalling Officer.
<i>I.A.R.Os. (attached) —</i>		
Lieut. H. T. McKeag	—
2/Lieut. T. E. Campbell	...	O.C. " D " Coy.
2/Lieut. J. C. K. Swan	...	M.G. Officer.
2/Lieut. H. Beaumont	—
Capt. R. B. Lloyd, I.M.S.	...	Medical Officer.

CHAPTER XVII.

ON February 6th, 1917, the Battalion was ordered to mobilize for Force "D" (Mesopotamia).

Officers and men on leave and furlough were ordered to rejoin, whilst British officers temporarily absent from the Regiment on Staff appointments and elsewhere were applied for. Captain F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., was the only one permitted to return.

On February 14th information was received that the Battalion would leave Abbottabad on the 23rd, and, since this precluded leave and furlough men from rejoining in time to accompany the Battalion, 230 recruits were sworn in to complete the field service strength ordered—1,000 all ranks.

The 1/6th Gurkhas left Abbottabad in two parties on February 23rd and 24th, entrained at Havelian, and arrived at Karachi on the 26th and 27th.

Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, M.C., I.O.M., was on furlough, but, hearing that the Battalion was under orders for Mesopotamia, hurried back and rejoined at Lahore, through which place the troop trains passed *en route* to Karachi.

Battalion Headquarters, "C" and "D" Companies embarked on the s.s. *Franz Ferdinand* on February 27th, and sailed for Basra on February 28th. As there was not room for "A" and "B" Companies on the *Franz Ferdinand*, they remained at Karachi and followed later.

A list of British officers who accompanied the Battalion is given below:—

Commanding Officer: Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Lloyd.

Adjutant: Captain N. H. King Salter.

Quartermaster: 2/Lieutenant H. V. Collingridge.

Signals: 2/Lieutenant J. W. A. Merk.

Medical Officer: Captain R. B. Lloyd, I.M.S.

"A" Company: Captain J. M. Whittall.

"B" Company: Major F. M. Ransford.

"C" Company: Major A. N. Bredin.

"D" Company: 2/Lieutenant T. E. Campbell,
I.A.R.O.

2/Lieutenant E. Castells.

2/Lieutenant H. T. McKeag, I.A.R.O.

2/Lieutenant H. Beaumont, I.A.R.O.

2/Lieutenant J. Swan, I.A.R.O.

Captain F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., remained at Abbottabad in command of the Depot. Lieutenant J. L. Miller Hallet, 2nd Gurkha Rifles, also remained to assist with the training of the recruits and Gurkha other ranks, in all numbering approximately 1,000.

On March 3rd, after an uneventful voyage, the *Franz Ferdinand* arrived at the bar at the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab (see Map No. 17). Entering the river, the ship proceeded up stream, and, having passed Muhammareh at 6.30 p.m., anchored at 9 p.m. just below the island south of Diaiji. It was at this place that the Turks sank two vessels in the early days of the campaign, in a fruitless endeavour to block the channel.

Basra was reached the next day at 8.30 a.m., and the s.s. *Franz Ferdinand* went alongside the wharf at Magil. Heavy kits were put ashore, but the Battalion remained on board during the night of March 4th/5th.

News from the front was good. In conjunction with an attack by General Cobbe's force against the Turkish position at Sannaiyat on February 23rd, the Tigris was crossed by General Marshall's force from the south to the north bank at the Shumran bend (see Map No. 16). The enemy's line of retreat from Sannaiyat was threatened. On the evening of the 24th there were indications that the enemy were in full retreat towards Baghdad. General Marshall's force pursued and drove the Turks in confusion through Aziziyeh, which was reached on the 27th. Here it was necessary to halt to allow General Cobbe's force to close to the front, and to reorganize the extended line of communication preparatory to a further advance. On March 5th the advance was resumed and Zeur was reached. The enemy's rearguard was found entrenched at Lajj, but they retreated during the night, and the force pressing on in pursuit arrived at Bustan (see Map No. 16) on March 6th.

The Army was advancing victoriously, and conse-

quently everybody was anxious to be away upstream to be in at the fall of Baghdad.

On the 5th kits were loaded on to the river steamer P.S. 56 and two barges. (Each steamer transporting troops up river in Mesopotamia took two barges, one lashed on each side.)

It had been hoped that "A" and "B" Companies would have reached Basra the day after the remainder of the Battalion. They had not arrived by the 6th, and at 4.30 p.m. that day the 1/6th Gurkhas left Basra without them.

By 7.30 p.m. on the 7th Amarah was reached, and continuing upstream the steamer arrived at Shaikh Saad at 3.30 p.m. on the 8th. It was necessary to delay at Shaikh Saad in order to take on board gun ammunition to replenish the supply at the front. The Arabs engaged on the work of loading were extremely slow. The Commanding Officer volunteered to take over the work, with the result that 200 men put on board 2,000 boxes, each box weighing 98lbs., in two and a half hours. The rapid and quiet way in which the work was completed was commented on in a most complimentary manner.

Several barge loads of Turkish prisoners were passed *en route* down river; rumours that Baghdad had fallen came through, only to be denied later. At 6 a.m. on the 9th the journey up the Tigris was continued. Passing Kut shortly before 9 p.m., the steamer tied up for the night upstream of that place. Baghela was passed on the 10th, and at twelve noon on March 11th the Battalion, less two companies, arrived at Aziziyeh, where very disappointing orders were received.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles were detailed for duty on the lines of communication.

News was received the next day that Baghdad had fallen on the 11th.

One of the chief features of the campaign in Mesopotamia was the length of the lines of communication which had necessarily to be adopted. The line of communication from Basra to Baghdad, a distance of 400 miles, followed the River Tigris. The country on either side of the river was inhabited by Arabs, whose attitude could not be depended upon. They were regarded as a potential enemy, and measures were taken to protect the long

line of communication from interference. The defence was organized into three sections. Each section was commanded by a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, who was furnished with two Staff officers. Defence posts in accordance with a sealed pattern were constructed by the troops at suitable intervals along the river, and later along the railway. These posts were held by garrisons varying from one to two platoons furnished by troops allotted to the section concerned, whilst all troops other than those detailed for post duty were concentrated in a central position to be used as a striking force (movable column) according to circumstances.

On arrival at Aziziyeh the Battalion was allotted to No. 3 Section, Kut to Baghdad, troops as follows:—

Headquarters, Aziziyeh. Troops: Detachment 10th Lancers, 2/7th Hampshire Regiment, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, 87th Punjabis. Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Lloyd, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, was appointed Officer Commanding No. 3 Section temporarily, and Major A. N. Bredin took command of the Battalion until the arrival of Major F. M. Ransford with "A" and "B" Companies on March 14th.

The sub-area allotted to the Battalion was from Shidaif to Lajj, "A" Company (under Captain J. M. Whittall) at Shidaif, Battalion Headquarters and "D" Company (under Lieutenant Campbell) at Aziziyeh, "C" Company (under Major Bredin) at Zeur, and "B" Company (under Major Ransford) at Lajj. "A," "C" and "B" Companies were later split up until the dispositions of the Battalion were as shown on Map No. 16.

On the night of April 3rd/4th the 2nd Battalion passed up the line garrisoned by the 1st Battalion, *en route* from the Euphrates Front to Baghdad.

On April 14th the Battalion sustained a severe loss by the death of 2/Lieutenant J. W. A. Merk. This officer, who was at Zeur, was detailed to accompany a cavalry patrol. He left the post in the early morning, and, whilst trotting quietly ahead, suddenly, for no known reason, fell from his horse and struck his head on the ground. He was dragged for about ten yards. Picked up unconscious, he was brought back to the post by the sowars, whence he was sent immediately by launch to

Nº 16.

Re
illustrate
the Tigris Li
garr

19

B. Coy
(less 2 Platoons)

2 Platoons C. Coy
Kutna C. Coy (less 2

Post
Camp

AZIZIYEH
16th Gun

Tubun

River Tigris

Sannaiyat

Sheikh Saud.

ARA

0 miles

30

D.G.J.R.

Aziziyeh. He died the next day from concussion of the brain, without having recovered consciousness. He was buried at Aziziyeh on April 16th with full military honours.

In commemoration of 2/Lieutenant Merk's association with the Regiment, his father sent a donation of Rs1,800, to be invested in 3½ per cent. Government of India paper, the interest accruing therefrom to be distributed in prizes of Rs30, Rs20, and Rs10 to the best signallers among the non-commissioned officers and riflemen of the 1st Battalion. This is the origin of the "Merk Prize" competition which is held annually.

In view of the approaching hot weather Cawnpore topies (pith hats) were issued to the men, a headdress which did not improve their appearance.

At the end of April the Army was disposed approximately on the line Adhaim—Samarrah—Fallujah, and here, due to the heat, operations on a large scale ceased until September.

Except near Zeur, where there was a forest, the sites selected for the defence posts were sandy wastes on the left bank of the Tigris. By the end of May the posts were approaching completion. In some, mud huts had been built with a view to affording the men better protection from the sun than tents—120 degrees Fahrenheit inside a tent during the day in Mesopotamia was not a rare occurrence.

The centenary of the raising of the Regiment (May 16th, 1817) was commemorated on May 30th, 1917. The 1st and 2nd Battalions exchanged telegrams, and the day was observed as a holiday as far as the exigencies of the service would permit. Companies held sports. It was indeed to be regretted that the celebration of such an important occasion in the Regiment could not, due to prevailing circumstances, be commemorated in a more befitting way.

Up to this period the Army at the front was maintained chiefly by barges and steamers plying on the Tigris, and by road echelons from Kut to Baghdad; escorts for the latter being furnished by the Battalion when moving through the area garrisoned by the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. Shortly after the March offensive it was decided to link up Kut and Baghdad by a metre gauge railway. Early

in June the railway reached the southern portion of the area held by the Battalion. The alignment selected for the railway necessitated a resiting of the existing posts. The general policy was that each railway station should be defended, and as construction proceeded through the Battalion area the posts were moved to the sites selected for railway stations and reconstructed so as to embrace all sidings within the perimeter. On July 25th the railway was completed to Baghdad. These unavoidable moves were a distinct hardship to the men, but realizing the importance of the change they set to with their usual cheerfulness and reconstructed their summer quarters under trying climatic conditions.

Work on the construction of defences demanded so much time that little training could be carried out. In view of the possibility of the Battalion moving to a more active sphere of operations later, this was a cause of anxiety.

As the summer advanced sandflies made their appearance, and, in spite of a timely issue of nets, sandfly fever levied its toll amongst all ranks. The irritation set up by sandfly bites caused the men to scratch their arms and legs, resulting in the appearance of a small sore. Later this sore developed into what was known as a Baghdad sore, which proved most difficult to cure and incapacitated a large number of men.

On June 7th Lieutenant C. G. Crawford, I.A.R.O., joined, and Major F. M. Ransford was transferred to the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles.

"D" Company relieved "B" Company at Bustan and Lajj on July 1st, after which date there were no more moves until late in December.

The heat had set in in earnest, fighting had come more or less to a standstill, and life on the lines of communication was monotonous.

A number of changes took place amongst the British officers in the Battalion between July and November. Lieutenant Driver, I.M.S., took over from Captain Lloyd, I.M.S., on July 1st.

On July 14th Lieut.-Colonel J. H. Lloyd was transferred to the field hospital, and was eventually invalided to India. Major A. N. Bredin assumed command.


On September 14th Captain and Adjutant N. H. King

Map N°17.

LOWER MESOPOTAMIA

Scale of Miles

0 10 20 30 40 50 100



Salter was appointed Staff Captain to the 36th Infantry Brigade. Lieutenant H. V. Collingridge took over the duties of Adjutant.

On September 26th operations were resumed, and the Battle of Ramadi, resulting in the capture of the Turkish commander (Ahmed Bey) and the surrender of his whole force, was fought on September 27th, 28th and 29th.

The Battalion still hoped that it might replace a war-weary unit at the front, but such was not to be the case.

Lieutenant F. S. Harrison, I.A.R.O., with a draft of 2 Gurkha officers and 115 Gurkha other ranks, arrived at Aziziyeh on October 1st.

Major B. A. Rice, 2/6th, joined on October 8th and assumed command of the Battalion *vice* Major Bredin. Captain J. M. Whittall was appointed G.S.O.3 at General Headquarters, and 2/Lieutenant B. A. Ryan, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles, joined. A week later Major F. M. Ransford returned from the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles, and a draft of 82 Gurkha other ranks arrived from the 2/6th Depot.

The strength of the Battalion was now 13 British officers and 1,140 Gurkha officers and Gurkha other ranks.

On November 16th the strength was increased further by the arrival of Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., with a draft of 48 Gurkha other ranks from the 1/6th Depot. Captain Ryan took over command of "D" Company at Bustan.

Sandgrouse, partridge, and duck shooting relieved the monotony of life during the autumn; the partridge shooting was distinctly good in the vicinity of most posts, and the birds afforded a welcome addition to the larder.

A report reached Battalion Headquarters during the afternoon of November 17th, intimating that General Maude, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, was seriously ill, and early on the morning of November 19th the sad news of his death from cholera was received.

On December 10th orders were received for the Battalion to relieve the 96th Berar Infantry at Baghela. Baghela was situated in No. 2 Section, Tigris Defences. (See Map No. 16.) The move commenced on December

M

28th, 1917, and on January 13th, 1918, the Battalion, less two detachments at Sumar and Imam Mahdi, was concentrated to a greater degree than it had been since leaving India.

Eleven months of detachment duty had rendered collective training impossible, and the opportunity now afforded of pulling the Battalion together was one of which full advantage was taken.

About this time information was received that the Arabs in the vicinity of Hai town had become unfriendly, and that as soon as the Hai River became navigable a small punitive expedition was to proceed to the disaffected area. A mixed force, composed of cavalry, pack artillery, and infantry, the latter to be furnished from the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, was earmarked, but, as will be seen later, the force to be employed eventually dwindled to one river gunboat and two platoons. However, the possibility of fighting in the near future acted as a stimulant to training.

On February 24th Lieutenant G. R. Grove joined, Captain Driver, I.M.S., was invalided, and later was replaced by Captain Kanal, I.M.S.

On March 1st, it having been decided to abandon the post at Baghela, "D" Company, under Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., was ordered to proceed as an advanced party to Kut, to which place the Battalion was ordered to move. The defence post was situated as shown on Map No. 16, immediately north-west of Kut-el-Amara and south-west of Kut Port.

Baghela was evacuated on March 8th, and the next day the Battalion, less two small detachments detailed for the defence of Imam Mahdi and Shumran, was concentrated at Kut West.

In view of the approaching hot weather, work on summer quarters was taken in hand at once. Three E.P. tents were allotted to each platoon, they were joined together, the ground dug out to a depth of two feet, and a sun-dried brick wall built up instead of using the tent walls.

About the middle of March the Tigris commenced to rise rapidly, and in many places threatened to break the bunds, resulting in the Battalion having to furnish strong working parties to strengthen them.

On March 28th the Battalion was ordered to detail two platoons to proceed to Hai Town. (See Map No. 17.) The object of the expedition was to instal a political officer, to deal with the local Arabs should they oppose the occupation of Hai Town, and to negotiate for the export of grain from the Jeziret area. Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., was put in command of the expedition, which consisted of H.M.S. *Sedgefly*, "D" Company, less two platoons, S.T. 69 and three mahelas carrying one month's supplies. At 7.30 a.m. on March 29th the expedition started down the Hai River, which proved easily navigable, and at 1 p.m., having arrived at a point some 2,000 yards from the town, the two platoons were disembarked on the east bank, on which was situated the town. Hardly had the disembarkation been completed when a deputation of friendly Arabs arrived and paid their respects to the Political Officer. On the departure of the deputation an escort to the Political Officer was detailed, and he proceeded to Hai Town on H.M.S. *Sedgefly*. He was received in a friendly spirit, and returned to the detachment at nightfall. On March 30th Hai Town was occupied and the Union Jack was officially hoisted on the old Turkish flagstaff which still remained on the roof of the Serai. Later the old Turkish barracks were taken over, occupied by the detachment, and put into a state of defence. Here the detachment remained until August 26th.

During the summer months in Mesopotamia a proportion of officers and men in every regiment were granted three months' leave, and on April 2nd the first of three leave parties from the Battalion, composed of 1 British officer, 3 Gurkha officers, 95 Gurkha other ranks, and two followers left for India.

An order was received abolishing rifle drill in all rifle regiments for the duration of the war. This was due to the difficulty of furnishing the required drafts to battalions from their own depots.

On April 10th a report was received that 500 mounted Arabs were in the vicinity of Sheikh Saad, on the left bank of the Tigris. A force (two troops 11th Lancers, one sub-section Indian Machine Gun Company, one company 1/6th Gurkha Rifles) under command of Lieut.-Colonel B. A. Rice, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, was ordered

out. Embarking at Kut West, the force arrived at Sheikh Saad at 8.30 p.m.

At 9.30 p.m. on the 14th the force arrived back at Kut. The Arabs turned out to be retainers of the Wali of Pusht-i-Koh, who was enjoying his annual gazelle shoot. No military action was therefore considered necessary!

On April 26th the post at Sheikh Saad was taken over by two platoons furnished by the Battalion.

Orders were received on May 8th that, consequent on the decision to raise a new battalion of Gurkhas (1/11th Gurkha Rifles), one company from the 1/6th Gurkhas was to be transferred bodily to this new unit. Major F. M. Ransford and "B" Company were detailed. On the departure of "B" Company the remaining three companies each transferred one platoon to form a new company; the fourth platoon in each company was completed from drafts. Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., returned from Hai Town on May 27th and took over command of the new company.

On May 18th the Commanding Officer received the welcome news from the General Officer Commanding Lines of Communication Defences that he had received orders from General Headquarters to prepare to free the 1/6th Gurkhas from lines of communication duties in September, since that battalion would be required elsewhere.

During the same month H.V. 303 rifles were issued.

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. Rice proceeded to India on three months' leave on May 28th, and Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., took over command of the Battalion.

On June 9th the Battalion was called upon to perform what might have been a most unpleasant duty.

During the night of June 8th/9th the subadar-major and two other Indian officers in the 49th Bengali Battalion were shot by individuals in the same battalion. The suspects were to be arrested. It was pointed out to the Commanding Officer that when the arrests were made there might be serious trouble, and that in the event of such trouble the Bengali battalion was to be fired on.

On receipt of the above orders Captain Ryan, with two platoons from "B" Company under command of Lieutenant G. R. Grove, and two platoons from "C" Company under Lieutenant E. Castells, and two Lewis



LIEUT.-COLONEL W. CAMPBELL LITTLE.
1918-1922

guns, took up a position 200 yards from where the Bengali battalion was ordered to form up in mass, and awaited eventualities. Two sepoys and one Indian officer were placed under arrest and were taken to the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles' camp. Fortunately no attempt was made to interfere with the proceedings.

Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little joined on June 11th and assumed command of the Battalion. He was appointed permanent Commandant.

On June 15th Lieutenant N. N. Hearsay, 2/Lieutenant E. W. Keen, 2/Lieutenant A. L. Rogers, and a draft of 1 Gurkha officer and 186 Gurkha other ranks joined.

"C" Company and two platoons "B" Company, under Lieutenant E. Castells, were ordered to proceed to Kut Port on June 19th to take over guard duties at the Turkish prisoners-of-war camp. They were relieved by the 49th Bengali Battalion on the 30th.

The post at Sheikh Saad was closed down on June 29th, and the next day the two platoons which had been there on detachment duty rejoined Headquarters at Kut West.

Shortly after his arrival, 2/Lieutenant E. W. Keen, I.A.R.O., contracted fever. Admitted to hospital at Kut on June 29th, he died of cerebral malaria in No. 133 British General Hospital on July 5th. He was buried the next day with full military honours in the military cemetery at Kut. British officers of the Battalion acted as pall bearers, and "B" Company furnished the firing party. The number of the grave is B.22. 2/Lieutenant Keen's death was as sad as it was sudden, and his loss was felt by all ranks of the Battalion.

"B" Company and two platoons "D" Company, under Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., relieved the 49th Bengali Regiment at the prisoners-of-war camp on July 5th.

Lieutenant C. G. Crawford, I.A.R.O., was transferred to a Military Police battalion in India, and Lieutenant N. N. Hearsay to the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles.

On August 25th orders were received to concentrate the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles at Kut at once, and to despatch the Battalion by rail to Ruz on September 1st. Except for the information that we were to be prepared for an extremely cold climate, no mention of destination was made.

On August 25th the detachment furnishing guard duties at the prisoners-of-war camp rejoined Headquarters, and on the 26th the Hai detachment arrived.

The Battalion at long last was fully concentrated for the first time in nineteen months.

First and second line transport (pack mules and A.T. carts) were issued on August 31st.

Orders were received later postponing the move to September 16th, whilst information was received that the Battalion was to join the 36th Infantry Brigade, which confirmed the idea that somewhere in North West Persia was its ultimate destination.

Intensive training and equipping was carried out during the fortnight which remained.

On September 14th orders were received to leave Kut on the 16th.

After a long spell of duty on the Tigris line of communication all ranks were delighted to be moving elsewhere, for although lines of communication are vital to an army there were few, if any, in the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles who would not have admitted that the duty of protecting them was monotonous.

General Maude, in his despatches, paid a warm tribute to all employed on lines of communication duties, whilst General Marshall, in his despatch dated April 15th, 1918 (*London Gazette* Supplement No. 30874 of August 29th, 1918) recognizes the good work in the following words:

"The maintenance of the line of communication defences along both the Tigris and Euphrates has been carried out with marked efficiency. Though the work has at times been arduous, and often more monotonous than that of our troops employed in forward areas, the inability of enemy agents to cause even the slightest damage or delay on the lines of communication redounds to the vigilance and credit of all concerned. I have nothing but praise for the patrols, railway guards and escorts, whose work has brought out qualities of self reliance and devotion to duty."

CHAPTER XVII.

BEFORE proceeding with the narrative of the sojourn of the Battalion in Persia, a description of events leading up to the situation in that country is first necessary.

Early in 1917 a Russian force, under General Baratoff, was advancing towards Mesopotamia from Kermanshah (see Map No. 18). The Turkish XIII Army Corps was opposing the Russian advance.

Bad weather on the Tak-i-Girra Pass delayed the progress of the Russians, and on April 2nd, 1917, an advanced party of cavalry joined hands with the British at Kizil Robat.

In June, 1917, due to the heat in Mesopotamia, the Russians withdrew to Karind. In December, 1917, Khanekin was occupied by the British.

By the summer of 1918 the Bolshevik movement had spread throughout Central Asia. The Russians in Persia, with the exception of a small detachment under Bicherakov, threw in their lot with the Bolsheviks. In the meantime a British Mission, under General Dunsterville, had arrived in Persia, *en route* to the Caucasus. A state of famine prevailed, and as the demoralized Russian troops were retreating on the Caspian, with the exception of General Bicherakov's partisan detachment there was nothing to prevent anarchy breaking loose in the country.

A glance at the map will show the strategical importance of denying to the Turks the means of delivering a blow against the right flank of the British Forces in Mesopotamia, and also of blocking the German channel of anti-British propaganda in Afghanistan and India via Trans-Caspia. The Persians, who had already suffered greatly from the Turks and Russians, were adverse to yet another belligerent entering their country. One thing certain was, that if the Turks were not prevented from so doing they would use Persia as an inroad to Mesopotamia and thence to the Trans-Caspian. The Persians as a whole were not likely to do more than protest against

such an idea. Situated on the northern frontier of Persia were the Assyrians, Nestorians, and Jelus. They might, on their own, dispute the right of any foreign army to traverse their territory.

In May, 1918, reinforcements from Mesopotamia were sent to General Dunsterville, and in June, Kasvin, which place covered Teheran from the north and west, was taken over from General Bicherakov. Later the same month the Russians, accompanied by a small British detachment, marched towards Enzeli. On arrival at Menjil a Persian tribe—the Jangalis—refused to allow the force to traverse that part of their country which lay between Menjil and the sea. Fighting ensued, and the Jangalis having been defeated the Caspian was reached.

On July 3rd the Russians left Enzeli for Baku. On arrival, General Bicherakov found that the Turks and Tartars were fighting the Russians and Armenians west of Baku. The Government was purely Bolshevik, and, as such, strongly opposed to British intervention. Fighting continued, but, owing to disorganization, the Russian resistance offered, with the exception of Bicherakov's troops, was ineffective, and proved powerless to prevent Baku being seriously threatened. On July 26th a *coup d'état* took place. The Bolshevik Government was overthrown, and a Centro-Caspian Dictatorship installed. The new Government appealed at once to the British for assistance, but, before it arrived, Bicherakov, convinced that the fall of Baku was inevitable, drew off his detachment to the north to Derbend.

Baku, however, did not fall, and on August 4th a small detachment of British troops arrived. A Turkish attack was repulsed. The Russians and Armenians, heartened by this success and by the presence of the British, pulled themselves together and opposed the Turks with renewed vigour. Further British reinforcements arrived in the middle of August, but, strange to relate, the inhabitants of Baku took this to mean that it was now no longer necessary for them to fight. Protests were of no avail. Finally, on September 14th, the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship was informed that the British intended to withdraw at once. The British detachment had denied to the Turks for a period of six weeks the town of Baku, with its very

valuable oilfields, and had caused heavy casualties to the enemy, who were compelled to bring up a force of considerable numerical superiority before they succeeded in capturing the town.

Having withdrawn from Baku, General Dunsterville's small force returned to Enzeli. The distance from Enzeli to Ruz (railhead in Mesopotamia) was 600 miles. Communications were vulnerable. The Turks, having disposed of Baku, were now free to turn their attention to Persia: in fact, they had already embarked on operations in that direction, and the Jelus were engaged opposing a Turkish advance through Urumiyah. British detachments were despatched during July in the direction of Miane and Bijar, to watch possible activities of the Turks against the long line of communication.

On July 23rd a British convoy, with arms, ammunition and money for the Jelus, reached Sain Kale, unfortunately, just too late, for on that date the Turks captured Urumiyah. They drove out the Jelus, massacred many of the inhabitants, and pursued them along the road to Sain Kale until checked by our advanced troops. The fugitives, many of whom perished from cholera and starvation, poured along the road through Bijar to Hamadan. From Hamadan they continued to Baquba, where a large refugee camp was formed.

At the end of August a report was received that the Turks were collecting transport at Tabriz.

In September, Major-General Thomson, C.B., M.C., was appointed General Officer Commanding Northern Persian Force, *vice* Major-General Dunsterville.

Such was the situation in Persia when the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles received orders at Kut to proceed to Ruz.


The Battalion (less "D" Company) left Kut in two trains on September 15th, 1918, and arrived at Ruz (railhead at that time) on the 16th. "D" Company left Kut on the 16th and arrived on the 17th. Captain E. C. Brown rejoined at Ruz and took over command of "A" Company. By the 18th, owing to a mistake, winter clothing for the men which was expected at Ruz had not arrived, and, since a warning had been received that very severe climatic conditions should be expected, Captain E. C. Brown paid a visit to the D.A.D.O.S. of the 14th Division. He explained the situation, and returned at

2 p.m. with most of the essential garments. As the Battalion was due to march at 5.30 p.m., kits had been done up ready for loading. They were opened, winter clothing issued, and then tied up again.

At 5.30 p.m. on September 18th "B" Echelon (Officer Commanding: Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles. Troops: Detachment 100 British details, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, detachment 100 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, No. 32 C.F.A.) left Ruz* *en route* to wherever developments in Persia demanded. The heat during the day was still considerable, and the marches long. It was decided, therefore, until a more suitable climate was reached, to split the daily march into two, and to confine marching to the late afternoon and early morning.

After a very dusty and stuffy march of eight miles, Kurdarrah Bridge, a point in the Jebel Hamrin Hills, was reached at 9 p.m., where the Battalion, tormented by sandflies, bivouacked until 3 a.m. the next morning. Resuming the march at 3.45 a.m., Jasun was reached after an easy six miles. Here a hot day was spent in bivouac. Leaving Jasun at 5.30 p.m. on September 19th, the column arrived at Nau Daman at 9.30 p.m., having marched eleven miles. During the march the first party of Jelu refugees was met on its way to Baquba from Hamadan. They were indeed a pitiable sight—chiefly old men, women and children. The young men had been detained at Hamadan, where they were being organized into battalions and trained. They were sore footed, hungry and weary. Donkeys and bullocks, equally tired, carrying what possessions it was possible to save, were either being goaded forward or had collapsed in the roadway. Leaving Nau Daman at 5 a.m. on the 20th, the echelon marched eleven miles to Khanekin, arriving at 9.30 a.m. A shortage of water, due to not being able to get sufficient at Jasun to fill waterbottles, combined with the heat during the latter part, made the march most trying for the men. There were two cases of heat stroke. Khanekin is a fairly large town, and with the exception of date palms in the immediate vicinity of the houses is devoid of shade. A halt of thirty-two hours was made, and at 5 p.m. on September 31st the echelon

* A march table, giving names of places, distances between, and dates of arrival at, will be found in Appendix IX, p. 305.



**SAR-I-PUL.
DARIUS' THRONE.
TOP OF TAK-I-GIRRA PASS.**

left *en route* to Kasr-i-Shirin. After a dusty march of twelve miles, a halt for the night was ordered at 10 p.m. The country was waterless, and darkness relieved us of the necessity of gazing at a desolate waste of country. The march was continued at 4 a.m. the next morning. Soon the column ran into another party of Jelu refugees: it was pitiful to watch comparatively young children urging the older members of the party to "stick it out" and carry on. One felt sorry for them, but was powerless to help.

At 6 a.m. the Battalion reached the Halawan River, where a halt of one hour was ordered. It was a picturesque spot, and there was an abundant supply of good water, a point which appealed more to thirsty men and animals than scenery. Having completed a march of ten miles the halting place for the day, near Kasr-i-Shirin, was reached. The country here, about 1,000 feet above sea level, is a series of broken foothills, whilst the outline of mountain ranges could be discerned in the distance in the direction of the march. At 5 p.m. on September 22nd the Battalion moved forward again. The road was strewn with large pebbles which, impossible to see in the dark, made the march most irksome. A halt for the night was made after thirteen miles. The bivouac site proved to be even more pebbly than the road, but it is wonderful how small details of such a nature fail to disturb sleep when really tired. Starting again at 4 a.m., the Battalion arrived at Sar-i-Pul at 6.30 a.m. The next day's march being a short one, it was decided not to start until the following morning. The Halawan River, on which Sar-i-Pul is situated, attracted a few fishermen; one three-pound mahseer was caught.



At 4 a.m. on September 24th the Battalion marched twelve miles to Pai Tak, where it arrived at 9 a.m. The camp is 3,400 feet above sea level, and consequently the climate is cooler. Literally translated, Pai Tak means "foot of the throne." According to the legend, the origin of the name is as follows: situated half-way up the pass there used to be a throne, the ruins of which are still visible; King Darius (522 B.C.) used to sit here to review his army as it marched down the pass *en route* to Mesopotamia.

The weather was now sufficiently cool to march

throughout the day, and night marches were no longer necessary. The whole of the 25th was spent at Pai Tak. Many of the men had very sore feet, which was to be expected, due to the conditions of life immediately preceding the Battalion's departure from the heat of Mesopotamia.

At 5.30 a.m. on September 26th the echelon started for Sar-i-Mil, distance fifteen miles. The Tak-i-Girra Pass was negotiated shortly after leaving the camp, and at 11.45 a.m. Sar-i-Mil, which stands at an altitude of 5,500 feet at the west end of the Karind Valley, was reached. The hillsides in these parts are covered with a species of stunted oak, but otherwise there is very little sign of vegetation. Three chikor and one hare were shot not far from the camp. Resuming the march early the next day, and leaving Karind to the north, Chasma Safed was reached at 11 a.m., after a twelve mile march.

The nights had become much colder, and, probably due to the change of temperature, a few cases of fever occurred amongst the men. On September 28th the Battalion marched sixteen miles to Harunabad and arrived at 11.40 a.m. The next day, crossing three small passes, we left the Karind Valley and arrived at Hassanabad. Fresh cases of fever continued to occur, Major Bredin, Captain Brown, and Lieutenant Castells amongst them. The climate was a difficult one with which to contend, for whereas it was bitterly cold in the early mornings when the march commenced, it was broiling hot by the time it ended. To overcome these extremes of temperature, jerseys were ordered to be worn when starting; they were removed and carried in rucksacks after the first halt. Mahidasht was reached on September 30th. The march was long, dusty, and hot. Half way we were worried by a plague of flies, probably caused by the filthy state of the Mahidasht village through which the Battalion passed six miles south-west of the halting place for the day. Shortly after leaving Mahidasht the next morning a small pass was crossed. From here the road descends to Kermanshah, a large Persian town of 30,000 inhabitants, situated in the valley through which the Karesu River flows. Skirting the town to the west, the road continues to a bridge by which the river is crossed, and after a twenty-one-mile march the Battalion went into bivouac



**BISITUN ROCK CARVINGS, BISITUN ROCK
BETWEEN YUZHASHICHAI AND MOULA ALI**

on the south bank and immediately west of the bridge, which is four miles north-east of the town. On arrival, the officers of the 26th Punjabis very kindly gave the British officers an excellent lunch.

The situation at this juncture in Persia was as follows. On the Mianeh line the Turks were south of Mianeh. On October 1st our troops were not in actual contact with the enemy, but frequent reconnaissances were undertaken by aeroplanes and armoured cars. Information received from these sources indicated that the Turks were withdrawing.

On the Bijar line British cavalry had driven a Turkish detachment northwards between Bijar and Sain Kale.

On the Senna line no enemy had been seen.

On October 2nd Major B. A. Rice, D.S.O., in compliance with orders to return to India, left the Battalion.

Headquarters of the Persian lines of communication were located at Kermanshah, and from them information was received that the Turks had been heavily defeated in Palestine, and that Damascus had been captured on October 1st.

The unfavourable situation in Palestine probably led to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops referred to above.

The Battalion remained at Karesu Bridge on October 2nd. The next day, the echelon (less 32 C.F.A. ordered to remain at Kermanshah) left for Bisitun, *en route* to Hamadan. It rained in the early morning. After a march of nineteen miles Bisitun was reached. The Battalion bivouacked at the foot of the Bisitun rock, which rises abruptly to a height of 1,700 feet above the plain. Three hundred feet up, on a steep cliff face, the famous bass relief carvings of Darius and the ten captive kings can be clearly seen. The next day, following the valley through which winds the Gumasiab River, Saneh was reached, a distance of seventeen miles. On October 5th, crossing a pass 7,000 feet above sea level, the Battalion, having marched twenty miles, arrived at the ancient town of Kangavar. It is supposed to date back to the fourth century B.C., when the place was known as Konkobar; amongst the ruins, on which modern buildings now stand, are those of a temple to the ancient Persian goddess Diana. On October 6th the Battalion did the longest march it was called upon to perform in Persia,

twenty-three miles from Kangavar to Assadabad. It left the former place at 5.30 a.m., and crossing a pass came into the Assadabad Valley, up which a dead straight road brought us to our destination at 3.30 p.m. The bivouac is situated at the base of a great mountain range 8,000 feet above sea level, which it is necessary to negotiate to reach Hamadan. Leaving Assadabad at 5.30 a.m., the Battalion toiled up 2,000 feet to the top of the pass, 7,500 feet, whence the road descended to Yungi Khan, where the Battalion arrived just before it commenced to rain. At 1 p.m. on October 8th Hamadan was reached, the total distance marched from Ruz being 295 miles. The town is not particularly impressive, and the ruins of the splendour of Ecbatana, the ancient capital in the days of the Medes, Persians, and Parthians, are not so apparent as to strike the eye on first sight. The town, from a landscape point of view, is pleasantly situated on a plateau 6,000 feet above sea level; Mount Elwend, 12,000 feet high, in the background; whilst the surrounding country boasts of a greater number of trees than met elsewhere to date in Persia.

The maintenance of the Army in Persia was very expensive. All stores were transported from railhead in Mesopotamia by motor lorries, or occasionally by hired camel and donkey transport. The average cost per ton to Hamadan was £83. The policy adopted, therefore, was to depend as far as possible on local resources, and to send up essential stores only. Foodstuffs were expensive, and to compensate the troops a preferential rate of exchange between the rupee and the kran was sanctioned. The following amounts, according to rank, were allowed to be converted monthly: Field officer, Rs300; other British officers, Rs200; subadars, Rs30; jemadars, Rs15; havildars, Rs6; naiks and riflemen, Rs5. The net result of the concession in the case of a captain was that for Rs200 he received Rs365.

The weather began to get colder, and as the Battalion had been on bivouac scale the issue of tents was appreciated.

On October 23rd an escort of one platoon, under Lieutenant Berkeley, was ordered to accompany a convoy to Bijar, whilst the local guards, amounting to 5 non-commissioned officers and 33 riflemen, were furnished by

the Battalion. A few days later further detachments were made from the Regiment. Lieutenant Castells and two platoons were ordered to proceed on escort duty to Bijar. "D" Company, under Captain Brown, marched to Absinah, with a view to preparing winter quarters for the Battalion at that place; whilst Lieutenant Rogers and Lieutenant Beaumont proceeded with a foraging party in the direction of Sultanabad.

On November 1st official information was received that an armistice had been concluded and brought into force, from noon on October 31st, between the Allies and Turkey.

Immediately after the conclusion of the armistice, the General Officer Commanding Northern Persian Force was instructed to re-occupy Baku in co-operation with the Russians. Accordingly all the available troops of the 39th (British) Infantry Brigade were ordered to concentrate at Enzeli. This move necessitated a redistribution of troops of the 36th Indian Infantry Brigade, and on November 3rd the Battalion was ordered to march to Kasvin as soon as possible. On November 4th Capt. D. G. J. Ryan was ordered to Kasvin to take up a temporary appointment as G.S.O.2 during the absence of advanced Northern Persian Force Headquarters at Baku. He left the same day by motor car. The Battalion was provided with hired transport, 160 camels and 50 Persian mules. The camels proved most refractory. On the 6th the march commenced, and Kulijan was reached at 3.30 p.m. The transport began to arrive at 8 p.m., but a number of the camels did not get in until next day. A biting wind sprang up at Kulijan, and serge clothing was taken into wear. On November 7th the Battalion marched twelve miles to Ruan. The cold increased, and the next day the march to Sirab was commenced in threatening weather. Snow began to fall, and continued for the greater part of the march. Great coats and waterproof capes were worn. Two miles south of Sirab a large house with accommodation sufficient for the Battalion was found, and here the night was spent. Manian, at the foot of the Sultan Bulak Pass, was reached after a march of fourteen miles on the 9th. A Russian post-house provided shelter for a proportion of the men; the remainder bivouacked in the vicinity.

Consequent on the order to concentrate the 39th British Infantry Brigade at Enzeli, it was necessary to relieve the garrisons of posts held by units of that Brigade. On November 10th, No. 14 Platoon was despatched in Ford vans from Manian to Menjil, a distance of 142 miles, to take over the post from a detachment of the 7th Bn. The Gloucestershire Regiment. The remainder of the Battalion marched to Aveh. Between Manian and Aveh the road crosses the Sultan Bulak Pass, 7,500 feet above sea level. From the pass the road descends 2,500 feet to the village of Aveh. No. 2 Platoon was ordered to remain and garrison the post there. Snow fell during the night. Ab-i-Garm, a name which indicates warm springs, was reached on the 11th. Shortly after arrival in bivouac orders were received to detach one company (less one platoon) to Enzeli, and one platoon to Resht, the Commanding Officer to proceed to the former place. The same evening twenty-two motor cars arrived to transport the detachments. During the night there was a heavy fall of snow. On the 12th the Commanding Officer and Adjutant (Lieut.-Colonel Little and Captain Collingridge) left by car for Enzeli. "C" Company, under Major Bredin, started for Resht and Enzeli. Captain Brown assumed temporary command of the Battalion, which continued the march to Nahvand. The men had spent a very cold night in the snow at Ab-i-Garm, and in the morning cooking was carried out with difficulty. The road was in a bad state, and Nahvand, after a tiring march of eighteen miles, was not reached until 4 p.m. A billet was secured, but one company had to bivouac.

On arrival at Siahdahan on the 13th, news was received that an armistice had been concluded between the Allies and Germany.

Halting at Sultanabad on the 14th the Battalion marched to Kasvin on the 15th. Barracks were allotted at Kasvin. The weather cleared up, and the men enjoyed a rest after ten days arduous marching and bivouacking. The actual distance covered was not very great (147 miles), but the weather conditions were severe. The town of Kasvin, which holds between 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants, is situated at an altitude of 4,100 feet above sea level. The houses are better built than

those at Hamadan, the streets are wider, and some consideration appears to have been paid to the general lay-out of the city.

An envoy had been despatched to Baku on November 4th to ask for a definite date to be fixed by the Turks for the evacuation of the town. A procrastinating reply was received, and, in consequence, the envoy was sent back to Baku, accompanied by a staff officer, to inform the Turkish Commander that Baku would be occupied by a British and Russian force on November 17th.

At dawn on November 16th the 39th Infantry Brigade, escorted by three vessels of the Caspian Fleet, armed by the Royal Navy, left Enzeli in seventeen transports for Baku. On the 17th they were joined near Baku by General Bicherakov's Russian force. The same day the vessel, conveying Major-General Thomson, C.B., M.C., entered Baku at the head of the combined fleets, flying the flags of Great Britain, France, Russia, and America. The troops landed without opposition, and the town was taken over from the Turks, who completed their evacuation during the afternoon.

Besides the troops at Baku, a small force was also despatched to Krasnovodsk, in order to secure that place as a naval base for shipping under British control and to deny it to the Bolsheviks.

The Battalion remained at Kasvin during November 16th and 17th. On the 17th Capt. D. G. J. Ryan rejoined from Northern Persian Force Headquarters, and assumed temporary command.

On the 18th the march to Enzeli commenced. Leaving Kasvin at 7.30 a.m., Agababa was reached after a march of fifteen miles. A billet for the whole Battalion was found and occupied. The next day's halt was Yuzbashichai. The first seven miles of the road traversed undulating and arid country, and later, striking a hill stream, followed its course down a valley, in which the Battalion camped after a march of nineteen miles. Towards evening it commenced to rain, and all ranks appreciated the tents which had been issued before leaving Kasvin. The next day, crossing the stream by an iron suspension bridge at Yuzbashichai, the road, ascending and decending to avoid precipitous cliffs, followed the course of the stream along its left bank to Moula Ali.

We arrived at 12.30 p.m., and camped for the night. Two Gurkha officers and 69 Gurkha other ranks were sent forward to Enzeli in Ford vans shortly after arrival. Continuing down the valley on November 21st the Safid Rud River, into which the Yuzbashichai stream flows, was crossed below the confluence by a stone bridge three miles from Jemalabad. Jemalabad, the halting place for the day, was reached at 12.30 p.m. The next day the Battalion marched to Menjil. It is said that only about once a month does Menjil escape the annoyance of a powerful wind, which whistles through the gorge from dawn till dusk. November 22nd was not that one day. Four miles from Menjil the road turns away north-east from the river and crosses a spur thrown out from a mountain. Hardly had the Battalion crossed this shoulder when it met the full force of the wind. Men were soon chasing their hats in all directions, whilst the remaining three miles of the march was quite an arduous and extremely annoying task. The few trees in the neighbourhood bear testimony to its force; they are all bent over in an opposite direction to that from which the wind blows. Mud barracks have been built on the camping ground; no tent could be kept standing for long during the day time. In the evening the wind dropped. "D" Company, under Captain E. C. Brown, was ordered to remain at Menjil. Lieutenant Berkeley left the Battalion to take up a political appointment at Baghdad. Early the next morning the wind had again commenced to whistle over Menjil. A portion of "A" Company, under Captain McKeag, was sent forward by Ford van to Resht.

The Battalion (less "D" Company and the several other detachments already mentioned) left for Lusadabad on November 23rd. The road crosses the Safid Rud River by a well-constructed iron girder bridge one mile from Menjil, and follows the left bank of the river, which flows for the first five miles of the march through a rocky gorge. Three miles from Menjil the wind ceased.

Lusadabad was reached at 3 p.m., and tents pitched. The country here showed a marked contrast to that through which we had marched to date. The valley opened out into green fields and woods. The mountain slopes were covered in forest, and the higher ranges



OLIVE TREES AND THE MENJIL WIND.
BETWEEN LUSADABAD AND IMAMZADA HACHEM.

MENJIL BRIDGE.
ENZELI

capped with snow. Imamzada Hachem was reached the next day after a march of fourteen miles through country very English in character. The road winds along the left bank of the Safid Rud. The camping ground was situated in dense forest, which continues from this point to within three or four miles from Resht. On November 25th, after a very muddy march, due to recent rain, the Battalion arrived at Sangar, a dirty little village in the heart of a dense forest. The fact that it was market day added to the general dirtiness of the place. The weather turned damp and misty, and the next day, after a march in drizzling rain, the Battalion reached Resht, where the men were billeted in a large shed on the southern outskirts of the town. Resht is similar to Kasvin in size. It boasts of a Hotel d'Europe, and has an electric installation which provides the streets, as well as shops and some of the houses, with light. Leaving "A" Company at Resht, under command of Captain McKeag, the march was continued the next day to Khomam. Billets were found, in spite of the protestations of a fat and very angry Polish lady, who, as far as could be made out, objected to the presence of the men in her back yard. During the quiet of the night the roaring of the Caspian Sea could be heard quite plainly. At 9 a.m. on Thursday, November 28th, the Battalion commenced the last stage of its march of 589 miles from Ruz to the Caspian. The distance from Khomam to Kasian is fourteen miles. Kasian was reached at 1.40 p.m. Some 200 yards from, and running parallel to the sea shore, rows of Nissen huts had been erected. They were occupied by the men, and proved both comfortable and warm. A few houses close to the men's huts were taken over as a mess and quarters for British officers.

The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles was now disposed as follows: Headquarters, "B" and "C" Companies, Kasian; "A" Company, Resht; "D" Company, Menjil.

Kasian and Enzeli are practically one place; the former is situated on the east bank of a narrow strait, which is the entrance to the Murdab lagoon, whilst Enzeli is located on the west bank. Owing to the similarity between the names of Kasvin and Kasian the latter was invariably referred to as Enzeli.

Enzeli in peace time is a flourishing seaport. There are

mechanical workshops, a radio station, fisheries, shipping offices, and several well-built European houses. Wharves are available for ocean-going steamers. During the time the Battalion was there, Enzeli was of military importance. All stores for the troops at Baku and Krasnovodsk having been brought up via the Persian line of communication were there transferred to ships and forwarded; whilst large supplies of petrol from Baku were back-loaded down the line of communication for use in Mesopotamia. Due to the presence of 10,000 Armenian refugees, many of whom succumbed to the ravages of cholera and typhus, martial law was proclaimed. Lieut.-Colonel Little was appointed Administrative Commandant, and Captain H. V. Collingridge Administrative Staff Officer, in addition to his duties as Adjutant.

The nationality of the inhabitants of the Persian towns on the shores of the Caspian was mixed; Russian, Armenian and Persian, and due to the Bolshevik situation there was a good deal of unrest. The Customs Offices in Persia were in charge of Belgian officers.

Early in December there was a skirmish between Russians and Turcomans just east of Bandar-i-Gez, a small town at the south-east corner of the Caspian; and three Russian ships bombarded the Turcoman coast near Gumish Tepe in retaliation for an act of piracy on the part of the Turcomans. Monsieur Mournard, the Customs Officer at Bandar-i-Gez, having no reliance in the Russians, most of whom he considered Bolshevik at heart, was unduly alarmed for the safety of the town. The Turcomans, to whom the port had been closed, had already fired into the town, and he considered that unless the British intervened there would be bloodshed. On December 8th, as a result of Monsieur Mournard's appeal to Teheran, Northern Persian Force Headquarters ordered two platoons to be despatched immediately to Bandar-i-Gez. "B" Company (less two platoons), under Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., was detailed, Lieutenant A. L. Rogers and Captain C. M. Ingoldby, R.A.M.C., accompanied the party.

On December 10th the detachment, having embarked on the s.s. *Paddy*, sailed from Enzeli at 12.45 p.m. After a voyage of twenty-four hours Ashurada Island

was passed, and entering a lagoon the s.s. *Paddy* dropped anchor three-quarters of a mile from the Bandar-i-Gez Jetty. Shallow water prevented ocean-going steamers riding alongside. Captain Ryan, with a small escort under No. 751 Havildar Pirthibahadur Gurung, went ashore in one of the ship's boats and met Monsieur Mournard and the Persian Governor of the town. Monsieur Mournard was very excited, but calmed himself considerably when he was informed that as soon as he arranged suitable accommodation a British detachment would be landed. The same evening the two platoons were landed, and the Lewis gun mules were put ashore the next day. The Customs warehouses and office were occupied and put into a state of defence. The situation was quiet. A few days after arrival a message was conveyed to the Commander of the detachment to the effect that as long as the British remained the Turcomans would behave, but that when the British left they would attend to Bandar-i-Gez.

Ashurada Island, at the entrance of the lagoon, was used by the Russians as a naval base. There was a radio station on the island, which was used occasionally by the detachment, but owing to the difficulty of getting to the island from Bandar-i-Gez the Persian telegraph offered a more convenient means of communication and, incidentally, of intelligence. For a few krans the telegraph master was not averse to allowing the perusal of all messages in the office.

The amount of intriguing which went on at Bandar-i-Gez defies description. It has got to be listened to to be understood. The Russian Consul, Monsieur Mournard, and the leading Armenians all had stories against each others party, and each, in turn, was only too ready to caution the Commander of the British detachment against the others. From the Commander's point of view this state of affairs was acceptable, because it furnished quite useful information. The detachment remained at Bandar-i-Gez for four and a half months, and during that time there was no trouble. The good behaviour of the men impressed the inhabitants deeply.

Before concluding this brief account of happenings at Bandar-i-Gez, a humorous episode which took place must be described. The day before the British party landed,

one company of Persian Cossacks and two machine guns arrived at Bandar-i-Gez. The Persian Commander in due course called on the British officers. There was a Gurkha guard at the door of the billet. On conclusion of his visit Captain Ingoldby saw the Persian officer off. The Gurkha sentry, seeing Captain Ingoldby, saluted. The Persian officer, fully imagining the salute was intended for him, drew himself up smartly, returned the salute, and much to the sentry's indignation forced a five kran silver piece into his hand.

On December 10th, "A" Company (Captain McKeag) and "D" Company (Captain Brown), having been relieved at Resht and Menjil by companies from the 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, arrived at Enzeli.

Shortly after the departure to Bandar-i-Gez of the detachment under Captain Ryan, "D" Company (less two platoons) and one sub-section 186th Machine Gun Company, under command of Captain E. C. Brown, were ordered to proceed to Astara as escort to Brig.-General H. Bateman Champain. Trouble had broken out at that place between Persians and Bolsheviks. A Bolshevik leader, Kholodoff by name, owned before the war a fishery north of Astara. The fishery was pillaged by Mohammedans (Russian subjects) from Russian Astara, who were known to be friendly with the inhabitants of Persian Astara. In retaliation, Kholodoff, who also wished to recoup himself, planned an attack on Persian Astara, with the object of looting the town and punishing the friends of his real enemy.

Having embarked at Enzeli, Captain Brown's detachment sailed on December 20th and arrived at Astara the same day. General Champain, having inquired into the situation, ordered Captain Brown to remain, and returned to Enzeli on December 23rd.

Several leaders of the Mohammedan tribes near Russian Astara volunteered to support the British in the event of trouble with the Bolsheviks. On January 15th a deputation of Mohammedan chiefs visited Captain Brown. They said they were anxious to restart trading and farming, and were prepared to surrender their arms to the British if the latter would guarantee them protection against the Bolsheviks. Captain Brown referred the question to Headquarters Northern Persian Force, and

requested the Russians and Mohammedans in the meantime to keep the peace. Headquarters Northern Persian Force replied that it was not possible to guarantee protection to Russian subjects in Russia. The Mohammedan party and the Russian (Bolshevik (?)), however, concluded peace and signed a treaty. For the time being the trouble came to an end, and except for intelligence work there was little to be achieved by keeping the detachment there any longer.

On January 1st, 1919, a British force landed at Batoum, on the Black Sea, and took over the garrisons in the Caucasus and at Krasnovodsk; it was found less of a drain on British resources to maintain the troops in these areas via the Black Sea than from Mesopotamia. Amongst the units which accompanied this force was the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Nothing of importance occurred during the New Year until March. Life at Enzeli, Astara and Bandar-i-Gez was peaceful. There were many opportunities of enjoying really excellent small game shooting. Snipe, duck, and woodcock abounded, whilst there were a fair number of pheasants (the same bird as shot at home), but without dogs they were difficult to get.

In February brevet majorities were awarded to Captain D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., and to Captain J. M. Whittall, who was still at G.H.Q. at Baghdad. The following Gurkha other ranks were awarded the Meritorious Service Medal, without annuity. The majority of these medals were awarded for valuable services rendered in Gallipoli* :—

- No. 345 Havildar Mane Thapa.
- No. 248 Rifleman Dalbir Thapa.
- No. 678 Rifleman Nalbahadur Gurung.
- No. 515 Havildar Mane Gurung.
- No. 265 Naik Punchabir Gurung.
- No. 528 Naik Ganjasing Gurung.
- No. 589 Rifleman Jire Gurung.
- No. 627 Naik Chandrasing Bura.
- No. 4785 Havildar Dalbahadur Rana.
- No. 443 Naik Bahadur Thapa.
- No. 896 Naik Amarsing Rana.

* *Gazette of India* No. 2537 of 1919.

No. 757 Havildar Mandrabahadur Gurung.

No. 1059 Lance-Naik Kansiram Thapa.

No. 1074 Lance-Naik Garbasing Gurung.

No. 1187 Rifleman Narsuba Gurung.

On February 9th Captain H. T. McKeag left the Battalion *en route* to England, where he was demobilized.

The Astara detachment returned to Enzeli on March 18th.

At the end of March the Battalion, in conjunction with other troops, was ordered to support the Persians in operations against the Jangali tribe to which reference has already been made. The Jangalis inhabit the area bounded approximately by a line drawn from Astara to Ardabil, thence south to the Kizil Usun River, south-east along the line of the river, and thence by a line drawn north-east from Menjil to the Caspian. (See Map No. 19.)

Kuchik Khan, the leader of the Jangalis, refused to recognize the Persian Government. An ultimatum was sent to him by the Persians, ordering him to surrender. In the event of Kuchik Khan refusing to comply with the terms, operations were to be commenced against him.

At this time the Jangali forces, estimated at 1,700 rifles and eight machine guns, were disposed as follows:—

In the Lahijan district 550 men under Dr. Heshmat, in the Kasma district 600 men under Haji Akhmed, and in the Fumen district 550 men under Kuchik Khan. Haji Akhmed's force, however, was known to be disaffected, and secret overtures to surrender were made.

In support of the Persian ultimatum the following dispositions were ordered:—

(a) ENZELI.—Two companies 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, one sub-section 186th Machine Gun Company, one section 15th Light Armoured Motor Battery, detachment R.A.F. (three aeroplanes).

(b) RESHT.—1/6th Gurkhas (less two and a half companies), two companies 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, one and a half sections 186th Machine Gun Company, 15th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less two sections).

(c) SIAHRUD.—Two platoons 36th Sikhs.

(d) MENJIL.—21st Mountain Battery, R.G.A. (less one section), one company 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, two



Scale.

100

200 miles

D.G.J.R.

platoons 36th Sikhs, one section Light Armoured Motor Battery, four guns and 600 infantry (Persian Cossacks).

(e) ZINJAN.—Two guns and 800 infantry (Persian Cossacks).

(f) ARDEBIL.—250 Persian Cossacks.

The above dispositions were completed by April 4th.

The plan of operations was:—

(i) The Persian Cossacks, supported by the 21st Mountain Battery, R.G.A. (less one section) and one company 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, escort to guns, to operate against the enemy at Kasma and Fumen. Commander, Colonel Starosselski, commanding the Persian Cossack Division.

(ii) Defence of Enzeli, Resht and Menjil by British detachments.

(iii) To keep open the Enzeli—Menjil road and prevent the Lahijan detachment of Jangalis joining Kuchik Khan.

(ii) and (iii) were entrusted to Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, who made his headquarters at Resht.

(iv) The Jangalis in the Kasma-Fumen area having been dealt with operations would then be undertaken in the Lahijan district by the Persian Cossacks.

On March 27th Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., returned from Bandar-i-Gez, and took over command of the defences at Enzeli. Two days later martial law was proclaimed in Resht, and before the inhabitants had time to realize what had happened the town was surrounded by a cordon of piquets under Major A. N. Bredin's orders, and twenty-five Jangalis were captured. The effect of this sudden movement bore fruit. The surprise was such that throughout the operations which followed there was no trouble in Resht, a town in which large numbers of the inhabitants were in sympathy with the Jangalis.

On April 4th the troops at Menjil (less two platoons 36th Sikhs) marched to Resht, where they arrived without incident on the 6th. Intelligence reports indicated that Kuchik Khan, no longer able to rely on assistance from the Kasma Jangalis, intended to cross to the east bank of the Safid Rud River to effect a junction with the Lahijan Jangalis. Lieut.-Colonel Little asked Starossolski

to detail troops to watch the fords across the river and to destroy all boats. Starossolski, however, declined to do this. He argued that it would be an advantage to allow Kuchik Khan to move east, as once across the river he would have to operate in a strange country away from his reserves of ammunition and other stores.

On April 7th Haji Akhmed formally surrendered with all his men. The same day a report was received that Kuchik Khan was near Shaft. Starassolski having got this information moved four days later north-west of that place to Fumen. One section 21st Mountain Battery, R.G.A., and two platoons 1/6th Gurkha Rifles accompanied the column.

Reserve rations for the British detachment were sent under an escort of one platoon to Passikhan. The Cossacks having "struck air" returned to Resht on the 15th. During the absence of the column information was received that Kuchik Khan and 350 men were about to cross the Safid Rud River near Reshtabad. One hundred and fifty Cossacks under Lieutenant Verba were despatched there. On the morning of the 12th aeroplanes, which were ordered to fly from Enzeli to reconnoitre the river from Reshtabad to Imamzada Hachem, surprised the Jangalis, who were actually crossing the river at Reshtabad. The machines, having bombed the enemy, descended to an altitude of 300 feet, opened with Lewis guns, and inflicted severe casualties, one machine was hit nine times. The moral effect of this air attack was good, and led to a number of desertions amongst Kuchik Khan's followers. In the meantime Lieutenant Verba had crossed the Safid Rud River, and was in pursuit. Reports now indicated that Kuchik Khan intended to escape by sea from Rudisar. The Officer Commanding Enzeli was ordered to embark one mountain gun and two sections 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, and to despatch the ship to patrol the coast near Rudisar. Later a report was received that the presence of this detachment dissuaded Kuchik Khan from his intention.

On the 16th, having captured Lahijan, the Cossacks pushed on to Langarud and Rudisar. Lest Kuchik Khan should endeavour to recross the Safid Rud, Lieut.-Colonel Little, at the request of Starossolski, piqueted the river from Nasroullabad to Imamzada Hachem.

Map No: 19


*Rough Sketch
to illustrate the
operations
against the Jangalis
April 1919*

N

C A S P I A N S E A

rud

Scale
miles 25 20 15 10 5 0 25 miles



D.G.J.R.

On the 24th the Cossacks, assisted by aeroplanes, attacked a party of Jangalis with four machine guns at Kaku, eight miles south-west of Lahijan. Twenty-five prisoners, including one German and two Russian officers, were captured, and the remainder of the enemy, breaking up into small parties, scattered. This was the last stand made by the Jangalis. There remained about 200 in several small parties, and these fugitives were hunted down in the Djourdacht area by the Cossacks.

Leaving the Persian Cossacks to mop up, the British troops, whose casualties amounted to one man accidentally shot on outpost duty, were withdrawn.

In recognition of good service in connection with the Jangali operations, Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little, Major A. N. Bredin, and Captain E. C. Brown were awarded the Persian Order of the Lion and Sun, 3rd Class.

On April 19th orders were telegraphed to the Bandar-i-Gez detachment to return to Enzeli. As soon as it was known that the detachment was to leave the attitude adopted by several people in the town was extraordinary. The Russian Consular Agent gave out that, consequent on the British having refused to comply with his instructions, they were ordered to leave. The entire Customs staff petitioned the detachment to remain. Seeing that their entreaties were of no avail, and rather than risk the retaliation threatened by the Turcomans, whose trade with Persia had been curtailed, they packed up their belongings and, with several other Persians, accompanied the detachment, which arrived at Enzeli during the Jangali operations on April 22nd.

Since the arrival of the Battalion at Enzeli, Subadar-Major Gambirsing Pun, M.C., I.O.M., had been complaining of loss of power in his legs. He was admitted to hospital, and for a long time the Medical Officer was worried about the symptoms. Later, having been informed that the Subadar-Major had been dangerously wounded in the head in Gallipoli on August 22nd, 1915, the Medical Officer feared that the symptoms were paralytic, directly due to the effects of the head wound. In April the Subadar-Major lost the use of his legs, and later was unable to speak. On April 30th the paralysis having become worse he was put on board a ship and sent

to India via Baku and Batum. He was an untold loss to the Battalion. In earlier pages of this history many tributes have been paid to his gallantry and devotion to duty. Such an end to his brilliant military career was indeed cruel, and deeply felt by all officers and men. Later the Order of British India was added to his other decorations. On arrival in India he was invalided out of the Service and transferred to the pension establishment with the honorary rank of Lieutenant. At the time of writing this history three of his sons are serving in the Regiment—Jemadar Janaksing Pun, No. 2542 Havildar Ranbahadur Pun, and No. 2962 Havildar Ganbahadur Pun.

Their illustrious father has set them and all ranks a fine example to live up to.

On May 7th instructions were received that on the arrival at Enzeli of the 1/42nd Deoli Regiment early in June the Battalion was to be ready to march back to Mesopotamia *en route* to India.

On May 10th the Battalion was concentrated at Enzeli.

The weather had now turned much warmer, and sea bathing was indulged in freely. There was a nice sandy beach, but for a man to get out of his depth it necessitated a very long wade. Later, on the march down to Mesopotamia, the cool waters of the Caspian were sorely missed.

On May 29th Captain E. C. Brown left Enzeli *en route* to England on leave via the Black Sea and Dardanelles.

The 1/42nd Deoli Regiment arrived at Enzeli on June 3rd, and the following day "C" and "D" Companies marched *en route* to Resht, under Major A. N. Bredin. The remainder of the Battalion left Enzeli on the 6th.

On June 4th Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little and Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., proceeded to Baku on leave. From Baku they went to Tiflis, where the 2nd Battalion, less detachments, was quartered. On return to Baku Captain G. C. Strahan and the company on detachment duty there were met.

On June 5th very sad news reached the Battalion. Captain N. H. King Salter, who was Brigade Major to the — Infantry Brigade, was killed in action on June 4th, 1919, fighting against the Kurds in the Sulaimanieh district. This news was a sad blow to the



THE CASPIAN SEA.
CAPTAIN H. N. KING SALTER'S GRAVE.
A HALT ON THE SULTAN BULAK PASS.

Regiment, and particularly to those who knew him. He was gifted with a charming and cheerful personality, and was an able soldier. By his death the Regiment lost a real friend and gallant officer. He was buried at Kan-i-Anyira, near Cham Chemal, in Southern Kurdistan.

The Battalion left Resht for Kasvin on June 7th, where it arrived on the 15th. The band of the 1/2nd Gurkhas met the Regiment at the Resht gate and played it through the town to the camp. The wind at Menjil was just as bad as ever when the Battalion marched through on the 9th and 10th. Lieut.-Colonel Little and Major Ryan returned from leave in the Caucasus on the 12th. A halt for one day was made at Kasvin. Captain Campbell and Lieutenant Beaumont bade farewell, the former to be demobilized and the latter to take over the appointment of D.A.P.M. Kasvin.

After ten days' hot and uneventful marching the Battalion arrived at Hamadan on June 26th. On June 28th telegraphic orders were received to detain the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles at Hamadan pending further instructions. No reason was given for the order. Three leave parties, amounting to 142 Gurkha other ranks, were despatched to India from Hamadan between July 13th and 27th.

News was received that the peace treaty had been signed in Paris on June 28th, and on July 19th the 83rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry and the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles carried out a demonstration march through the town in connection with other peace celebrations.

As there did not appear to be any immediate prospect of continuing the march to Mesopotamia, it was decided to commence company training and musketry. "C" Company moved out to a camp at a place called Fakira for this purpose, but a week later the Battalion received orders to march to Kermanshah.

The weather at this time was hot, and it was decided to march in the afternoons and early morning, as was done during the first marches in 1918 when the Battalion left Mesopotamia for Persia.

The 1/6th Gurkhas left Hamadan on July 21st, and seven days later arrived at Karesu Bridge (the Kermanshah camping ground). A halt of one day was made. Major A. N. Bredin and "C" Company were ordered to remain at Kermanshah to replace one company

126th Baluchistan Infantry, which was ordered to accompany the Battalion to Quaraitu.

The column resumed the march on July 29th and reached Hassanabad on the 30th. On arrival, orders were received to despatch Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., to report for duty with the 18th Division at Mosul. He left the same afternoon by motor. Continuing the march, the column arrived at Pai Tak on August 4th. The heat was intense, and one day's halt was made. Quaraitu was reached on August 7th. 2/Lieutenant Macleod, with a draft of 182 Gurkha other ranks which, pending the arrival of the Battalion, had been ordered to remain in camp near Kasr-i-Shirin, joined. On the afternoon of August 7th, Battalion Headquarters and "B" Company entrained and were railed to Hinaidi. "D" Company and "A" Company, following later, arrived at Hinaidi on August 10th and 12th. A company of 126th Baluchistan Infantry was despatched to Zakho, eighty miles north-west of Mosul, where a punitive column was being concentrated for operations in Kurdistan. Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., was appointed Brigade Major to this column.



BREDIN, ROGERS, CASTELLS, COLLINGRIDGE, LITTLE.
(A Halt for Breakfast.)

1st BN. MARCHING DOWN FROM PERSIA.
QUARAITU, RAILHEAD FOR PERSIA.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE 1/6th Gurkha Rifles (less "C" Company at Kermanshah) was ordered to halt at Hinaidi. (See Map No. 16.).

On August 18th the Battalion was detailed for guard duties at various Turkish prisoners-of-war camps, and to furnish escorts to the prisoners when working outside the cages. "B" Company (2/Lieutenant Macleod) moved to the right bank of the Tigris, and "A" and "D" Companies took over the camps on the left bank of the river. The arrangements to guard against prisoners escaping were not good. The lighting of perimeters at night was bad, and in one month 200 prisoners were reported to have escaped. Two days after "B" Company had taken over their duties there was a disturbance amongst the prisoners; a sentry fired, and four prisoners were wounded by the same bullet. In view of possible further trouble two platoons from "A" Company reinforced "B" Company. Later one platoon was withdrawn. On September 8th 200 of the prisoners in a camp on the left bank commenced a disturbance. Subadar Balsing Thapa, I.O.M., in charge of the camp detachment, ordered the prisoners to disperse. They refused to obey the order, and appeared to be getting ready to rush the wire. Subadar Balsing ordered the guard to fire. Four prisoners were killed and six wounded. There was no further trouble. Later the 1/4th Rajputs were detailed to take over No. 19 Camp from the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Major A. N. Bredin, who had remained at Kermanshah with "C" Company, was transferred temporarily on August 28th to command the 83rd Wallahjabad Light Infantry at Hamadan, and on September 13th Lieutenant E. Castells left the Battalion to take up a political appointment.

The 45th Sikhs relieved the Battalion on October 2nd, and on the 3rd it was railed to Kut-el-Amara. Immediately after arrival on the 4th all station guards were taken

over from the 36th Sikhs, and a detachment under Subadar Balsing Thapa was sent to Sheikh Saad. "C" Company arrived at Kut from Kermanshah on October 12th.

Operations in Kurdistan having been concluded, Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., rejoined the Regiment at Kut on October 2nd. Subsequently, in connection with these operations, Major Ryan was awarded a bar to the D.S.O.

On arrival at Kut the Battalion was instructed to be ready to embark at short notice for Basra, *en route* to India.

On October 29th the 62nd Punjabis relieved the Battalion at Kut, and the same afternoon it embarked on the river steamer P 52 and two barges.

The steamer left Kut at 6 a.m. the next day. At 9 a.m. a signaller, No. 306 Rifleman Ujirsing Thapa, fell overboard. He was very lucky to be picked up. Many men fell into the Tigris during the war, but very few were saved, on account of the strong undercurrents. The steamer reached Sheikh Saad at noon, and waited whilst Subadar Balsing Thapa, I.O.M., embarked his detachment. Leaving Sheikh Saad at 1 p.m., the journey down river was continued until 7.30 p.m., when the steamer tied up for the night below Aligharbi. (See Map No. 17.) Amarah was reached at 3 p.m. on October 31st, where the men went ashore for half an hour to stretch their legs. Accommodation on the steamer and barges was very limited. At 4 p.m. the steamer left Amara, and tied up for the night at the head of the Narrows at 9 p.m. Having resumed the journey at 6.30 a.m. and run hard aground in the Narrows, the steamer eventually arrived at Basra at 7 p.m. on November 1st. The steamer and barges were banked alongside the wharves at Magil, but owing to the late hour heavy stores only were put ashore; the men remained on board for the night.

The Battalion disembarked the next morning at 6.30, and marched to Camp "H," two miles from Makina.

A halt of eleven days was made at Basra. During this period there was a mild epidemic of influenza, and, fearing that the medical authorities might delay embarkation on this account, every measure possible was taken to prevent the disease spreading. All ranks were paraded

and dosed with quinine, and morning and evening gargling parades were held.

On the 5th, Captain Kanal, I.M.S., was transferred to an advanced hospital section. The Battalion was sorry to lose him. He had attended to the medical requirements of the men for nearly two years, and during this period had displayed the keenest interest in the welfare and health of all ranks.

Companies were marched down in turn to the disinfecting sheds on the 6th, where the men and all their clothes were disinfected, a precautionary measure adopted in every case before a unit left Mesopotamia.

The Battalion left Makina at 11 a.m. on November 11th, and marched to the docks at Magil. Immediately on arrival the men embarked on the s.s. *Barpeta*, a ship belonging to the British India Steam Navigation Company. November 11th was the anniversary of the signing of the armistice, and, whilst embarking, the two minutes' silence to commemorate those who fell in the Great War was observed for the first time.

The ship sailed for Karachi at 1 p.m.

Before leaving Baghdad, Lieutenant A. L. Rogers was transferred to the Cipher Section at G.H.Q., and only five British officers now remained with the Battalion: Lieut.-Colonel W. Campbell Little, Commanding Officer; Captain H. V. Collingridge, Adjutant; Lieutenant G. R. Grove, Quartermaster; Major D. G. J. Ryan, D.S.O., and 2/Lieutenant Macleod, Company Commanders.

After an uneventful voyage of five days, the *Barpeta* arrived at the Kiamari Docks, Karachi, on November 16th. As soon as the usual port formalities were over, the Battalion disembarked; the men transferred themselves and their kits into coal trucks, and were railed to the rest camp. The Battalion had to wait ten days at Karachi for a troop train to take it north. Eventually it entrained at the rest camp siding, and, amidst wild cheers from the men, the train left at 8.30 a.m. on November 25th for Havelian. Journeying via Campbellpur, Havelian was reached three days later at 8 a.m., November 28th. Brig.-General the Hon. C. G. Bruce, C.B., M.V.O., Major D. R. H. Jackson, and Major F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., and other officers met the Battalion on arrival. Kits having been loaded on the lorries, and the men having eaten their

breakfast, the Battalion was ready for the last stage of the journey, Havelian to Abbottabad. Many of the men had been away for two years and ten months. At 1.30 p.m. the Battalion marched—the same road down which it had marched in 1914, and again in 1917. There were many who marched down who never returned. They gave their lives for their King and the Empire, and by their deaths have added to the glory of the name of their Regiment. All honour to them.

As it was in the days before the war, so it was now; the Regimental Band met the Battalion near Salhad, the band dog as of old was there, and the small Gurkha children, in many cases grown out of recognition, were soon racing down the column in search of their fathers. Headed by the band, the Battalion entered Abbottabad. The Bazaar was beflagged, and its inhabitants turned out in force and cheered the men as they marched through. From the Bazaar to the barracks the roads were lined by the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles F.F., and by the men of the depots of the 2/5th, 1/6th and 2/6th Gurkha Rifles. They, too, cheered as the Battalion passed. Finally, marching under an arch of welcome at the entrance to the lines, in response to the order "Company Parades," the companies wheeled to their own barracks and dismissed.

The next day the 2nd Battalion arrived at Abbottabad from the Caucasus.

The following Gurkha other ranks, in addition to those already mentioned, were awarded the Meritorious Service Medal, without annuity, for good work in connection with the war:—

- No. 1050 Havildar Dalsing Thapa.
- No. 4677 Havildar Kumsing Gurung.
- No. 936 Havildar Surju Rana.
- No. 885 Havildar Mir Ahmad.
- No. 751 Havildar Pirthibahadur Gurung.

Gazette of India, Notification No. 755 of 1920.

- No. 887 Havildar Gul Husain.

Gazette of India, Notification No. 801 of 1920.

- No. 1055 Havildar Jadunath Singh.

Gazette of India, Notification No. 1364 of 1920.

The following medals were granted for the Great War, 1914-18:—

1. 1914-15 Star, granted to all ranks serving within the period defined in A.I.I. No. 141 of 1919.
2. British War Medal and Victory Medal, to all ranks who served overseas during the Great War in any theatre of operations (authority, A.I.Is. 783 and 873 of 1919).

This brings to a close the story of the part played by the 1st Battalion The 6th Gurkha Rifles in the Great War, 1914-1918.

THE 2ND BATTALION

CHAPTER I.

THE RAISING OF THE BATTALION—EARLY TRAINING— CHITRAL, 1911-1913, AND UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, 1914.

ON November 3rd, 1904, telegraphic intimation was received from the Adjutant-General in India that the immediate raising of a 2nd Battalion to the 6th Gurkha Rifles had been sanctioned. The official instructions on the subject were embodied in India Army Order No. 790 of 1904, and were to the effect that the Battalion should be raised and located in Abbottabad, and should wear the same uniform as had hitherto been worn by the 6th Gurkha Rifles. It was directed that the existing Battalion should be divided into two wings, the one being retained to form the 1st Battalion, while the other constituted the nucleus of the 2nd Battalion.

The 2nd Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles was to fill the gap caused by the disbandment of the 65th Carnatic Light Infantry, and the latter regiment was directed to make over its regimental funds, as well as its mess and band property, to the new battalion.

On November 8th, 1904, the 6th Gurkha Rifles was broken up into two wings, the left wing becoming the nucleus of the 2nd Battalion: but with the exception of half the regimental signallers, all specialists, such as bandsmen, clerks, tailors, shoemakers, khud runners, and the football team were left with the 1st Battalion. The original "E" Company of the 6th Gurkha Rifles became "A" and "B" Companies in the 2nd Battalion, and so on throughout the companies.

The Government having decided that the best ground available in the neighbourhood of Abbottabad was to be taken up for the Battalion lines, a committee, under the presidency of Colonel A. A. Barrett, commanding 1/5th

Gurkha Rifles F.F., assembled on November 8th, 1904, and selected the open spurs bordering the northern limits of the existing station.

The first batch of recruiters, fifty strong, left for Gorakhpur on November 8th, 1904. These numbers were gradually increased up to a total of 200.

At the close of the recruiting season in April, 1905, 469 recruits had been obtained, which was only some thirty short of the actual complement required.

Major F. C. Colomb, 2nd-in-Command of the 1st Battalion, was appointed Commandant, with effect from November 15th, 1904.

Consequent on the shortage of officers in the 1st Battalion and delay in appointing officers to the 2nd Battalion, the permanent separation of the two battalions could not be effected until January 4th, 1905.

Various localities were examined with a view to a rifle range, and it was finally decided that the ground immediately west of the lines was the most suitable in all respects. This rifle range was finished and taken into use in October, 1906.

It was originally the intention of the Government of India that the Battalion should build its own lines, and to this end, with the assistance of Colonel Cregan, C.R.E., plans and estimates were submitted for an expenditure of rather over one-and-a-half lakhs of rupees. However, on the recommendation of the Sanitary Officer, Northern Command, various improvements were suggested to the type and location of the buildings, which raised the estimate to rather over two lakhs. Rs20,000 were allotted to be expended prior to April 1st, 1906, but before any steps could be taken in the matter the Government cancelled the order for building by Gurkha labour, and directed that the lines should be constructed by Military Works agency. The public buildings and roads were commenced in November, 1905.

The Battalion, which had moved into camp on the camping ground (south of the Brigade parade ground) on March 13th, 1905, moved into camp above their permanent lines on October 1st, 1906.

The new quarter guard and armouries were taken over and occupied on January 29th, 1907; the offices occupied "H" Company's top barrack on May 5th, 1907, and on

September 16th, 1907, the Battalion entered into occupation of the new single men's barracks and Gurkha officers' quarters, taking over the lines on the 14th and the new orderly-room on the 15th.

The Battalion bugle call was introduced By Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Colomb, and received official sanction. With a very slight modification it is the 1st Battalion call reversed.

During the cold weather of 1905-06, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales (now King George V.) paid a visit to India, and the outstanding event of this season was the Royal Review at Rawal Pindi, in which the Battalion took part.

It was originally intended to concentrate a large body of troops in the vicinity of Delhi, where, after a few days' manœuvres, they were to have been reviewed by the Prince of Wales; but want of water in the manœuvre area, consequent on a dry season, caused the abandonment of the scheme in favour of a general concentration of the Northern Command forces in the neighbourhood of Rawal Pindi, December 5th to 7th being allotted to manœuvres and December 8th to the Royal Review on the Khanna Plain.

In consideration of both battalions of the 6th Gurkha Rifles being composed mainly of recruits, it was supposed that these units would not be in a position to attend as separate units, and the temporary formation of a composite battalion was therefore ordered. However, at the urgent representation of all ranks, both British and Gurkha, both battalions were permitted to attend as separate units.

The 2nd Battalion, strength—9 British officers, 14 Gurkha officers and 633 other ranks, marched from Abbottabad on November 29th and reached Rawal Pindi, via the Shalditta Pass, on December 3rd.

The Battalion formed part of the 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division, the remaining units being the 1st Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles and the 1st and 2nd Battalions 5th Gurkha Rifles, the whole under the command of Major-General J. B. Woon, C.B.

On the evening of December 4th the Brigade moved into bivouac at West Ridge, and on the 5th (less the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, which was detached to the Shalditta

Pass) it moved 21 miles to Losar, three miles north-west of Kalaki-Serai. Between 11 a.m. on the 6th and 3.30 p.m. on the 7th, when it returned to its concentration camp at Rawal Pindi, the Battalion covered thirty-eight miles. Only two men fell out during this very severe test.

On December 8th the Battalion took part in the Royal Review, and the same evening the Prince of Wales visited the Brigade camp. All the British and Gurkha officers were introduced to him.

The Battalion marched *en route* for Abbottabad on December 10th, and arrived on the 14th.

The following complimentary letter from His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was published for the information of all troops which took part in the Rawal Pindi concentration:—

“ My dear Lord Kitchener,—

“ After having spent three days in the camp of a large portion of the Army of India, and witnessed the parade and march-past of this morning, I am anxious to express my appreciation of the physical fitness and high standard of training evinced by the troops in the field, and of their smart and soldierly bearing on parade. I very much regret that time would not permit of my staying longer with them. But I have seen enough to enable me to form a high estimate of the efficiency of the Army and of its readiness to take the field whenever called upon to do so.

“ While congratulating you upon your splendid command, I beg that you will convey to all ranks the assurance of my great pleasure in having been thus personally associated for the first time with the King Emperor's Army in India under these practical conditions. I shall take the earliest opportunity of communicating to His Majesty the very favourable impression which I have been able to form.”

Shortly after the return from the Royal Review the transport at Abbottabad was redistributed, the Battalion, which had hitherto been without transport, receiving forty mules and six carts.

On February 12th, 1906, the Battalion, 591 strong, marched to Hasan Abdal to take part in Divisional

manœuvres. The weather was persistently bad, and, after remaining in camp at Hasan Abdal for four days, the manœuvres were abandoned.

The return march was begun on the 20th instant. Some difficulty was experienced in crossing the Haru, which was in high flood, and Abbottabad was only reached on the 23rd. Heavy rain necessitated a day's halt at Haripur, the march thence being accomplished in one day.

The Battalion was inspected for the first time on March 27th, 1905, by Brig.-General J. B. Woon, C.B., commanding Abbottabad Brigade. As the Battalion was in process of formation, no special remarks were made.

The Battalion was included in those to be mobilized for active service, and took over the mobilization stores of the 58th Vaughan's Rifles in March, 1906.

On September 10th, 1906, His Excellency Lord Kitchener inspected the Abbottabad garrison, including the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.

There was no regular inspection of the Battalion this year by the Brigade Commander. The Battalion was judged on the work done during the Rawal Pindi concentration in December, 1906. More training was pronounced to be necessary before the Battalion would be fully fitted for active service. The Battalion failed to reach the required standard in signalling, having an insufficient number of trained signallers.

On January 2nd, 1907, the Battalion marched out to camp at Chamhad, to carry out Kitchener's Test, and to take part in the Brigade manœuvres. The test was completed, but wet weather prevented the Brigade manœuvres, and on the 9th the Battalion returned to Abbottabad, in heavy rain and sleet.

Certain details of the work were criticized by the General Officer Commanding, and some points were noted as requiring more practice, but the general report was satisfactory, and was confirmed by the inspection report.

On April 20th the report on the annual signalling inspection was received—a most satisfactory one, stating that great improvement had been made, and that the men were a useful, well-trained body of signallers.

On October 23rd, 1907, the Battalion was inspected by

General Sir Alfred Gaselee, K.C.B., G.C.I.E., commanding Northern Army, who expressed himself as "thoroughly satisfied" with his recent inspection. He considered that the high state of discipline and efficiency which obtained reflected credit on all concerned, and that the fine appearance of the men pointed to a good system of physical training.

In November, 1907, the Battalion marched via Sultanpur and Haripur to Battalion camp at Thapla. On the 25th and 26th, the Kitchener Test (march, attack, perimeter camp, night march, retirement, occupation of position) was performed while in camp at Paswal; here a halt was made until December 7th, on which date a march was made via Thapla to Haripur, arriving near the latter place on the 8th. Further manœuvres were performed, and the Battalion marched into Abbottabad on December 14th.

On the occasion of the mobilization of the Zakha Khel Field Force in February, 1908, the Battalion furnished detachments to the three other battalions of the Abbottabad Brigade; of which the detachment attached to the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles took part in the operations in the Zakha Khel country with that battalion. The other two detachments remained at Peshawar and Nowshera respectively, with the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. All three detachments returned to Abbottabad in March.

Similar detachments were furnished on the mobilization of the Mohmand Field Force in May of the same year. These detachments returned to Abbottabad in July.

In the following October the Battalion attended the Murree Hill manœuvres, under Major the Honourable C. G. Bruce, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles. Lieut.-Colonel Colomb having been appointed A.A.G., Burma Division, in July, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Crawford, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, was appointed to succeed him, and took over command on October 31st, 1908.

The Battalion proceeded to battalion training at Koti-ki-Khabar on November 18th, 1908, returning on December 12th, 1908.

In December, 1909, the Battalion attended Brigade and 2nd Divisional manœuvres near Hasan Abdal; Brigade and 1st Divisional manœuvres in February and



LIEUT.-COLONEL F. C. COLOMB,
2nd BN. 1904-1908.



COLONEL F. F. BADCOCK, D.S.O.,
2nd BN. 1912-1918.

March, 1910; and Brigade, Divisional and inter-Divisional manœuvres in November and December, 1910, as part of the 3rd Brigade, Peshawar Division.

The Battalion marched from Abbottabad for Chitral on September 9th, 1911, and reached Kila Drosh on October 2nd, where it relieved the 1/9th Gurkha Rifles.

The distribution of the Battalion during the winter months was Headquarters and three companies at Drosh and one company at Chitral Fort.

The first three months were spent in collecting fire-wood for the winter. This was cut and collected by the men, and Battalion funds benefited very greatly by the sale of such wood to the Supply and Transport Corps.

In the month of April, 1912, a company moved out to repair the road to Madaglasht, where a glorious summer camp was established at an altitude of 10,000 feet. It was from Madaglasht that two notable marches by companies of the Battalion were made. The first in July, 1912, by — Company crossing the Jagor Pass at 15,000 feet and thence to Chitral Fort; the second by — Company crossing the Dok Pass at 14,600 feet and on to Chitral that way. These three-day treks were in each case accomplished without transport, the men subsisting on what they carried in their rucksacks.

In the month of June the Battalion sustained a severe loss in the death of its Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel C. M. Crawford. Colonel Crawford had commanded the 1st Battalion from January 30th, 1907, to August 31st, 1908, and since that date had been in command of the 2nd Battalion. He had throughout worked unremittingly to raise the efficiency of the Regiment to its present standard. For his skilful training, his keen regard for the interests of the Regiment, and his unvarying kindness and consideration for all serving under him, the Regiment owes him a debt of gratitude which it can never repay.

Major F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., was appointed Commandant of the Battalion in Colonel Crawford's place, and assumed command on July 11th, 1912.

Usually, the tour of duty in Chitral was for one year only, but the reliefs were cancelled for the autumn of 1912, and the Battalion had to resign itself to another year of exile. To alleviate any possible disappointment

caused, furlough was opened to both officers and men on a fairly liberal scale. Moreover, it should not be thought that life as a whole in this outpost of Empire was altogether disagreeable. Far from it. For officers there was shikar of all sorts easily obtainable, whilst leave was granted at frequent intervals. For the men there was a fairly free and easy life, with a maximum of experience to encourage initiative and interest in their profession. For both, the pay was excellent, with a chance of putting some aside for a rainy day.

In June, 1913, the Battalion was inspected in Chitral by Major-General Blomfield, commanding the 1st Peshawar Division. This same general inspected the Battalion on its return to India in October, 1913.

An untoward incident happened in August, 1913, when the signalling post established above Drosh Fort for communication with Madaglasht Camp was attacked by raiders, and our casualties numbered 4 killed and 3 wounded, one of whom died later.

The Battalion was relieved in Chitral on October 2nd, 1913, by the 2/1st Gurkha Rifles, and on October 8th began its return march to India, after a sojourn of two years in Chitral territory. It reached Abbottabad on October 31st.

The two years' experience had been thoroughly enjoyed by all ranks, and two years' consumption of rations at field service scale had noticeably benefited the physique of the entire Battalion.

The winter was spent in Abbottabad, and in January, 1914, the Battalion took part in Brigade Training and inter-Brigade manœuvres in the vicinity of Gondal, returning to Abbottabad early in February.

During the summer months of 1914 the recruits and companies went to summer camps in turn, at Kund, Nanga, and near Dheri village; in addition, the Battalion furnished guards at Murree and Nathia Gali.

Such was the distribution of the Battalion on the outbreak of war with Germany on August 4th, 1914.

CHAPTER II.

OUTBREAK OF WAR—MESOPOTAMIA (i) MARCH, 1916, TO
APRIL, 1917.

ON the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914, the Battalion was not one of the fortunate ones to be immediately mobilized for active service. Several officers belonging to the Battalion who were on leave in England were detained there, and appointed to units of the New Army. Later, certain officers were sent to certain regiments in France and elsewhere; and several non-commissioned officers and men were sent as pack store havildars and ward orderlies to newly-raised hospital units.

In January, 1915, a verbal order was received from Brigade at 11 a.m. to be ready to march for Oghi at 2 p.m., as the Deputy Commissioner had wired in to say that an attack was expected that night by the Black Mountain tribes, and the loyalty of some of the police in the posts was suspect. All companies were out on field training and had to be called in by mounted orderlies. In spite of the delay caused by this fact, the Battalion marched out about 600 strong at 2.15 p.m., under Colonel Badcock, D.S.O. The movable column of 2/5th Gurkha Rifles was ahead, and the remainder of 2/5th Gurkha Rifles behind. A halt was made at Mansehra (sixteen miles) for two hours to allow the column to close up, and the men to eat. The next halt was at Khaki (twenty-four miles), but only half an hour was allowed. It was bitterly cold; the Susal Pass was crossed in darkness that could almost be felt; one or two men fell over the khud, but no casualties were sustained. Oghi (thirty-six miles) was reached at 8 a.m. the following day (Tuesday) and the Battalion bivouacked round the Rest House. It then transpired that the tribesmen had dispersed on hearing that the troops were coming. They made no show of wishing to fight, and on January 29th the return march was made to Mansehra, Abbottabad being reached on the 30th.

From April, 1915, onwards, drafts were regularly despatched to the 1/4th Gurkhas, and to the 1st Battalion in the Dardanelles. The heavy fighting of May and June necessitated constant reinforcements, which were all sent from the Depot, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, or from the Battalion.

The 1/6th, therefore, during the whole of its fighting in Gallipoli, included none but men of the 6th.

The following is the list of drafts despatched:—

April 2nd, 1915, Subadar Harku Thapa and 86 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/4th.

April 13th, 1915, 2/Lieutenant Manson and 40 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th; 2/Lieutenant Collingridge and 4 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th; 1 Gurkha officer and 59 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th.

June 30th, 1915, 1 Gurkha officer and 39 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th.

August 13th, 1915, Captain Bagot Harte, 1 Gurkha officer, and 40 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th.

November 13th, 1915, 2/Lieutenant Barton, 1 Gurkha officer, and 98 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th.

December 12th, 1915, 2/Lieutenant Marley, 1 Gurkha officer, and 49 non-commissioned officers and men to 1/6th.

				<i>B.O.</i>	<i>G.O.</i>	<i>N.C.Os. & men.</i>
Total	1	2	126	to 1/4th
Total	4	5	299	to 1/6th
Despatched in drafts			5	7	425	

It will be realized from the above figures what a heavy drain on the Battalion these drafts entailed. The following complimentary letter from Army Headquarters on the subject was received from the General Officer Commanding 2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division:—

“I am directed to request that you will convey to the marginally-noted battalions (2/6th Gurkha Rifles) H's Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's great appreciation of the very fine manner in which they have responded to

the calls made upon them for drafts to their linked battalions, and to units other than their own links.

“ With a wide conception of the situation, which necessarily entails sacrifices by individual units for the good of the whole Army, these battalions have readily given of their best, notwithstanding the fact that by so doing they were possibly for a period lessening their own efficiency.”

In August, 1915, the Battalion received orders to join the 3rd Brigade at Rustam, at which place it arrived on the 19th after a twenty-mile night march from Mardan. It took part in the operations round Rustam between August 19th and September 5th, notably the action at Sarkawi, the preliminary reconnaissance towards Malandri Pass, and the burning of the villages of Soria and Patao Malandri. The burning of the former village was carried out by the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles and 81st Pioneers, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Badcock, D.S.O.

The Battalion remained in camp at Rustam until November 18th, 1915, on which date it returned to Peshawar.

In the middle of December, however, it went into camp again, at Nagoman, where it remained until orders were received to be ready to embark for Mesopotamia on arrival of the 1st Battalion in Peshawar, which was returning from Egypt. The latter arrived in Peshawar on February 28th, and the two battalions spent three days together before the 2nd Battalion's departure. Two very cheery dinners were given at Dean's Hotel, first by the 2nd Battalion on the arrival of the 1st Battalion, and again by the 1st Battalion on the eve of the 2nd Battalion's departure.

The 2nd Battalion entrained at Peshawar on March 3rd, for Karachi, where it embarked on H.T. *Chakdara* to proceed to Mesopotamia.

On arrival in Basra, a draft of 4 officers and 200 men which had been sent to the 1st Battalion and had proceeded direct from Suez, joined.

The Battalion remained over a month at Basra, during which time it was chiefly engaged on the building of bunds, which were of great importance, due to the very heavy floods that year. The Battalion joined the 42nd Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General F. G. Lucas, D.S.O. (5th Gurkha Rifles), with which, except for a

short interval, it remained the whole of its sojourn in Mesopotamia.

On April 26th the 42nd Brigade was ordered to Nasiriyeh, and the march was begun the following day.

The distance was 148 miles, and was accomplished in twelve days, halt being made at Gubashayah.

The stages were:—

Basra to Shaiba	14 miles
Shaiba to Shwebda	8 "
Shwebda to Grainat	16 "
Grainat to Ratwi	14 "
Ratwi to Gubashayah	14 "
Gubashayah to Legette	16 "
Legette to Hamadieh	15 "
Hamadieh to Kamsieh	16 "
Fifteen miles north of Kamsieh	15 "
Kamsieh to Sakharieh	10 "
Sakharieh to Nasariyeh	10 "

148 miles

The march was a hot, uninteresting one, and the going very heavy, as in most cases a bee-line was made across the desert. The first day found 300 men in the Brigade falling out (only thirty of the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles), but so quickly does the marching habit come that on the later marches the casualties were in single figures each day.

The transport was originally pack only, but was later changed to mule, camel and cart. Most of the marches were accomplished in diamond formation, and defences were thrown up at night as a safeguard against marauding Arabs. Water was generally poor, and always had to be chlorinated. On one day a very heavy, though happily brief, rainstorm converted the camp into a marsh; on another the same result was effected by a very heavy wind which blew up a lot of water from the Hammar Lake and flooded out the north-west face of the camp, where the machine guns and two companies of the 1/4th Dorsets were posted. The water came up at a great pace, and flooded out the men before they could get clear.

On the march many relics of the Turkish retreat were passed—the chassis of a large motor, skeletons, various

kinds of stores, etc., mute witnesses of our first victorious advance. The later marches were rendered even more unpleasant than the earlier ones, owing to the swarms of green-fly through which the column passed.

However, all things come to an end, and the Battalion arrived safely at Nasariyeh on April 10th, and, crossing the Euphrates River, went into camp on the north bank. During the year it remained there it was to see many changes, both in the place and in the garrison.

The Battalion had hardly settled down into camp when news was received that the "bund" had burst for a distance of three-quarters of a mile, and there was every danger of the camp being flooded out. Great efforts were made to dam the flood, but they proved useless, and the camp had to be abandoned the same day, being three feet below the water level, and therefore uninhabitable once the water topped the "bund." A move was made to the south bank of the river, and daily fatigues were detailed to strengthen the "bund" and keep the new camp clear. The year 1916 saw a particularly high flood all over Mesopotamia, as will be remembered when the accounts of the ill-fated attempts to relieve Kut are read.

The hot weather of 1916 passed uneventfully; camp was again changed, but the new camp turned out to be hotter than the previous one. Cholera broke out in May, and took toll, though fortunately not a very heavy one, of the Battalion. The British troops at Nasariyeh suffered more heavily.

In June a disastrous bombing accident occurred, in which Lieutenant L. E. Poynder, M.C., and two other men were killed, and several wounded; the bomb, which appears to have exploded in Jemadar Seoraj's hand, killed or wounded all who were near. Poynder died almost immediately, and was buried the same day. Jemadar Seoraj lost two fingers of his right hand. The funeral was attended by officers from all units, who came to pay their last tribute to an officer whose sunny disposition had won him a large circle of friends. "His keen common sense, cheerful zest in his work, and experience made him an invaluable officer, while his character was indeed that of a very gallant gentleman."

In July a bellum escort of 1 non-commissioned officer, 1 lance-naik, and 5 riflemen of the Battalion was

attacked by about 100 marsh Arabs near Chabaish; 5 men were killed and 2 wounded. The only remaining non-commissioned officer was a young lance-naik, who, disposing his small forces very skilfully, brought the remnant back to Nasariyeh. The fact that the party was so heavily outnumbered, taken together with the number of casualties incurred, show that they fought with considerable bravery. The attack took place at night, the Arabs emerging from reeds near at hand, which made it exceedingly difficult to obtain adequate warning of an impending attack. It was estimated by the intelligence people that our men killed 12 and wounded 14 Arabs. Lance-Naik Narsing Ale received the Servian Cross of Kara George, 2nd Class, with Swords; also the Italian Bronze Medal for Military Valour. On August 14th a very successful little punitive expedition, in which the Battalion took part, set out. The troops proceeded about sixty miles upstream from Nasariyeh in the river boats T₁, S₄, and *Muzaffariyeh*, with H.M.Ss. *Crane* and *Dragonfly*, and disembarked. One column, moving up the right bank, marched on the village of Al Ain, and destroyed the towers without much difficulty. The column included the 1/4th Dorsets, of whom 1 man was killed. The enemy's losses were estimated at 80. The left-bank column proceeded to El Khidr; on its approach the Arabs sent out a deputation, under a white flag, to interview the A.P.O. After some delay a local Sheikh, Mahomed el Ajairib, came out and was taken into custody. After this the party re-embarked and returned to Nasariyeh; on the return journey, at one point the boat struck on the mud (no infrequent occurrence on Mesopotamian rivers), but the entire detachment, getting into the river, managed to push her off.

In September, and onwards throughout the cold weather, a detachment of two companies was found for a fortnight at a time, alternately with the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles, at a place called Safah, six miles away. The chief interest of this place was its proximity to Ur of the Chaldees, only three or four miles off. Many officers found the ruins very interesting, and a certain party made great efforts to disinter a sarcophagus. Despite Major Rice's best efforts, however, and those of the rest of the party, it had to be left. The looting propensities of the 2/6th

Gurkha Rifles resulted in the carrying away of a large basalt slab, which had for some time been regarded with longing eyes by everyone who visited Safah. This slab was thought by experts to be the lintel of a door-post, and was very finely carved, showing the lower part of an Assyrian figure, *i.e.*, the legs and feet of a profile. This was brought back in a hospital tonga, and reposed for a long time in Major Rice's bath-room in Nasariyeh, to the great disgust of all who searched for and were unable to find it at Ur of the Chaldees later. It eventually found its way back to India, and is now in the Mess at Abbottabad.

The detachment at Safah was visited at one time or another by antiquarians—of both sexes, Miss Bell at one juncture. Their arrival was usually heralded by orders from Divisional Headquarters for a detachment to be exercising near the ruins, with a cavalry patrol thrown well forward, pending their arrival. Strict orders were issued later that no unauthorized persons were on any account to dig in the ruins.

During December the railway reached Nasariyeh, a great event, though the entire Battalion for some weeks was engaged on building a perimeter for the railway works. A fine hospital train used to come up to Nasariyeh periodically, and convey sick or wounded to the base; a great contrast to the hot and uncomfortable journey in a mahela, the journey being accomplished in about twelve hours instead of as many days.

In September a part of the Nasariyeh garrison was engaged with Arabs just outside the town, but the Battalion did not participate. The machine guns, however, did great service under Captain Mullaly and Lieutenant Mercer; the latter receiving the Italian Silver Medal for Military Valour for his share in the action. Jemadar Jasbir Thapa was mentioned in despatches for the same action, and the following men received awards:

No. 1061 Lance-Naik Permande Rana.—Mention, and Italian Medal for Military Valour.

No. 1972 Rifleman Anarup Bura.—*Médaille Militaire* and I.D.S.M.

No. 898 Naik Jasbir Rana.—Mention.

During all the heavy fighting round Kut, and the march on Baghdad by the I and III Corps, the 15th

Division remained at Nasariyeh; this, and its subsequent wait at Baghdad during the hot weather, earned it the name in the force of the "holiday division"; its turn, however, was to come later.

During the advance on Baghdad there were many rumours and counter-rumours as to the share to be taken by the 15th Division. These were finally set at rest at the end of March, when orders were received for it to move up to Baghdad. The Battalion was the second unit in the Brigade to go, taking entire kits and personnel but handing back to ordnance all tents, except for guards and followers. The Battalion left by train for Basra on the 29th, and arrived at Magil in two trains in about twelve hours, somewhat of a contrast from the march up to Nasariyeh the previous year.

The Battalion embarked on paddle steamer 53 on the 31st, and commenced the voyage up river to Baghdad. Two barges were lashed alongside, as was the invariable custom, two companies being on the steamer itself and one on each barge. The voyage was uneventful, except in the Narrows, where the barges on either side of the steamer continually—and as was customary—ran on the bank, but without serious mishap. The paddle steamer 53 was the ship on which General Maude had followed the advance to Baghdad; the skipper receiving the M.C. On the voyage up a good view was obtained of the battlefield of Sanna-i-yat.

The 1st Battalion had come out from India a few weeks previously, and they were reported to be at Aziziyeh, where all hoped to see them. This place was passed at midnight, however, and the ship only stopped a moment to land some mails. It transpired later that two officers of the 1st Battalion had waited up to come out with the M.L.O. to see the Battalion, but the latter had failed to keep his promise of taking them out.

The steamer reached Baghdad in the early morning of April 6th, and anchored. Instructions were eventually received to proceed to the vicinity of Hinaidi, a few miles downstream, where the Brigade was concentrating. The 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, who had come out from India at the same time as the 1/6th, were joining the Brigade, and had already arrived. The Battalion bivouacked in a grove of orange trees, which gave a very welcome shade,

as there were no tents and it was a very hot day. The whole countryside was littered with debris from the Turkish retreat, and there was a small line of trenches in this very grove. Many rifles were picked up by the men, but nothing of any very great interest. The Battalion had now arrived at Baghdad, but it was uncertain what the next move would be; the air was full of rumours, and everyone expected to be on the heels of the Turks before long. These rumours, however, came to nothing, and the Battalion was destined to remain in Baghdad for nearly six months, the 15th Division being kept in reserve by the Army Commander.

CHAPTER III.

MESOPOTAMIA (*Continued*): APRIL, 1917—OCTOBER, 1918.

THE Battalion remained in camp at Hinaidi for two months, bivouac being gradually replaced by a permanent camp of E.P. tents. The rest of April was uneventful. It transpired later that the rest of the 15th Division was delayed at the base to allow of reinforcements coming up to join the troops at the front, who had had heavy casualties in the recent fighting. The 42nd Brigade thereupon became Army troops, liable to be sent anywhere.

The result was that in May two very successful punitive expeditions against Arabs were accomplished by the Brigade, in conjunction with other troops, the whole comprising Lucas's column.

The former of these was to a place on the Euphrates called Khan Maqudam. The march to this place (twenty-eight miles) was completed in three days, certain villages being burnt *en route*. There was a great shortage of transport, and the kit allowed was 10 lbs. per Gurkha officer and man, and 20 lbs. per officer—no tents. At Khan Maqudam liaison was made with Colonel Haldane's column from Felluja. From Khan Maqudam the column returned via Mufraj to Baghdad, where it was broken up, units rejoining their own formations. During the whole operation little opposition was experienced, there being few, if any, young men in evidence. Crops and villages, which were most of the blanket or brushwood type, were burnt, and some 1,000 head of cattle taken away. About 25,000 rounds of small arm ammunition (Turkish and French) were destroyed, also some very old double-barrelled m.l. shot-guns. During the burning of some of the huts a certain number of rounds that had been overlooked exploded, and one bullet lodged in the elbow of one of the men, causing rather a nasty wound. After the capture of the live stock mentioned above, all troops got a very welcome fresh meat ration.

The march back was troubled by transport difficulties, and also by the slow movement by the unconsumed portion of cattle captures, which were being taken along on hoof. The Battalion reached Hinaidi on May 10th, having been away eight days and covered some eighty miles.

On return from this expedition, preparations were made to move camp to a new site at Qarradah, some two miles north of Hinaidi and only four miles south of Baghdad. On the 16th, however, at 2.15 p.m., orders were received that Lucas's column was to go out again, this time to punish Arabs north of Baghdad who had attacked and destroyed a post on the Tigris near Khor Tarmiyeh. Accordingly the column moved off at 5.15 p.m. to Kazimain, where it halted for the remainder of the night—it had arrived in camp at 1.30 p.m., having been primarily warned for a short march of eight miles.

The route was only eight miles, but the way chosen by the guide proved to be considerably longer. A move was made at 9 p.m. for a point ten miles away, on the Samarra railway.

The next day brought a twenty-mile march to Khor Tarmiyeh, followed by a night march the same night starting at 11 p.m. The Battalion marched until 2 a.m., having come about six miles, and dawn found the column in position for the drive.

Another column from the north was operating southwards, and with Guns column on the left; as the River Tigris completed the square, the Arabs were completely hemmed in and could not make any resistance. The cavalry and armoured cars completed the rounding up, and the Brigade returned to camp at Khor Tarmiyeh shortly afterwards, arriving about 12 noon. This operation had been a very fine test of endurance, as the Battalion had covered about fifty-eight miles in under seventy-two hours; in which had been two night marches. Much of the marching had been particularly trying owing to the clouds of dust which blew into the men's faces. On the way up, the battlefield of Mushaidieh was crossed, which was at that time still covered with debris and corpses.

At one of the camps, alongside the railway, a train passed full of troops and drawn by a German engine,

pleasing evidence of the successful fight at Samarra some time previously, at which much railway material had been taken.

During operations some 2,300 sheep, a quantity of rifles, and thousands of rounds of ammunition were taken, with many prisoners, the majority of whom were eventually released on promising to behave themselves in future. It was satisfactory to know that the village which was destroyed was declared to be the one from which the men hailed who had attacked the post at Beled. A halt of two days was made at Khor Tarmiyeh, at which the column made up some of its lost sleep, and bathed in the lake which supplied the drinking-water. The water was the colour and consistency of milk, but was the only water available, and no one refused it; it was, of course, chlorinated. On the latter days of the halt a case of cholera was discovered; the medical authorities, however, decided that the cause was not the water, as, if so, the whole camp would have been down with it. Dates were suspected, of which a certain number had been taken from the Arabs. The column had been away nine days, and had covered approximately 95 miles in seven marching days.

The comparative civilization of Hinaidi was much appreciated by all after a week's absence on a 10 lb. kit. Mails were received, also the good news that the Division had been allotted an ice-barge, which was moored in the river near the camp, and from which all troops were to have a ration daily.

Leave to India was opened to the Mesopotamian Force in 1917, and Lieut.-Colonel Strange, Captains Mercer, Ebdon, Winn, Bilderbeck (I.M.S.), Lieutenants Howard Smith and Barton, proceeded on leave during the hot weather.

Lieut.-Colonel Badcock having been invalided early in May, Major B. A. Rice commanded the Battalion all through the summer months, and Captains Bernard and Mullaly having been transferred to the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles and Captain Strahan to the 1/1st Gurkhas, there were, for some weeks, only five officers with the Battalion.

These were Major Rice, Captain Barstow, and Lieutenants Hart, Hardman and Lynes, the last named

being away with 100 men on the Diala River building a railway.

The Battalion did a good deal of railway work (the line concerned being the one to Baquba), as, in addition to Lieut. Lynes' party, men at Headquarters were engaged on constant fatigues unloading the material from barges, which went out from Hinaidi to the construction party.

The manner of construction was very quick and simple. A train-load of railway material steamed out to railhead, on which the Battalion's men unloaded the rails and sleepers and placed them in position on the track (previously levelled by another party working from a camp ahead), the actual fixing was done by the 48th Pioneers.

It was strenuous work, being out in the sun all day, but the need was urgent, as the Diala River was quite insufficient for the transport necessary for the 14th Division, and was expected to get too low for mahelas; moreover, the strenuous work did not appear to do any harm, as the number of sick was extraordinarily small.

A move was made into the new camp at Qarradah on June 2nd. The site had been previously prepared, and the men were settled in by 9.30 a.m. Tents had been issued on a lavish scale, and everyone was comparatively comfortable; owing to the absence of officers on leave, each British officer had an E.P. tent to himself. All tents and the mess, etc., were roofed over with matting supported by wooden poles, and in some cases tents were dug down as an additional precaution against the heat. Each man in the Battalion was supplied with a chagul, and each tent was allotted a Persian filter. Ice and soda water, too, were issued daily.

It was well that these precautions were taken, for 1917 turned out to be an extremely hot year—many said the hottest summer there had been for years. However that may be, the month of July contained no fewer than fifteen days whose maximum temperature was over 120 degrees in the shade, the absolute maximum being reached on the 10th with a temperature of 128. In spite of the high temperatures, however, the heat was not so trying as might have been expected, owing to the fact that, with very few exceptions, the nights were cool. The greatest discomfort was the dust, which, especially on windy days,

was appalling; much was done in the way of watering to alleviate this—a water channel from the river was made, and the Royal Engineers pumped into this twice daily, watering fatigues being provided in the camp. It was hard to decide which was preferable—a windless, and consequently dustless, day—very hot—or a day of wind and dust, with torment to the eyes and temper, but with a saving coolness.

Early in June a small punitive expedition was undertaken by one company and attached troops, under Major Rice, but was completed in one day, after having confiscated all weapons, swords, etc., in the village concerned.

The hot weather was devoted to such training as could be carried out, owing to the heat and the small number of men available, consequent on leave and fatigues. A system of trenches was dug, in which exercises were carried out, bombers, tree-climbers, snipers and other specialists were trained.

Very welcome parcels of clothing were received from Lady O'Dwyer's Punjab "Comforts" Fund, which helped to replace the flimsy unserviceable khaki shirts issued to the men.

May 30th was observed as the centenary of the Regiment. It was kept as a holiday and sports were arranged, rum being also issued. The following wire was sent to the 1st Battalion at Aziziyeh: "Heartiest congratulations and best wishes for the future to all ranks"; who replied: "Salutations and best wishes for next year and a bust."

During the stay at Baghdad news was received of the death in action of two officers of the Regiment, serving with other units. On April 25th a wire was received from the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles saying that Captain F. T. H. Mullaly had been killed in action with them on the 21st, "holding on to captured position with the utmost gallantry against a strong counter-attack." The Commanding Officer announced his death to the Battalion in the following words: "It is with the greatest regret that the Commanding Officer has to announce the death in action of Captain F. T. H. Mullaly, and he knows well how the whole Battalion will mourn his death. An A1 Adjutant, and an excellent officer at whatever job he

was put to, Captain Mullaly loved the Battalion and all the men in it. He died doing his duty."

On July 21st news was received of the death in action on the North-West Frontier of India (Mahsuds) of Major I. W. Bagot Harte, "deeply regretted by all ranks of the Regiment. The loss of such a smart and capable officer is deeply felt."

Early in August the leave parties rejoined, and training began to be more strenuous; everyone felt a move was in the air, though no one knew whither.

In July, Colonel Badcock was awarded the Order of St. Stanislas (3rd Class) with Swords.

The railway from Kut to Baghdad was finished during the hot weather, and the site of the old camp at Hinaidi became a large railway station.

Several officers of the 1st Battalion took advantage of the railway to pay a visit. One or two officers of the Battalion had arranged to pay return visits, when marching orders were suddenly received and arrangements had to be cancelled.

In September the Brigade received orders to move to an unknown destination. Two very busy days were then spent in returning E.P. tents to Ordnance, and drawing 160 lb. tents instead, and making a dump of all surplus kits, etc. The Brigade moved out from Qarradah on the 16th at 5 a.m.

The first day's march was a short one, though the time taken was considerable, owing to the fact that the river had to be crossed at Baghdad. Eight o'clock found the Battalion still on the east bank, but the crossing was eventually made, and, after a halt near the iron bridge, camp was reached at about 12 noon.

The crossing of the Tigris and the march due west from there gave the Battalion's destination, the Euphrates front, only many miles higher up than at Nasariyeh. The waters of Babylon again.

The next day's march was to Nuktah, and the third day, after a long march of eighteen to twenty miles, Felluja was reached, and the 42nd Brigade crossed the Euphrates River and went into camp on the west bank.

All ranks had a much-appreciated wash and bathe in the river, after three dusty and (comparatively) waterless marches.

The 14th Sikhs, who were in brigade with the 1st Battalion in the Dardanelles, were in Felluja, and several officers paid them a visit.

The next march was to Dhibban, the present outpost line; the two companies of the Battalion who were advanced guard, on arrival at the camp, went straight on to the hills overlooking the camp, and piquetted them. The country had changed now. Instead of an expanse of sand and mud there was a range of low sandhills, running more or less parallel to the river and rising to a height of about 150 feet. The dust from these, however, was even more trying than the alluvial dust of Baghdad or Nasariyeh, as it consisted of a kind of grit, which caused much trouble to the eyes.

The next day's march was beyond the outpost line, and was therefore made with the usual advanced guards, the Battalion being rear guard. Much difficulty was experienced in getting the carts over a patch of sand just outside camp.

After an uneventful march Madhij camp was reached, the Brigade having covered sixty miles in five days. Here a halt was made to allow other troops to concentrate. The Brigade group had consisted of the 42nd Brigade, a Stokes mortar battery, the 222nd Brigade R.F.A., 448th Field Company R.E., and other troops, and was only the first echelon of a force being concentrated to destroy a Turkish force at Ramadi.

Shortly after arrival at Madhij, a convoy of Ford vans loaded with rations arrived. This was the first time that these useful and ubiquitous cars had been seen by most of the troops, and caused considerable interest.

The next day the Battalion moved out on reconnaissance to the Madhij ridge. A small enemy cavalry patrol was surprised, and one man was killed, otherwise there was no opposition.

During the ensuing night heavy firing was heard from the opposite bank of the river, and it transpired later that a piquet had been rushed by Arabs.

As a result, the next evening the Battalion had to take over and entrench the perimeter of the R.H.A. battery which had joined the column, as the intelligence people reported that the Arabs were expected to attack the camp in large numbers. The night was, however, spent peace-

ably, and the column moved off early the next morning (the 24th) to a camp three miles further upstream. The Battalion, being advanced guard, went straight on to outpost duty on arrival at the new camp. They were relieved the next day. Two days were spent in this camp. Colonel Badcock rejoined on the 25th, and took over command. During the ensuing operations, however, he proceeded to Brigade Headquarters as senior Commanding Officer of the Brigade, and Major Rice remained in command of the Battalion. The 12th Brigade and some 6-inch guns arrived, also a bridging train of some fifty pontoons, and went through the Brigade line and encamped in front, thus relieving the 42nd Brigade of outposts. A flight of eight aeroplanes also appeared. Throughout the operations the British had superiority in the air, as, indeed, they had in other matters.

At 1.30 p.m. on the 27th C.O.s. were sent for, to whom the scheme was explained. (See Map 20.)

The force was to march at 6.30 p.m. that night. It was, in fact, to be a night *attack*, a difficult proposition, but which, if successful, would outflank the whole of the Mushaid position, a strong one and strongly held. The 42nd Brigade was to advance on the First Knoll, which was to be taken by the 1/4th Dorsets, without any noise, if possible. The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, without halting, to go straight on to Lower Knoll, and, having taken it, occupy in succession Lake Knoll, the Dam, Habbaniyah Hill, and Escape Hill. Meanwhile the 12th Brigade, on the right, was to advance on Mushaid Point at dawn, making a holding attack, the 42nd Brigade to come in on the flank.

The Cavalry Brigade were to demonstrate at dawn at Horse Shoe Lake, but as soon as possible were to work right round, and get astride the Turks' line of retreat on the Aziziyeh Canal.

The Turks' numbers were estimated at about 4,500, with 10 guns and 14 machine guns.

The Battalion's part was to be done without bombardment, as the knolls concerned were expected to be only lightly held, and the enemy were to be turned out with the bayonet; after which the orders were to dig in and wait for morning. If all went well, it was hoped that all the first objectives would be taken in half an hour.

So much for the original scheme, subject, of course, to alteration as the situation varied.

The Battalion fell in at 6.10 p.m. and marched off to the starting point. Captain Barstow had been detailed to lead the Brigade. The Battalion was leading, with "A" Company, under Lieutenant Hardman, as advanced guard. The route was along the Aleppo—Felluja road for about three miles, then diverged to the left to the position of assembly, which was reached at 9 p.m. The Battalion was formed in close column of companies, to simplify subsequent operations, with the 1/4th Dorsets on the right in mass, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles, and 130th Machine Gun Company and attached troops in rear. The advance was continued at 10.15 p.m. on a bearing of 265 degrees for a distance of 2,300 yards to the position of deployment. It was a clear moonlight night, and the surface was excellent. No hostile patrols were encountered. At the position of deployment, the 2/6th and the Dorsets deployed into four lines and advanced on to the First Knoll with eighty yards distance between lines. First Knoll being the Dorsets' objective, they halted, and the 2/6th went on for 1,000 yards or so and occupied Lower Knoll, unoccupied, as First Knoll had been. The ground rose very gradually, and it was difficult to recognize the objectives when reached. "A" Company started to dig in here. From Lower Knoll, one platoon of "B" Company, under Lieutenant Hart, was sent to occupy Lake Knoll, and one platoon of "D" Company, under Jemadar Harising, to reconnoitre towards the dam over Habbaniyah Escape. These two platoons went out at once, and before long firing and yelling was heard from the direction of the dam. Major Rice detailed the remainder of "D" Company to go off to the dam and clear up the situation; remainder of "B" Company behind in support. Lieutenant Winn acted with boldness, and captured the dam over the Habbaniyah Escape without loss, in face of Arab opposition. On his way there he picked up Jemadar Harising's platoon, retiring with the information that the dam was held. The dam was found to be passable for all arms, and its capture was of the greatest importance to the success of the operations leading up to the attack on the Turkish positions. "D" Company remained in

occupation of the dam throughout the night. "B" Company withdrew to Lower Knoll, meeting on the way Lieutenant Hart's platoon, who reported Lake Knoll as being unoccupied. "A" Company was then sent to occupy Habbaniyah Hill, while "B" and "C" Companies dug in on Lower Knoll in anticipation of shelling as soon as the Turks realized we were in possession of the right flank of their entrenched position on Mushaid Ridge.

At about 6 a.m. on the 28th the Battalion, less two companies ("A" and "D") was ordered to attack and capture the Turkish trenches on Mushaid Point, in conjunction with the 1/4th Dorsets, whose attack, however, having been counter-ordered, did not materialize.

Mushaid Point was not held by the enemy, but the Battalion, while crossing an absolutely open flat piece of ground with no cover, came under heavy enfilade artillery fire from the Turkish guns at Ramadi. Shrapnel was bursting all round, but the Battalion came through with marvellously few casualties, some seven men only being hit, and none killed. For this we have to thank the poor quality of the Turkish ammunition, or, rather, the fact that the Turkish gunners burst it too high; their range and direction was perfect. On several occasions men were seen to be hit, and even knocked down, by bullets which did not penetrate.

The Battalion then occupied the trenches on Mushaid Point, and while there endured heavy shrapnel fire and some high explosive, without having any chance of replying to it.

Meanwhile the attack on the Turkish positions at Ramadi was developing, the 12th Brigade and the remainder of the 42nd Brigade crossing the dam over the Habbaniyah Escape.

Lieutenant Barton did good work, consolidating under shell fire, and the example set by Major Rice, who went everywhere to see the situation for himself, was excellent.

At about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion was ordered to withdraw and to move round to the dam. This rather tricky movement was successfully accomplished, with only two casualties from Arab or Turkish snipers hidden in the cultivation between the river and Mushaid Point; these two men, however, both subsequently died. During the

retirement the Turkish gunners were in constant attendance with shrapnel. Their observation was excellent—so much so that they sent over a special contribution for each officer, but fortunately they did little damage. Major Rice received a graze on the right knee, and Lieutenant Howard Smith a shrapnel bullet through his water bottle. "B" and "C" Companies assembled under cover of Mushaid Point, and marched to the dam without further loss, meeting on the way the water dump, where all men got a welcome drink and refilled their water bottles. A short halt was made here, and all ranks had a small meal from their haversacks. (During the operations elaborate arrangements had been made by the supply authorities for water. A special convoy of Ford vans was set aside to convey water from the river to this dump, from which arrangements were made to supply the advanced troops. In addition to this, each company of an infantry battalion had an additional cart, full of chaguls filled with water.)

At the dam "D" Company joined up, and "A" Company was withdrawn from Habbaniyah Hill. The Battalion halted south of the dam, being held in Brigade reserve while the 1/4th Dorsets, 2/5th and 1/5th Gurkha Rifles attacked the Turkish main position on Ramadi Ridge. This attack was intended to hold the Turk to his trenches while the 12th Brigade worked round his right flank towards the Aziziyeh Canal Bridge. The Cavalry Brigade in the meantime had crossed the canal and was astride the enemy's line of retreat. All this was not made clear at the time, thereby causing some doubt to arise as to the intentions of the General Officer Commanding, when at 1.30 p.m. two companies were hurriedly ordered up to the support of the 1/5th. "A" and "B" Companies, under Captain Barstow, went forward, and, passing under pretty heavy shrapnel fire, eventually arrived on the right of the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles, occupying the ground between them and the Escape. The attack took Ramadi Ridge, the Turkish trenches being some 800 yards to the west of it. On this ridge the attack was definitely held up by machine-gun fire. The ground was firm and pebbly, with no cover whatsoever, an impossible position to attack and take, against such heavy machine-gun fire, unless amply

covered by artillery—which, in this case, was not available.

Considerable gallantry was shown by many. The subadar-major (Subadar-Major Manbahadur Thapa, O.B.I.) set an excellent example during a critical period, as did Company Havildar-Major Pahalsing Thapa and Naik Puranbahadur, of "A" Company. The Lewis gunners of "B" Company did excellent work in trying to silence hostile machine guns. No. 1920 Rifleman Sukbar Gurung in particular, though wounded himself, carried on alone after all the rest of his team were knocked out; he brought up his gun and magazines, and kept the gun in action until the spare Lewis gunners, collected by Lieutenant Hart, relieved him. The work of ammunition-carrying parties was excellent. Men brought up small arms ammunition and bombs very bravely, in spite of heavy machine-gun fire, which was continually sweeping the position. Casualties here were heavy, though the majority were only wounded, three being killed outright; of the wounded, however, several subsequently died in hospital.

At about 3.30 p.m. Major Rice was ordered up in support of the 1/5th, but had only some 120 men left in "C" and "D" Companies, the remainder being occupied in carrying up ammunition to "A" and "B." The men of "D" Company, under Lieutenant Winn, came up on the right of "A" and "B," strengthening the hold on the Escape. They were in time to drive off a demonstration on the flank from some 100 Arabs.

In the meantime the action as a whole had gone well. The 12th Brigade were well round the Turks' right flank, and it was considered that the holding attack by the 42nd Brigade had achieved its purpose. As the position on Ramadi Ridge was very exposed, and as no good object could be accomplished by holding on, the Battalion was ordered to fall back into bivouac by the Habbaniyah Lake. The retirement started at 7.50 p.m., and was carried out without loss; the dead were buried, all remaining wounded picked up, and all ammunition and equipment was brought in.

The Battalion concentrated in camp again by 10.30 p.m., where much-needed food was ready for the men, and where they were enabled to get a few hours' welcome

sleep with boots and equipment off. During the night the Turks attempted to break out and make good their escape by the Aleppo road, but were held up by the cavalry.

At 4.30 a.m. on the 29th the Battalion marched out to entrench a position from Middle Hill to the Escape. The ground was easy to dig, and the men were soon under cover. Impetus was given to the digging by the expectation that daylight would bring its complement of shells. Fortunately, however, the Turks were occupied elsewhere, and the Battalion was not shelled, even on the approach of daylight. The attention of the Turks was fully occupied with the 12th Brigade, who vigorously pressed forward and captured the bridge over the Aziziyeh Canal. By 10 a.m. the Turks were surrendering, and Ramadi was virtually taken, practically all resistance having ceased. A man was seen coming along the Escape carrying a white flag. A small escort from "B" Company went out to meet him. He, however, turned out to be a released prisoner of the 90th Punjabis who had been captured the previous day in a counter-attack. Shortly after this, an immense cloud of dust was seen on the horizon in the direction of the Habbaniyah Lake. When it was realized that this was a long column of Turkish prisoners all ranks felt greatly cheered. Any rejoicings, however, were temporarily suspended, as at 11.30 the Battalion received orders to cross the Escape and cut across in a northerly direction to the river to cut off any Turks attempting to escape, and to drive off any Arabs coming in to loot. The scouts fired a few rounds at Arabs, but otherwise nothing of interest occurred. Some four miles of soft, dusty "maidan" were covered in the face of a strong wind. This march was severely felt by all after the fatigues of the past forty-eight hours, and on arrival at the river short work was made of a patch of water melons on the bank. After a short rest the Battalion advanced towards Ramadi, meeting with no opposition, the advanced troops, however, driving before them some sheep to the number of fifty, which proved invaluable that night in the absence of the ration carts.

On arrival at Jackson's House, the Battalion halted for a while at the head of the Escape, fatigue parties being requisitioned to bring in captured Turkish guns

and ammunition. At about 5.30 p.m. the Battalion moved off to bivouac on the river bank, about one mile upstream of Ramadi, and spent a chilly night, the second line transport not having arrived. The men cooked the aforementioned sheep, on some wood they had found on the battlefield, and fed a good many of the Dorsets in addition to themselves.

The next day was spent in cleaning up, and in reorganization. The following two messages from Brigade and Divisional Commanders respectively were received during the day:—

“The General Officer Commanding 42nd Infantry Brigade wishes to convey to all units his warm appreciation of the gallantry and endurance shown by them since marching out of Baghdad. The brilliant success of the operations was in great measure due to the tenacity with which the troops held on to the Ramadi Ridge on the 28th instant, thereby pinning the Turks to their ground and preventing them from withdrawing before the turning movement was completed.

“He congratulates all ranks on their behaviour, and is very proud of the Brigade he has the honour to command.”

The General Officer Commanding subsequently learned from the captured Turkish commander that the holding attack completely deceived him. The latter believed that the British were out to capture his main position, and held it strongly, leaving a weak detachment only to look after his right flank. When he realized that the attack on his main position north of Ramadi Ridge was not materializing in any great force, and fearing at the same time for his right flank, he transferred 1,000 men to his right. When, however, he saw supports coming up from the south of Ramadi, he recalled those 1,000 men to the original position, thus leaving his right flank weakly held. The holding attack there must have been of great assistance to the brigade working round the Turkish right flank.

The 2/6th Gurkha Rifles casualties in the action were as follows: Killed, 1 lance-naik, “B” Company; 2 riflemen, “A” Company. Wounded, Major B. A. Rice (slightly), Subadar Harisharan Thapa, Jemadars Asbahadur and Bagsing Gurung; “A” Company, 1

havildar, 2 naiks, 26 riflemen; "B" Company, 2 havildars, 1 naik, 39 riflemen; "C" Company, 1 naik, 6 riflemen; "D" Company, nil. Totals: 3 killed, 82 wounded, all ranks.

The following officers were present with the Battalion:
Lieut.-Colonel F. F. Badcock (with Brigade Headquarters).

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. Rice, Commanding.

Captain (Acting-Major) T. C. E. Barstow, 2nd-in-Command, commanding "B" Company.

Lieutenant (Acting-Captain) L. F. Mercer, commanding "C" Company.

Lieutenant (Acting-Captain) M. H. Howard Smith (Adjutant).

Lieutenant (Acting-Captain) H. E. Winn, commanding "D" Company.

Lieutenant R. M. S. Barton, "C" Company.

Lieutenant N. B. Hart, "B" Company.

Lieutenant R. H. Lynes, Transport Officer.

Lieutenant P. L. Hardman, commanding "A" Company in the absence of Major Rice.

Shortly after the action, the undermentioned immediate awards to men of the Battalion were announced (others followed later), and on October 10th the Army Commander flew over from Baghdad in an aeroplane and distributed them.

No. 1920 Rifleman Sukhbar Gurung, "B" Company, I.O.M., Second Class.

Jemadar Bagsing Gurung, "D" Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 76 C. H. M. Pahalsing Thapa, "A" Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 167 Havildar Puranbahadur Gurung, "A" Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 464 Naik Ransing Thapa, "A" Company, I.D.S.M.


No. 1540 Rifleman Parbir Pun, "A" Company, I.D.S.M.

The following awards were announced later, at different periods:—

No. 1061 Lance-Naik Permande Rana, "A" Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 1299 Naik Narbir Thapa, "C" Company, I.D.S.M.

MAP N°20



High Ground
230' to 295'

SCALE
Yards 1000 500 0 1/2 Miles

BATTLE OF RAMADI

No. 1444 Rifleman Mangalsing Gurung, " B " Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 1741 Rifleman Mainalal Rai, " B " Company, I.D.S.M.

No. 537 Naik Dhanbahadur Gurung, " C " Company, Mention.

On the day after the Battle of Ramadi, while the troops were resting in camp, an aeroplane was seen to be descending quite close to the camp; on nearing the ground, however, it suddenly turned round and made off, it being a Turkish aeroplane. British aeroplanes at once gave chase, but to no purpose. The fact that this aeroplane, which, rumour had it, came from the Turkish front on the Tigris, did not know that Ramadi had been taken by the British, points to the surprise with which the whole operations were carried out.

The next few days immediately after the battle were spent in cleaning up and reorganization; leave men and men discharged from hospital arrived, also drafts from India, which brought the Battalion up to strength.

Higher command having decided that Ramadi was to be held as the forward position, a start was soon made on an outpost position, on which work was regularly carried out.

The Battalion did not, however, remain in Ramadi long, as on October 30th it returned to Madhij, where it spent the winter with the other units of the 42nd Brigade. Here it was necessary to dig another position, as a second line.

The winter was spent uneventfully, in training and digging. One company periodically occupied Madhij Post, whence it provided escorts for marching convoys, and fatigue parties to unload ration bellums, the supply depot being located in the post; also guards of various kinds, including one which occupied a post on the other bank of the river, to which there was a ferry, also worked by this company.

In February, 1918, orders were received for the Brigade to march to Ramadi to relieve the 12th Brigade, which had been there on outpost duty all the winter.

The Battalion marched on the 4th, and on arrival at Ramadi crossed the bridge to the left bank of the river,

and took over left bank defences from the 43rd Erinpura Regiment.

One company remained on the right bank as a detachment for local duties, the rest of the Brigade being some distance away. This turned out to be an unpleasant, dusty camp, with a very small perimeter, and water a mile away. Several days were spent in settling down and improving the accommodation, after which the Battalion began long route marches; these occurred three times a week, and were anything up to eighteen or twenty miles. On February 20th, on return to camp about 2 p.m., after an eighteen-mile march towards Nafatah and back, a warning order was received for the Battalion to be ready to move on the morrow, with the rest of the Brigade, to reinforce a reconnaissance towards the Turkish position at Hit.

Accordingly, on the 21st the Battalion moved out at 8.30 a.m. to march to Khan Abu Rayat, as head of the main body. This was a longish march, as it took two hours to reach the starting point, the river having to be crossed downstream of Ramadi. The going was heavy, and the men were rather done after the long march of the day before, but very few fell out.

On arrival at camp, some Turkish prisoners who had been taken by the cavalry were handed over to the quarter guard for safe custody, including one officer, who was, however, very reticent, and refused to disclose anything.

Moreover, he declined to eat until he had seen his men fed. He appeared to have no love for the Germans.

The next day brought a short march to Uqbah, only seven miles. Very shortly after arrival in camp, as units were settling in, an enemy aeroplane appeared and dropped bombs all round the camp; no great damage was done, though one bomb fell very close to the latrines; several officers were taken at a disadvantage, one officer being at the time in a bath inside a small bivouac tent. He evidently considered that he was safest where he was, as periodically his head appeared to ask if the aeroplanes had gone. It was discovered afterwards that the mess servants had risen to the occasion quicker than anyone else, as they had all taken refuge in the small trenches which were invariably dug for the feet in the mess tent.

The same evening the Battalion went on to outposts, where an uneventful, though rather cold, night was spent.

Two days later the Battalion, together with one section R.A.F., carried out a reconnaissance two miles north-west of the Wadi Mohammed, to ascertain if there was any hostile movement south of the Turkish position south of Hit. An enemy patrol of four horsemen was seen, but nothing else, and camp was reached by 1 p.m.

The next day the Brigade returned to Khan Abu Rayat, where some ten days or so, owing to difficulties of rationing, had to be spent. A comfortable camp (that is, as comfortable as it was possible to be on a light scale of kit) was made, tents being received shortly afterwards; aeroplane trenches were dug, and a certain amount of training was carried out. There was one visit from an enemy aeroplane, which dropped bombs, but missed the camp completely, being evidently deceived by a dummy camp which the Brigade had made some distance downstream. During the first week of March, as the weather was getting somewhat warm for the men in serge, it was decided to march the Battalion down to Ramadi, in portions, to exchange serge for drill clothing from the dump there. Accordingly, on the 7th "A" and "B" Companies marched to Ramadi, fourteen miles away, returning on the 8th in drill. They arrived at about 2 p.m., and orders were received for them to march at 4 p.m. to Uqbah, as news had been received that the Turks were evacuating the Broad Wadi position. "C" and "D" Companies remained behind, but marched the next morning about 3 a.m. Headquarters and "A" and "B" Companies reached Uqbah at 9 p.m., but had to wait until 10 p.m., when the 50th Brigade had cleared camp. Night was spent in the 6th Jats' lines, where tents had been left standing; one day's rations were being carried on the men, some wood was procured, and the cooks spent most of the night cooking in anticipation of an early start next day.

The column moved off at 6 a.m. the next day, March 9th, marching in support of the 50th Brigade to Hit. There was a strong south-east wind, with quantities of dust. The men were by no means fresh, having marched from Ramadi the previous day, about twenty-one miles. with very little sleep during the night.

A few shots were heard, but there was no sound of real opposition. The 50th Brigade appeared to be progressing slowly, and our advanced guard soon came up with their rear guard.

Progress was very slow; a halt of about an hour and a half was made at 8 a.m. and animals were watered. Hit was approached at 1 p.m. No sounds of opposition were heard, and, after another long halt in the Turkish position south-east of Hit, the column entered and camped on the river bank about half a mile below the town.

The country was rather interesting, broken and full of bitumen, with sulphurous springs, and a strong smell of H_2S prevalent, which was rather unpleasant.

The town of Hit itself stands on a small hill, and with its minaret looked quite imposing, far bigger than Ramadi or Felluja; with its narrow streets, winding uphill. It bore a faint resemblance to a small Italian town, even unto its smells. It, however, got unfairly blamed for the smell of H_2S , until it was realized what this was. Several officers visited the town the next day; the inhabitants seemed friendly—perhaps they knew they had full pockets.

The 50th Brigade went on and occupied the Broad Wadi position, and the next few days were spent in making the camp comfortable, digging aeroplane trenches, etc. Tents and extra kits arrived, and the column appeared to be in for another stay. The column had already been a month on the move, and had not yet been able to come up with the Turk; as the ration and ammunition dumps progressed, and the force appeared to be on the verge of preparedness for our advance, he, with considerable resource, evacuated his forward position, falling back on to a prepared one some distance behind, thus causing all the building up of dumps, etc., to be started afresh.

The Hit position would have been a most formidable one to attack, as it had a beautiful field of fire straight across a depression which had to be crossed. The soil all round being full of bitumen, the Turks had taken advantage of this to pave the firing platform of all their machine-gun emplacements with it, an excellent idea which would prevent any dust giving away their position. Some of the dug-outs near the machine-gun emplace-

ments were of great depth; one in particular was about fifteen feet below ground level.

This position had evidently been built under German supervision, and it must have been abandoned with some reluctance.

The country around Hit was full of bitumen wells; the average size was about fifteen feet in diameter, bubbling and frothing and coated with a thick layer of bitumen. The water was quite warm, and on disturbing the bitumen the water seethed all the more, and a great fume of H_2S came to the top and escaped. Had an attack been made upon the Hit trenches, probably most of the troops would have thought they were being gassed.

Round about Hit there were several enormous water wheels, each about thirty to forty feet in diameter. Weirs were built out into the river, and about six of these wheels fixed vertically into each weir, each with small pots to raise water; paddles of palm fronds being attached to the wheels to catch the current, the wheels revolve by the force of the latter, thereby raising the water in the pots, which, on reaching the top of the wheels, falls into the irrigation channels. As far as the troops were concerned, the chief objection to these wheels was the noise they made, as any old date palm was used for an axle, and such things as bearings were not. Consequently, the creaking and groaning which these things made could be heard a long distance away, and with no relief by day or night.

While at Hit the Battalion was chiefly occupied in making roads; fatigues on these were very heavy, as was only to be expected, the force having taken over some thirty-five miles of fresh country. The famous Baghdad—Aleppo road was, in fact, little more than a track across the desert. The fatigues supplied by the Battalion were chiefly occupied in shovelling the loose sand from the road to each side of it until a fairly hard surface was reached. Well enough, but in a few days the work had to be repeated.

The Battalion remained in camp below Hit town until March 22nd, on which date it moved up to join the rest of the Brigade about two miles upstream.

The column moved off to attack the Turks on the evening of the 23rd at 8 p.m., marching to Sahiliyeh.

which was reached about 11.30 p.m. The night was excellent for marching, and roads were good, but delays occurred twice, when wadis had to be crossed by trestle bridges. After a day's halt at Sahiliyeh, Lucas' Group (comprising the 42nd Brigade and attached troops) marched at 11 p.m. on the night of the 25th, in rear of the 50th Brigade, towards Khan Baghdadi, where the Turks were in position—estimated strength on right bank, 100 sabres, 2,800 rifles, 34 machine guns, 12-16 guns. Food was cooked for the 26th, and rations for the 27th carried on second line carts. Arrangements had been made for extra insulated food cans to be distributed, and an issue of tea, sugar, and wood was made. Tea was prepared and carried in these food cans on extra A.T. carts with the first line transport, the intention being to issue it after the night march and before going into action. All bombs were fuzed and distributed.

The Battalion was at the head of the main body, behind Brigade Headquarters, and marched for the starting point at 10.45 p.m. No advanced guard was found, Andrews' Group (50th Brigade) being ahead. The moon was nearly full, the sky clear, and the road good. The pace was slow, and towards 1 a.m. it began to get cold. Guns were heard firing on Andrews' Group, and, later on, machine guns and rifles. At about 3.30 a.m. Lucas' Group halted, and awaited daylight and further orders.

The Battalion cleared the road and lay down, but it was too cold to sleep. When morning broke, the men were very congested in a hollow, and Turkish guns were searching a ridge about three-quarters of a mile in front.

Battalions sorted themselves out into hollows and depressions; tea was distributed; that made last had kept warm, but tea made at 4 p.m. the day before had got cold.

Soon after eight o'clock four 6-inch guns (Aurora, Bora, Cora and Dora) arrived, camouflaged with palm fronds, and drawn by caterpillar tractors; they were followed by Rupert, the captive balloon, which also halted close to us.

At 9.30 a.m. orders were dictated by the Brigade-Major for an attack on the P Trenches (T.C. 209). Andrews' Group were to move off to the left, and to attack on the left; 1/4th Dorsets and 2/6th Gurkha Rifles in the front

line; 2/5th Gurkha Rifles and two sections 130th Machine Gun Company in support, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles and two sections 130th Machine Gun Company in Brigade reserve; 1/4th Dorsets on a front of 400 yards (200 yards on each side of the Aleppo road) with the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles on a similar front to the right of the Dorsets. The objectives were Trenches P 9 and P 10, which aeroplanes reported to be strongly held. A half-ton of rum was issued to all, and the attack started at 10.30 a.m. The ground was level at first, but as P Trenches were approached the ground became undulating and stony; the Battalion eventually came under shell fire, chiefly from one or two guns on the left bank of the river, or possibly from barges on the river. The shelling was mostly high explosive, and did extraordinarily little damage. The casualties during this part of the advance consisted of Lieutenant Marley and one rifleman wounded.

The advance carried on right up to the P Trenches, which were found to have been evacuated. The Battalion went straight on into Khan Baghdadi, arriving about 1 p.m., with Andrews' Group on the left attacking the Q Trenches. During the advance the sun had come out, and the heat was considerable and was much felt by all.

The advance had been for some six to eight miles in the open, and the Lewis gunners especially had had a hard time carrying their guns so far.

On arrival at Khan Baghdadi, "B" Company went forward and occupied the garden round the Khan. A few Turks were fired at on the river just before reaching the Khan, but no more were seen.

The Dorset scouts, however, sent a message that this place was under the Turks' observation and fire from the left bank of the river, and advised withdrawal. This was done, and only just in time. Barely had the last man left the garden, when it received a regular crumping, presumably from the same river guns which had attended the advance.

The Battalion closed up in the Wadi Baghdadi, and efforts were made to collect the first line transport, which had got scattered by shell fire, and three mules were eventually found to be missing. Food and drink was appreciated by all.

Then followed a period of uncertainty and indecision.

It was not known what Andrews' Group were doing, or where they had got to. The ground between the river and the Aleppo road—about 200 yards—was under fire of enemy machine guns.

At 4 p.m. orders were received for the Battalion to advance in support of the 1/4th Dorsets in an attack on the Northern Position, machine guns covering the advance.

Scouts were sent forward under No. 1763 Naik Parsadman Rai, who, as in the morning advance, took his scouts well forward over ground swept by considerable rifle and machine-gun fire, keeping them fully under control, and sent back most accurate and timely information as to the whereabouts of enemy guns, which proved of the greatest value to his company commander. For this he later received the I.D.S.M.

The attack reached the further edge of Wadi Brooking, where a machine gun opened, wounding three men. The Battalion took cover in the Wadi, and, moving off to the left, got in behind the Dorsets under cover of a ridge.

Our machine guns engaged enemy guns, and a heavy bombardment of the Northern Position began. To all appearance every gun in the force was concentrated on this position, and many people who saw it considered it the finest barrage they had seen in Mesopotamia.

To the surprise of all, the 50th Brigade were co-operating in the attack, and under cover of the bombardment the attack went forward in great style without losing a man, capturing the position, about 700 prisoners and four guns.

The success was exploited, the 97th Infantry pushing forward and occupying a ridge about a mile ahead, while the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles came through in support.

The Battalion closed under the Northern Position, and bivouacked for the night without second line kits. A very cold night was spent, too cold for much sleep; wood and other debris from the Turkish trenches was collected, and fires made, round which officers and men warmed themselves. The second line transport was mostly parked on the road below the plateau on which the Northern Position was situated, and tea and sugar, procured from the ration carts, was much appreciated by all.

Telephone communication with the Brigade broke

down, so, early the next morning, the 27th, the Adjutant went off to find Brigade Headquarters, and returned with orders to continue the pursuit at once. First line mules were loaded, and men fell in on the Aleppo road, where considerable confusion prevailed—motors, guns, and infantry all trying to get along. The Battalion cut in eventually, and proceeded about one mile along the road, when information was sent that the cavalry had captured all remaining Turks, and that the Brigade would camp near Jabba, some two miles farther on. This was done. Cooks and bhistis arrived about midday carrying up cooked food, and the second line transport arrived about 4.30 p.m. All ranks were very glad of a night in bed, after having been on the move almost continuously for forty-eight hours.

In the afternoon about 3,000 prisoners came down, some walking, others riding; with a large number of officers, including two Germans, both of whom talked English. Later it transpired that one of them had been for many years in Calcutta before the war, in a German firm there.

In the meantime the cavalry, armoured cars, and two units of the 12th Brigade in Ford cars, had advanced to Hadithah, where further captures of prisoners were made, including the Turkish Divisional Commander, Nazim Bey. The story went that the latter had superseded the previous commander, Shukri Bey, owing to his retirement from the Hit position. Both were captured together. At Hadithah also a large German wireless plant, together with a big ammunition dump, were captured.

The Turkish prisoners captured were a fine set of men, but the state of their kit and equipment was appalling. The animals, of whom 600 were captured, were mere skin and bone.

On the 28th the Battalion returned to Khan Baghdadi, clearing the battlefield *en route*. The area allotted was the ground west of the Aleppo road, to the depth of one mile, as far as the Northern Position. Little was found other than small arms ammunition, a few shells, pack saddles, wire, and tools, and one rather tired prisoner, who was much too thankful at being captured to attempt to escape. "D" Company were left behind to load up a big ammunition and ordnance dump found near Jabba.

Camp was pitched on the river bank near Khan Baghdadi, and "A" Company, under Major Blackett, was detailed to look after the 600 captured animals. At 6 p.m. 100 men under Lieutenant Armstrong ("C" Company) were detailed to relieve the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles as guard over Turkish prisoners.

The following officers were present with the Battalion during the operations:—

Lieut.-Colonel F. F. Badcock, D.S.O., Commanding.
Major C. P. Blackett, 2nd-in-Command, Officer
Commanding "A" Company.

Captain G. C. Strahan, Officer Commanding "B"
Company.

Captain T. C. E. Barstow, Adjutant.

Captain L. F. Mercer, Officer Commanding "C"
Company.

Lieutenant H. E. Winn, Officer Commanding "D"
Company.

Lieutenant N. B. Hart, "B" Company.

Lieutenant W. H. Marley, "A" Company.

Lieutenant J. R. C. V. Leir, "A" Company.

Lieutenant R. H. Lynes, Transport Officer.

Lieutenant P. L. Hardman, Quartermaster.

Lieutenant J. A. E. Armstrong, "C" Company.

2/Lieutenant H. Walsh, "D" Company.

Captain L. R. H. Williams, R.A.M.C., Medical
Officer.

A special order was issued by Brooking's Column, showing the number of prisoners, etc., captured during the operations. The particulars are given below:—

Turkish officers, 212; German officers, 2; Turkish other ranks, 5,024; German other ranks, 16.

British Casualties: Killed, 2 British officers, 4 British other ranks, 13 Indian other ranks; wounded, 5 British officers, 30 British other ranks, 4 Indian officers, 82 Indian other ranks, 2 followers; missing, 17 Indian other ranks. Total: 7 British officers, 34 British other ranks, 4 Indian officers, 112 Indian other ranks, 2 followers—159 all ranks.

Captures included: Fourteen guns, 47 machine guns, 38 machine-gun carts, 16,650 shells (excluding large dump destroyed at Anah), 500 boxes British small arms ammunition, 2,176 Turkish and German boxes (about

600,000 rounds), 720 grenades, 59 G.S. wagons, 5 ambulance wagons, 23 cooking carts, 4 water carts, 2 search-lights, 3 wireless sets, 1,500 gallons of petrol, 230 shakturs, 1 launch (2 destroyed), 2 gun barges, 110 picks, 109 shovels.

Treasure: 750 gold liras, 2,175 liras in notes.

The following awards were received by non-commissioned officers and men of the Battalion for their share in the operations:—

No. 1763 Naik Parsadman Rai, A.M.P., I.D.S.M.

No. 1330 Rifleman Sarabjit Thapa, "B" Company, Mention.

No. 4608 Naik Jaharsing Thapa, Mention.

Jemadar Bishanbir Thapa, "B" Company, Mention.

No. 702 Lance-Naik Ratanbir Ale, Mention.

No. 695 Havildar Dhanbir Gurung, Mention.

The casualties sustained by the Battalion in the operations were: Lieutenant W. H. Marley, No. 333 Havildar Singbir Thapa, "C" Company, and 3 riflemen wounded.

The next few days were spent in clearing up the Q Trenches at Khan Baghdadi, a good deal of ammunition, some rucksacks, bombs, pouches, and machine-gun belt boxes being found. These trenches were then filled in.

On the last day of March very strong wind and heavy rain were experienced, and the men still in bivouac were all very wet and uncomfortable. The first few days of April were all wet and stormy; an occasional rum ration was, however, issued, which cheered the men considerably, and on the 5th the tents came up from Hit.

The Battalion guard over the prisoners' camp remained, their chief duty being to instil some idea of sanitation into the Turks. A batch marched every day for Hit and Baghdad, escorts being supplied by other regiments. The captured animals were also despatched in like manner, with considerable difficulty to the escort. The Turkish officers in the prisoners' camp appeared to have no love for the Germans, and, almost unanimously, openly stated that the Germans started the war to conquer the world, and that they were *des animaux ferores sans humanité*, adding bitterly that Turkey was nothing better than a German colony.

Before leaving Khan Baghdadi the Battalion was engaged in building a cemetery over the graves of our

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dead; these were all built up high, as a protection against marauding Arabs, and cairns were built as a memorial. These cairns were about eleven feet high and ten feet in diameter at the bottom, tapering to a point at the top.

The force left Khan Baghdadi entirely, Sahiliyeh becoming the outpost line. The 50th and 12th Brigades went through on their way downstream, and were followed by the 42nd, which marched for Ramadi on the 13th, where it was to stay the hot weather.

This march was uneventful, and was accomplished in four stages, the distance being about sixty miles. The first camp was at Sahiliyeh (about seventeen miles); the second, Hit, after a short march of about eight miles; the third was a march of two stages, eighteen miles, through Uqbah to Khan Abu Rayat, with a half-hour's halt at the former place. On Tuesday, the 16th, the Battalion marched into Ramadi, after nearly two months' absence on operation scale of kit.

Colonel Preston, who had come out from India to take command, was waiting for the Battalion at Ramadi, and Colonel Badcock, on relief by him, proceeded to Baghdad and thence to India, on completion of his tenure of command.

Leave for the Division had been opened while the force was still at Khan Baghdadi, one party having marched from there on April 7th. This was followed by another party on the 18th from Ramadi, and frequent allotments were made all through the ensuing hot weather, most of the officers in the Battalion getting away to India before the end of the season. No less than ten parties were despatched, totalling six Gurkha officers and about 450 other ranks.

On arrival at Ramadi a hot weather camp was made, E.P. tents being issued on a liberal scale, as in 1917. The site was one and a half miles upstream of Ramadi.

The hot weather passed uneventfully; a Divisional Training School was opened, and a good deal of training was done regimentally, too—that is, as far as the small numbers of men would allow. The Ramadi position needed a good deal of repair, and fatigues of all kinds were heavy: making of roads, unloading of bellums, and marching escorts—the latter particularly for convoys of sheep, which came from downstream and went up the line

to Sahiliyeh, which was held by the 50th Brigade. A theatre was built, and as Divisional Headquarters was also located at Ramadi, together with all Divisional and Corps troops (such as heavy artillery and Air Force), regular concerts were given, which proved a great boon to all.

During the hot weather the garrison was visited by an epidemic of Spanish influenza, which ran through the troops like wildfire. The illness was, however, of short duration, and was not of a serious nature, as most of the men rejoined within a week. All ranks were instructed to gargle as a preventive measure, parade being held for this purpose.

With this exception there was extraordinarily little sickness, due, probably, just as in 1917, to the excellent camp, sanitation, and rations. The divisional ice barge was again functioning.

On the evening of September 7th a wire came in warning the Battalion to be ready to move to another theatre of war. The order was for one battalion to proceed from each brigade in the Division. No indication of destination was given. Speculation was divided between Palestine and Salonika; the latter supposition, however, turned out to be correct.

The move was ordered to take place on the 9th with only personal equipment, all surplus stores and equipment, ammunition, bombs, etc., being collected and returned to the departments concerned.

The Battalion (less "C" and "D" Companies) marched out of Ramadi at 5.30 a.m. on the 9th, being played out by the 5th Gurkha band. The Dorsets and the 5th Gurkha Rifles both turned out to give a cheer, and General Lucas and staff accompanied the Battalion a short way. The General Officer Commanding expressed his sorrow at losing the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, sending as an appreciation of its services the following letter:—

**" H.Q. 42ND INFANTRY BRIGADE,
September 9th, 1918.**

" MY DEAR PRESTON,

" I should be much obliged if you would convey to all ranks my warm appreciation of the work they have done ever since they joined the 42nd Brigade. We have been

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together now for two and a half years, and it is a great wrench to have to part with one of the fine battalions which has done so much to gain the Brigade the good name it has.

"I am quite sure you will maintain the reputation the 2/6th now possesses, and I wish you all the best of luck, and much honour in your new sphere of operations.

"I shall always be glad to hear how the Battalion is getting on.

"Yours very sincerely,

"F. G. LUCAS."

The Battalion remained two or three days at Madhis, plans being frequently altered owing to difficulties of transport on the lines of communication. However, on the night of the 16th/17th a move was made to Dhibban, at which place entrainment took place for Baghdad at about 7.15 a.m. on the 17th, the latter place being reached at noon.

Basra was reached on the 22nd morning, and the Battalion went into camp at Makina.

The following days were spent in very thorough inspections of clothing and equipment, and indents to complete were submitted.

Subadar-Major Harku Thapa, who had come from India as a reinforcement, arrived with a party of returning leave men: thirty-eight supply and transport drivers and four R.A. drivers were posted, the Battalion having had to leave its former drivers with the 42nd Brigade Transport Company. These drivers were destined to give a good deal of trouble, being very indifferently trained and of poor physique.

A new establishment was issued. A large number of non-commissioned officers were, therefore, promoted on this scale. Sixteen British non-commissioned officers had accompanied the Battalion from Ramadi, being attached for instructional purposes, four to "H.Q." Company and three to each other company. On arrival at Basra, however, orders were received that these British non-commissioned officers would be supplied by the force the Battalion was going to; the non-commissioned officers of the Dorsets, therefore, with the exception of two, who were allowed to be retained, were returned to their units.

The day before embarkation a ceremonial parade was held for presentation of medals by Brig.-General H. Sutton, C.B., who expressed his pleasure at being able to present the ribbons, congratulated the Battalion on its fine record in the country, and wished it good luck and further distinction in the future. The following British officer, Gurkha officers, non-commissioned officers and men received decorations as under:—

Captain L. F. Mercer, Italian Silver Medal for Military Valour.

Jemadar Bagsing Gurung, I.D.S.M.

Jemadar Balasing Gurung, 1914 Star.

Jemadar Manbir Gurung, M.S.M.

No. 666 Havildar Thamansing Gurung, M.S.M.

No. 1763 Havildar Parsadman Rai, A.M.P., I.D.S.M.

No. 1061 Naik Permande Rana, Italian Bronze Medal for Military Valour.

No. 1922 Lance-Naik Anarup Bura, Medaille Militaire.

No. 1920 Rifleman Sukhbal Gurung, I.O.M., Second Class.

No. 1444 Rifleman Mangalsing Gurung, I.D.S.M.

No. 3323 Naik Dhanbir Gharti, 1914 Star.

The Battalion, together with a detachment of the 1/2nd Q.V.O. Rajput Light Infantry, embarked at 7.30 a.m. on October 1st on the H.T. *Ellenga* (B.I.S.N. Co.), and was accommodated on the troop decks forward. A life-belt inspection was held at 10.30 a.m., and embarkation was complete at 11 a.m., including one month's voyage and three months' land rations.

Shortly after this the ship sailed, and lusty cheers were given by all as the ship swung round in the stream; the last of Basra was seen shortly after noon, a thing no one expected to see before the end of the war. Few were sorry to see the last of a country of flies, heat and dust. All felt that whatever discomforts there might be in store in the country the Battalion was bound for, they were well rid of Mesopotamia, with the mental ennui of everlasting plains.

The following officers embarked with the Battalion:—

Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Preston, Commanding.

Major C. P. Blackett, 2nd-in-Command.

Captain G. C. Strahan, Officer Commanding " A " Company.

Captain T. C. E. Barstow, Adjutant.

Captain L. F. Mercer, Officer Commanding " C " Company.

Captain N. B. Hart, Officer Commanding " B " Company.

Lieutenant R. H. Lynes, Transport Officer.

Lieutenant P. L. Hardman, Quartermaster.

Lieutenant J. A. E. Armstrong, Officer Commanding " D " Company.

Lieutenant S. S. H. Berkeley, " B " Company.

Lieutenant H. Walsh, Assistant Quartermaster.

Lieutenant N. E. Thewlis.

Lieutenant G. de la Rue Browne.

Captain L. R. H. Williams, R.A.M.C. (S.R.),
Medical Officer.

Total strength, 14 British officers, 2 British other ranks, 20 Indian officers, 949 Indian other ranks, and 49 followers.

CHAPTER IV.

SALONIKA.

THE voyage from Basra to Salonika took twenty-five days, and was carried out without trans-shipment. It proved uneventful, though full precautions were taken against submarine attack. The usual boat station drill was practised, and boats' crews were detailed and given some rudimentary training in rowing a boat, an accomplishment in which the Gurkha does not as a rule excel. The ship halted at Muscat for a day and a half, opportunity being taken to get the men into the sea in their lifebelts. The first few men were a trifle diffident, but as soon as others saw how easily they floated there was no difficulty in getting the entire battalion into the water, even to the followers and private servants. On arrival at Suez the men were got off in lighters for a few hours' exercise. At Port Said all the boats were launched with their respective crews, and a halt was made while a convoy was collecting for the journey across the Mediterranean. Advantage was taken of the Annamese, French Indo-China troops. They were in appearance rather like a Gurkha, and on some of the men addressing a party, and asking where they came from, they found to their mutual surprise that they could understand each other. The convoy, of four ships, sailed from Port Said on the 21st, being escorted by six Japanese destroyers and one British sloop. Salonika was safely reached on the 24th without interference from hostile submarines, and disembarkation took place the next morning. The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, General Milne, was on the quay to meet the Battalion, and expressed himself as very pleased with the men's turn-out.

On disembarking, the Battalion marched some seven miles out to camp at Uchantar, where a camp of bell tents was found standing. The men marched well, though they were rather soft after three weeks on the ship; the

varied uniforms of the many nationalities caused considerable interest, which was reciprocated by the troops concerned, and by the local inhabitants.

On arrival at Salonika, six British officers from British regiments were posted to the Battalion, also batmen for them, together with fourteen British sergeants from Scotch regiments; these latter were of great use, and got on excellently with the men.

Immediately on arrival in camp the Battalion was visited by Staff officers of all kinds, with a view to hurrying on the equipping, as the Battalion was to be sent forthwith to join the 22nd Division, *en route* for the Chatalja Lines and Constantinople. The route was to be via Stavros and Dedeagatch.

The 26th and 27th were spent drawing equipment, ammunition, first line transport, and chargers; summer kit was returned, and warm clothing taken into use. Much difficulty was experienced with the transport drivers received in Basra; they were barely trained, had no non-commissioned officers, and many were unable to walk properly. The Battalion was equipped at lightning speed, so much so that it was ready to move on the 29th.

On the 28th, at 4 p.m., the Battalion was inspected in marching order by the Commander-in-Chief, with first and second line transport ready to march. He seemed pleased with the appearance of the men, though he remarked on the poor quality of the drivers.

The Battalion marched at 11 a.m. on October 29th to General's Corner, preceded by second line transport. Each man carried one greatcoat, one mackintosh, one steel helmet, and half bivouac shelter, in addition to canteen and full water-bottle; also twenty-five rounds of ammunition, though original orders had been for 120 rounds. On representation being made, however, this was reduced to the former figure.

The Battalion found the new bivouac most comfortable; two sheets being joined together on two poles made a lean-to shelter for two men.

Heavy rain fell during the following night, and the orders to move to Tumba were cancelled, the Battalion remaining where it was until its departure from Salonika in December, owing to the recent armistice with Turkey.

The bivouac was situated in a delightful place, on the

side of a hill, with a valley in front stretching away to the mountains on the other side, and all found the pleasant view a great relief after the deserts of Mesopotamia.

The six weeks spent at General's Corner passed uneventfully: constant route marches were carried out, and also training; companies fired field firing; some hill warfare was practised. The weather was unsettled, a good deal of rain falling, and, what was more trying, the Vardar wind blew consistently for two and three days at a time—a bitter, piercing wind, which not even the excellent leather jerkins which were issued to all were able to keep out.

By a curious oversight on the part of the Army Service Corps authorities, who up till now had had little or no experience of Indian troops and their rations, a daily ration of rum appeared on their scale of rations for Indian troops; this was received regularly for some time, and thankfully consumed, until the error was discovered.

Round about the bivouac at General's Corner was a line of defence on the hills overlooking Salonika town. After the armistice was signed, permission was accorded to dismantle this position and use the material for erection of cook-houses, and other shelters against the weather; this was greatly appreciated. Tents were received in November, and the officers' mess took possession of a deserted building which had been erected by a works company, Royal Engineers, and possessed a pukka bath, with boiler for hot water; most of the officers were accommodated in a building close at hand.

New pattern equipment was received towards the end of November, the old regimental bandolier equipment which had been in use ever since the formation of the Battalion being returned to store. The new equipment included packs instead of rucksacks, and was considered to be much more satisfactory. Several days were spent in fitting this, and in dyeing it black; in the latter connection it is interesting to note that the mochis were in the habit of dyeing leather with a substance called in Khaskura "hirakassi." Unfortunately, no officer in the Battalion knew the English name for this, and its acquisition was a matter of considerable difficulty. The Subadar-Major, however, together with the mochis, paid

a visit to Salonika, and were able to recognize it and procure sufficient to dye the equipment of the whole Battalion.

The armistice with Turkey, and, later, that with Germany, were celebrated as well as circumstances permitted; a holiday was granted, and a rum ration issued.

On December 13th the Battalion was posted to the 80th Brigade of the 27th Division, and a move overseas appeared imminent.

On the 17th the Battalion marched to the White Tower Pier at Salonika, and embarked by tenders on the H.T. *Malwa* (P. and O.) for Batum, the animals and transport personnel being embarked on the H.T. *Kandy*.

The *Malwa* sailed on the 18th. It was a fine ship, with big roomy decks, but not suited to Indian troops, as the decks were fitted with fixed tables and benches.

The trip through the Dardanelles was very interesting; Cape Helles and the *River Clyde* were seen distinctly, and other wrecks ashore. The ship anchored off Constantinople for the night of the 19th/20th, and when morning broke a fine view was disclosed. The French warship *France*, quite close; British, Italian and Greek warships were also in the vicinity.

Four British submarines, one of them the E11, which had entered the harbour in 1915 and torpedoed a Turkish warship lying alongside the wharf. The ship sailed through the Bosphorus that afternoon, the Turkish shore batteries on both sides being clearly visible all the way along. The warship *Superb* and two destroyers were ahead. The minefield at the Black Sea entrance was safely passed about 3 p.m., Batum being reached on the 22nd.

CHAPTER V.

BATUM AND THE CAUCASUS.

THE *Malwa* arrived at Batum about 9.30 a.m. on December 22nd and steamed slowly in. The scenery was very fine, with hills behind the town, well wooded and snow capped. Disembarkation began the next morning, and the Battalion went into billets in the town. The men's billets were in a big factory, airy, and with plenty of room; very dirty, as was only to be expected from the fact that the Turks had been in occupation—in fact, a Turkish guard had to be evicted before the guard could take over. British officers had good rooms in the house of a director of the factory, a pleasant old Russian anxious to help. Gurkha officers and British non-commissioned officers also obtained good accommodation. Some electric lights were in working order, and a second director, a French-speaking Armenian with a red-hot hatred for the Turks, was very anxious to complete the lighting arrangements.

The first few days in Batum were very heavy as regards fatigues—chiefly unloading steamers. These were required every day, in greater or less numbers. The following letter received shows the value of the work put in by the men here:—

“ I.W. AND D.R.E.,

“ BATUM,

“ 22/1/1919.

“ To the Officer Commanding,

“ 6th Gurkhas,

“ Batum.

“ DEAR SIR,

“ A working party of 150 of your non-commissioned officers and men, under Captain Strahan, was sent here for duty to-day at 13.00 hours.

“ I thought you would like to know that these men, who are the finest we have had for work, did in one hour

and a half as much work as 100 native labourers did yesterday in eight hours.

"I have written this as I thought you would like to know how highly I appreciate the work performed by your officer, non-commissioned officers and men.

"Yours faithfully,

"(Sd.) — WHITE, *Major*,

"D.A.D.I.W. & D."

Guards soon became very heavy in Batum, the numbers of men on duty being at one period as many as 300, out of a total of about 550 fit for duty, though this was later reduced to about 200. The strain on the men was very great. The following is a list of some of the permanent guards supplied during this period: Railway Goods Yard, Custom House, Civil Food Store, Docks, Anaria Explosives Dump, a ship's guard, 21st Stationary Hospital, Bhoosa Dump, banks' guard, A.P.M. (for police duty in the town), Aerodrome, at Choronowsky Fort, and at Ardahan Garage, Ardahan Barracks. These were in addition to the usual regimental guards.

Shortly after arrival in Batum a road control post, consisting of two British officers (Lieutenants Armstrong and Blyth) and two platoons, was sent to the junction of the Batum—Tiflis and Erzerum—Tiflis roads, about eleven miles out, to prevent Turks moving cars or lorries to Erzerum, and to search the transport of any marching echelons for loot, etc. This post remained out for a fortnight, after which it was removed, and one platoon instead, under Captain Barstow, departed for Kuhlla, about sixty miles out, with a similar object in view. This detachment remained out until shortly before the Battalion's departure for Tiflis.

Towards the end of February, in addition to other fatigues a party was required daily for repair to the railway embankment which, running alongside the sea, had been damaged by high water and had subsided into the sea.

Weather was variable, a heavy fall of snow being experienced in the middle of February.

The 2/4th Gurkhas arrived in the Caucasus, and a football match was played early in January, in which the Battalion team defeated them by 4 goals to 1.

In the first week of February intimation was received that the 2/6th was to move to Tiflis, but it was not until March 1st that a warning order was received to entrain on the 3rd. All preparations were made accordingly, when the "Stand Fast" was ordered, as the trucks had not arrived. The next day exactly the same thing happened again. The Battalion finally entrained on the 5th, the men rather crowded, in leaky trucks, and the officers in a third-class carriage.

The journey was slow, cold and uneventful, taking the best part of two days. A halt for cooking was made on the 6th at Michaelovo, in strong wind and snow, and Tiflis was reached in the early morning of the 7th.

Before leaving Batum, the Battalion had received orders for Sub-Assistant Surgeon Mahman Singh to return to India. The Battalion parted with him with keen regret, as he was a great favourite with all ranks. His keenness at games was greatly missed.

The 2/6th arrived at Tiflis on the morning of March 7th, considerable "strafing" being required to get the train shunted into a siding. The Battalion's billet was in a big school, but accommodation and cooking places were insufficient. There was no lighting or heating, one water tap only, and a small courtyard at the back, where everything, including transport, had to be accommodated. The officers were housed in the same billet, with no kitchen. The owner was very truculent, and not in the least inclined to help. The night that followed was very cold.

The next few days were spent in improving the accommodation; another billet was provided for the transport, which eased things considerably.

The Battalion was now in the 82nd Brigade, and its Commander, Brig.-General K. M. Davie, D.S.O., who was General Officer Commanding, Tiflis, came to pay a visit. The Divisional General, in whose honour a special guard was supplied at the station, sent the following appreciation:—

"The Divisional Commander very much appreciated the smart guard that turned out in his honour this afternoon, and he would be glad if the Commanding Officer would inform the officers, non-commissioned officers and

men who formed the guard of his appreciation of their keenness and smartness.

“(Sd.) _____,”

“Staff Captain, 82nd Inf. Bde.”

“*March 9th.*”

Very shortly after arrival in Tiflis the usual plethora of guards was required. The following were the guards taken over by the Battalion: General Officer Commanding, Tiflis; Royal Scots' billet, Hotel Majestic, University, German Stores, Wireless Station, Tiflis Station, Supplies, 83rd Field Ambulance, Expeditionary Force Canteen, also a guard for duty with the D.A.P.M., for police duties.

The guard which relieved the Cameron Highlanders' guard at the Hotel Majestic, in the main street of the town, caused a great stir; it was estimated some 700 people watched the proceedings. The following letter was received from Brig.-General Cooke-Collis, D.S.O., commanding in Batum:—

“BATUM,

“*March 7th, 1919.*”

“MY DEAR PRESTON,

“Before you left the 80th Brigade I had hoped to have had an opportunity to convey to you in person an expression of the great pleasure it has been to me to have had your Battalion under my command, and my regret at your departure.

“The high standard of discipline and efficiency of your unit, the smartness of your guards, and the cheerful willingness and ability with which your men set about any sort of work, have earned the praise of all with whom you have come in contact.

“The excellent work you have done whilst you have been here is thoroughly appreciated, and it is with sincere regret that I say good-bye to you; and I hope that some day you may return to the Brigade.

“Yours sincerely,

“W. J. COOKE-COLLIS.

“2/6th Gurkha Rifles.”

The Battalion remained about a month in Tiflis, though it returned again later, after a stay in Armenia. Tiflis is a large and fine city of 300,000 inhabitants,

though the surroundings were ugly. It is a very up-to-date place, having a large railway and station, electric light, trams, a University (with a guard supplied by the Battalion), and Houses of Parliament. There is also a large opera house, the fourth largest in the world.

The British officers used to go fairly often; as a box holding four could be obtained for twenty roubles (the rouble at that time being about 1½d.), the price was not ruinous. Grand opera was regularly given, the *prima donna* being as a rule very good, though the chorus was a trifle poor. The language of the place was Georgian. In pre-war days Tiflis was the capital of the Caucasus, and the headquarters of the Viceroy of the Caucasus. It had a very brilliant winter season, which explained the glories of the place. The latter were, however, by 1919, a trifle decayed, and the dirt appalling.

Towards the end of March, Colonel Preston departed for Kars with a guard of thirty men, leaving Major Blackett in command of the battalion. The latter followed on April 5th, leaving Tiflis in two trains which reached Kars on the 7th.

The country outside Tiflis consisted of rolling downs covered with turf, with the Kura River running eastwards for some distance by the side of the railway.

The Georgian—Armenian frontier was crossed without incident at 1.30 a.m. on the 6th, after which the country became rugged and mountainous. A four-hours' halt was made at Kara-Klis to let the men cook; the journey being then resumed for Alexandropol, which was reached at 9.30 p.m. that night, a halt being made during the hours of darkness owing to the fact that the Tartars were in the habit of pulling up the rails. The men cooked early the next morning, and were ready to move by 8 a.m. Crowds of starving Armenians surrounded the train and fought like dogs for scraps of food.

Alexandropol was, as far as could be seen, a mass of ruins, and what had once been a splendid station was wholly destroyed; the inhabitants were dying at the rate of 200 a day.

The train moved on again about 9 a.m., through dismal-looking country deep in snow. Everywhere along the line evidence of the Turks' handiwork, in the shape of burnt-out villages, wrecked wagons and engines

was to be seen. Kars was reached about 3 p.m. on April 7th, in pouring rain. Kars was a town only in name; it was not at all an inviting-looking place; the whole place was burnt out, and what must have been splendid shops were now mournful skeletons; snow on the ground, and the streets were filthy. The only inhabitants to be seen were a few Turks and wild-looking Tartars.

The Battalion went into billets, which were very dirty, and would have been worse but for the fact that "A" Company, who had arrived first, had been at work on them all day.

The next two or three days were spent in cleaning up the billets (in this country invariably the first occupation on arrival) and things were soon neat and comfortable. In front of the billets were some small fishponds; these were emptied out and cleaned, filled with fresh water, and small fish put in—an object of much interest to the men. Gardens and tennis courts were also cleaned up.

The usual demands for guards were made and complied with. In Kars they were as follows: Citadel Wireless Guard, Station Guard, Petrol Guard, Supply Dump Guard, Rifle Guard, and Magazine Guard.

Almost immediately on arrival in Kars detachments had to be dispatched, two platoons of "B" Company, under Lieutenant Clarke, to Sari-Kamish, to reinforce the Rifle Brigade detachment there, and two platoons of "B" Company, under Lieutenant de la Rue Browne, for Turzuma. The latter could not get sufficient transport, and were unable to leave the station until 4 p.m., with a forty-five to fifty-mile march ahead. The history of this detachment will be read later. Another detachment, of 50 rifles and a machine gun, was sent to Kizil-Cha-Cha to reinforce the Rifle Brigade detachment there. These were handed over to an officer of the latter regiment, and seemed comfortable enough, though in tents.

While at Kars the Battalion met a part of the 13th L.A.M.B. (armoured cars), who were with the 15th Division at Khan Baghdadi, in Mesopotamia.

On April 12th the Battalion brought off a distinct coup. The story is as follows:—

At this time there was a Government of South West

Caucasia which was not recognized by the British as such. Unfortunately the former were strong, stronger, in fact, than the British in the place, which in January consisted of the Rifle Brigade alone. Action was at this time impossible, owing to weakness; moreover, as the snows melted, and communications between villages opened up, the Tartar Government became stronger, and grew more and more arrogant. At this stage of the affairs the Battalion, with the L.A.M.B. cars and the 23rd Sikh Pioneers, were sent to Kars to restore the situation. Colonel Preston had been sent on ahead as Military Governor of Kars, and the *coup d'état* was organized and carried through by him.

At 4.15 p.m. "A" Company, under Captain Strahan, and No. 13 Platoon, under Lieutenant Walsh, were to surround the new and old Parliament Houses respectively; No. 14 Platoon, under the direction of Lieutenant Tooker, was to surround suspected houses; and Lieutenant Hutton, with 10 men, to rush the telegraph office and seize all inside. The remainder of No. 16 Platoon to be a reserve, under Major Blackett.

At the agreed moment Colonel Preston went into the Parliament House (the "Shura") and said, "I declare martial law in this room."

The building had been duly surrounded by "A" Company, and, as chance had it, at this precise moment a rifleman in that company accidentally let off a round. Upon this all inside the building stood up, and, seeing the troops, realized the futility of resistance and gave themselves up. The leaders of the "South West Caucasian Republic" were thereupon arrested, and promptly taken away in Ford vans to the station, whence they were despatched to Tiflis. The remainder of the Assembly then declared for a Provisional Government of the town of Kars. The essence of the coup was surprise; secrecy had been maintained, and all went according to plan.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Walsh, with his platoon, had surrounded and captured all inside the old Parliament House. Part of his duty was to protect the archives, and about 20,000,000 roubles, which were supposed to be there. This coup was as great a success as the other, and some seven ringleaders were arrested.

Immediately afterwards patrols scoured the streets, and British guards disarmed all the Tartar guards in Kars, and, after holding them as prisoners for a time, let them go.

These patrols were kept on for two or three days afterwards, and also at night. Martial law orders were that any civilians outside in the streets after a certain time at night would be shot. A strong guard was placed over each Parliament House, and control posts were placed on the roads leading northwards and southwards out of Kars. On the 17th all available men were paraded for a house-to-house search for arms in the town and outskirts. Five parties were supplied, working in towards the centre of the town, under Captain Strahan, Lieutenants Armstrong, Walsh, and Hutton. There were many lanes, and the task took a considerable time, parties finally returning by 2 p.m.

Some fifty rifles were collected, as well as a miscellaneous assortment of pistols, revolvers, knives and swords. A few prisoners were taken at nights by the patrols or by the control posts.

About this time parties were sent out to collect what they could in the way of material from the various dumps left derelict by the Russians and Tartars. While most of the stuff collected consisted of such things as telephone wire, wood, oil and other such useful things for the Quartermaster's store, a few exceptional captures were made. These included two very nice small brass mortars, and a pair of complete 3-inch field guns. Three very handsome brass bells with Russian inscriptions were also collected—evidently school bells.

Shortly after this the Armenian Parliament and Army arrived in Kars from Alexandropol, and took over the place from the British. The Battalion was warned that it would shortly return to Tiflis.

The two platoons of "B" Company under Lieutenant Browne, of which mention was made above, returned on April 14th, after experiencing great hardships. They had left Kars on the 9th, and had covered some 100 miles before they returned. They were unable to reach Turzuma, owing to the deep snow drifts along the road, which in some places were as much as twenty feet deep. They had had practically no wood, and had cooked their

food on cow-dung fires. They had bivouacked in pouring rain and sleet, marching fifteen to twenty miles each day. The country towards Turzuma was very bleak and desolate, with no trees, and snow still lying deep.

The detachment, on return to Kars, was given hot food and tea, and holidays for three days.

Before leaving Kars the battalion sent a detachment to Kagizmain (100 men), about sixty miles south of Kars, which was very shortly followed by another one of 150—200 men to Merdenek, north-west of Kars.

Throughout April the weather was very wild and stormy, causing a good deal of discomfort to all, and rather militating against any training. This, however, was impracticable in any case, owing to the very large number of men on guard. After the arrival of the Armenian Army the situation as regards guards was eased somewhat, as the latter took over a good many.

On the 27th the Commander-in-Chief (General Sir G. F. Milne) paid a visit to the Battalion.

A letter was received from the Staff Captain, Southern Command, detailing the good work done by No. 3147 Rifleman Narbahadur Chhetri, "D" Company, while a sentry on the General Officer Commanding's train, for cutting away with his kukri the burning portions of a truck which had caught fire, thereby saving the truck and its contents.

Early in May the Battalion was assembled again at Kars, preparatory to its departure for Tiflis, detachments being recalled from Kizil-Cha-Cha, Sari-Kamish, Merdenek, and Kagizmain at various times prior to May 15th. The latter detachment marched in gum boots, owing to their boots having given out.

Just before the departure of "A" and "C" Companies for Tiflis on May 6th, the Battalion sustained a very severe loss in the death of its Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Preston, who was thrown from his horse and sustained a severe fracture of the skull. He was carried back to the Battalion hospital, where all that was possible was done for him. On the arrival of an ambulance he was taken to No. 110 Field Ambulance, but died shortly after arrival. The loss cast a great gloom on all ranks of the Battalion. The body was taken to Tiflis with the two companies which proceeded there.

The following telegram was received from Brig.-General Davey, commanding the Southern Command:—

“Have learnt with greatest sorrow of the accidental death which happened to Lieut.-Colonel Preston aaa Armenian Government have asked me to express their deepest condolences. From General Davey.” A suitable acknowledgment was sent.

After many delays, owing to lack of rolling stock, etc., the remainder of the Battalion eventually got off by train on May 17th. The country was looking green and considerably fresher than on arrival in Kars. Sanain, the Georgian—Armenian frontier, was reached on the morning of the 18th. Here a difficulty arose, as the train had Armenian engines, which were not allowed to proceed to Tiflis, and there were no others. However, it was eventually decided to allow the train to proceed a short distance farther, where the Georgian engines were finally met, and journey to Tiflis was successfully accomplished.

In the meantime, “A” Company, under Captain Strahan, had gone to Baku, and “D” Company were now sent in the opposite direction along the railway towards Batum, the Battalion thus becoming scattered along the railway from Batum to Baku. Frequent escorts to trains were found by the rest of the Battalion at Tiflis, and a platoon was sent to Alexandropol, which was later withdrawn to Alaverdi, when the troops in the Nakhichaun area were withdrawn.

Early in June the Battalion received a visit from Lieut.-Colonel Little and Major Ryan, D.S.O., of the 1st Battalion, who had come over from Enzeli on a few days’ leave. When the 2nd Battalion was leaving Mesopotamia, information had been received at Baghdad that the 1st Battalion had entrained for Persia only the day before, the two battalions having just missed each other by twenty-four hours. While the 2nd Battalion had proceeded to Salonika through the Red Sea, and had come from there through the Black Sea, the 1st Battalion had marched up through Persia to Enzeli, on the Caspian Sea, thus completing the circle. After staying a day or two with the Battalion at Tiflis, they returned with Major Blackett, via Baku, where the latter went to inspect the detachment.

About this time there was a good deal of trouble with the Georgians: the British were attempting to send guns and ammunition from Kars to General Denikin's army, which was reported to be at Baku. This, apparently, the Georgians did not relish, and on one occasion they brought out their armoured train against the British, and refused to allow trains to proceed with munitions, etc., to Denikin. In Tiflis on one occasion a detachment of the Battalion, which had returned from Akstafa, was prevented from leaving the station by the Georgians, and an officer had to be sent to get them away. The same day the R.T.O. informed the Battalion that a rifleman had been shot; Major Blackett, with an escort of 10 men, went off to the station, followed immediately by another officer and 50 more men, but nothing could be found out as to the man's assailant. A guard was put on the armoured train, with orders not to allow it to proceed. News was received later that the wounded man, No. 3031 Jagman Thapa, had died in the hospital train, having been wounded in the body.

Towards the end of June the Battalion's detachments from Akstafa, Alexandropol, Evlakh, Adjikabul, and other places, rejoined, and the Battalion entrained for Batum on the 24th, which was reached without incident on the 25th at 11 p.m.

Detrainment took place the next day, and the Battalion settled down in the same billets as before. News came in that the Battalion had been detailed to go to Samsun, on the south coast of the Black Sea, midway between Batum and Constantinople. This information came in the same day as the news that peace with Germany had been signed; it was therefore felt by all that peace had made little difference to the Battalion.

The stay in Batum was uneventful; guards were heavy, though not so heavy as formerly; all were a good deal troubled by dust and flies, and particularly the latter. Sea bathing was indulged in a good deal, and much appreciated.

The Battalion embarked on the *Anglo-Egyptian* on July 3rd; all heavy kit, rations, etc., had been embarked before. The Battalion embarked in twelve minutes. The ship sailed about 11 a.m., in mist and rain. The mist hung low over Trans-Caucasia, obscuring the view.

CHAPTER VI.

SAMSUN AND CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE *Anglo-Egyptian* arrived off Samsun at 10 a.m. on July 4th; it was raining hard, blowing, and the sea was rising. Samsun was a Turkish-looking town, with square houses, and was situated at the foot and sides of hills sloping down to the sea. There was no quay or pier for disembarkation, and this had to be carried out in lighters, after the style of Roman galleys.

No one appeared to have been warned of the Battalion's arrival, and the detachment of the 95th Russell's Infantry who were there were very much surprised at its sudden appearance. Only two lighters were forthcoming, and disembarkation was a matter of some difficulty. It was not completed until midday the next day.

Camp was made on the top of a hill above the town, and was situated on a large, flat, grassy plain, near the old Turkish barracks; the latter could have been taken over, but were at the time swarming with fleas.

The Battalion took over the whole of the Samsun—Merzivan area from the 95th Russell's Infantry. The chief reason for the Battalion's presence there seemed to be the American Mission to the Armenians. "C" Company went off on detachment to Merzivan on the 9th. The Control officer reported that the Commander of the Turkish Third Army resented the Battalion's landing at Samsun, and intended to oppose the relief of the 95th detachment at Merzivan.

On the 10th a wire was received from Merzivan that six guns and troops had left Merzivan for Kamsa, and that troops were concentrating at the latter place to oppose the advance of our detachment.

After a conference with the Control and Intelligence officers, it was decided to send an Intelligence officer in a motor-lorry, borrowed from the American Relief Commission, to catch up and assist Lieutenant Armstrong

(commanding "C" Company), and to clear up the situation generally. The next day H.M.S. *Shark* arrived, bringing a new Commander for the Turkish Third Army, to replace the man who had threatened to oppose the advance. This officer was sent out the same evening in an American car to catch up the party. No developments had up to this time taken place; it transpired afterwards that the Turkish troops had withdrawn when it was realized that the troops advancing were not Greeks or Armenians.

The people of the town were thoroughly frightened of the men, and could not quite make out who they were; but the general impression created seemed to be good. In spite of this, however, they seemed to be of a trusting disposition—this may have been due to the fact that they had been for some time under Turkish rule—for the Battalion was able to raise a loan from a local banker of £T2,000 to pay "C" Company preparatory to their move.

Shortly after this a guard was sent in a sailing boat to a place called Uniya, farther along the coast; this arrived without mishap.

July and August passed uneventfully, with the exception of great celebrations in the town on the 14th, owing to French Independence Day. On the 27th the officers were entertained to a picnic at a place four miles out by the chief "lighterman" of the town, a villainous-looking Turk. Most of the American community were present also, and the host had provided an enormous luncheon, and a very excellent one, with plenty of cold beer.

Fortunately, a whole roast lamb was found to be insufficiently roasted, and so was not served. However, there was more than sufficient without it.

There was a certain amount of promiscuous firing in the town and neighbourhood at nights. On one occasion, instructions were sent by the Control officers to villages in the neighbourhood that a machine gun would be turned on to them unless they desisted from firing at night. On one occasion the Battalion had to supply two patrols of 30 men each, owing to the presence in the vicinity of 30 Lazz brigands; with no result, however.

Some friction was experienced with the local Turkish troops. The first encounter was between a Turk who tried to interfere at the Battalion's water hydrant.

This man was captured by the bhists under the tent police havildar and brought to the quarter guard. He was eventually released on the representation of the Turkish Commander. A similar occurrence took place again the next day, when Major Blackett removed a Turkish sentry and later managed to make the Turkish officers understand that their guard was superfluous. Early in August their water supply began to peter out, on which permission was given to them to use our supply for men only. Great difficulty was experienced in getting them to keep their camp, etc., even moderately clean.

Owing to the prevalence of malaria, which became bad early in August, it was decided on August 10th to occupy the Turkish barracks in the vicinity, so as to provide shelter from the sun, ensure the proper use of mosquito nets, and make the men more comfortable. The Turkish troops in occupation were asked to vacate them. This request was immediately followed by a visit from Lieut.-Colonel Ismail, commanding 15th Turkish Division, who came armed with many difficulties concerning the vacation of the barracks; where was he to go, there being no empty houses in the town? After a good deal of talk, probably mostly bluff on his part, he departed, having assured himself that the Battalion intended to occupy the barracks somehow. The Control officer decided that the Turks could not find sufficient accommodation in the town to warrant their evacuating the barracks altogether; an arrangement was therefore made by which they handed over eight barracks and retained the remainder.

The Battalion moved in on the 18th, after a week's hard work on cleaning up the filth in the barracks. They proved a good deal more comfortable than the camp.

The Battalion was visited on August 15th by General Rycroft, D.Q.M.G. of the force, who inspected the Battalion with first line transport loaded. He passed down the ranks, paying special regard to the men's equipment, and asking many questions. He expressed himself as being very satisfied with the smartness of the men, their appearance, and their steadiness on parade.

The men's need of rice and quinine was represented to him. This resulted in the arrival of the former within a week. By this time the men were full of malaria, which took a heavy toll of all ranks. "C" Company, at

Merzivan, were the only exception, their health being extremely good. On the 24th a code wire was received from General Headquarters that this detachment could be reduced to half-company if the situation permitted. This was followed on September 10th by instructions to withdraw the detachment entirely, one week's notice being given to the Americans before marching. About this time the Control officer informed the Battalion that Amaria, Merzivan, and Samsun were about to proclaim their independence of the Constantinople Government and their adherence to Mustafa Pasha, the local troops being apparently involved in it also. A warship was asked for in a code wire, in order to ensure communication by wireless, and one company was detailed as inlying piquet in the event of any trouble occurring.

On September 15th, however, instructions were received that the Battalion was to withdraw from Samsun and be located in the Constantinople area; the s.s. *Huntscastle* being despatched for the purpose of conveying the Battalion there. The Merzivan detachment rejoined on the 22nd, having stood the march well; the men all looked fit and well, a distinct contrast to the rest of the Battalion.

Leave to India had been opened in August, and three parties were despatched. A Battalion roster was made out for Gurkha officers, non-commissioned officers and riflemen, and men were sent on leave in accordance with it. Any very special claims for leave out of their turn were considered by a punchayat of Gurkha officers, after investigation by company commanders. Those passed were despatched with the next leave party.

While at Samsun a range was constructed, and companies did a certain amount of range practice, also field firing. Not very much could be done, however, owing to sickness and heavy guards.

A ship thought to be the *Huntscastle* was signalled on the 29th, and embarkation orders for the next day issued accordingly; but the ship turned out to be the *Rotenfels*, with two Indian other ranks and six tins of creosol for the Battalion. The 30th passed with no sign of the *Huntscastle*, though a small American tramp, an American destroyer, and a Turkish steamer came in. The *Huntscastle* was, however, sighted early on October

1st, with a lighter towing astern. Embarkation commenced the same morning.

Difficulties were encountered, as the sea had risen, and at 11 p.m. that night embarkation was still incomplete. The next day was spent in getting the animals aboard, also stores from the dump. Embarkation was finished on the evening of October 3rd, and the voyage commenced on the 4th.

The sea was moderately smooth, a few men only being seasick.

The ship anchored off Haidar Pasha at 10 a.m. on the 6th. Orders were received for one company to proceed to Bostandjik, the remainder of the Battalion to Kilo, 28½ kilos along the Anatolian Railway, where it would occupy a camp vacated by the 1/10th Jāfs. The next thirty-six hours were spent in disembarking stores, etc., permission being given for the men to sleep on board for the night of the 7th/8th.

The Battalion disembarked at 6 a.m. on the 8th, disembarkation being completed in an hour, straight from the steamer into the train.

The two trains left almost at once, the journey to Kilo, 28½ kilos, occupying about two hours. Camp was well and quickly made; proper latrines, cookhouse, and water supply being found in existence.

The Battalion was now in the 84th Infantry Brigade. Shortly after arrival in this camp, and in response to a report from the Medical Officer on the ill-health of the Battalion, the A.D.M.S., 28th Division, ordered fourteen days' complete rest. In consequence, outside guards were shortly afterwards taken over by another unit. The detachment from Bostandjik rejoined on the 16th at 7.30 p.m., having entrained that morning at 9 a.m., and having come a distance of fifteen miles.

About this time the 2/4th Gurkha Rifles passed through on their way to Bostandjik; they were given tea.

On the 20th, the good, but entirely unexpected, news was received that the Battalion was to return to India immediately; detailed instructions were given. A busy time returning transport, returning equipment to Ordnance, drawing clothing, medal ribbons, etc., prior to an inspection by the Commander-in-Chief, on October 23rd, followed.

The Commander-in-Chief went through the ranks, and afterwards fell-in British officers, Gurkha officers and non-commissioned officers, and addressed them, Colonel Rice, who had recently come from India to take over command, interpreting. He made a congratulatory speech, and evidently meant what he said. He conveyed his appreciation of the very smart parade, and warmly thanked all ranks for the excellence of their work during the time the Battalion had been under his command. He said the Battalion had been specially selected to go to Samsun at a critical period—he regretted that it had suffered so much from sickness whilst there—and as a reward for its good services had again been specially selected to be the first battalion to return to India. He personally thanked all British officers for their efforts in maintaining the high standard of discipline and efficiency acquired by the Battalion.

It had been reported to the Commander-in-Chief during his visit that the Headquarters Canteen owed the unit some £65 on account of stores despatched through the good offices of General Rycroft, but not received at Samsun. Also that the Canteen refused to refund the money until delivery of the stores had been taken by them and losses checked. The following wire was subsequently received by the Battalion, and is preserved as unique:—

“From —

“2/6th Gurkhas.

“GHQ Q Cn.

“23 Oct.

“Send Officer to Hq. Canteen Constant to collect all monies due for goods not delivered aaa If not entirely satisfactory officer should report AQMG GHQ aaa Addsd 2/6th Gurkhas rep. 28th Divn.”

Colonel Rice and Captain Strahan consequently went to the Headquarters Canteen, where they were warmly welcomed, and found the money at once forthcoming.

Embarkation was originally ordered for the 25th. This, however, was postponed until the 29th, and again until the 30th. The reason appeared to be that, although the ship was in, it was not yet ready for the Battalion, and there was, moreover, considerable doubt as to whether it would be ready on the 30th.

The Battalion eventually embarked on the 31st on the *Baron Beck*, a small dirty-looking boat flying the Italian flag. The Battalion, after detraining at Haidar Pasha, embarked on a ferry boat, and forty-five minutes' steaming up to the Bosphorus brought her to the *Baron Beck*. Accommodation was very short, and the men were very crowded. There were no Indian galleys on board, and all the cooking had to be carried out on a galley for British troops. The rest of the day and the following day were spent in stowing kits, etc. in the hold, which had to be done by hand. This was complete by midday on November 1st, when an influx of civilian passengers arrived, with individual British officers and an Indian leave party of 35 other ranks, batmen, rations and goats. Galleys, too, were put on board and erected the same evening for use the next day. On the morning of the 2nd the ship moved down the Bosphorus and anchored for the day off Haidar Pasha once more. After "Boat Stations" the ship sailed at 8 p.m.

As the ship swung round on to her course all the men were brought up on deck to give a lusty cheer, after which they had a sing-song and dance on the after deck, much to the interest of the other passengers.

The following officers embarked at Constantinople with the Battalion:—

Lieut.-Colonel B. A. Rice, D.S.O.

Major C. P. Blackett, 2nd-in-Command.

Captain G. C. Strahan, Officer Commanding "A" Company.

Captain T. C. E. Barstow, O.B.E., Adjutant.

Captain L. F. Mercer, Officer Commanding "C" Company.

Lieutenant H. Walsh, Quartermaster.

Lieutenant H. Robinson.

Captain A. Gonsalves, I.M.S., Medical Officer.

Ten Gurkha officers, 1 Indian Warrant Officer (Munshi), 765 Gurkha other ranks, and 59 followers.

Lieutenant J. A. E. Armstrong, Lieutenant W. G. Cook, 2 Gurkha officers, with 228 other ranks and 9 followers remained behind in Hospital. Of these two Gurkha officers and 180 odd other ranks were despatched in another boat, as there was not room on the *Baron Beck*.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RETURN TO INDIA AND ARRIVAL IN ABBOTTABAD.

THE *Baron Beck* arrived at Alexandria after a four days' voyage; the sea was fairly calm. Alexandria was reached on the 6th, and after two days in quarantine disembarkation took place on the morning of the 8th. The Battalion went into sheds some 800 yards away, where every man and his kit were disinfected. The Battalion remained in these sheds for the night, and the next morning the remaining men were disinfected, and entrained the same afternoon for Suez. After an all-night journey Suez was reached on the morning of the 10th, and the Battalion went into the transit camp. Here a draft of 1 officer and 92 other ranks *en route* from the Depot was picked up. Many guards were supplied for the Suez area while in this camp. The Battalion, however, embarked at Port Tewfik on the *Coconada* on the 13th. The accommodation was very good, especially on the troop decks, but the upper deck was limited. Steam galleys were provided for cooking, and were much appreciated. The voyage commenced the same afternoon.

The voyage to Bombay was uneventful. There was a few hours' stay at Aden to disembark and embark various details, and the ship arrived at Bombay and berthed in the Alexandra Docks early on the morning of the 25th. Orders were received to proceed to Abbottabad in two trains, 550 men to each train, the first leaving at noon, the second at 9 p.m.

The Reception Committee carried out their part of the programme very nobly. At 11 a.m. all men were marshalled in a shed and given soda water and fruit. Officers received gin slings and a bronze match-box each. Both trains started in good time.

The first train should have arrived at Havelian during the night of the 28th/29th, but the engine was defeated

by the gradients between Jhelum and Pindi. The morning of the 29th found the train at Mankiala, on the wrong side of Pindi. Sarai Kala was reached at 1 p.m., and the train set forth gaily for Havelian, but the engines were again defeated by the gradients within a mile of the station. By detaching the engine of a passenger train, which came into Baldher while the train was waiting, helpless, the first train finally arrived at Havelian about 5.30 p.m. with three engines on.

Major F. B. Abbott, D.S.O., Commanding Depot, Captain N. B. Hart, Captain R. Faulkner, M.C., and 2/Lieut. Bulfield met the Battalion with the welcome news that there was tea and food for all waiting at the station; also that the 1st Battalion had arrived from Persia only one day before. It was a curious coincidence that the two Battalions come from very nearly the same districts by very different routes, and arrived within one day of each other. As may be imagined, there were great rejoicings in Abbottabad in consequence.

The Battalion detrained, fed, and bivouacked for the night. The second train got in at midnight, but did not detrain until the morning.

On November 30th the Battalion marched at 9.30 a.m., timed to have plenty of long halts, and to reach the Octroi Post at 2 p.m. The band met the Battalion a short way out, also the General Officer Commanding, and at 2 p.m. the Battalion marched into Abbottabad.

The Depot had made preparations for their reception, the vicinity of the lines being decorated, and more food and rum was ready for all. The great feature of the decorations was an arch made of wood, covered in white cloth, with the regimental crest, green and black flags, and all the countries in which the two Battalions of the Regiment had served during the war painted on it in English and Khaskura, which had been placed at the entrance to the lines. This had been prepared by the two Depots together, and had been used for the return of the 1st Battalion two days earlier.

The Battalion formed up in mass on the lower parade ground for the benefit of photographers, companies were afterwards led to their quarters—and food.

At 6 p.m. the officers of both Battalions congregated in the Gurkha Officers' Club and passed a cheery time until

it was time to break up for dinner. After dinner the Gurkha officers of both Battalions came to the Officers' Mess and foregathered again.

Next morning, in office, when orders were grasped, it was realized that the whole Battalion could be sent on four months' leave. Arrangements were begun accordingly, certain men deciding to go on pension right away.

The Suez draft was put into the Depot Company for purposes of duty, rations, leave, etc., the remainder of the Battalion being kept separate was given a holiday.

On December 2nd, after four years three and a half months' absence, the Battalion and the Depot amalgamated and became one.

The men were sent off on leave about the middle of the month, arrangements being made that the bulk of the pay due to them should be paid at Gorakhpur. An officer was sent on in advance to draw the money there, and a day or two later the men followed in a special train with two other officers. The amount of pay drawn by most of the men was considerable. The men were got safely away from Gorakhpur on Christmas Day, 1919, amid great scenes of rejoicing.

And here this story of the Battalion's part in the Great War may fitly close: they did not see very much actual fighting, but they bore considerable heat and burden of the day in strange places, never failed to do what was required of them, and invariably acquired much merit in the doing of it.

THE 3RD BATTALION

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CHAPTER I

THE 3rd Battalion 6th Gurkha Rifles was formed at Rawal Pindi on February 5th, 1917, by drafts from 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles, 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, 1/9th Gurkha Rifles, 2/9th Gurkha Rifles, 1/10th Gurkha Rifles, and 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

Major F. S. Massy, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles, was appointed Commandant.

On March 5th, 1917, orders were received to mobilize for the protection of the North-West Frontier. The following British officers joined the Battalion:—

Captain M. C. Baldwin, M.C., 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.

Lieutenant A. G. Littledale, I.A.R.O.

Lieutenant H. C. R. Gilman, I.A.R.O.

On March 12th, 1917, Lieut.-Colonel E. B. C. Boddam, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles F.F., assumed command.

The Battalion was at first organized in two wings. The Right Wing ("A" and "B" Companies) commanded by Major F. S. Massy, and the Left Wing ("C" and "D" Companies) by Captain M. C. Baldwin, M.C. Lieutenant H. R. C. Gilman was appointed Adjutant, and Subadar Bhadrabir Thapa, late 2/6th Gurkha Rifles, Subadar-Major.

On May 20th, 1917, the Battalion was ordered to proceed to camp at Chamiari, in the Murree Hills. This place proved to be the top of a hill some 7,000 feet high and about six miles from Murree. This was the first time troops had camped here, and the Battalion was kept busy levelling sites for pitching tents and making parade grounds. A road into camp about half a mile in length, and a range, were also constructed.

On September 17th the Battalion moved to Burhan Camp, marching to Rawal Pindi by the usual stages, where it entrained, and proceeded by rail to Burhan, a distance of about thirty-five miles. The Battalion joined

the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brig.-General Peterson, C.M.G., D.S.O., and composed of the 1st Battalion Duke of Wellington's Regiment, 2/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles, 33rd and 34th Reserve Mountain Batteries.

On November 17th the Battalion marched with the 5th Indian Infantry Brigade to Chitti Camp, about four miles from Taxila and at the foot of the Kala Chitta Range, to take part in the 2nd (Rawal Pindi) Division manoeuvres.

The Brigade was brought up to strength by the addition of a Nepalese regiment, the Pashu Patti Pasad Regiment. The final phase of these manoeuvres was a three-days' battle between the 4th and 5th Brigades, ending in the vicinity of Fateh Jang, on the North-Western Railway, where the troops proceeded to bivouac on the night of the 16th, having previously received orders to march to their respective destinations the following morning. Unfortunately heavy rain fell during the night, and by dawn the area was from two to three inches under water, the bright outlook being a free issue of rum.

The situation proved too much for one battalion commander, who, having expressed his opinion of the weather in a short, eloquent speech, hired a special train in which he and his unit departed.

About the middle of January, 1918, an advance party, under Lieutenant J. G. Bruce, proceeded to Bannu to take over barracks, etc., prior to the arrival of the Battalion, which, leaving Burhan on February 6th, followed via Mari-Indus, Kalabagh, and the Bannu Kalabagh Railway.

The Bannu Independent Brigade was commanded by Brig.-General the Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O., and was composed of the following units:—31st D.C.O. Lancers, two sections 63 R.M.L. guns, 33rd Mountain Battery, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, 41st Dogras, 2/112th Infantry, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles, and Nos. 5 and 6 Armoured Motor Batteries.

The Battalion was quartered in Fort Edwards, named after the original British cantonment, Edwardsabad, Bannu being the native city situated about 600 yards south of the fort. With the exception of the bungalow of the General Officer Commanding and some bachelor officers' quarters known as the Albert Mansions, cantonment bungalows were outside the fort and to the north-

west. Although the duties were heavier than had yet been experienced by the Battalion, the turning out of the movable column, which had to be in constant readiness, and the escorting of convoys carrying rations, etc., to the garrison of Miranshah and later to Dardoni, had a marked effect on the efficiency of all ranks.

The "convoy escorting" covered a period of one week. First day from Bannu to Saidgi, next day to Idak (both thirteen-mile marches), and finally to Dardoni, about fourteen miles; where one day's halt was made to rest the animals before returning. At Saidgi and Idak, two of the North Waziristan Militia posts, the convoy parked under the orders of the British officer in charge of the escort and formed a perimeter camp outside the Militia posts, for which the escort provided necessary protection during the night. Gangs of raiders in this area were numerous and bold, and it was only by constant alertness that loss of life and material was avoided. General Bruce carried out frequent staff rides, which proved of great value to the British officers, most of whom had only been in India a few months, and on such occasions one had to be prepared to travel fast and far over any type of country. The hot weather in Bannu, noted for its severity, caused a good deal of sickness, chiefly fever and dysentery. A detachment of the Brigade was always situated at Miranshah, about forty miles due west of Bannu, in the Tochi River Valley, which was the headquarters of the North Waziristan Militia, who occupied a fort constructed on the same lines as the usual frontier post. The Regular troops occupied an area having the north wall of the fort as one side, the remaining three sides being enclosed by a mud and stone wall about four feet high, with an outer line of barbed wire entanglement. This area had been a dumping ground for refuse of all kinds for some years, and when it was decided that a detachment of Regular troops should always be at Miranshah, General Fane, General Bruce's predecessor, unfortunately selected the site.

The troops were put on to construct the camp, and the digging up of the earth to form shelters for the men and small mud huts for British officers stirred up all the accumulated foulness, and the garrison suffered from a great deal of sickness. It was eventually condemned and

a new site selected about one mile north of the Militia post, called Dardoni.

Unfortunately, the Battalion moved from Bannu (on July 3rd) in relief of the 41st Dogras, before Dardoni was ready for occupation, and was obliged to make a short but unpleasant sojourn in "Profaneabad," as it was generally called.

On May 28th, 1918, Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Jewett, 1/8th Gurkha Rifles, arrived and took over command from Lieut.-Colonel Boddam, who proceeded to Mhow as Brigadier-General i/c Administration. Prior to the move to Miranshah the two wings were replaced by four companies.

On January 6th, 1919, the Battalion moved to Bannu, in relief of the 41st Dogras.

About a month later strong rumours of restlessness in Afghanistan were current, and on May 5th, 1919, orders were received from Brigade Headquarters to recall all British officers on leave in India and all Indian soldiers on leave or furlough, except those on demobilization leave.

The following day saw the commencement of the third Afghan War. At 10.30 a.m. on the same day orders were received for immediate mobilization.

It was to the great regret of all ranks that at this time General Bruce had to be invalided, owing to temporary ill-health. Brig.-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., D.S.O., took over command of the Brigade. At the same time Major-General Woodyatt, C.B., C.I.E., was appointed General Officer Commanding Waziristan Force, i.e., the Bannu and Derajat Brigades.

On May 8th sanction to recruit 200 men in excess of peace establishment was received. Lieutenants Green, Diak and Thompson arrived from the 2/5th Gurkha Rifles on the same day, as reinforcements.

Mobilization of the Battalion was completed on May 6th. It had been somewhat delayed owing to the heavy duties causing difficulties in collecting the men for medical and kit inspections. These duties, under the Bannu defence scheme, included the furnishing of several outposts round cantonments, including one at Islam Choki, seven miles distant, where an aerodrome was situated.

The local Bannuchies had a bad reputation and could

not be relied on in any way; in fact, they had to be very carefully watched.

On May 17th Major M. Wylie joined the Battalion and became officiating 2nd-in-Command, Major Massy having proceeded on transfer to the 4/11th Gurkha Rifles.

About this time news was received of a concentration in Khost, and of the movement of Afghan troops towards the Upper Tochi, where there were several Militia posts, Boya and Datta Khel among the number.

The force at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding was not sufficient to allow of troops being sent to extricate the garrisons of these posts in the event of their being besieged. It was therefore decided to evacuate them, and a column from Dardoni was ordered to assist in the operations.

On May 19th the Battalion was ordered to join the Dardoni Column on relief by the 55th (Cokes) Rifles, who arrived on the evening of the 20th. The Battalion received orders to march at 12.30 p.m. on May 21st, 1919.

At 4 a.m. on the 22nd the Battalion marched to Saidgi, arriving at 9.55 a.m. (a depot being left at Bannu). The following day the Battalion moved off at 3.30 a.m., arriving at Idak at 9.50 a.m.; and at 3.30 a.m. on the 24th to Dardoni, arriving there at 9 a.m.

Previous to the Battalion's departure from Bannu, the distribution of troops in the 67th Brigade area was as under:—

Bannu.—31st D.C.O. Lancers (less one squadron), one section 6.3 R.M.L. guns, one section 33rd Mountain Battery, 1/103rd Mahratta Light Infantry, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles, Nos. 5 and 6 Armoured Motor Batteries.

Dardoni.—One squadron 31st D.C.O. Lancers, one section 6.3 R.M.L. guns, 33rd Mountain Battery (less one section), 55th Field Company Sappers and Miners, 1/41st Dogras, 2/112th Infantry.

North Waziristan Militia and Frontier Constabulary holding their usual posts.

On May 24th, 1919, the Dardoni Movable Column, which was always held in readiness, was despatched to Muhammed Khel in order to reassure the Militia garrisons and tribes in the upper Tochi, but in consequence of information being received that the Afghan general,

Nadir Khan, whose headquarters were at this time situated at Matum, was preparing to move either towards Thal (Kurram) or Miranshah, the General Officer Commanding North-West Frontier Police decided to withdraw the movable column to Dardoni, where it would be more suitably placed to meet the threatened attack. It was also realized that this move could not be carried out unless the Militia post garrisons in this area were also withdrawn.

On May 25th the evacuation of Datta Khel, Tut Narai, and Spina Khaisora began, small columns of Regular troops visiting each.

Owing to insufficient transport, only the more valuable stores could be removed, the remainder being destroyed.

The garrisons returned with the troops to Muhammad Khel. Boya Post was also evacuated and handed over to a Daur Malik, who was considered trustworthy, for safe custody.

News of these evacuations and the destruction of stores quickly spread amongst the tribesmen, and by dusk a large number of Wazirs had collected in the vicinity of Boya and Muhammah Khel. The troops had been out since 6 a.m., and were greatly in need of rest, so the return march to Dardoni was ordered to begin at 8 p.m.

By this time the Wazirs had overawed the Daur Malik and those responsible for Boya Post, seized and begun to sack it. Owing to this, the march of the column was interrupted by an attack on the transport as it was crossing a ford, resulting in the loss of several transport camels carrying ammunition.

A short halt was made to drive off the attackers and reorganize the transport.

The column then proceeded, being followed up by bodies of local tribesmen, who indulged in occasional sniping.

The 3/6th Gurkha Rifles had moved out from Dardoni and taken up a position in the vicinity of the Chasmai Bridge, from where they were able to cover the further withdrawal of the column. A party of Wazirs, estimated at about 700 strong, located 2,800 yards north of the road, near the thirty-seventh mile-stone, was dispersed by fire from the 33rd Mountain Battery. The troops then retired to camp unmolested, arriving at

3.30 p.m. On the 26th inst. it was discovered that during the attack on the transport near Boya, 150 of the Militia had seized the opportunity during the confusion in the darkness to desert, taking their rifles and ammunition with them.

A few words must now be said about the Militia posts of Spinwan (Kaitu River) and Shewa, both in the Bannu Brigade area. The withdrawal of these garrisons presented great difficulties, as they were situated twenty-one and twenty-nine miles distant, respectively, from Idak, to which they had to retire.

Owing to lack of water there were no intermediate posts for refuge, if hotly pursued.

On May 24th news had reached the Officer Commanding Spinwan that General Nadir Khan, with his force, including artillery, had crossed the frontier and was expected at Spinwan the following day. In accordance with the pre-arranged plan, the withdrawal of the Shewa garrison to Spinwan was commenced, but unfortunately they were hotly pressed by the Wazirs from Datta Khel, and 1 subadar and 15 men were taken prisoners. The Spinwan garrison was able to withdraw in its turn by the assistance of three squadrons of the 31st Lancers, under Lieut.-Colonel B. P. Ellwood, who moved out from Kajuri (Tochi Valley), where they had been placed for this purpose.

The crossing of the frontier by General Nadir Khan caused the tribesmen of the upper Kaitu to flock to join his army, and other Wazirs to collect together to assist his enterprise. The evacuation of the upper Tochi posts had also had the effect of Lashkars of local tribes pouring down towards Miranshah. Here the situation was anything but pleasant. Letters had been received from Afghan officials calling on the Wazir officers serving with the North-West Militia to desert with their companies and join in the expulsion of the British from Waziristan. These had been shown to the British officers, which action was considered evidence of continued allegiance on the part of the Wazir officers concerned. However, the events of the last few days had very much excited the Wazirs still in the post, and on the 6th a company of 41st Dogras from Dardoni was sent as

an addition to the garrison, with a view to steadying them.

The following day about 600 Wazirs openly, and at the instigation of Jemadar Adjutant Tarin and Subadar Pal, declared their intention of leaving the post with their rifles and joining the Jihad. The Khattaks remained staunch, but another company of the 41st Dogras and one gun were added to the garrison. It was impossible to isolate the rebels, and any concerted movement produced indiscriminate firing. The Dogras were disposed in commanding positions, but during the night the Wazirs dug holes through the outer walls and made good their escape, but not without some casualties.

After this, order was restored in Miranshah. At this time the only communication with Bannu was by wireless, and the Battalion was kept busy with other units in Dardoni in strengthening the defences, including the construction of a covered way to the water supply about 500 yards due north of the camp, for the protection of which a small outpost was furnished. This was the outcome of strong rumours of an impending attack.

The tribal lashkars gathered on the surrounding hills, the bolder spirits sniping the camp and posts, awaiting the retirement of the garrison, which they considered our military weakness would necessitate.

In this they were disappointed, as Nadir Khan never paid his expected visit, but turned his attention to Thal instead.

One night, whilst the British officers of the Battalion were enjoying their well-earned dinner by the light of a famous lamp of new design, a party of the enemy were also attracted by its brilliance, and showed their appreciation by heavy sniping.

On the night of the 26th-27th all the lower Tochi posts held by the Militia were attacked, some of the garrisons deserting and taking with them rifles and ammunition.

On May 27th an aeroplane on reconnaissance landed at Dardoni, and, although it crashed when taking off, had considerable effect on the surrounding lashkars.

A counter-attraction was put up by a local Mulla, who claimed he could destroy any aeroplane by casting a spell on it, a statement which procured him a large number of followers. However, his demonstration proved so poor,

when a week later a successful bombing raid was carried out, that his disciples soon lost faith in him. Meanwhile a relief column was being formed in Bannu, which at this time consisted of three squadrons of cavalry, details of the 3/6th Gurkha Rifles and 2/112th Infantry, also two battalions of infantry and two guns.

Major-General Climo, C.B., D.S.O., had by now taken over command of the Waziristan Force, and decided to await the arrival of the other two battalions and Headquarters of the 43rd Brigade before reopening communication with Miranshah. Saidgi Post was, however, reinforced by two platoons of Regular troops from Bannu.

News that the Afghan army was sweeping down into the Tochi caused a great gathering of Wazirs in the vicinity of Darpa Khel, and General Lucas decided to disperse this lashkar and destroy certain villages.

Accordingly, at 5 a.m. on June 1st a column moved out of Dardoni and was joined by 250 of the North Waziristan Militia from Miranshah. The 3/6th Gurkha Rifles were detailed to cover the Miranshah Serai, to enable the Sappers and Miners to carry out their demolition orders, and finally to cover the retirement of the 41st Dogras and the 2/112th Infantry. The 41st Dogras encountered the enemy when piqueting Black Hill. When the withdrawal commenced one sepoy was killed and fell down the reverse slope of the hill. This caused considerable delay, and the enemy were comparatively close when the position was finally evacuated.

The 3/6th Gurkha Rifles then had to retire under heavy fire from the enemy, who were now on ground about 400 feet above the level of their position. During this one non-commissioned officer was killed and two Gurkha other ranks wounded. The evacuation of these casualties caused very little delay, and the Battalion withdrew successfully to Dardoni.

Total casualties during the operation: Killed, 2; wounded, 2.

During this action several towers from which sniping had occurred were destroyed, and later reports proved that the enemy had sustained some fifty casualties.

The result had a marked effect on the tribesmen, who

now realized that our forces could operate against them and with some success.

The following day the relief column from Bannu moved out and reached Saidgi without encountering any resistance. On June 3rd it moved to Khajuri, which was re-established and a squadron of the 31st D.C.O. Lancers sent on ahead towards Idak. On reaching Idak village, parties of hostile tribesmen were sighted. The cavalry got to close quarters and charged a party of fifty, killing eight with the lance. The remainder escaped into a deep, steep-sided nullah.

The main body reached Idak at midday. The march had been very hot, and there were a good many cases of heat stroke and exhaustion.

On June 4th the Battalion formed part of a column from Dardoni which connected up with the relief column from Idak to allow the convoy to pass through. The Battalion acted as advanced guard, and assisted in piqueting the Isha Kotal Hills. The operation was successfully carried out without opposition.

On June 7th the Battalion was on piqueting duty, and secured hills between thirty-six mile-stone and Isha post. No opposition was met with, and withdrawal to camp was successful.

On June 8th the Battalion formed part of a column detailed to destroy the villages in the area of Anghar, Peri Kot and Tagri. Destruction of the latter was allocated to "B" Company, commanded by Captain J. G. Bruce. The remainder of the Battalion left camp at 4.45 a.m. The heights of Black Hill enabled "B" Company to work round the north-west flank of the hill and complete the destruction of the village. The following captures were made: Men, 5 (two of whom appeared to be Militia deserters); women, 1; seen, 10 buffaloes; donkeys, 2.

At 9.50 a.m. a thick dust haze made communication with the North Waziristan Militia, piqueting Isha Kotal, and the 41st Dogras' headquarters on Chasmai Hill, impossible.

In spite of this, operations were successfully carried out, and the troops withdrew to camp unmolested.

On June 11th the Depot was ordered to join the Battalion at Dardoni.

On June 15th a force left Dardoni at 5 a.m. to destroy Tal village, which was dominated by Tal Fort, one of the evacuated Militia posts. The Battalion formed part of this force, and at 8 a.m. occupied a position south-west of Hill 3427, in accordance with orders. At 8.10 a.m. "A" and "D" Companies, commanded by Lieutenant Shuker and Captain Qualtrough, crossed the Tochi and occupied the hill west of Tal.

"B" and "C" Companies, commanded by Captains Bruce and Jones, then crossed the Tochi and occupied Tal Fort. This was found to be closed, and some shots had been fired which came from that direction.

A small party scaled the wall and bombed the keep, opening the door. A careful search of the fort produced no enemy. During the attack Jemadar Patrasing Gurung, "B" Company, was hit in the throat and leg, but not severely. A party from "A" Company was sent to assist the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry in destroying Tal village. At 12.2 p.m. orders for the withdrawal were received, and at this time the enemy were sniping from a position about 800 yards north-west of the fort. Artillery support was asked for, and the guns soon silenced the enemy. "A" and "C" Companies withdrew without any further casualty, followed by "A" and "D" Companies, and the Battalion, reforming at Chasmai, marched to camp, arriving at 2.15 p.m.

Total casualties: 1 Gurkha officer wounded.

At this time a considerable amount of patrolling was carried out by day and night from the camp, which resulted in the capture of several small parties of armed tribesmen.

On June 14th five armed Pathans were caught west of the camp and brought in. A letter was found on one, which proved to be from General Nadir Khan, addressed to the Officer Commanding Troops and Political Agent, Miranshah, forwarding a petition from certain Wazirs, stating that notwithstanding their observance of the armistice enjoined by the General, the British Government was destroying their villages. General Nadir Khan recommended that such action on our part should cease. The Pathans were handed over to the Political Agent, but arms and ammunition retained in the Battalion quarter guard.

On the 21st and 23rd two similar parties of tribesmen, carrying arms, were captured by a patrol of this Battalion.

During the next five weeks the Battalion took its turn on road protection duty, to allow the convoys to proceed. No enemy were encountered, and even the so-called local friendlies rarely showed themselves.

On June 6th the General Officer Commanding the force inspected the Battalion in field service order, and expressed his satisfaction as to general efficiency and turn-out.

At 5 p.m. on August 7th the Battalion received orders to be prepared to march at 4.30 the following morning.

At 7.30 p.m. information was received that a lashkar of Mahsuds and Wazirs was assembling at Wolghai, two miles south-east of Anghar, with the intention of attacking troops in the Tochi, and that the General Officer Commanding intended keeping the road open and attacking the enemy should he appear.

Two columns were formed, "A" (commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Ross, 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry), and "B" (commanded by Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Jewett, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles). The Battalion was located in "B" Column, with the following units: Section 55th Sappers and Miners, two companies 2/112th Infantry, one section 35th Mountain Battery, sub-section 303 Maxim guns, Bearer Division 25th Field Ambulance, with riding mules.

The column left camp at 4.30 a.m., with "B" Company, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles as advanced guard, and was joined by two companies of the 2/112th Infantry at the east gate of Militia Fort at 5 a.m.

The advance was then continued by a previously reconnoitred route. "B" Company occupied Fullers Earth, and "D" Company secured the hills south-east of this position and also occupied Table Hill.

"C" Company covered "A" Company on to Black Hill, and then took up a position on the same hill to the south. No enemy were encountered, and both columns withdrew to camp unmolested.

On the 9th, 13th and 17th the Battalion carried out road protection duties, without encountering any opposition, but the cavalry lost one sowar, killed, on

the last day, when reconnoitring in the vicinity of Anghar.

On the 18th inst. the Battalion took part in the destruction of Tal, Spalga, and small villages south-west of Anghand. No enemy were seen, and the operations were successfully carried out. During the next fortnight normal road protection duties were without incident.

On September 5th "A" and "B" Companies were out on convoy escort duty, and at 8.45 a.m. orders were received for the remainder of the Battalion to move out and take up a position at Chasmai, in support.

It was discovered that the enemy had damaged the road in several places, and had been seen collecting near Tappi. The road was repaired and the convoy passed safely, the troops withdrawing to camp without opposition.

Information had been received that a large lashkar of tribesmen had assembled in the Tochi, with a view to attacking our troops during the evacuation, which Nadir Khan had stated would take place on the Id. The Battalion was part of a force of all arms which moved out at 6 a.m. to deal with any attack that might take place.

The Battalion remained at Chasmai in reserve until 10 a.m., when orders were received to return to camp. No enemy were encountered, and the force withdrew without incident.

For the remainder of September normal road protection duties were carried out, and nothing of interest occurred. A new camel track was constructed by troops in reserve.

On October 5th, a road protection duty day for the Battalion, information was received that two Wazir gangs, numbering eighty all told, intended attacking the convoy or a piquet; also that there were another two gangs, numbering 200 each, wandering about the Tochi, location unknown. Such reports were frequent, but very seldom materialized, as in this case. A certain number of permanent piquets were under construction at this period, which, when completed and garrisoned, greatly assisted the road protection troops in their duty, and allowed their numbers to be considerably reduced.

The largest of these was situated on Point 3427 (Black Hill), and had a garrison of one British officer, 100 other

ranks, and one gun (275). The highest point of a ridge about two miles long, running east, and the vicinity of which was favourable for the enemy to lay an ambush for troops advancing to secure it, was occupied by a strong permanent garrison, which was able to send out subsidiary piquets in conjunction with the advance of the road protection troops, and reduced the anxieties of the officer commanding these troops to a minimum as regards that flank. The 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry furnished garrisons for the permanent piquets on completion of their construction.

On October 17th information was received that a party of enemy was occupying Naghar. The Battalion was ordered to round them up.

All perimeter posts held were relieved by the 2/112th Infantry, and the Battalion moved out at 1 a.m. on the 18th inst. "A" Company found the advanced guard, and the column proceeded south-east for about half a mile and entered a large nullah, running due south, which afforded good cover, and light flank guards proved sufficient protection. "D" Company furnished the rear guard.

The bridge at Takal Kot was reached at 2.30 a.m., when a whistling noise was heard which rather indicated that the enemy were being warned. "D" Company then moved about 1,000 yards down the Tochi, crossed the river bed, and took up a position to the south and south-west of Anghar. "B" and "C" Companies, following in succession, crossed the Tochi, "B" Company the area between Banda and Anghar, and "C" Company passing through and securing the low hills west of Anghar. "A" Company and Battalion Headquarters remained at 2999 in the vicinity of Takal Kot.

The high crops (the property of friendlies and therefore not to be destroyed) and the many irrigation channels, caused a good many falls, and many of the men, drenched to the skin, were not sorry to see the dawn.

Anghar was completely surrounded by 5 a.m., and at 6 a.m. visual communication was established between Battalion Headquarters and companies. "A" and "D" Companies then advanced into the village, but the enemy had evidently received warning and retired, and

only a few traces of their former presence were to be found. The Battalion then withdrew to camp.

A friendly Malik, or one of his followers, who owned Takal Kot was suspected of having given warning to the enemy in Anghar. Although the place was evacuated, Black Hill piquet had reported that on occasions a light had been seen in the direction of Takal Kot during the night. This was not forgotten.

On the 20th Captain Bruce, with 100 Gurkha other ranks, relieved the 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry in Black Hill piquet. Any light seen in unauthorized places was soon extinguished by a shell from the gun, and a series of bomb traps were laid—one in Takal Kot, which proved very effective and blew up the Malik's son.

Orders were received on October 28th for the Battalion to leave the force area, and on November 1st the move to Bannu began.

The Battalion arrived at Kalabagh on the 5th and remained there until the 9th, when it moved to Peshawar.

The General Officer Commanding expressed his regret at losing the Battalion, and complimented all ranks on the excellent way in which they had carried out their duties during their stay in the force.

Peshawar was reached on November 11th, and the Depot arrived from Kakul on the 16th, where it had been despatched from Bannu some months previously.

There was a great deal of work to be done in the way of reorganization, and the very heavy duties caused many difficulties.

In January, 1920, "C" Company moved to Bara Fort, where it remained on detachment for one month.

The Battalion left Peshawar on February 28th for Abbottabad, as demonstration troops to the Mountain Warfare School.

All ranks were in good fettle for such work after their experiences on the North-West Frontier, and the Commandant of the school frequently congratulated them on their speed and efficiency. This work was carried on until August 25th, when, owing to a local outbreak at Mansehra, the Battalion was despatched there and assisted the police in making several arrests.

From there it joined the Oghi Column, and remained in Oghi until November 17th, 1920.

On September 9th Lieut.-Colonel Jewett left to take over command of the 3/39th Garhwal Rifles.

Disbandment orders, dated September 16th, 1920, were received at Oghi, but, as no relief could be arranged at the time, it was postponed.

The Battalion was subsequently relieved and arrived at Abbottabad, when disbandment was commenced.

Cadre strength was reached on January 1st, 1921, and all men had left by February 1st, with the exception of a few clerks to deal with accounts. Officers then present with the Battalion were posted as under:—

Captain J. G. Bruce, Captain J. K. Jones, and
Captain G. H. Pulling to the 2/6th Gurkha Rifles.
They proceeded at once to Waziristan in October, 1920.

Captain H. Shuker to 62nd Punjabis.

Lieutenant E. G. H. Green to 2/5th Royal Gurkhas.

Lieutenant R. St. B. Emmott to 111th Mahrattas, but
employed as A.D.C. to His Excellency the
Governor of Punjab.

Major M. Wylie to 2/4th Gurkha Rifles.

Lieutenant A. G. Fuller to 1/70th Burma Rifles.

The following, being on leave ex-India, were not posted:—

Captain E. F. Qualtrough.

Captain A. V. W. Sheperd.

Captain E. F. W. H. Kevill-Davies.

Many of the Gurkha officers and other ranks returned to their old regiments, and a small percentage returned to re-enlist after a period in their homes.

A silver cup was presented to the 1st and 2nd Battalions as a memorial of the 3rd Battalion, which had done its best at all times to live up to the name of the regiment to which it had the honour to belong.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.

BRITISH OFFICERS WHO JOINED THE 2ND BATTALION 6TH GURKHA RIFLES IN 1904-05.

<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Appointment.</i>	<i>Joined.</i>	<i>From.</i>
Major F. C. Colomb	Commandant	15/11/04	1/6th G.R.
Major V. A. Ormsby	2nd-in-Comd.	25 2/05	2/3rd G.R.
Major H. C. Ducat	D.C.C.	6/2/05	2/4th G.R.
Captain J. H. Lloyd	D.C.C.	11/1/05	2/3rd G.R.
Captain A. J. Strange	D.C.C.	23/2/05	1/6th G.R.
Captain A. E. C. Perkins	Adjutant	8/11/04	1/6th G.R.
Captain F. S. B. Dalrymple-Hay	D.C.C.	23/2/05	1/6th G.R.
Lieut. B. A. McH. Rice	D.C.O.	23/2/05	1/6th G.R.
Lieut. H. D. MacLaughlin	D.C.O.	10/3/05	Malwa Bil. Corps.
Lieut. R. C. Blair	Qr.Mr.	8/11/04	1/6th G.R.
Lieut. B. C. Sparrow	D.C.O.	23/2/05	1/6th G.R.
Lieut. S. W. Beeman	D.C.O.	5/1/05	95th Inf.
Lieut. H. C. Hall	D.C.O.	7/5/05	Connaught Rangers.
Lieut. I. W. Bagot-Harte	D.C.O.	12/4/05	13th Raj- puts.
2/Lieut. C. L. Tireman	D.C.O.	7/5/05	7th Raj- puts.
2/Lieut. H. M. M. Hackett	D.C.O.	16/11/05	Attached.
Captain S. A. Harris	M.O.	21/1/05	—

APPENDIX II.

SECRET.

OPERATION INSTRUCTIONS BY LIEUT.-COLONEL THE HON.
C. G. BRUCE, M.V.O., COMMANDING 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES

COPY No.....

Place : BRUCE'S RAVINE.

Date : 3rd June, 1915.

Reference : Trench Maps.

Operation orders have not yet been received, but the following information is circulated as a preliminary measure.

Every Gurkha officer and Section Commander, and Rifleman if possible, must be acquainted with these instructions.

1. There are two distinct phases in the attack.

The first phase is to capture the trench 250 yards ahead of our position and beyond the enemy's wired trench, which is 60 yards ahead of our trenches.

If the wire has not been destroyed by our artillery, it will have to be cut and pulled down by men specially told off in the first line. This wired trench not being the objective, all men are to be warned that they must not stop to deal with any enemy who may be holding it, but are to press on as *fast* as possible.

Success will depend upon the pace at which the men can get over the ground.

The second phase of the attack will take place when ordered by the G.O.C., and it will not commence until the first phase has been carried through. The objective in the second phase is a trench 250 yards ahead of the first phase trench, and is distinguished by a hedge which bounds it.

2. The Lancashire Fusiliers will be on our right, and as they leave their trenches the Company of ours detailed for the first line of attack will leave their trenches so as to rush along level with their first line.

The Battalion is distributed as under for the attack :—

1st Phase.—"D" Company on the right to go straight forward in two lines, 13 and 14 Platoons leading, followed by 15 and 16 Platoons 50 yards behind. "C" Company will work along the Cliff.

2nd Phase.—"B" Company will occupy the position vacated by "D" Company. The Inniskillings will have occupied the trenches vacated by the Lancashire Fusiliers. When the Inniskillings start "B" Company will keep level with them, making every use of the ground to obtain cover. When the Inniskillings dash forward "B" Company will go with them.

The Company will be in two lines—5 and 6 Platoons in the first, in the second 50 yards behind, 7 and 8 Platoons.

"A" Company will work forward along the Cliff.

3. To get Companies into position for the attack, as soon as orders are received as to times, etc., the following will be carried out :—A draft of 80 men are expected to-night. All young soldiers will be picked from this to garrison the trenches (64 men have got to remain behind). Company Commanders will arrange to leave 1 N.C.O. per Company.

and Jemadar Indrajit, to look after the garrison. N.C.Os. to be included in the 64. If the draft does not arrive in time, 1 man per Section will be detailed from men present.

"D" Company, plus this Company of 64 men, will man the firing line.

When the time comes to leave the trench there must be no delay in crossing the parapet. The Garrison men must help the others over.

Sandbags and empty ammunition boxes must be made into steps. As soon as "D" Company has gone forward "B" Company will occupy the firing line.

"C" Company will collect under Captain Birdwood's orders.

"A" Company under Captain Abbott's.

4. Every man will carry 2 sandbags, 200 rounds of ammunition, 100 in pouches, 100 in rucksack, emergency ration, iron ration, full water-bottle, entrenching tool (Sirhind). Greatcoats and any other kit usually carried in the rucksack, to be rolled up in the blanket, and stacked in the position occupied by the Reserve Company.

5. Twenty men per Company will be detailed to follow up their Companies with entrenching tools and ammunition; on arrival at their Companies, they will remain with them, and not come back unless specially ordered to do so to get more ammunition.

On arrival of Companies at their objectives, the position will be strengthened at once. It must be impressed on all men that the enemy will certainly counter-attack, and upon their digging rests their safety.

6. Telephones must be run forward from H.Q. to Companies as soon as possible. A helio should be taken to guard against communication breaking.

Battalion H.Q. will be located at the Ship Signal Station for the first phase.

Battalion H.Q. will be at Mushroom Redoubt during second phase.

7. Dressing Station: at present H.Q. nalla, first phase.

Mushroom nalla, second phase.

No man is to come back with a wounded man. Stretcher-bearers will render first aid, slightly wounded men will make their own way back.

Badly wounded men will be collected after dark.

8. Instructions and a map received from the Brigade are being circulated. These are secret. Don't chance allowing them or these orders being blown over the parapet by the wind.

9. "D" and "B" Companies are to take over all wire-cutters from "A" and "C" Companies.

Pistols, flares, and periscopes must be brought on by the 20 men detailed to bring forward ammunition and entrenching tools.

D. G. J. RYAN, *Captain,*

Adjutant, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Copy No. 1 to "A" Company.

" No. 2 to "B" Company.

" No. 3 to "C" Company.

" No. 4 to "D" Company.

" No. 5 filed.

APPENDIX III.

SECRET.**OPERATION ORDER BY LIEUT.-COLONEL THE HON. C. G. BRUCE, M.V.O., COMMANDING 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.**

COPY No.....

*Place : GURKHA BEACH.**Date : June 27th, 1915.**Reference : Trench Map 3.*

1. Reference Brigade Operation Orders of 22/6/1915. The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles will take part in the second assault, and will act in combination with half battalion 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, which will secure as directed as much of the trench marked J.11a as possible. The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, less half battalion held in reserve, under the C.O. will follow behind the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, and will secure any part of J.11a which the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles have been unable to secure up to the N.W. corner of J.12, when the spur running from J.12 to the sea will be secured and held. The reserve half-battalion, under orders of the O.C. 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, will follow in rear of the leading half-battalion, and will assist in its turn in securing the ridge from J.13 to the sea.

The 1/5th Gurkha Rifles will support the advance of the left half battalion 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

2. The right half battalion "A" and "B" Companies, "A" Company leading, will follow the 2/10th Gurkha Rifles.

The left half battalion, less 15 and 16 Platoons, will form the reserve and will move out, "C" Company leading.

The machine guns, which will be withdrawn from their present positions at dawn, are distributed as follows:—One gun to accompany leading half battalion, one gun with reserve half battalion.

3. The 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, prior to moving forward, will assemble in Y Ravine at 9.45 a.m.

4. Nos. 15 and 16 Platoons will furnish two sections to each Company. These sections will be utilized in carrying forward ammunition and entrenching tools, 4 boxes ammunition per Company to be taken forward.

5. The M.O. will establish a dressing station in Mushroom Nulla to begin with, and if opportunity offers will push forward and form a Station under cover in a suitable nullah. No man is to leave the firing line to accompany casualties to the rear.

6. Telephonic communication is to be established with Battalion H.Q. as soon as possible.

C.O.'s 1st position : Bruce's Ravine.

„ 2nd position : J.12.

7. All kit will be stored by the cookhouses, and will be left in charge of the sanitary police.

8. Dress for to-morrow : Field Service Order shirts ; jerseys will *not* be worn under shirts ; 200 rounds ammunition—100 in pouches, 100

in rucksack ; emergency and iron ration and unexpended portion of day's ration in rucksack ; 2 respirators per man.

Field Service hats will be worn.

9. Should more ammunition be required, requisite men will be sent back to the Adjutant with a chit stating how many boxes.

If the Adjutant cannot be found, these men will be ordered to proceed direct to the Brigade dump in Y Ravine.

10. Fifty bombs are available per Company, and will be obtained from the J.A. on an indent.

11. As soon as the position has been consolidated the Quartermaster will arrange to send forward food and water and ammunition.

Twenty-five mules are being supplied by the Brigade for this purpose.

12. These orders are to be explained to Company and Section Commanders.

D. G. J. RYAN, *Captain,*
Adjutant 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Copy No. 1 to " A " Company.
,, No. 2 to " B " Company.
,, No. 3 to " C " Company.
,, No. 4 to " D " Company.
,, No. 5 to 29th Infantry Brigade.
,, No. 6 filed.

APPENDIX IV.

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDER BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. J. ALLANSON,
COMMANDING 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

COPY No.

Date : 29/10/1915.

Reference : Attached sketch.

1. A support trench 100 yards in length, with its right taking off from a point 50 yards in rear of the firing line out of Tillard Sap will be constructed to-night.

2. The Battalion will work in three reliefs—viz. :—

First relief : 7 p.m.—10 p.m. " D " Company.

Second relief : 10 p.m.—1 a.m. " B " Company.

Third relief : 1 a.m.—4 a.m. " C " Company.

3. The first relief will work on the line which will be laid out with white paper by the Adjutant, and will take up entrenching tools and 1,000 sandbags, each man carrying 10 empty bags.

4. Incoming Companies will move to work via Regent Street and Tillard Sap. Outgoing Companies, Tillard Sap, Piccadilly—Green Lane. The ingoing Company will not pass the junction of Regent Street and Bond Street until the outgoing Company is clear of Charing Cross.

5. Tools will be left in rear of the work by Companies. The last relief will bring all tools home again.

6. The British officer of the outgoing relief will point out the work to the officer of the new relief.

7. Should the trench be completed within nine hours, the unexpended portion of the time will be expended on latrines, officers, and Gurkha officers' dug-outs.

8. Dimensions of trench as per attached diagram.

9. The Adjutant will meet O.C. " D " Company in Tillard Sap at 7 p.m. at a point 50 yards in rear of the firing line.

10. Communication trenches will be constructed to-morrow night.

D. G. J. RYAN, *Captain,*

Adjutant 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Copy No. 1 to O.C. " B " Company.

„ No. 2 to O.C. " C " Company.

„ No. 3 to O.C. " D " Company.

„ No. 4 retained.

APPENDIX V.

SECRET.

OPERATION ORDERS BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. J. L. ALLANSON,
COMMANDING 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

COPY No.....

Date : 1/11/1915.

Reference : Attached sketch.

1. The Battalion will relieve the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles occupying the line from Bury Street to Leeson Street on 3/11/1915.

2. Distribution of line as follows :—

(i) From Bury Street to the 15th Ward inclusive in Harte Sap, "D" Company; the New Sap between Bury Street and the prolongation of Bagot Street will be occupied. Supports in Gurkha Street.

(ii) From 15th Ward exclusive in Harte Sap to 2nd Ward inclusive on the right of Tillard Sap, "A" Company; the new portion of the line branching off from near Grafton Street will be occupied; supports in Gurkha Street.

(iii) From 1st Ward inclusive on right of Tillard Sap to Leeson Street, "C" Company. Supports in Palpa Lane.

(iv) "B" Company will furnish two platoons as support to "C" Company in Palpa Lane.

"B" Company, less two platoons, will form a local reserve, and will occupy Piccadilly and Bond Street.

3. "D" Company will be at the head of Bagot Street at 5 a.m., moving via Regent Street—"A" Sap—Gurkha Street.

"A" Company will be at the head of Tillard Sap at 5.10 a.m., moving via Regent Street—Tillard Sap.

"C" Company will be at the head of Leeson Street at 5.20 a.m., moving via Green Lane—Leeson Street.

"B" Company will occupy Piccadilly and Bond Street at 5.30 a.m., moving via Green Lane and Piccadilly.

As soon as the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles are clear of the firing line two platoons "B" Company will be sent to Palpa Lane.

4. All trench stores will be taken over from 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

5. Telephonic communication will be established between Company Commanders and H.Q.

6. As soon as reliefs are complete Company Commanders will report to H.Q. by telephone.

7. Headquarters will move to firing line H.Q. immediately in rear of "A" Company.

D. G. J. RYAN, *Captain,*
Adjutant 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

8 p.m.

Copy No. 1 to O.C. "A" Company.

" No. 2 to O.C. "B" Company.

" No. 3 to O.C. "C" Company.

" No. 4 to O.C. "D" Company.

" No. 5 to O.C. 1/4th Gurkha Rifles.

" No. 6 to Brigade Major.

" No. 7 retained.

" No. 8 to Medical Officer.

APPENDICES—

Trench Map.

"Trench Discipline."

O.Cs. "B" and "C" Companies will visit the firing line at 10.30 a.m.

2/11/1915.

O.Cs. "A" and "D" Companies, at 3 p.m. 2/11/1915.

APPENDIX VI

SECRET.

1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES ORDER No. 17/12/15.

Reference Map No. 12.

1. Orders have been received for the re-embarkation of 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and its transfer to Imbros.

2. The Battalion will embark on two nights, dates to be notified later, and will move as follows:—

(a) 1st Night.— O.C. : Captain J. O. Airy.

Troops : 2 Gurkha Officers.

45 Gurkha Other Ranks.

This party will arrive at Brigade Headquarters at 20.15 hours, where it will be met by a Staff Officer, who will guide it to North Beach, Anzac, where it will embark.

(b) 2nd Night.—The Battalion less the above party will move in three parties, as under:—

"A" Party—O.C. : Captain Kirkwood, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles.

Troops : Lieut. H. C. Toller (O.C. 1/6th Party).

2/Lieut. N. B. Hart.

2 Gurkha Officers.

89 Gurkha Other Ranks.

"A" Party will arrive at Brigade Headquarters at 17.40 hours, where it will be met by a Staff Officer, who will guide it to North Beach, Anzac, arriving at place of embarkation at 18.25 hours.

The Lighter will arrive at 19.00 hours.

Orders regarding time and method of departure will be issued verbally to Lieut. H. C. Toller, but "A" Party will be ready to move from the trenches at 16.00 hours.

"B" Party—O.C. : Major A. B. Tillard, D.S.O., 1/5th Gurkha Rifles.

Troops—Lieut. K. L. Fasken (O.C. 1/6th Party).

3 Gurkha Officers.

95 Gurkha Other Ranks.

Battalion Headquarters will accompany "B" Party.

"B" Party will arrive at Brigade Headquarters at 21.15 hours. Captain Finnis, 14th Sikhs, will guide it to Anzac, arriving at place of embarkation at 22.15 hours. Lighter arrives 23.00 hours and leaves at midnight.

"C" Party—O.C. : Captain C. Watson Smyth, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Troops : Captain I. W. Bagot Harte (O.C. 1/6th Party).

2/Lieut. J. Snodgrass.

2 Gurkha Officers.

46 Gurkha Other Ranks.

The men of "C" Party will be the last to leave the firing-line trenches, and will be selected by Captain Bagot Harte.

Orders regarding the embarkation of "C" Party will be verbal.

3. The composition of the various parties will be communicated later.

4. Movements will be carried out expeditiously and in ABSOLUTE SILENCE. There will be no smoking, and no lights will be lit. Company Commanders are held personally responsible that every man thoroughly understands this order.

5. All parties with the exception of "C" Party will move off from the support trench (Palpa Lane); the route to be followed by all parties is Leeson Street—Sackville Street—Sikh Walk—Bde. H.Qs.

6. Parties moving from the support trench will be closed up on the

first ward on the right of Leeson Street. If there is not sufficient room, wards to the left of Leeson Street will also be occupied.

7. "B" and "C" Parties, unless ordered to the contrary, will wear socks over their boots, putties being put on over the top part of the sock to prevent it coming off.

8. 150 rounds of ammunition will be taken from the trenches. Before leaving the support trench the round in the chamber will be removed, but magazines will remain charged. Bayonets will be unfixed. Great care must be taken to carry out these operations in silence.

9. Captain J. O. Airy's party will wear great coats and carry rucksacks. In addition, they will carry 1 W.P. sheet and 1 blanket.

"A" Party will wear great coats and rucksacks, but will carry nothing in addition.

"B" Party will carry rucksacks, but will leave their great coats in the trenches.

"C" Party will carry nothing.

10. Rucksacks of "A" and "B" Parties will contain—

1 pair socks.

Emergency ration.

W.P. cape.

Waterbottle (filled).

Canteen (inside cape). (Note precaution against noise.)

Ammunition (50 rounds).

Nothing will be added to this. Canteens will contain the unconsumed portion of the day's ration. Company Commanders will see that this order is obeyed absolutely and that no brushes, tins or cleaning material are included.

11. Shoulder straps will not be fastened.

12. No fires will be lit to burn discarded kits, etc.

13. All official correspondence will be removed or destroyed.

14. Telephone instruments will be removed by "B" Party, with the exception of one telephone in Tillard Sap, which will be connected direct with Brigade Headquarters.

15. On the first day of evacuation, Kehars will take over casualties at Brigade Headquarters. On the second day casualties must be sent direct to No. 13 C.C.S. under Regimental arrangements.

16. Tins and other articles likely to make a noise if accidentally moved should be placed in positions of safety (e.g., in tunnels), but care should be taken not to alter the appearance of the firing line or support trenches as seen from commanding points. Blankets, etc., should be replaced, if necessary, in the support line after the departure of Captain Airy's party.

17. During the second night the 1/5th Gurkha Rifles will relieve the Battalion in that portion of the line from the right of our present line (Ivy Lane) to Tillard Sap (inclusive). Probable hour of relief, 16.45 hours. Captain Bagot Harte will arrange to remove to their own wards those men of "D" Company detailed for "C" Party before the relief takes place. "D" Company on relief will move into the support line to the left of the Tillard Sap.

18. On the second day ammunition boxes will be opened and placed in such positions as Captain Bagot Harte may direct.

19. Pickaxes and shovels will be placed in the tunnels, with the exception of those in use in the New Sap.

20. Stretchers to accompany parties will be taken to Sackville Street before dark, in such a way that they will not be seen.

(Sd) N. H. KING SALTER, *Lieut.,
Adjutant, 1/6th Gurkha Rifles.*

To be read and initialled by all British Officers.

APPENDIX VII.

SECRET.

"C" PARTY ORDER No.

19/12/15.

Reference Map No. 12.

1. From 21.00 hours onwards O.C. "C" Party will be at Brigade Headquarters (Damajelik Bair), and will be in telephonic communication with the firing line by means of a telephone located in Tillard Sap.

2. Orders to commence the evacuation will be telephoned, but should telephonic communication break down the evacuation will commence at 01.30 hours, December 20th. It must be distinctly understood that the last few men do not leave the trenches until 01.40 hours.

3. A covering party as follows—

O.C. : 2/Lieut. Gladstone, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles ;

Troops : 25 Gurkha Other Ranks, 1/5th Gurkha Rifles—

will be clear of the trenches by 01.25 hours, December 20th, and will act in accordance with verbal orders which have been issued to the O.C. Covering Party regarding route, and position.

4. The O.C. Covering Party will report to O.C. "C" Party as soon as O.C. "C" Party arrives at the pier for embarkation, that the covering party is in position. After this the covering party will receive orders from Lieut.-Colonel Lord Kensington, O.C. Welch Horse.

5. Party 1/5th Gurkha Rifles will withdraw via Tillard Sap—Cypress Alley to Brigade Headquarters.

Party 1/6th Gurkha Rifles will withdraw via Leeson Street—Sikh Walk to Brigade Headquarters.

O.C. "C" Party will meet both detachments at Brigade Headquarters.

6. It is essential that sniping as usual from the firing line be kept up until the last moment.

7. Absolute silence will be maintained throughout ; men will not carry blankets, kits or W.P. sheets ; if capes are carried they must be packed inside rucksacks, which will contain the following articles :—

Waterbottle (filled).

Emergency ration.

50 rounds ammunition.

1 pair socks.

Canteen with unexpended portion of day's ration in it.

Shoulder straps must be unfastened.

8. Men of both regiments must either remove their boots or wear socks over their boots. They will be instructed to step as lightly as possible.

9. All men must be warned beforehand of the way by which they will leave the trenches. A British or Gurkha Officer will be instructed to bring up the rear.

10. The pace must be as fast as possible without doubling.

11. It must be carefully impressed on all ranks that there is to be no firing once the men have got down from the firing step ; only the bayonet is to be used. The round in the chamber will be removed and bayonets unfixed.

12. The rear files of each detachment should be bombers, and they must carry as many bombs as the respective O.Cs. think advisable.

13. "C" Party is timed to arrive at the Azmac Dere by 02.30 hours, December 20th.

(Sd) C. WATSON SMYTH, *Captain,*

1/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Copy No. 1 to Captain I. W. Bagot Harte, 1/6th G.R.

Copy No. 2 to Captain W. G. Harrington, 1/5th G.R.

APPENDIX VIII.

LIST OF HONOURS AWARDED FOR CONSPICUOUS
GALLANTRY AND DEVOTION TO DUTY IN GALLIPOLI.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Company.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
—	Lt.-Col. The Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.	C.O.	C.B., Bt. Colonelcy.
—	Major C. J. L. Allanson, C.I.E.	—	D.S.O.
—	Capt. H. R. A. Whytehead	" B "	Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Capt. C. W. B. Birdwood...	" C "	Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Capt. A. W. D. Cornish ...	—	M.C.
—	Capt. P. J. Gout ...	" D "	M.C. (attached).
—	Capt. J. S. Dallas ...	—	Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Capt. F. B. Abbott ...	—	D.S.O.
—	Capt. D. G. J. Ryan ...	Adj't.	D.S.O.
—	Capt. G. Tomes ...	—	Mentioned in Despatches (attached).
—	Capt. E. S. Phipson ...	M.O.	D.S.O.
—	Lieut. L. E. Poynder ...	—	M.C.
—	Lieut. H. C. Toller ...	—	Mentioned in Despatches (I.A.R.O.).
—	Lieut. H. C. Underhill ...	—	Mentioned in Despatches (I.A.R.O.).
—	Lieut. J. W. LeMarchant	—	Mentioned in Despatches (attached).
—	Sub.-Major Gambirsing Pun	" A "	M.C. and I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Sub. Sahabir Thapa ...	" D "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Sub. Dalbir Rana ...	" C "	Mentioned in Despatches.
—	Sub. Satalsing Thapa ...	Jem. Adj.	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Sub. Kulbahadur Thapa ...	" B "	I.O.M. (2nd Class) and I.D.S.M.
—	Jem. Santabir Gurung ...	" A "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Jem. Balsing Thapa ...	" A "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Jem. Dalbahadur Thapa ...	" D "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Jem. Dhanraj Thapa ...	" B "	I.D.S.M.
—	Jem. Nandalal Gurung ...	" C "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
—	Jem. Nandasing Gurung ...	" B "	I.D.S.M.
42	Hav. Balbir Rana ...	" D "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
285	Hav. Narbahadur Gurung	" D "	I.D.S.M.
4388	Hav. Puransing Gharti ...	" A "	I.D.S.M.
724	Hav. Indrajit Gurung ...	" C "	I.D.S.M.

<i>No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Company.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
266	Naik Budhiram Gharti ...	" A "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
343	Naik Hembahadur Rana	" B "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
810	L./Naik Gorla Gurung ...	" C "	Médaille Militaire.
560	L./Naik Kaharsing Gurung	" B "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
957	L./Naik Nimbahadur Pun	" B "	Médaille Militaire.
1088	Rfmn. Harka Gurung ...	" B "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
29	Rfmn. Chandrasing Gurung	" B "	I.O.M. (2nd Class).
561	Rfmn. Lalsing Thapa ...	" D "	I.D.S.M.
1105	Rfmn. Dhanbir Thapa ...	" D "	I.D.S.M.
331	Rfmn. Lalbir Thapa ...	" A "	Mentioned in Despatches.
4804	Rfmn. Dammarsing ...	" A "	Mentioned in Despatches.
604	Rfmn. Kesar Rana ...	" D "	I.D.S.M.
706	Rfmn. Kabiraj Gurung ...	" B "	I.D.S.M.
1074	Rfma. Garbhasing Gurung	" A "	I.D.S.M. (attached).

APPENDIX IX.

MARCH TABLE.

<i>Date.</i>	<i>From—</i>	<i>To—</i>	<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles to Date.</i>	<i>Height above Sea Level</i>
					<i>Feet.</i>
1918.					
Sept. 18	Ruz	Kurdarrah Bridge	8	8	—
" 19	Kurdarrah Bridge	Jasun	6	14	—
" 19	Jasun	Nau Daman ...	11	25	—
" 20	Nau Daman ...	Khanekin ...	11	36	—
" 21	Khanekin ...	Night Halt ...	12	48	—
" 22	Night Halt ...	Kasr-i-Shirin ...	10	58	1,800
" 22	Kasr-i-Shirin ...	Night Halt ...	13	71	—
" 23	Night Halt ...	Sar-i-Pul ...	5	76	2,500
" 24	Sar-i-Pul ...	Pai Tak... ..	12	88	3,350
" 26	Pai Tak... ..	Sar-i-Mil ...	15	103	5,500
" 27	Sar-i-Mil ...	Chasma Safid ...	12	115	5,300
" 28	Chasma Safid ...	Harunabad ...	16	131	4,850
" 29	Harunabad ...	Hassanabad ...	12	143	—
" 30	Hassanabad ...	Mahidasht ...	17	160	4,850
Oct. 1	Mahidasht ...	Karesu Bridge	21	181	4,500
" 3	Karesu Bridge	Bisitun	19	200	4,500
" 4	Bisitun	Saneh	17	217	—
" 5	Saneh	Kangavar ...	20	237	—
" 6	Kangavar ...	Assadabad ...	23	260	—
" 7	Assadabad ...	Yungi Khan ...	18	278	—
" 8	Yungi Khan ...	Hamadan ...	17	295	6,156
Nov. 6	Hamadan ...	Kulijan	19	314	—
" 7	Kulijan	Ruan	12	326	—
" 8	Ruan	Sirab	15	341	—
" 9	Sirab	Manian	14	355	—
" 10	Manian	Aveh	15	370	—
" 11	Aveh	Ab-i-Garm ...	15	385	—
" 12	Ab-i-Garm ...	Nahvand ...	18	403	—
" 13	Nahvand ...	Siahdahan ...	16	419	—
" 14	Siahdahan ...	Sultanabad ...	16	435	—
" 15	Sultanabad ...	Kasvin	7	442	4,165
" 18	Kasvin	Agababa ...	15	457	—
" 19	Agababa ...	Yuzbashichai ...	19	476	—
" 20	Yuzbashichai ...	Moula Ali ...	10	486	—
" 21	Moula Ali ...	Jemalabad ...	12	498	—
" 22	Jemalabad ...	Menjil	13	511	—
" 23	Menjil	Lusadabad ...	18	529	—
" 24	Lusadabad ...	Imamzada Hachem ...	14	543	—
" 25	Imamzada Hachem ...	Sangar	11	554	—
" 26	Sangar	Resht	10	564	—
" 27	Resht	Khomam	11	575	—
" 28	Khomam	Enzeli	14	589	—

APPENDIX X.

ROLL OF HONOUR BRITISH OFFICERS,
6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Lieutenant	Bedingfield	Nanklao, 1829.
Lieutenant	Burlton	Nanklao, 1829.
Lieut.-Col.	A. White (C.O.)	Sadiya, 1839.
Lieutenant	Lockett	Sadiya, 1843.
Captain	A. Harrison	Lushai Expdn., 1872
Major	H. Stevens	Chin Hills, 1889.
Lieut.-Col.	C. McD. Skene, D.S.O. (C.O.) ...	Manipur, 1891.
Capt. and Bt. Col.	A. G. B. Ternan, D.S.O. (C.O.) ...	Manipur, 1893.
Captain	C. W. B. Birdwood	Gallipoli, 1915.
Captain	H. R. A. Whytehead	Gallipoli, 1915.
Captain	J. S. Dallas	Gallipoli, 1915.
Lieutenant	H. C. Underhill, I.A.R.O.	Gallipoli, 1915.
Lieutenant	C. C. E. Manson, M.C.	Gallipoli, 1915.
Lieutenant	J. W. J. Le Marchand (attd.) ...	Gallipoli, 1915.
Captain	G. Tomes (attd.)	Gallipoli, 1915.
Captain	D. I. B. Lloyd (attd.)	Gallipoli, 1915.
Lieutenant	H. Greene (attd.)	Gallipoli, 1915.
Lieutenant	L. E. Poynder, M.C.	Mesopotamia, 1916.
Major	I. W. Bagot Harte	Waziristan, 1917.
Captain	F. T. H. Mullaly	Mesopotamia, 1917.
Lieutenant	W. Mowbray	Mesopotamia, 1917.
Lieutenant	J. W. A. Merk	Mesopotamia, 1917.
Lieutenant	E. W. Keen, I.A.R.O.	Mesopotamia, 1918.
Captain	N. H. King Salter	Mesopotamia, 1919.
Lieut.-Col.	G. A. Preston (C.O.)	Caucasus, 1919.
Lieutenant	F. le F. Dobbin	Mesopotamia, 1919.
Lieut.-Col.	G. W. S. Sherlock	Waziristan, 1921.

APPENDIX XI.

NOMINAL ROLL OF GURKHA OFFICERS, 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES, KILLED IN ACTION, 1914-1919.

Subadar Dalbir Rana.
Subadar Lilaram Gurung.
Subadar Dhanbir Thapa.

NOMINAL ROLL OF OTHER RANKS OF "A" COMPANY, 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES, KILLED IN ACTION, 1914-1919.

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
4599	Hav. Kulbahadur Thapa.	4700	Rfmn. Dalsur Pun.
4953	Naik Indrasing Gurung.	4802	Rfmn. Apai Gurung.
4979	Naik Puransing Gharti.	4887	Rfmn. Tularam Thapa.
4010	Rfmn. Dhule Gurung.	480	Rfmn. Aibaria Pun.
1531	Rfmn. Nainsing Thapa.	513	Rfmn. Aitasing Gurung.
4678	Rfmn. Chandrasing Gurung.	599	Rfmn. Keshar Rana.
4803	Rfmn. Narbir Gurung.	782	Rfmn. Kaharsing Bura.
4933	Rfmn. Jangbir Bura.	916	Rfmn. Lachman Thapa.
72	Rfmn. Tulasing Thapa.	1011	Rfmn. Mansaram Rana.
97	Rfmn. Jokhe Thapa.	1775	Rfmn. Parmandhoj Thapa.
111	Rfmn. Deosing Thapa.	420	Rfmn. Dande Rana.
193	Rfmn. Karbir Rana.	439	Rfmn. Motiram Pun.
330	Rfmn. Jokhe Bura.	851	Rfmn. Dalbahadur Thapa.
357	Rfmn. Nachendra Gurung.	1007	Rfmn. Mohansing Thapa.
392	Rfmn. Chabilal Ale.	1281	Rfmn. Sabal Thapa.
396	Rfmn. Balusing Gurung.	1351	Rfmn. Dasarai Rai.
462	Rfmn. Santbir Thapa.	1411	Rfmn. Puste Rai.
473	Rfmn. Bhuwansing Rana.	1637	Rfmn. Kare Rana.
577	Rfmn. Jangbir Bura.	1518	Rfmn. Manjit Pun.
687	Rfmn. Mansarma Gurung.	4287	Rfmn. Chandrasing Gurung.
781	Rfmn. Manbahadur Ale.	993	Rfmn. Tekbahadur Pun.
821	Rfmn. Ranbahadur Thapa.	1473	Rfmn. Jagatbahadur Sunwar.
908	Rfmn. Ranu Gurung.	1982	Rfmn. Kale Pun.
923	Rfmn. Damarsing Gurung.	2019	Rfmn. Tulsiram Pun.
927	Rfmn. Bhimdhoj Gurung.	2403	Rfmn. Tamar Thapa.
1000	Rfmn. Gore Rana.	2583	Rfmn. Kabiram Chettri.
1048	Rfmn. Dalsur Rana.	933	Rfmn. Pahalsing Thapa.
1072	Rfmn. Kharakbahadur Thapa.	1730	Rfmn. Parbir Gurung.
1091	Rfmn. Santbir Gurung.	3018	Rfmn. Gangabir Gurung.
1133	Rfmn. Sarbe Gharti.	4410	Rfmn. Ranbahadur Rana.
1214	Rfmn. Kharksing Thapa.		

NOMINAL ROLL OF OTHER RANKS OF "B" COMPANY, 1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES, KILLED IN ACTION, 1914-1919.

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
4626	Hav. Dhanbir Thapa.	4508	Rfmn. Hastbir Gharti.
4927	Hav. Bisambahadur Thapa.	4997	Rfmn. Amarsing Thapa.
247	Naik Mansharka Thapa.	112	Rfmn. Sete Pun.
296	Naik Lachhe Pun.	280	Rfmn. Rudrasing Thapa.
285	Naik Narbahadur Gurung.	372	Rfmn. Mahabir Thapa.
4899	L./Naik Manbahadur Gurung.	412	Rfmn. Tikaram Thapa.
4945	L./Naik Jasbir Gurung.	424	Rfmn. Gopilal Ghalie.
		441	Rfmn. Dhansing Pun.

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
481	Rfmn. Bhakte Gharti.	4778	Rfmn. Hastabir Gurung.
539	Rfmn. Sherbahadur Gurung.	591	Rfmn. Adalsur Pun.
548	Rfmn. Chandrasing Gurung.	734	Rfmn. Gagsansing Thapa.
578	Rfmn. Motiram Bura.	735	Rfmn. Mahadeo Ale.
609	Rfmn. Khage Rana.	769	Rfmn. Parsaram Thapa.
795	Rfmn. Thagbir Pun.	820	Rfmn. Chhatar Gurung.
863	Rfmn. Akbar Gurung.	846	Rfmn. Mandhoj Gurung.
951	Rfmn. Narjit Gurung.	967	Rfmn. Bahadur Gurung.
978	Rfmn. Pirthising Gurung.	995	Rfmn. Bai Gurung.
997	Rfmn. Nardhoj Gurung.	996	Rfmn. Dalsing Thapa.
1017	Rfmn. Pirthiman Gurung.	1006	Rfmn. Jokhe Gharti.
1052	Rfmn. Hiralal Gurung.	1156	Rfmn. Dadram Ghalie.
1056	Rfmn. Dhanbir Gurung.	1166	Rfmn. Bharat Thapa.
1106	Rfmn. Narbir Thapa.	1186	Rfmn. Kharaksing Rana.
1115	Rfmn. Hirabahadur Thapa.	1195	Rfmn. Bishnu Thapa.
1119	Rfmn. Meharsing Bura.	1481	Rfmn. Champasing Gurung.
1138	Rfmn. Kaloo Gurung.	557	Rfmn. Pahalman Gurung.
1172	Rfmn. Ujarsing Gurung.	1028	Rfmn. Narbahadur Gurung.
1178	Rfmn. Tekbahadur Gurung.	1059	Rfmn. Kansiram Thapa.
1185	Rfmn. Damarsing Gurung.	1213	Rfmn. Puransing Gurung.
4570	Rfmn. Nandbir Thapa.	1317	Rfmn. Birman Thapa.
4655	Rfmn. Bishnu Rana.	1354	Rfmn. Partiman Pun.
		1545	Rfmn. Manbir Gurung.
		2384	Rfmn. Bhadrabir Thapa.

NOMINAL ROLL OF OTHER RANKS OF "C" COMPANY,
1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES, KILLED IN ACTION, 1914-1919.

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
4444	Hav. Gambarsing Gurung.	470	Rfmn. Jitbahadur Thapa.
4571	Hav. Ranbir Thapa.	593	Rfmn. Padamsing Gharti.
121	Hav. Bhimbahadur Thapa.	635	Rfmn. Chandrabir Thapa.
317	Hav. Dhansing Thapa.	641	Rfmn. Bhimsing Thapa.
3960	Hav. Kaloo Gurung.	674	Rfmn. Birkhsing Thapa.
4717	Naik. Gambu Thapa.	699	Rfmn. Sahabir Pun.
4247	Rfmn. Aitlal Thapa.	703	Rfmn. Balbir Thapa.
4701	Rfmn. Jokhe Gurung.	729	Rfmn. Antbir Thapa.
4820	Rfmn. Asbir Gurung.	745	Rfmn. Balbir Thapa.
4855	Rfmn. Bajendra Gurung.	835	Rfmn. Mangalsing Gurung.
4862	Rfmn. Tikaram Thapa.	837	Rfmn. Gokulsing Thapa.
4890	Rfmn. Mansing Gharti.	841	Rfmn. Kame Thapa.
4913	Rfmn. Bhagtabir Thapa.	880	Rfmn. Bhorbir Ghalie.
4915	Rfmn. Bahadur Rana.	909	Rfmn. Sakhrum Gurung.
4952	Rfmn. Bahadur Rana.	920	Rfmn. Narbahadur Gurung.
45	Rfmn. Budhibal Gurung.	1054	Rfmn. Attarsing Gurung.
205	Rfmn. Ranbir Ghalie.	1085	Rfmn. Kharaksing Gurung.
218	Rfmn. Puransing Gurung.	1088	Rfmn. Keharsing Ale.
264	Rfmn. Bhagatbir Rana.	1097	Rfmn. Khajyang Gurung.
303	Rfmn. Harkbir Thapa.	1145	Rfmn. Hirasing Thapa.
388	Rfmn. Balu Gurung.	1154	Rfmn. Narbahadur Gurung
444	Rfmn. Bahadur Rana.	1204	Rfmn. Amarsing Thapa.
459	Rfmn. Chiran Thapa.	1208	Rfmn. Narbir Sahi.
469	Rfmn. Manbahadur Thapa.		

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
1528	Rfmn. Ranbahadur Gurung	1101	Rfmn. Puransing Gurung.
3086	Rfmn. Dhanraj Gurung.	1039	Rfmn. Chiran Gurung.
4731	Rfmn. Tulasing Bura.	1079	Rfmn. Jitbahadur Gurung.
4837	Rfmn. Kharaksing Thapa.	1199	Rfmn. Balbir Sarki.
394	Rfmn. Dalsur Rana.	1500	Rfmn. Hira Thapa.
427	Rfmn. Tejran Bura.	1682	Rfmn. Gambiria Gurung.
529	Rfmn. Haripershad Pun.	1770	Rfmn. Purandhoj Gurung.
542	Rfmn. Manbahadur	1891	Rfmn. Narbahadur
	Gurung.		Gurung.
669	Rfmn. Dadraj Gurung.	1973	Rfmn. Partapsing Thapa.
766	Rfmn. Kesbir Thapa.	2578	Rfmn. Narain Gurung.
798	Rfmn. Jange Gharti.	2737	Rfmn. Mege Pun.
1089	Rfmn. Khilbahadur	3083	Rfmn. Khage Rana.
	Gurung.		

NOMINAL ROLL OF OTHER RANKS OF "D" COMPANY,
1/6TH GURKHA RIFLES, KILLED IN ACTION, 1914-1919.

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>
4902	Hav. Hastabir Gurung.	551	Rfmn. Kaloo Thapa.
83	Hav. Rajman Gurung.	592	Rfmn. Budhibal Thapa.
4412	Hav. Bhimbahadur Thapa.	640	Rfmn. Bahadur Rana.
4632	Naik Dharapsing Thapa.	664	Rfmn. Badambir Thapa.
4892	Naik Damdar Thapa.	690	Rfmn. Parbir Damai.
42	Naik Balbir Rana.	737	Rfmn. Dalbir Gurung.
4132	Naik Dalsing Thapa.	740	Rfmn. Jaibahadur Thapa.
373	Naik Kamansing Gurung.	826	Rfmn. Siriman Thapa.
4127	Rfmn. Mangle Thapa.	1013	Rfmn. Harkbir Thapa.
4400	Rfmn. Bahadur Thapa.	1045	Rfmn. Raghubir Thapa.
4432	Rfmn. Dalu Thapa.	1060	Rfmn. Dewansing Rana.
4522	Rfmn. Matbarsing Gurung.	1100	Rfmn. Himlal Thapa.
4528	Rfmn. Raghubir Thapa.	1102	Rfmn. Khemsing Rana.
4578	Rfmn. Ranbir Thapa.	1226	Rfmn. Harkman Bura.
4596	Rfmn. Baldher Thapa.	1263	Rfmn. Manbahadur Rana.
4663	Rfmn. Santram Pun.	4681	Rfmn. Manbir Thapa.
4696	Rfmn. Baldher Thapa.	4848	Rfmn. Birbal Bura.
4723	Rfmn. Harilal Thapa.	4872	Rfmn. Balbir Gharti.
4743	Rfmn. Kamansing Thapa.	4923	Rfmn. Lalbir Thapa.
4850	Rfmn. Deosing Thapa.	65	Rfmn. Kharaksing Pun.
4857	Rfmn. Bahadur Thapa.	120	Rfmn. Deoraj Gurung.
4967	Rfmn. Manbir Gurung.	195	Rfmn. Kamansing Gurung.
4984	Rfmn. Nandlal Thapa.	262	Rfmn. Ganjman Gurung.
12	Rfmn. Dhanbir Gurung.	415	Rfmn. Gajbir Ale.
82	Rfmn. Jahansing Gurung.	536	Rfmn. Gorasing Thapa.
92	Rfmn. Jaharsing Thapa.	554	Rfmn. Singbahadur Ale.
130	Rfmn. Aitabir Thapa.	645	Rfmn. Kharaksing Thapa.
156	Rfmn. Dhanbahadur	883	Rfmn. Ramagha Sing.
	Gurung.	932	Rfmn. Jitman Gurung.
187	Rfmn. Balbahadur Gurung.	1057	Rfmn. Jasbir Rana.
200	Rfmn. Nandbir Rana.	1087	Rfmn. Balbahadur Thapa.
214	Rfmn. Manbir Gurung.	1261	Rfmn. Nandlal Thapa.
241	Rfmn. Kharaksing Rana.	1446	Rfmn. Balbahadur Rana.
381	Rfmn. Dalsing Thapa.	1533	Rfmn. Karnabahadur
487	Rfmn. Tilaksing Thapa.		Gurung.
506	Rfmn. Singbir Thapa.	1936	Rfmn. Champasing Thapa.
546	Rfmn. Kishanbahadur	2008	Rfmn. Lalbahadur Ghalle.
	Rana.	2044	Rfmn. Besiram Thapa.

APPENDIX XII.

NOMINAL ROLL OF OTHER RANKS, 2/6TH GURKHA RIFLES,
KILLED IN ACTION OR DIED OF DISEASE.

SALONIKA AND BLACK SEA, 1918-19.

		<i>Killed in Action.</i>					<i>Date.</i>
<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>						
3031	Rfmn. Jagman Thapa						31/7/19
<i>Died of Disease.</i>							
1312	Naik Mattansing Gurung						17/6/19
886	Rfmn. Aghandar Mal						22/7/19
1044	Rfmn. Kulman Thapa						22/5/19
1430	Rfmn. Keharsing Thapa						30/1/19
1596	Rfmn. Khalu Ghalle						9/4/19
1963	Rfmn. Narbahadur Ale						14/6/19
2066	L./Naik Jamansing Rana						15/9/19
2068	Rfmn. Dhanbahadur L						30/3/19
3728	Rfmn. Lalbahadur Thapa						8/4/19
2273	Rfmn. Munarke Thapa						21/2/19
2400	Rfmn. Ranbir Rai						5/4/19
2709	Rfmn. Lachhe Pun						13/10/19
3024	Rfmn. Dalpati Pun						4/3/19
3073	Rfmn. Puranbahadur Thapa						9/1/19
3120	Rfmn. Ramsing Gurung						17/3/19
3304	Rfmn. Jitbahadur Gurung						18/10/19
3483	Rfmn. Chakman Damai						12/6/19

MESOPOTAMIA, 1916-1918.

		<i>Killed in Action.</i>					<i>Date.</i>
103	Rfmn. Bahadur Gurung						27/10/16
1439	Rfmn. Gampe Thapa						28/9/17
1609	Rfmn. Tularam Gurung						28/9/17
<i>Died of Disease.</i>							
4269	Hav. Dalbahadur						31/5/16
333	Hav. Singbir Thapa						4/5/18
683	Hav. Asaram Ale						13/4/19
891	Naik Hira Gurung						31/5/16
4261	Rfmn. Parbir Thapa						1/3/16
4469	Rfmn. Mansur Thapa						26/6/18
4478	Rfmn. Ude Pun						7/5/16
505	Rfmn. Rajbal Roka						31/8/16
698	L./Naik Dhanlal Gurung						6/11/17
635	Rfmn. Manbahadur Gurung						1/1/15
730	Rfmn. Jaising Gurung						1/1/18
800	Rfmn. Sukte Gurung						1/3/18
1016	Rfmn. Chandarsing Gurung						2/9/17
1039	L./Naik Chamu Gurung						26/6/16
1062	Rfmn. Bhadrabir Thapa						24/8/15
1594	Rfmn. Narbir Gurung						7/9/16
1696	Rfmn. Kabiram Rana						21/5/16
1700	Rfmn. Hirasing Thapa						8/6/16

<i>Regtl. No.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Date.</i>
1738	Rfmn. Pirthiman Thapa	2/6/16
7072	Rfmn. Jagman Pun	8/7/16
1813	Rfmn. Lachman Thapa	5/7/16
1838	Rfmn. Manbir Thapa	13/9/16
1869	Rfmn. Jitman Pun	25/1/17
1888	Rfmn. Kalu Thapa	1/8/16
1900	Rfmn. Mohansing Pun	7/10/17
1902	Rfmn. Pahalsing Thapa	31/8/20
1957	Rfmn. Manbahadur Thapa	12/6/17
1982	Rfmn. Bine Gurung	25/11/16
2044	Rfmn. Nainsing Nagarkoti	27/5/17
2119	Rfmn. Kalamsing Bhandari	4/3/18
2136	Rfmn. Birsing Ghalle	17/6/16
2174	Rfmn. Lalbir Thapa	11/7/17
2265	Rfmn. Birkhe Pun	8/1/19
2353	Rfmn. Mohlal Pun	15/5/19
2465	Rfmn. Keharsing Gurung	19/1/18
2468	Rfmn. Dhanbir Chettri	24/4/19
2938	Rfmn. Dalbahadur Gurung	15/5/19
3075	Rfmn. Kanakbahadur Thapa	28/10/17
3167	Rfmn. Harakbahadur Khattri	4/1/19
3183	Rfmn. Rane Thapa	4/2/19
3287	Rfmn. Lukewali	15/5/19
3355	Rfmn. Padamsing Thapa	27/4/18
3421	Rfmn. Pahalbahadur Thapa	20/1/20

DARDANELLES, 1915.

Killed in Action.

318	Naik Maniraj Gurung	8/8/15
429	Naik Bahadur Gurung	12/10/15
13	Rfmn. Dalbir Gurung	6/9/15
485	Rfmn. Mangalsing Gurung	2/12/15
926	Rfmn. Bhabesor Gurung	30/9/15
1022	Rfmn. Birkhe Pun	25/10/15
1081	Rfmn. Dharamraj Gurung	22/5/15
1153	Rfmn. Harka Gurung	29/11/15
1178	Rfmn. Narbir Gurung	1/12/15
1201	Rfmn. Jangbir Thapa	22/8/15
1266	Rfmn. Dalbir Rana	21/8/15
1275	Rfmn. Keshbir Rana	8/8/15
1291	Rfmn. Ghambarsing Gurung	21/8/15
1658	Rfmn. Santabir Thapa	15/8/16
2278	Rfmn. Manisur Pun	5/12/17

FRANCE, 1914-1915.

Killed in Action.

483	Rfmn. Kishensing Gurung	23/5/15
1196	Rfmn. Santabir Rana	17/8/15
1420	Rfmn. Chandarbir Thapa	7/8/15

Died of Disease.

173	Rfmn. Lalsing Gurung	29/10/15
607	Rfmn. Adamsing Rana	18/4/15

APPENDIX XIII.

HONOURS AND AWARDS, 1916-1919, 2/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

D.S.O.	Major B. A. McH. Rice.
O.B.E.	Capt. G. C. Strahan.
M.C.	Capt. T. C. E. Barstow.
	Capt. H. M. M. Hackett.
Mentioned in Despatches	2/Lieut. E. C. Manson, I.A.R.
				Lieut.-Col. F. F. Badcock, D.S.O. (2).
				Lieut.-Col. G. O. Preston.
				Capt. T. C. E. Barstow.
				Capt. N. B. Harte.
				Capt. F. T. H. Mullaly.
				Lieut. L. F. Mercer.
				Lieut. H. E. Winn, I.A.R.
Foreign Decorations	Lieut.-Col. F. F. Badcock, D.S.O. (Order of St. Stanislas, 3rd Class, with Swords.)
				Lieut. L. F. Mercer. (Silver Medal for Military Valour, conferred by H.M. the King of Italy.)

GURKHA OFFICERS AND N.C.Os.

I.O.M., 2ND CLASS.

" B "	1920 R./M. Sukhbar Gurung	...	For conspicuous gallantry in the action of Ramadi. After all the other men of his Lewis gun team had been killed or wounded, though wounded himself, he brought his gun up and kept it in action. He did not leave it until spare Lewis gunners relieved him (28/9/17).
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O.B.I., 2ND CLASS.

A./Sub.-Major Harku Thapa	...	A G.O. of very exceptional capabilities. Wherever this officer has served, he has been very highly reported on, and his name has already been submitted for reward on two occasions, but up to the present he has received no recognition of his good services. He was attached to the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles in France and the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles in Gallipoli, in both of which battalions he acted as Subadar-Major. All his war service has been in the firing line. He has carried out his duties as Subadar-Major of this Battalion in most satisfactory manner; is always cheerful; very hard-working and respected by the men. I cannot speak too highly of him.
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M.S.M.

" D "	666 Hav. Thamansing Rana	...	Zealous devotion to duty, and particular good service rendered as Transport Havildar, on the line of march from Basra to Nasiriyeh (April—May, 1916).
" D "	3990 Naik Motilal Rana	...	Conspicuous devotion to duty as ward orderly. Has proved himself very reliable when in medical charge of a detachment.
" B "	4611 Hav. Manbir Gurung	...	For excellent service rendered as Battalion Quartermaster Havildar since March, 1916. His duties have been arduous, and he has proved himself absolutely reliable.
" B "	391 R./M. Dilapsing Thapa	...	Conspicuous zeal and untiring devotion to duty as ward orderly. He has always proved of the greatest assistance to the Battalion Medical Staff.
" B "	2121 L./Naik Ansing Bisht	...	No record.
" D "	605 Hav. Bhawanbir Thapa	...	Recommendations were made on account of the zeal, devotion to duty, and inspiring example of these men during very trying marches in deep snow, in endeavour to relieve isolated British posts, in the vicinity of Kara, Trans-
" A "	1327 Naik Dalbahadur Gurung	...	Caucasia (April, 1919).
" A "	1286 Naik Bakhatbahadur Gurung	...	

I.D.S.M.

" A "	1972 R./M. Anarup Bura	...	Conspicuous gallantry in continually bringing up S.A.A. to his machine gun under heavy fire in close proximity to Arabs at Nasiriyeh (11/9/16).
" A "	1061 L./Naik Parmande Rana	...	For gallant conduct in the handling of his Lewis gun. He showed great bravery in getting his gun forward, under heavy machine gun fire, in an endeavour to silence it (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" A "	Jemadar Bagsing Gurung	...	For the boldness and resourcefulness with which he organized and conducted an ammunition carrying party to the firing line under heavy fire. This officer set an excellent example (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" A "	167 Naik Puranbahadur Gurung	...	By his utter contempt for danger under heavy fire, he set an excellent example to the men of his section. He continuously walked up and down the line controlling fire and encouraging his men during a critical half-hour (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" A "	76 Hav. Pahalsing Thapa	...	When his platoon commander was wounded he immediately assumed command of the platoon and directed it in offensive action with utmost coolness and skill. He supervised the men getting under cover, neglecting to dig himself in until the safety of his men was assured (Ramadi, 28/9/17).

HONOURS AND AWARDS. I.D.S.M.—*Continued.*

" A "	...	464 Naik Ransing Thapa	...	For engaging in a duel with an entrenched enemy machine gun while his Lewis gun was in the open. By the coolness of his fire orders and the bold employment of his gun he very largely succeeded in subduing hostile fire (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" A "	...	1540 R./M. Parbir Pun	...	For employing his Lewis gun in a duel with a hostile machine gun, and by the accuracy and coolness of his fire so interfering with the enemy gun as to render its fire ineffective. He was therefore the means of preserving many lives during the period his Lewis gun was in the open without cover (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" C "	...	1299 Naik Narbir Thapa	...	For the conspicuous gallantry which he showed in leading a carrying party up to the firing line under heavy machine gun fire. He showed utter contempt of danger (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" B "	...	1444 R./M. Mangalsing Gurung	{	For bravery and devotion in working a Lewis gun under heavy and continuous fire. Repeated attempts were made by these two men to silence a machine gun, and both set an excellent example to the men near them (Ramadi, 28/9/17).
" B "	...	1741 R./M. Manilal Rai		
...	...	1763 Naik Persadman Rai		
...	For conspicuous resource and initiative in handling and controlling his scouts throughout the action on March 26th, 1918, on two occasions under considerable shell and machine gun fire; he sent back timely and accurate information as to location of the enemy trenches and machine gun which proved of greatest value.

MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES.

" A "	...	Jemadar Jasbir Thapa	...	Marked gallantry and coolness under heavy fire, when assisting in the handling of two machine guns in close proximity to Arabs at Nasiriyeh (11/9/16).
" C "	...	1061 L./Naik Parmande Rana	...	Conspicuous gallantry and coolness under heavy fire when handling his machine gun in close proximity to Arabs at Nasiriyeh (11/9/16).
" C "	...	898 L./Naik Jasbir Rana	...	Conspicuous gallantry and coolness under heavy fire in handling his machine gun while in close proximity to the enemy at Nasiriyeh (11/9/16).
" C "	...	537 Naik Dhanbahadur Gurung	...	For resourcefulness and gallantry when in charge of a party carrying ammunition to the firing line. Although under heavy shell and machine gun fire, he delivered the ammunition and brought his party back safely. He set an excellent and encouraging example to his men (Ramadi, 28/9/17).

Subadar-Major Manbahadur Thapa ...	Throughout the operations, and especially during the fighting around Khan Bagdadi, this officer encouraged his men by his personal example. He exposed himself fearlessly under shell fire in order to keep his platoon in hand. When machine gun fire was opened from a flank, he got his men under cover in perfect order. This officer has rendered conspicuously good service on a previous occasion.
1330 R./M. Sarabjit Thapa ...	For the excellent example he showed to his fellow scouts. Though blown over by the explosion of a high explosive shell, he pressed forward without the slightest hesitation after being helped to his feet by his fellow scouts.
4608 Naik Jaharsing Gurung ...	For coolness and resource in handling his section under shell fire, and by personal example encouraging and leading the advance.
Jemadar Bishenbir Thapa ...	For fine leadership of his platoon, when after a long night march, followed by an attack over several miles, his platoon was again required to advance under considerable rifle and machine gun fire; he showed conspicuous skill in rallying his men and getting them under cover without a casualty. He set a fine example to all ranks throughout.
702 L./Naik Ratanbir Ale ...	For extreme steadiness with which he took forward his scouts under shell fire, well ahead of his company. He showed conspicuous ability in maintaining direction, extension, and in furnishing reliable information.
695 Hav. Dhanbar Gurung ...	When machine gun fire was suddenly opened on his section, he showed coolness and ability in leading it forward under cover without confusion or casualties.
Jemadar Jasbir Thapa ...	For conspicuously all round good work, zeal, and constant devotion to duty. He has always set an excellent example to all ranks under trying conditions. On a previous occasion this officer has shown considerable gallantry under close fire of the enemy.
308 Col.-Hav. Lankapati Jaici ...	For constant devotion to duty as Coy. Qr.Mr. Havildar. His arrangements for supplying food to the firing line during the Ramadi action were excellent. He has on all occasions proved himself absolutely reliable.
283 Hav. Deobar Charti ...	The excellence of his arrangements at all times when in charge of the regimental signallers. His devotion to duty and attention to the smallest detail are most praiseworthy.
4266 Col.-Hav. Suce Ale ...	For constant devotion to duty when in charge of the Regimental Sanitary Section. Under his supervision sanitary arrangements have worked well, and camp sites have been left scrupulously clean. He has always proved himself absolutely reliable.

HONOURS AND AWARDS. MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES.—*Continued.*

Subadar Sheoraj Pun	A bold and dashing G.O. who does not know what fear is. Cheerful, energetic, and hard-working. Served in France, Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia, when he was accidentally wounded by the explosion of a bomb. Part of his service was with 1/4th Gurkha Rifles and 1/6th Gurkha Rifles, in which Battalion his work was much appreciated.
723 Naik Parbasing Rana	For continuous good service in France, Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia. On one occasion while in trenches in Gallipoli, though dazed by the explosion of a bomb which fell a few feet away, he continued to bomb the enemy.
929 Havildar Lalasing Thapa	} For continuous good work, gallantry, and devotion to duty in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia.
137 Rfmn. Manbir Thapa	
526 Rfmn. Manjasing Gurung	} For continuous good work, gallantry, and devotion to duty in France, Gallipoli, and Mesopotamia.
3406 L./Naik Manirattan Gharti	
3223 Naik Dhanbir Gharti	} For continuous good work, devotion to duty, and gallantry in Gallipoli and Mesopotamia.
414 Rfmn. Parsaram Thapa	
A./Subadar-Major Harku Thapa	A G.O. of very exceptional abilities. Wherever this officer has served, he has been very highly reported on, and his name has already been submitted for reward on two occasions, but up to the present he has received no recognition of his good services. He was attached to 1/4th Gurkha Rifles in France, and the 1/6th Gurkha Rifles in Gallipoli, in both of which battalions he acted as Subadar-Major. All his war service has been in the firing line. He has carried out his duties as Subadar-Major of this Battalion in most satisfactory manner; is always cheerful, very hard-working, and respected by the men. I cannot speak too highly of him.

FOREIGN DECORATIONS.

1061 L./Naik Parmande Rana	...	Italian Bronze Medal for Military Valour.
1972 Rfmn. Anarup Bura	...	Médaille Militaire.
1036 Naik Narsing Ale	...	(1) Cross of Kara George, 2nd Class, with Swords (Servian). (2) Italian Bronze Medal for Military Valour.

APPENDIX XIV.

SUCCESSION ROLL OF COMMANDING OFFICERS,
1817-1918.

<i>Rank at time of assuming Command.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Commanded</i>	
		<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>
Captain	S. Fraser	16/5/1817	1/1823
Captain	A. McLeod	1/1823	14/11/1827
Captain	J. B. Neufville	10/3/1828	10/1830
Lieutenant	A. Charlton	10/1830	12/8/1831
Captain	A. White	12/8/1831	28/1/1839
Captain	J. F. Hannay	25/3/1839	25/1/1861
Major	H. M. Garstin	25/4/1861	3/4/1867
Major	T. Rattray	3/4/1867	16/5/1873
Lieut.-Col.	J. P. Sherriff	16/5/1873	1/4/1884
Lieut.-Col.	A. D. Butter	1/4/1884	25/10/1886
Lieut.-Col.	A. T. Davis	25/10/1886	10/2/1888
Lieut.-Col.	C. McD. Skene, D.S.O.	10/2/1888	25/3/1891
Lieut.-Col.	E. C. Elliston	25/3/1891	10/9/1891
Capt. and Bt. Col.	A. G. B. Ternan, D.S.O.	10/9/1891	11/8/1893
Bt. Lt.-Col.	C. R. Macgregor, D.S.O.	11/12/1893	9/5/1899
Major	H. O'Donnell, D.S.O.	10/5/1899	30/1/1907
Major	C. M. Crawford	31/1/1907	31/8/1908
Major	J. B. Chatterton	1/9/1908	16/3/1914
Lieut.-Col.	The Hon. C. G. Bruce, M.V.O.	17/3/1914	16/3/1918
Lieut.-Col.	W. C. Little	17/3/1918	—

LIST OF COMMANDING OFFICERS 2/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

<i>Rank time assuming Command.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Commanded</i>	
		<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>
Lieut.-Col.	F. C. Colomb	5/11/04	31/8/08
Lieut.-Col.	C. M. Crawford	1/9/08	10/7/12
Lieut.-Col.	F. F. Badcock, D.S.O.	11/7/12	15/4/18
Lieut.-Col.	G. A. Preston	16/4/18	24/8/19
Lieut.-Col.	B. A. McH. Rice, D.S.O.	25/8/19	—

LIST OF COMMANDING OFFICERS 3/6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

<i>Rank time assuming Command.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Commanded</i>	
		<i>From</i>	<i>To</i>
Lieut.-Col.	E. B. C. Boddam	12/3/17	27/5/18
Major	A. E. Jewett	28/5/18	—

Commanding Officers officiating during the temporary absence of a permanent Commanding Officer on leave, furlough or duty, have not been included in the above list.

APPENDIX XV.

SUCCESSION ROLL OF BRITISH OFFICERS

NOTE.—(a) Name in *italics* signifies that the officer commanded a battalion of the Regiment. (b) Name preceded by * indicates the officer was killed on, or died from the effects of, active service.

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Date.</i>
16/5/1817	<i>Fraser, Simon</i>	Capt. ...	—	—	—/3/1823
1817	<i>McLeod, Alexander</i>	Major ...	—	—	14/11/1827
1817	Wallace, N.	—	—	—	1824
1817	Waddilove, J.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1823
1817	Aird, G. D. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	1823
1817	Aird, P. A. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	1823
1817	McGregor, J.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1823
1817	Valle, B.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1823
1823	Armstrong, R.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1824
1823	Wake, W. H.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1824
1823	Thomson, J. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	—
1824	Chambers ...	Capt. ...	—	—	1825
1824	Fuller —, ...	—	—	—	1825
1824	Kennedy ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	1829
1824	Forster ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	1825
1826	Horsburg, A.	Capt. ...	—	—	1826
1826	Stewart, G. A. C. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
1827	McIsaac, R. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	1827
1827	Van-Sandau, L.	Lieut. ...	—	—	1829
14/9/1827	Douglas, C.	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
1827	O'Dwyer, J. (Medical Officer)	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
1827	Matthie ...	—	—	—	1831
6/12/1827	*Bedingfield	Lieut.
1828	<i>Newville, J. B.</i>	Lieut.	4/4/1829
10/3/1828	*Burton ...	Capt.	—/10/1830
1828	MacLeod, D. A. (Medical Officer) ...	Lieut.
8/11/1828	Charlton, A.	—
27/7/1829	Smith, W. A.	Capt.	5/4/1829
24/10/1829		Lieut.	—/11/1837
			1830

Became Non-effective.

30/7/1830	Vetch, H.	Lieut. ...	1834
12/8/1831	*White, A.	Lieut.-Col.	28/1/1839
7/9/1831	Tait, T. F.	Lieut. ...	1832
2/12/1831	Wood, J. A.	Lieut. ...	1838
13/8/1832	Bigge, H. L.	Lieut. ...	1835
28/1/1835	Shortreed, W.	Bt. Capt. ...	1837
28/1/1835	Backhouse, F. G.	Lieut. ...	1838
5/2/1835	Millar, J.	Lieut. ...	1835
7/3/1835	Grange, R.	Ensign ...	1835
5/6/1835	Lyons, E. R.	Lieut. ...	1838
25/1/1836	Wemyss, J.	Lieut. ...	1836
25/1/1836	Phayre, A. P.	Ensign ...	1838
22/7/1836	Seppings, A. M. (Artillery)	...	Lieut. ...	1836
18/10/1836	Davies, W. B. (Medical Officer)	...	—	1838
1/11/1836	Erskine, W. C.	Ensign ...	1836
27/3/1837	Marshall, J. N.	Lieut. ...	1839
—/4/1837	Jacob, W. (Medical Officer)	...	—	—
27/5/1837	Furnell, F. (Medical Officer)	...	Lieut.-Col.	25/1/1861
14/5/1838	Hannay, J. F.	Lieut. ...	—/4/1843
11/3/1839	Dalton, E. T.	Lieut. ...	1840
11/3/1839	Harris W. O.	Lieut. ...	1840
5/8/1839	Staples, N. A. (Artillery)	...	2/Lieut.	1842
18/3/1840	Eld, L. P. D.	Lieut. ...	1842
1/11/1840	Butler, J.	Capt. ...	1845
19/5/1841	Reynolds, C. S.	Lieut. ...	1843
30/6/1841	Parker, N. A.	Capt. ...	—
1/3/1842	Shurluck, W. (Medical Officer)	1853
14/3/1843	Smith, E. F.	Capt. ...	1844
5/10/1844	Brodie, G. M.	Lieut. ...	1849
5/10/1844	Holroyd, C.	Lieut. ...	1852
5/12/1845	Vincent, G. F. F.	Lieut. ...	1848
28/4/1847	Babbage, H. P.	Lieut. ...	1855
16/1/1849	Eden	Lieut. ...	1853
18/5/1852	Camplin, J. M. (Medical Officer)	...	—	—
29/4/1853	McLean, A. (Medical Officer)	...	—	—

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Rank and Name.</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Became Non-effective.</i>	<i>Date.</i>
28/9/1853	Comber, A. K. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
30/8/1854	Moir, R. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	—
13/11/1855	Hunter, C. P. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
11/12/1855	Winson, W. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	1855
2/7/1856	Lowther, W. H. ...	—	—	—	—
9/12/1857	Garden, W. A. ...	Lieut. ...	—	—	—
30/10/1858	Hastings, T. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	—
13/6/1859	White, J. B. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	—
21/6/1859	Loveday, B. M. ...	Capt. ...	—	—	—
27/1/1860	Ross, D. ...	Capt. ...	Civil employ, Bengal	...	1863
21/3/1860	Johnstone, J. ...	Lieut. ...	—	...	1867
6/6/1860	Forsyth, A. G. ...	Capt. ...	—	—	—
25/4/1861	<i>Garsin, H. M.</i> ...	<i>Lieut.-Col.</i> ...	On completion of command	...	24/1/1867
25/7/1861	Crawford G. D. ...	Capt. ...	Transferred to 36th Native Infantry	...	14/6/1863
16/9/1861	Davis, R. P. ...	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 16th Native Infantry	...	1863
14/2/1862	Boyd, P. ...	Lieut. ...	—	...	1864
30/9/1862	Jervis, F. V. R. ...	Major ...	Transferred to 56th Native Infantry	...	1866
1862	Cripps, A. W. ...	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 26th Native Infantry	...	1863
6/5/1863	French, J. G. (Medical Officer)	—	—	—	—
22/6/1863	Woodhouse, H. ...	Capt. ...	Transferred to 23rd Native Infantry	...	16/12/1868
22/6/1863	Williamson, W. J. ...	Lieut. ...	Civil employ, Bengal	...	1864
22/6/1863	Trower, S. C. ...	Lieut. ...	—	...	1864
22/6/1863	Smith, R. E. S. ...	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 45th Native Infantry	...	9/9/1864
26/6/1863	Shakespeare, R. ...	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 36th Native Infantry	...	30/1/1865
7/8/1863	Williams, H. W. ...	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 43rd Assam Light Infantry	...	20/2/1866
20/1/1864	Nuttall, J. M. ...	Major ...	Transferred to 44th Sylhet Infantry	...	12/3/1868
3/4/1865	<i>Rathay, T., C.B., C.S.I.</i> ...	<i>Lieut.-Col.</i> ...	—	—	—
28/9/1865	Cologan, J. F. FitzG. ...	Capt. ...	Transferred to 18th Native Infantry	...	11/9/1870
4/7/1865	•Harrison, A. ...	Capt. ...	Died on Field Service, Lushai Expedition	...	16/2/1872
25/4/1866	Nowell, R. A. ...	—	—	—	—
1866	Vivian, R. ...	—	—	—	—
23/7/1866	Alexander, F. H. ...	—	—	—	—
22/10/1866	Newington, G. D. G. ...	—	—	—	—
9/3/1867	Dyce, F. L. S. ...	—	—	—	—

30/8/1867	Jones, G. T.	...	Capt.	Transferred to 41st Native Infantry	...	29/6/1870
9/11/1868	Beeston, R. D.	...	Capt.	Cashiered	...	16/7/1873
24/12/1868	Byrdon, W.	...	Major	—
20/1/1869	Hood, F. H.	...	—	—	—	—
8/3/1869	Thompson, M.	...	Lieut.-Col.	—	—	—
3/3/1870	Abbott, A. K.	...	Major	Transferred to 40th Bengal Infantry.	Retired	30/12/1884
6/5/1871	Reid, A. J. F.	...	Ensign	Transferred to 30th Punjab Infantry	...	—
8/9/1871	*Stevens, H. FitzG.	...	Major	Died at Fort White, Chin Hills (on service)	...	1889
7/11/1871	Rutherford, W. E.	...	—	Transferred to 16th Native Infantry	...	—
16/10/1871	<i>Sherriff, J. P.</i>	...	Col.	—	—	—
1/12/1871	Moules, H. S.	...	—	—	—	—
13/3/1872	<i>Macgregor, C. R., C.B., D.S.O.</i>	...	Colonel	On completion of command	...	—
21/9/1872	Campbell, A. D.	...	—	—	...	—
14/4/1873	Curran, R. H. (Medical Officer)	...	Lieut.-Col.	Transferred to 33rd Native Infantry	...	9/5/1879
26/7/1873	Tulloch, A.	...	—	—	...	—
1/12/1874	Wauchope, R. A.	...	—	Transferred to H.M. 94th Foot	...	—
17/1/1875	Ponsonby, —	...	—	—	...	—
11/11/1875	Melvin, A.	...	—	—	...	—
1875	Goldney, F. C. N.	...	—	—	...	—
10/12/1875	Wilson, J. (Medical Officer)	...	—	—	...	—
12/3/1877	<i>Butler, A. D.</i>	...	Col.	—	...	—
19/9/1877	Mahon, C. E.	...	—	—	...	—
22/12/1877	Chambers, W. E.	...	—	—	...	—
20/7/1880	Goldsmid, E. V.	...	—	—	...	—
16/2/1881	Conry, W. (Medical Officer)	...	—	—	...	—
1/7/1882	Briscoe, H. M.	...	Capt.	Retired	...	—
7/10/1882	Little, H. A.	...	—	—	...	—
7/11/1882	Butcher, G. H.	...	—	—	...	—
29/1/1883	Mullane, P. (Medical Officer)	...	Capt.	Removed from the Service	...	17/11/1891
25/5/1883	Cotton, S. L.	...	—	—	...	—
6/10/1883	Banerji, — (I.M.S.)	...	—	—	...	—
16/1/1884	<i>Colomb, F. C.</i>	...	Lieut.-Col.	Transferred to Staff, Burma Division	...	—
24/4/1884	Brown, H. T.	...	—	—	...	—
17/9/1884	Dundas, G. A. (I.M.S.)	...	—	—	...	—
13/5/1885	Barry, D. F. (I.M.S.)	...	—	—	...	—
22/11/1885	Sanders, G. L'H.	...	—	—	...	—

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Became Non-effective.</i>	<i>Date. 1888</i>
5/4/1886	Daly, D. H.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to Burma Police	...	—
8/4/1886	Prain, Sir D. (I.M.S.), Kt., C.M.G., C.I.E.	—	—	—	—
4/10/1886	Robin, N. E.	—	—	—	—
25/10/1886	Davis, A. T.	—	—	—	—
1/12/1886	Beville, C. H.	—	—	—	—
18/12/1886	Rogers, F. A. (I.M.S.), D.S.O.	Surg.-Capt. Col.	Transferred to Civil	1892
26/11/1887	*Shene, C. McD., D.S.O.	Capt. ...	Killed at Manipur	...	24/3/1891
7/12/1887	Westmorland, C. H.	Capt. ...	Rejoined 6th B.I.	...	1889
16/12/1887	Bell, L. M.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 17th B.I.	...	1889
28/7/1888	Lugard, E. J., D.S.O., O.B.E.	Major ...	Retired	...	10/11/1906
17/8/1888	James, M. G.	Major ...	Retired	...	1907
27/3/1889	*Chatterton, J. B.	Col.	Died Rawal Pindi	...	16/3/1914
31/5/1889	Bolton, H. J.	Major ...	Retired	...	1896
21/10/1889	Roddy, H. H.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to Commissariat Transport Dept.	...	16/4/1895
27/12/1889	Elliston, E. C.	Lieut. ...	Retired	...	1/10/1892
3/7/1890	Graves, S. H. P.	Lieut.-Col.	Retired	...	22/1/1891
3/9/1890	Calvert, J. T. (I.M.S.)	Major ...	Transferred 40th B.I.	...	1891
18/8/1891	Shaw H. S.	Surg.-Capt.	Transferred to Civil	10/5/1913
10/9/1891	*Ternan, A. G. B., D.S.O.	Major ...	Retired	...	11/8/1893
17/3/1892	Wheatley, H. S.	Capt. & Bi.-Col.	Died. Result of Field Service	...	17/3/1893
29/4/1892	Macintyre, D. C. F.	Major ...	Rejoined 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles	...	—
11/5/1892	Bird, R. (I.M.S.)	Surg.-Capt.	Transferred to Civil	1894
6/12/1892	Priestley, H. W.	Major ...	Died at Shillong	...	5/5/1899
4/3/1893	Strange, A. J.	Lieut.-Col.	Retired	...	—
17/8/1893	Chaytor White, J. (I.M.S.)	—	—	—	—
26/2/1894	Nuttall, J. R.	—	—	—	—
1894	Chatterson, B. R. (I.M.S.)	—	—	—	—
3/1/1895	Parry, E. R. (I.M.S.)	—	—	—	—
26/5/1895	Norie, F. H., D.S.O.	Major ...	Transferred to Half Pay List	...	8/10/1911
2/4/1896	Weller, A. T.	Major ...	Retired	...	31/5/1896
—/8/1896	Werne Ord, G.	—	—	—	—
29/4/1897	Macnaughten, F. C.	Lieut. ...	Died Shillong	...	3/8/1897
23/6/1897	*Perkins, A. E. C.	Capt. ...	Transferred to 40th Pathans	...	1/3/1909
14/7/1897	Green, D. R. (I.M.S.)	Capt. ...	Transferred to civil employ	...	8/5/1900

17/11/1897	Bromhead, E. G. ...	—	...	—	...	Transferred to civil employ	29/4/1899
21/10/1898	Waters, E. E. (I.M.S.) ...	Capt.	...	—	...	—	—
30/4/1899	Weinman, C. F., (I.M.S.) ...	Major	...	—	...	Transferred to 43rd Erinpura Infantry	4/8/1908
6/5/1899	Dalrymple-Hay, S. F. B.	Col.	...	—	...	On completion of command	30/1/1907
10/5/1899	*O'Donnell, H., C.B., D.S.O.	Lieut.-Col.	...	—	...	Killed in Waziristan	30/6/1921
27/6/1899	*Sherlock, G. W. S.	Lieut.-Col.	...	—	...	Retired	7/10/1920
31/7/1899	Rice, B. A. McH., D.S.O.,	—	...	—	...	—	—
8/5/1900	Duncan, —, (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
19/5/1900	Ozzard, —, (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
13/7/1900	Tate, —, (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
5/8/1900	Raunir, —, (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
21/8/1900	Ward E. L., (I.M.S.)	Capt.	...	—	...	Transferred to civil employ	8/3/1902
15/9/1900	Moule, H. E.	Lieut.	...	—	...	Transferred to 4th Gurkha Rifles	16/11/1901
21/9/1900	*Graham, A. M. (attached)	Lieut.	...	—	...	Rejoined 5th Gurkha Rifles	10/11/1901
29/9/1900	Graham, B. C. (attached)	—	...	—	...	—	—
26/11/1901	Stokes, —	—	...	—	...	Retired	—
21/3/1902	Allanson, C. J. L., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O. Colonel	—	...	—	...	—	17/11/1922
1/8/1902	Bradley, R. I. (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
3/10/1902	Gilbert, —, (Medical Officer)	—	...	—	...	—	—
25/11/1902	Granger, T. A. (Medical Officer)	Major	...	—	...	D.D.M.S., A.H.Q.	13/1/1911
28/8/1903	Blair, R. C.	Capt.	...	—	...	Died at sea	27/10/1911
7/12/1903	Seagrim, A. H.	Capt.	...	—	...	Exchanged into British Service	1904
31/1/1904	Morice, R. C. L.	Lieut.	...	—	...	Transferred, 37th Dogras	7/6/1915
7/4/1904	*Birdwood, C. W. B.	Capt.	...	—	...	Died of wounds in Gallipoli...	1/9/1909
19/10/1904	*Sparrow, B. C.	Capt.	...	—	...	Transferred, 39th Garhwalis	19/10/1910
5/1/1905	Beeman, S. W.	Major	...	—	...	Exchanged to British Service	—
5/1/1905	Harriss, S. A. (I.M.S.)	Capt.	...	—	...	Retired	20/5/1911
10/1/1905	Ducat, H. C. C.	Major	...	—	...	Retired	1917
11/1/1905	Lloyd, J. H.	Lieut.-Col.	...	—	...	Retired	9/1/1924
1/2/1905	Ransford, F. M.	Major	...	—	...	Transferred to Cantt. Dept.	22/5/1915
20/2/1905	*Whytehead, H. R. A.	Capt.	...	—	...	Killed in Gallipoli	8/4/1920
23/2/1905	McLoughlin, H. W. D.	Capt.	...	—	...	Transferred to Malwa Bhil Corps	16/1/1923
23/2/1905	Jackson, D. R. H., D.S.O.	Major	...	—	...	Retired	8/6/1908
25/2/1905	*Ormsby, V. A.	Major	...	—	...	Transferred to 3rd Gurkha Rifles	—
27/2/1905	Cornish, A. W. D., D.S.O., M.C.	—	...	—	...	Still serving	21/6/1917
12/4/1905	*Bagot Harte, I. W.	Major	...	—	...	Killed in Waziristan	—

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Name.</i>	<i>Rank.</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Became Non-effective.</i>	<i>Date.</i>
1903	Lang, A. G. B.	Major	Rejoined 1st Gurkha Rifles	...	13/9/1905
23/4/1903	Hall, H. C.	Capt.	Transferred to S. and T. Corps	...	23/6/1910
7/5/1903	Tireman, C. L.	Lieut.	Resigned	...	7/5/1905
8/11/1903	Abbott, F. B., D.S.O.	—	Still serving	...	—
1903	Anson, O. M. H.	Lieut.	Died at Bombay	...	29/8/1905
3/1/1906	<i>Crawford, C. M.</i>	Lieut.-Col.	Died at Chitral	...	—/6/1912
1/3/1906	Hackett, H. M. M., M.C.	—	Still serving	...	—
9/8/1906	*Dallas, J. S.	Capt.	Died of wounds received in Gallipoli	...	12/9/1915
31/1/1907	<i>Little, W. C.</i>	Col.	Retired on completion of command	...	1/9/1922
16/6/1907	Ryan, D. G. J., D.S.O.	—	Still serving	...	—
17/8/1907	Rombulow Pearse, A. B.	Major	Transferred to 20th Burma Rifles	...	13/12/1921
—/4/1908	Simpson, —, (Medical Officer)	—	—	...	—
22/7/1908	Holroyd, G. H. (Medical Officer)	—	—	...	—
1/9/1908	Beynon, W. G. L., D.S.O.	Lt.-Col.	Transferred to 2nd Gurkha Rifles	...	1910
10/10/1908	Anderson, W. C.	Lt.-Col.	Transferred to 1st Gurkha Rifles	...	—/1/1915
7/11/1908	*King Salter, N. H.	Capt.	Killed in Mesopotamia	...	4/6/1919
7/11/1908	Burt, H. V.	Lieut.	Transferred to Indian Cavalry	...	1909
9/11/1908	Blackett, C. P.	Major	Transferred to 73rd Carnatic Infantry	...	3/2/1921
22/11/1908	Bernard, R. F. St. V., D.S.O., M.C.	—	Still serving	...	—
26/11/1908	*Mullaly, F. T. H.	Capt.	Killed in Mesopotamia	...	21/4/1917
27/2/1909	*Preston, G. A.	Lieut.-Col.	Killed in the Caucasus	...	6/5/1919
12/4/1909	Falk, H. (Medical Officer)	—	Transferred	...	—/5/1915
10/10/1909	Peploe, J. R.	Lieut.	Transferred to British Service	...	1915
12/7/1910	Brown, E. C.	—	Still serving	...	—
15/8/1910	Smith, —, (Medical Officer)	—	Transferred	...	1913
12/3/1911	Strahan, G. C., O.B.E.	Lieut.	Still serving	...	—
15/3/1911	*Poynder, L. E., M.C.	—	Killed in Mesopotamia	...	26/6/1916
4/5/1911	Barstow, T. C. E., O.B.E.	—	Still serving	...	—
6/5/1911	Rennie, P. M. (Medical Officer)	Capt.	Transferred	...	—/12/1915
27/10/1911	Bredin, A. N.	Major	Retired	...	20/2/1923
29/12/1911	Whittall, J. M.	Bt. Major	Vacated Command	...	1922
11/7/1912	<i>Badcock, F. F., D.S.O.</i>	Colonel	Appointed Brigadier-General	...	17/4/1918
16/5/1913	<i>Bruce, Hon. C. G., C.B., M.V.O.</i>	Colonel	Transferred to I.G. Hospital, Alexandria	...	28/3/1916
15/10/1914	Phipson, E. S., D.S.O. (Medical Officer)	Capt.	—	...	—/12/1915

6TH GURKHA RIFLES

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17/12/1914	Smith, M. H. H. ...	Capt.	Transferred to Indian Signal Corps	1925
—/1/1915	Toller, H. C., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Released	1920
—/1/1915	Bear, R. M., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Transferred	1915
—/1/1915	*Underhill, H. C., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Killed, Gallipoli	8/8/1915
19/1/1915	*Manson, C. C. E. ...	Lieut.	Killed, Gallipoli	—/11/1915
25/1/1915	Collingridge, H. V.	—	Still serving	1917
22/2/1915	*Mowbray, W.	Lieut.	Killed, Mesopotamia	23/12/1915
25/2/1915	Le Mesurier, A. E.	Lieut.	Transferred, 86th Carnatics...	15/4/1917
25/2/1915	*Merk, J. W. A.	Lieut.	Killed, Mesopotamia	1915
26/2/1915	Daley, F. M., I.A.R.O.	2/Lieut.	Transferred, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles	1915
14/4/1915	De Brath, E. E., I.A.R.O.	2/Lieut.	Transferred, 1/4th Gurkha Rifles	28/12/1915
11/5/1915	Sheridan, F. S., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Transferred to Nepalese Contingent	1917
17/5/1915	Bilderbeck, A. C. L. (I.M.S.)	—	Retired	26/11/1922
21/5/1915	Hart, N. B., I.A.R.O.	Capt.	Transferred to 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles	1915
13/6/1915	Allenson, G. H., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Examiner, Local Fund Accounts, Burma	1916
21/6/1915	Ebden, J. W., I.A.R.O.	Capt.	Resigned	24/11/15
21/6/1915	Jordan, H. P., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Released	1919
6/7/1915	Gill, G. T., I.A.R.O.	Capt.	Transferred to Assam Rifles	23/1/1918
17/7/1915	Carter, W. H., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Killed in Gallipoli	9/8/1915
—/7/1915	*Le Marchand, J. W. J.	Lieut.	Killed, Gallipoli	10/8/1915
10/8/1915	*Tomes, G. ...	Capt.	Killed, Gallipoli	14/8/1915
11/8/1915	*Lloyd, D. I. B.	Capt.	Killed, Gallipoli	21/8/1915
1915	*Greene, H. ...	Lieut.	Wounded : never rejoined	21/8/1915
1915	Leman, R. L.	Lieut.	Transferred, British Service	1916
1915	Airy, J. O. ...	—	—	—
1915	Roberts, J. E. B. ...	—	—	—
1915	Ogilvie, G. H., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Transferred, 1/11th Gurkha Rifles	30/5/1918
1915	Harrop, H. R., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Released	31/3/1919
21/8/1915	Marley, W. H., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Released	3/3/1919
21/8/1915	Lynes, R. H., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Transferred, Base Depot	23/1/1918
9/9/1915	Hardman, P. L., I.A.R.O.	Lieut.	Transferred, 8th Gurkha Rifles	1920
9/9/1915	Barton, R. M. S., I.A.R.O.	Capt.	—	1915
0/11/1915	Mercer, L. F.	Capt.	Released	1920
1915	Fasken, K. L.	Lieut.	Transferred	1916
1915	Snodgrass, —, I.A.R.O.	Capt.	—	—
1915	Gout, P. J. ...	Capt.	—	—

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Name.</i>		<i>Rank</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Became Non-effective.</i>	<i>Date.</i>
1915	Watson Smyth, C. A.	...	Capt.	Transferred, 1st Brahmans	1916
1915	Hearsey, N. N., I.A.R.O.	...	Capt.	Transferred, 1/7th Gurkha Rifles	...	1916
1915	Warhurst, A. E.	...	Lieut.	Transferred, 1/2nd Gurkha Rifles	...	5/3/1917
23/12/1915	Campbell, T. E., I.A.R.O.	...	Capt.	Transferred, Civil Department	...	1919
1915	Falk, H. (I.M.S.)	...	—	—	...	—
19/1/1916	Humphrys, B. H., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Transferred, Alwar Infantry	...	11/12/1916
31/1/1916	David, I., I.A.R.O.	...	2/Lieut.	Transferred to S. and T.	...	23/5/1916
7/9/1916	Winn, H. E., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Invalided	...	24/3/1919
7/9/1916	Banks, R. M.	...	2/Lieut.	Transferred to 2/5th Gurkha Rifles	...	25/11/1916
10/10/1916	Swan, J. C. K., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Transferred	...	1918
22/11/1916	Castells, E.	...	Lieut.	Transferred, Civil Employ, Baghdad	...	—/10/1919
27/1/1917	Massy, F. S.	...	Major	Re-transferred to 1/4th Gurkha Rifles	...	—
1917	Makeag, H. T. H.	...	Capt.	Demobilized	...	1919
1917	Crawford, C. G.	...	Capt.	Transferred to Police Department	...	1918
29/1/1917	Harrison, F. S., I.A.R.O.	...	—	Released	...	—
29/1/1917	Littledale, A. G., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Struck off strength	...	25/6/1919
29/1/1917	Gilman, H. C. R., I.A.R.O.	...	Capt.	Retired	...	1920
29/1/1917	Armstrong, J. A. E.	...	Capt.	Transferred, 1/10th Gurkha Rifles	...	1923
2/2/1917	Beaumont, H., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Civil Employ, Persia	...	1919
4/2/1917	Grove, G. R.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
15/2/1917	Lloyd, R. B. (I.M.S.)	...	Capt.	Transferred, I.G.H.	...	14/10/1917
26/2/1917	Baldwin, M. C., M.C.	...	Capt.	Transferred, 2/11th Gurkha Rifles	...	5/9/1918
12/3/1917	Boddam, E. B. C.	...	Lieut.-Col.	Appointed B. G. Admin., Mhow	...	6/4/1918
16/4/1917	Jack, L. A., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Transferred, Machine Gun School, Mhow	...	12/6/1918
16/4/1917	Walsh, H.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
14/6/1917	Shepherd, A. V. W.	...	Capt.	Released under Demobilization Scheme	...	1921
25/6/1917	Clarke Bell, D. M.	...	Lieut.	Released under Demobilization Scheme	...	1919
13/8/1917	Bruce, J. G., M.C.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
19/8/1917	Reiner, N. A., I.A.R.O.	...	Lieut.	Released	...	1920
21/8/1917	Leir, J. R. C. V.	...	Lieut.	Transferred, 1/11th Gurkha Rifles	...	18/5/1918
30/8/1917	Jones, J. K.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
—/8/1917	H2 rtnoll, F. H., I.A.R.O.	...	Capt.	Transferred, 1/11th Gurkha Rifles	...	31/8/1918
5/10/1917	*Keen, E. W.	...	Lieut.	Died, Mesopotamia	...	5/7/1918
5/10/1917	McMillan, T. B.	...	Lieut.	Released under Demobilization Scheme	...	1919

13/10/1917	MacVay, S.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, 1/11th Gurkha Rifles	...	2/9/1918
3/11/1917	Rogers, A. L.	...	Lient. ...	Civil Employ, Baghdad	...	1919
3/11/1917	Thewlis, N. E., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Released	...	10/1/1919
4/11/1917	Ward, G. R.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
5/11/1917	Gibbs, H. R. K.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
28/11/1917	Peattie, G. D.	...	—	Transferred, Refugees' Camp	...	27/9/18
1/12/1917	Kevill Davies, E. F. W. H.	...	Capt. ...	Released under Demobilization Scheme	...	1922
5/12/1917	Voyle, S. G.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, 70th Burmas	...	5/10/1918
5/12/1917	Crozier, W. H.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, 2/7th Gurkha Rifles	...	6/6/1919
10/12/1917	Moffatt, J., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, Kumaon Rifles	...	1918
10/12/1917	Simmonds, H., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, Kumaon Rifles	...	1918
10/12/1917	Shuker, H.	...	Capt. ...	Transferred, 62nd Punjabis	...	1921
10/12/1917	Pertwee, L...	...	Lient. ...	Left for duty at Burma	...	17/8/1918
11/12/1917	Weir, A. D.	...	2/Lient. ...	Transferred, Armed Motor Brigade, Kobat	...	17/11/1918
12/12/1917	Wells, W. G. H.,	...	—	Still serving	...	—
13/12/1917	Robinson, H.	...	—	Retired	...	21/4/1923
26/12/1917	Berkaley, S. S. H.	...	Capt. ...	Still serving	...	—
22/1/1918	Emmott, R. St. B.	...	—	Retired, Surplus Officers Scheme	...	1922
27/1/1918	Barker, H. A., I.A.R.O.	...	Capt. ...	Transferred to Punjabi Regiment	...	1920
27/1/1918	Cook, W. G.	...	Lient. ...	Released	...	18/8/1919
28/1/1918	Hingston, F. P., I.A.R.O.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
31/1/1918	Phillips, W. K.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
7/2/1918	Sinker, R. C.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
15/2/1918	Fuller, G.	...	Capt. ...	Transferred, 1/20th Burmas	...	—/4/1921
16/2/1918	Qualtrough, E. F.	...	Capt. ...	Released	...	1922
2/22/1918	Maund, J. A. H.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, 3rd Gurkha Rifles	...	1920
23/2/1918	Calvert, F. E. R., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Released	...	1919
15/3/1918	Brooks, J. B., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Released	...	1918
23/3/1918	Molloy, H. T.	...	Major	Re-transferred, 5th Gurkha Rifles	...	4/1/1919
30/3/1918	Pulling, H. D., M.C.	...	Capt. ...	Transferred to Burma Rifles	...	1919
15/4/1918	Bett, J. H.	...	Lient. ...	Transferred, Military Accounts Department	...	11/1/1919
27/4/1918	Clarabutt, R. B.	...	Capt. ...	Transferred, I.A.S.C.	...	—
27/4/1918	Bowen, W. O.	...	—	Still serving	...	—
28/5/1918	Jessett, A. E.	...	Lieut.-Col.	Transferred, 3/39th Garhwalis	...	—/2/1921
2/6/1918	Whiffin, F. D., I.A.R.O.	...	Lient. ...	Released under Demobilization Scheme	...	1/4/1919
14/6/1918	Browne, De La Rue	...	Lient. ...	Transferred to 2/5th Gurkhas Rifles	...	18/1/1920

HISTORICAL RECORD OF THE

<i>Date of Joining.</i>	<i>Names.</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>Cause.</i>	<i>Became Non-effective.</i>	<i>Date.</i>
22/6/1918	Hopewell, T., I.A.R.O.	—	Transferred, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles	28/2/1919
15/7/1918	Power, C. C.	Lieut. ...	Released	3/3/1919
15/7/1918	Allen, R. A.	Lieut. ...	Still serving	—
20/7/1918	Pulling, G. H.	—	Still serving	—
22/7/1918	Macleod, I. N.	—	Transferred, Signals	2/12/1921
6/8/1918	Booker, J. T. B.	Capt. ...	Transferred to Base, Salonika	8/7/1919
4/9/1918	Wheeler, G. E.	Capt. ...	Transferred, 1/11th Gurkha Rifles	18/9/1920
4/9/1918	Faulkner, R., M.C.	Capt. ...	Still serving	—
5/9/1918	Smith, T. N.	—	Killed	16/7/1919
7/10/1918	*Dobbin, F. Le F.	Lieut. ...	Released under Surplus Officers Scheme	1921
2/11/1918	Belcher, G. W., V.C.	Capt. ...	Released under Surplus Officers Scheme	1921
3/12/1918	Jenkins, W. A.	—	Released under Surplus Officers Scheme	6/6/1919
18/1/1919	Wray, D. L.	Lieut. ...	Transferred, 3/11th Gurkha Rifles	1922
18/1/1919	Harvey, C. D. W.	Capt. ...	Released under Demobilization Scheme	1922
31/1/1919	Cartwright, H. E.	Lieut. ...	Released under Demobilization Scheme	1919
4/3/1919	Trelour, C. C. M., I.A.R.O.	Lieut. ...	Released under Demobilization Scheme	—
22/4/1919	Bulfield, G. F. X.	—	Still serving	1923
22/4/1919	Forman, J. F. R.	Lieut. ...	Transferred, 1/19th Hyderabad Regiment	1920
12/5/1919	Green, E. G. H.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 5th Gurkha Rifles	1920
12/5/1919	Diack, H. J. W.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 5th Gurkha Rifles	15/9/1919
12/5/1919	Thompson, J.	2/Lieut.	Released	—/3/1921
15/5/1919	Wylie, M.	Major ...	Re-transferred, 4th Gurkha Rifles	15/9/1919
31/8/1919	Blake, S. B.	2/Lieut.	Released under Demobilization Scheme	15/9/1919
31/8/1919	Bryson, H. E.	2/Lieut.	Released under Demobilization Scheme	15/9/1919
1919	Matthews, J. F.	Lieut. ...	Transferred to 39th Garhwal Rifles	1919

APPENDIX XVI.

ROLL OF BRITISH OFFICERS WHO SERVED WITH THE
3RD BATTALION 6TH GURKHA RIFLES.

Lieut.-Colonel E. B. C. Boddam, 2/5th Gurkha Rifles.

Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Jewett, 1/8th Gurkha Rifles.

Major F. S. Massy, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles.

Major M. Wylie, 2/4th Gurkha Rifles.

Captain M. C. Baldwin, M.C., 1/1st Gurkha Rifles.

Lieut. J. G. Bruce.

Lieut. H. D. Pulling, M.C.

Lieut. F. H. Hartnoll.

Lieut. N. A. Reiner.

Lieut. E. F. Qualtrough.

Lieut. L. A. Jack.

Lieut. J. K. Jones.

Lieut. S. McVay.

Lieut. A. G. Littledale.

Lieut. A. G. Fuller.

Lieut. A. V. W. Sheperd.

Lieut. T. B. McMillan.

Lieut. H. Shuker.

Lieut. H. R. K. Gibbs.

Lieut. E. F. W. H. Kevill-Davies.

Lieut. D. M. Clarke-Bell.

Lieut. H. C. R. Gilman.

2/Lieut. E. G. H. Green.

Lieut. F. E. R. Calvert.

Lieut. H. J. W. Diack.

Lieut. R. St. B. Emmott.

Lieut. J. Thompson.

Lieut. G. H. Pulling.

Lieut. S. B. Blake.

Lieut. H. Walsh.

Lieut. J. F. Mathews.

Lieut. J. A. E. Armstrong.

The following Gurkha Officers transferred to the 2nd Battalion
on disbandment of the 3rd Battalion :—

Subadar Maite Bura.

Jemadar Harkabir Thapa.

APPENDIX XVII.

DECORATIONS, 3RD BATTALION 6TH GURKHA RIFLES

INDIAN DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL.

4624 Havildar Aitbir Thapa, 3/6th Gurkha Rifles.

Awarded for gallantry in action when seconded with No. 10 Armoured
Motor Company.

(*Extract from the Gazette of India, No. 146, dated 17/1/20.*)

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